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This dissertation constructs a history and conducts an analysis of Bangladeshi political thought 
with the aim to better understand the thought-world and political subjectivities in Bangladesh. 
The dissertation argues that political thought in Bangladesh has been profoundly structured by 
colonial and other encounters with modernity and by concerns about constructing a national 
identity. Negotiations between the incomplete and continuous projects of modernization and 
identity formation have produced certain anxieties about becoming that permeates political 
consciousness and ideas in the country.  Though such anxieties of becoming are also shared by 
other postcolonial countries, the specific, though not necessarily exclusive, character of 
Bangladeshi thought emerges out of the country’s particular political history and the double birth 
of the nation – first as Pakistan, then as Bangladesh.  The dissertation seeks to establish this 
specific character of Bangladeshi political thought and political subjectivity through 
investigations into the political and intellectual histories of erstwhile East Pakistan and present 
day Bangladesh, engaging closely with the political lives and thoughts of four select thinkers and 
political actors – Abul Mansur Ahmad, Abul Hashim, Maolana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, 
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NOTES ON TRANSLATIONS, TRANSLITERATIONS, AND NAMES 
 
 
● This dissertation draws heavily upon Bangla language primary texts.  All the translations 
from Bangla are mine unless otherwise stated.   
● I use the spelling “Bangla” rather than Anglicized “Bengali” to name the language 
because Bangladeshi scholars increasingly prefer to use the former spelling.  However, I 
retain the use of “Bengali” to refer to the ethno-linguistic group.   
● What is Bangladesh today was legally called “East Pakistan” from 1956 to 1971 and was 
named “East Bengal” until then.  I alternate between these three names depending on the 
historical period under discussion.   
● Non-English terms are italicized and their meanings are explained either in context or in 
parenthetical notes.   
● I use phonetic transliterations of Bangla and other non-English terms, phrases, names.  
However, certain non-English terms and names may appear in variant spellings in 
quotations or titles of primary sources. For example, while I use the spelling “maolana,” a 
word that means Muslim scholar, is variously spelled as “maulana” or “mawlana”.   
● For the sake of continuity I have used “Calcutta” and “Dhaka” to spell the names of these 
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Figure1. A map of South Asia, highlighting Bangladesh, which from 1947 until 1971 was a part 
of Pakistan. Map by Julius Paulo. Source: Reece Jones, “The False Premise of Partition,” Space 










For days in February 2013, tens of thousands of mostly young people chanting fanshi 
chai, “we want a hanging,” occupied Shahbag, a square at the heart of Bangladesh’s capital 
Dhaka. This was not, however, a mob of Islamic fundamentalists demanding the death of an 
atheist or apostate offenders of Islam. Rather, they were smart young urbanites occupying the 
square strategically and articulating their demands creatively and colorfully. They were 
protesting a lenient sentence and demanding capital punishment instead for alleged “war-
criminals,”1 who had been accused of collaborating with the Pakistani Army in perpetrating mass 
atrocities and genocide during Bangladesh’s “liberation war” 2 in 1971 and were being tried by a 
special tribunal. The demonstration, lasting weeks, became known variously as Projonomo-
Chattar [generation square], Gonojagoron Mancha [people’s wakening platform/stage], and 
simply and most popularly as Shahbag, named after the square occupied by the demonstrators. 
The demonstration became a movement as it gripped consciousness of and spurred to action 
millions of Bangladeshis in and outside of Bangladesh. The war-crime trials and the Shahbag 
movement, however, also provoked a determined and widespread counter movement by Jamaat-
																																								 																				
1 Though the accused were formally charged with “crimes against humanity” and not “war-
crimes,” the media, commentators, and public commonly used the terms war crimes and war 
criminals to refer to the trials and the accused.  See Kjell Anderson, “Collective Crime, 
Collective Memories, and Transitional Justice in Bangladesh,” in Understanding the Age of 
Transitional Justice: Crimes, Courts, Commissions, and Chronicling, ed. Nanci Adler (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2018). 
2 The nine months of war, from March 26th to December 16th of 1971, that preceded the 
emergence of the Bangladeshi state have been dubbed in Bangladeshi historiography as 
Shadhinotar Juddho [war of independence] and Mukti-Juddho [war of liberation]. Pakistani 
historians and some international commentators have chosen to describe the war as a civil war or 
war of secession. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the 




e-Islami and its allies, who had close ties with the accused war criminals. The counter movement 
staged rallies, strikes, and sieges and was accused of rioting, vandalism, and attacks on law-
enforcement personnel and minority communities. While the Bangladesh government tried to co-
opt the Shahbag movement, it responded to the counter movement with a curious mix of 
appeasement and violent suppression. These two movements and the state’s reaction produced 
massive political unrest and a cycle of violence that claimed dozens of lives. For weeks it 
seemed that Bangladesh was at the edge of a precipice and radical change was in the cards. 
Those anxieties and hopes, however, proved to be far-fetched and soon enough the Shahbag 
movement and its counter movements subsided and political life in Bangladesh returned to 
relative normalcy.  
It would be reasonable to treat the political moment produced by the Shahbag movement 
as just another forgettable episode of political unrest in a country where political unrest is all too 
frequent. Yet there was and continues to be a feeling among close observers of Bangladesh that 
Shahbag was somehow different and significant.3 Given my personal connection with and 
scholarly interest in Bangladesh, I have followed the “Shahbag moment” closely and have 
participated in discussions trying to make sense of it.4 I find the Shahbag moment significant, 
and I invoke it here because the immediate concerns of the trial and punishments of past “war-
																																								 																				
3 Shahbag provoked discussions and debates on various platforms and mediums – from social 
media comments to op-eds in major newspapers to scholarly articles to academic symposiums. 
See Ratan Kumar Roy, “Performing Shahbag: Debating Culture and Politics of Youth in 
Contemporary Bangladesh,” in Culture and Politics in South Asia: Performative 
Communication, ed. Dev Nath Pathak and Sasanka Perera (New Delhi: Routledge India, 2017), 
271–86, and Leslie J. Reynard, “Activism in the Public Cyber-Sphere: Shahbag Square and Rana 
Plaza in Bangladesh,” in From Tahrir Square to Ferguson: Social Networks as Facilitators of 
Social Movements, ed. Juliet Dee (New York: Peter Lang, 2017). 
4 Beyond informal discussions in person and online, I wrote an opinion piece for the online 
magazine Alal-O-Dulal and organized and moderated a panel discussion with several 




criminals' ' that Shahbag responded to evoked fundamental questions regarding the identity and 
character of the contemporary Bangladeshi nation. A new generation of Bangladeshis born after 
independence and thus without any direct experience of the struggle and trauma that 
accompanied the nation’s birth nevertheless had invoked the “Spirit of Liberation War'' to put 
forward a vision of what it means to be Bangladeshi. However, the vision that the Shahbag 
movement had advanced was not shared by many others in Bangladesh, as became apparent with 
the emergence of a counter movement by Jamaat and its allies.  Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest and 
most significant Islamist political party in Bangladesh, mobilized support from thousands of 
madrasa (Islamic religious school) teachers and students united under the banner of Hefazot-e-
Islam [protection of Islam]. The central point of contention became not so much the appropriate 
severity of punishment for the war criminals but the appropriate role and place of religion, 
namely Islam, in Bangladeshi society and politics. The Shahbag movement posited the ethno-
linguistic category of “Bengali'' to be the central marker of Bangladeshi identity and advanced 
visions for a secular and liberal Bangladesh. The movement used the accused war criminals’ 
association with Jamaat and other Islamist parties to delegitimize Islamist politics. On the other 
hand, the Islamists stressed the centrality of Islam in Bangladeshi society and argued that 
Shahbag was a movement of a small group of secular/atheist middle-class urbanites not only 
against Islam but also against the sentiments of the majority of Bangladeshis.  The Islamists also 
accused the war-crimes trials and Shahbag movement for being instruments in the global 
oppression of Islam carried out by the United States and its allies under the guise of the global 
war on terror. What ultimately was at stake in this struggle over the appropriate place of Islam in 




The Shahbag moment is expressive not only of a struggle over national identity but also 
of a profound tension between identity and modernity that often characterizes political discourses 
in a place like Bangladesh. For example, the urban middle-class youth who participated in the 
Shahbag movement have grown up with the Internet, cell phones, and satellite television.  Their 
desires and subjectivities have been shaped by globalized consumer culture and cosmopolitan 
identities. They want to enjoy the freedoms and luxuries enjoyed by their counterparts elsewhere 
in the world, particularly in the so-called First World that is so clearly visible via all the modern 
means of communication. Yet, these freedoms and luxuries are placed at an insurmountable 
distance by the location of the urbane participants of the Shahbag movement in contemporary 
Bangladesh and by all the material, social, and political conditions that produce the country’s 
backwardness. The young participants of Shahbag must constantly negotiate a contradiction in 
constructing their subjectivities and identities. They must negotiate their global desires and 
cosmopolitan aspirations with their local position in Bangladesh and their Bangladeshi 
identities.5 To negotiate they must enter cosmopolitan spaces as Bangladeshi subjects, which 
means Bangladeshi subjectivity itself must be admissible to the cosmopolitan. Thus, their efforts 
to construct personal subjectivities are inexorably linked to struggles over the construction of 
Bangladeshi identity. Putting it simply, to claim to be modern and Bangladeshi at the same time 
they must claim Bangladesh modern. Yet the desire to become modern also exposes them to 
charges of betraying their autochthonous identity, as illustrated by Hefazot’s efforts to portray 
Shahbag as an elitist movement out of touch with the sensibilities of the devoutly religious 
																																								 																				
5 I echo Anthony Giddens’ argument in Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991) about increasing interconnection 
between globalizing influences and construction of self-identity. A similar argument in the 
Bangladeshi context has been advanced by Faheem Hasan Shahed, “Revisiting Bangladeshi 
Nationhood: Walking along Global, Glocal and Local Pathway,” Journal of Asiatic Society of 




majority. The large following and participation that Hefazot generated, particularly among the 
rural masses and madrasa students, in its effort to valorize traditional authority and practices in 
the name of a religious identity, demonstrate that large sections of the Bangladeshi population 
still remain apprehensive about the social changes modernization demands.  
This tension between identity and modernity highlighted by the Shahbag moment is not 
an isolated phenomenon but symptomatic and expressive of deep-seated contradictions and 
unresolved tensions that have long characterized Bangladesh’s society, politics, culture, and 
thought-world. The project of constructing Bangladeshi identity remains unfinished and 
contested even after forty-seven years of existence as an independent state. Not only are there 
debates about the contents that would define Bangladeshi-ness but also the category of 
“Bangladeshi” remains contested and unstable.6 On the other hand, as conventional descriptions 
of Bangladesh as a “developing,” “democratizing,” and “modernizing” country suggest, the 
program of becoming modern also remains unfinished and continuous. These transformative 
processes and contestations over national identity have produced a sense in Bangladesh that 
things are in constant flux, that identities are unsettled, that orders are not fully established, and 
that a fully functional system is not yet in place. This state of flux produced by the dual 
processes of becoming modern and a nation has shaped the character of Bangladesh, including 
its political dynamics and discourses. Engaging the debates, struggles, anxieties, excitements, 
and hopes that these two processes of becoming have generated enhance our understanding of 
Bangladeshi politics. This dissertation project focuses on how Bangladeshis experience and 
negotiate the tensions arising from the processes of becoming Bangladeshi and modern.  
																																								 																				
6 The question of whether the national identity of Bangladesh should be “Bengali” or 
“Bangladeshi” is highly contentious, arising from partisan political affiliations and different 




Though a project examining the tension between modernity and identity can be quite 
enormous in scope and can pursue different questions employing various methodologies from a 
range of disciplines, I seek to understand this tension through a political theory approach. The 
decision arises partially from my academic location and training within the discipline of political 
science and political theory. More importantly, however, the concerns about becoming a nation 
and modern are political concerns about social order and transformations, which constitute some 
of the core concerns of political theory. Decades earlier Isaiah Berlin argued that political 
philosophy is possible only in a society where the ends of politics collide because there “is no 
total acceptance of any single end.”7 Though Berlin was not talking about postcolonial 
developing nations like Bangladesh, his idea of “collision of political ends” captures the 
character of political dynamics and discourses in such places rather well.  And, if political theory 
is “a tradition of discourse concerned about the present being and well being of collectivities,”8 
discourses about modernization and national identity formation fall within the purview of 
political theory. This is not to say that in Bangladesh a significant body of literature can be 
recognized as formal political theory or that this dissertation produces any such theory. Rather, I 
approach the tension between modernity and identity through political theory because, as Wolin 
has argued, one of the vocations of political theorists is to “sharpen our sense of the subtle, 
complex interplay between political experience and thought.”9  
Over the last half-century, political theorists have passionately debated about what it 
means to do political theory. Despite the diverging definitions, a degree of consensus exists that 
																																								 																				
7 Isaiah Berlin in his 1961 essay “Does Political Theory Still Exist?” in Concepts and Categories 
Philosophical Essays, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
8 Sheldon Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). 
9 Sheldon Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” The American Political Science Review 63, 




at least one vocation of political theory is to study history of political thought or to carry out, in 
Michael Freeden’s words, “an analysis and interpretation of the rich and layered thought practice 
referred to as political thinking.”10  Though political thought should ideally include both thinking 
about politics and thinking politically, Freeden argues, conventional approaches in political 
theory have predominantly focused on the former through their preference for “the thinking of 
political and intellectual elites, such as politicians, scholars, and commentators.”11 Staying within 
the convention, I analyze the negotiation of modernity and identity in Bangladeshi political 
thought by focusing on a set of intellectuals and political actors. Admittedly, such a project will 
give us direct access to the experiences and thought worlds of only a small, and perhaps elite, 
section of the population. However, political and intellectual discourses exist in and respond to 
concrete historical and political contexts and dynamics and reflect the aspirations and 
experiences of not only the actors participating in these discourses but also of people in general. 
Thus, an examination of the thinking of Bangladeshi politicians, scholars, and commentators 
helps us understand how people in Bangladesh experience becoming modern and a nation. 
 The state of becoming, the feeling of flux, and the tension between modernity and 
identity are not unique to Bangladesh but experienced by other countries, particularly those 
situated outside of the West. These experiences are intrinsic to the “postcolonial condition,” 
where uncertainties about national identities are compounded by the experience of backwardness 
as a form of identity.12  Postcolonial nations, which emerge from and through the experiences of 
																																								 																				
10 Michael Freeden, The Political Theory of Political Thinking: The Anatomy of a Practice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
11 Ibid, p. 19  
12 This idea of the “postcolonial condition” is borrowed from Akhil Gupta, who proposes it based 
on his readings of postcolonial critiques, most notably those advanced by Partha Chatterjee. 
Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (Durham: Duke 




being colonized by modern European countries, face a double-edge challenge.  They must on the 
one hand articulate an autochthonous national identity and on the other hand overcome the 
backwardness that the authenticity necessarily implies.  The backwardness of the post-colonial 
countries is produced materially through colonial exploitation and relations of dependent 
capitalism and discursively through a Eurocentric understanding of history, progress, modernity, 
and development.13 Thus, the tension between identity and modernity in Bangladesh must 
necessarily be analyzed with reference to the general dynamics of the colonial and postcolonial 
encounter with modernity and national identity formation. And, such an analysis must engage 
with the vast and rich bodies of literature dealing with modernity, nationalism and the 
postcolonial condition.  However, if my dissertation is to be compelling it must go beyond the 
literature reviews and even beyond analyzing Bangladesh as another case study of the 
postcolonial condition.  It must add to understanding the postcolonial condition by delineating 
the specificities of the negotiation between modernity and identity in Bangladesh.  
This dissertation demonstrates that Bangladesh’s thought world, intellectual tendencies, 
and political discourses are conditioned by specific encounters with modernity and by the 
specific history of nationalism in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi thought-world and political-
intellectual discourses, like those of other postcolonial countries, are engaged with modern 
Western discourses but are neither reducible to nor wholly determined by them.  In this space of 
negotiation between modernity and Bangladeshi identity lays the possibility of recovering a 
Bangladeshi subjectivity and a distinct body of political thought.  The phrase “negotiation” is 
employed here to capture a process that is different from a simple contestation between Western 
																																								 																				
13 Arturo Escobar, following Edward Said’s arguments about the discursive construction of the 
Orient, in Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World 




modernity and an essential notion of Bangladeshi-ness. Rather, the negotiation between 
modernity and Bangladeshi identity involves adoption, appropriation, and reinvention not only of 
tradition and identity but also of modernity. This negotiation produces a modernity that is 
stamped with a specific “Bangladeshi” national identity, itself a modern invention. This 
argument undertakes an examination of how Bangladeshi national identity has been imagined 
and constructed through the process of the double birth of the nation. Arguing against the 
dominant nationalist narratives, I treat the emergence of the postcolonial state of Pakistan in 
1947 as the moment of the first birth of the nation, which produce the possibilities and 
necessities for the second birth of the nation as Bangladesh in 1971 and inexorably shape 
discourses about identity and modernity in post-colonial Bangladesh.  I argue against the 
nationalist interpretation that reads the birth of Bangladesh as the negation of the Muslim 
nationalism of Pakistan. Though in many ways the birth of Bangladesh represents a historical 
break and a negation of Pakistan, Bangladeshi nationalist discourses in 1971 and after have 
shown remarkable continuity with the discourses of Pakistani nationalism of the 1940s and 
afterwards, at least as it was understood by Bengali-Muslim actors. In both moments of the 
double birth efforts to construct a regional or national identity were motivated by desires to 
inhabit Bengali and Muslim identities while producing distinctions from other Bengalis and other 
Muslims, as well as from other larger identity categories like Indian, Pakistani, humanity, etc. As 
the Shahbag moment demonstrates, the tension arising from the uneasy cohabitation of Bengali 
and Muslim identities still informs Bangladeshi political discourses.  
Though the specific history of Bangladeshi nationalism is a central concern, I do not, 
however, simply produce a history of nationalism or nationalist thought in Bangladesh.  I analyze 




imagine the nation but also the political ideals and ethical impulses contained within those 
imaginations. Like political thinkers elsewhere, Bangladeshi thinkers also have been concerned 
with questions regarding the nature of man, political authority, the place of religion in politics 
and society, and such in their efforts to elaborate conceptions of freedom, equality, and justice. 
Reflections on these perennial themes of political theory, however, occurred and continue to 
occur in postcolonial contexts like Bangladesh within the discursive and political horizon set by 
nationalism. As postcolonial political thought is almost always entangled with nationalist 
concerns, I excavate the efforts to accommodate, appropriate, and negotiate with ostensibly 
modern political ideals like freedom, equality, or progress by analyzing the political ideals 
elaborated in imagining the nation.  
Bangladesh has for decades been imagined as little more than a “basket case” ravaged by 
natural calamities, overpopulation, war, and political strife. As it began to shed some of these 
labels by making significant progress towards economic growth and Millennium Human 
Development Goals, it has been rebranded, following the logics of the Global War on Terror, as 
a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.14 Postcolonial Bangladesh exists in an 
epistemic void except as an object of development, democratization, and more recently 
securitization. Bangladeshi actors have rarely been treated seriously as subjects of 
modernization, with their own thoughts and anxieties about modernization and nation building. 
Consequently, the Bangladeshi thought-world has received scant attention in Western academia. 
Even South Asia specialists rarely engage with the political and intellectual discourses of 
Bangladesh. While the colonial Bengal of the 19th and early 20th centuries has been studied 
extensively and while there exist numerous nuanced and sophisticated readings of many Bengali 
																																								 																				





thinkers from this period, Bengali-Muslims who have constituted Bangladeshi identity over the 
course of the 20th century are hardly ever read. I seek to fill the lacuna by producing a general 
intellectual history and engaging the thought world of select 20th century Bengali-Muslim 
intellectuals and public figures, focusing especially on the second half of the century. In doing so 
I capture the complexities and distinctiveness of Bangladeshi nationalism and its negotiations 
with modernity. Moreover, discussions of Bengali-Muslim construction and conceptualization of 
Muslim identity will provide nuance in the global discourses on Islam, which still to a large 
degree view Islam through the orientalist tropes as the quintessential other of Western modernity 





Theoretical concerns and location of the dissertation in various fields of studies  
This dissertation is in dialogue with a body of literature that traverses multiple 
disciplinary boundaries and fields of study including political theory, comparative politics, and 
history. On the theoretical level the dissertation engages with literature on political theory, 
postcolonial theories, non-Western political thought, modernity, modernization, and national 
identity. It also engages with studies in South Asian intellectual history and analyses politics, 
history, economy, culture, and the identity of Bangladesh and South Asia.  
It is located within the vibrant discussions and debates about what is or should be 
political theory or what it means to do political theory.15  While many political theorists have 
chosen to study the history of political thought or intellectual history in general, they have 
differed greatly about how to read texts, understand contexts, construct a history of ideas, or 
analyze political discourses. The debates and tensions have opened up innovative ways of doing 
political theory.16 Over the last few decades, Postcolonial critics have contributed to this 
productive tension by critiquing the Eurocentrism of modern social and political theories and 
highlighting how these theories have denied the agency of non-Westerners as thinking subjects 
																																								 																				
15 John Gunnell’s commentaries, especially Political Theory and Social Science: Cutting Against 
the Grain (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), and the commentaries by political theorists 
assembled in Noël O’Sullivan, ed., Political Theory in Transition (New York: Routledge, 2000) 
and Stephen K. White and J. Donald Moon, eds., What Is Political Theory? (Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications Ltd, 2004) provide an excellent survey of the nature and state of political 
theory.  
16 Methodological discussions in political theory inevitably involve engagement with the 
provocative and fruitful arguments advanced by Quentin Skinner over four decades and 
assembled in Visions of Politics, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). In 
addition, the following essays and books provide an excellent overview of methodological 
debates: Leslie Butler, “From the History Of Ideas to Ideas In History,” Modern Intellectual 
History 9, no. 01 (2012): 157–69, Patricia L. Dunmire, “Political Discourse Analysis: Exploring 
the Language of Politics and the Politics of Language,” Language and Linguistics Compass 6, 
no. 11 (2012): 735–751, Freeden, The Political Theory of Political Thinking (2013), and Daniel 
Wickberg, “Intellectual History vs. the Social History of Intellectuals,” Rethinking History 5, no. 




and have excluded non-Western thought from their canons.17 In efforts to recover the agency of 
colonial and postcolonial subjects some scholars have sought to analyze how the politics, 
subjectivity, and thought of both the colonized and the colonizer have been structured by 
colonial encounters and the exigencies of imperialism.18 Other scholars, however, have 
deemphasized the centrality of colonial encounters and have focused, instead, on travel, 
friendship, and other encounters to explain global circulations of ideas and the emergence of 
cosmopolitan thought zones and theories.19  The effects of both the Postcolonial critiques and the 
efforts to theorize cosmopolitan thought have been positive for the study of non-Western thought 
																																								 																				
17 While the seminal texts of postcolonial theories such as Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White 
Masks, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1994 [1952]) and The Wretched of 
the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox, (New York: Grove Press, 2005 [1963]) and Edward W Said, 
Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) have established a critique of the denial of the 
agency of non-Western/colonized subjects, a foundational concern of postcolonialism, more 
recent critics has focused on the exclusion of non-Western thought and knowledge. Especially 
notable among the critiques that have informed my thinking on the subject are Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Partha Chatterjee, “The Poverty of Western 
Political Theory: Concluding Remarks on Concepts Like ‘Community’ East and West,” in 
Indian Political Thought: A Reader, ed. Aakash Singh and Silika Mohapatra (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), Mohammad Salama, Islam, Orientalism and Intellectual History: Modernity 
and the Politics of Exclusion Since Ibn Khaldun (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2011).  
18 See Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: The Derivative 
Discourse? (London: Zed Books, 1986), Sudipta Kaviraj, On the Construction of Colonial 
Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony (New Delhi: Indian council of social science research, 
1989), Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and 
Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999), C. A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and 
Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
19 See Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996), Roxanne Euben, Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and 
Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006), Leela 
Gandhi, Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and the Politics 
of Friendship (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), Javed Majeed, Autobiography, Travel & 
Postnational Identity: Gandhi, Nehru, and Iqbal (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
Sugata Bose and Kris Manjapra, Cosmopolitan Thought Zones: South Asia and the Global 
Circulation of Ideas (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Farah Godrej, Cosmopolitan 




and have inspired studies on Arab, Muslim, and Indian thought and intellectual history that break 
with the orientalist practice of treating non-Western thought either as an exotic other or as a 
vestige of a dying past.20  Scholars have also intervened in the field of political theory by asking 
what it means to theorize from non-Western locations. Many of these scholars have noted that 
non-Western, particularly post-colonial, settings produce different fields of politics and, thus, the 
study of non-Western political thought and action generates different theoretical insights from 
those coming out of a Western context.21  
By inquiring about the construction of a Bangladeshi identity space, I explore the 
literature of nations, nationalism, and identity formation. Though nations have been foundational 
for modern politics, they have remained relatively understudied and theorized until recently. A 
burst of scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s has produced provocative theories about the nature 
and origins of nations.22  Again, postcolonial critiques have challenged the supposedly modular 
																																								 																				
20 See Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (New York: I.B.Tauris, 1982), Muzaffar 
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Chicago Press, 2004), Anthony Parel, “From Political Thought in India to Indian Political 
Thought,” in Western Political Thought in Dialogue with Asia, ed. Takashi Shogimen and Cary 
J. Nederman (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 187–208, Shruti Kapila, An Intellectual History 
for India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Sheldon Pollock, Forms of 
Knowledge in Early Modern Asia: Explorations in the Intellectual History of India and Tibet, 
1500–1800 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).  
21 See Nalini Persram, ed., Postcolonialism and Political Theory (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2007), Ranabir Samaddar, Emergence of the Political Subject (New Delhi: SAGE Publications 
India, 2009), Sudipta Kaviraj, The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), Margaret Kohn and Keally McBride, Political Theories of 
Decolonization: Postcolonialism and the Problem of Foundations (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), Partha Chatterjee, Lineages of Political Society: Studies in Postcolonial 
Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
22 See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 
Homi K. Bhabha, ed., Nation & Narration (New York: Routledge, 2013), Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 
2006), Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (New York: Routledge, 1998), Azar Gat, 




and universal forms of the nation and the process of national identity formation by arguing that 
post-colonial/non-Western nations are imagined and produced differently than their European 
counterparts. These critiques, many advanced through studies of national identity and nationalist 
thought, have produced fruitful theoretical and analytical approaches to nations and national 
identity.23  
By interrogating the possibilities of becoming modern, I engage with arguments about 
modernity and modernization advanced by classic and contemporary texts. The works of 
Baudelaire, Tocqueville, Marx, Tönnies, Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber provide categories for 
distinguishing the “old” from the “new,” categories through which we continue to think about 
and theorize the modern.24  Our conceptions of modernity are also indebted to mid-20th century 
philosophers like Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and other critical theorists.25 This 
dissertation, however, most directly involves discussions about modernity (and post-modernity) 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), Gopal Balakrishnan, ed., Mapping the Nation (New York: Verso, 
2012). 
23 See Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the 
Imagination of Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), C. A. Bayly, Origins 
of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India 
(Oxford University Press, 2001), Ranabir Samaddar, A Biography of the Indian Nation, 1947-
1997 (SAGE Publications, 2001) and Paradoxes of the Nationalist Time : Political Essays on 
Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press, 2002), Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial 
Economy to National Space (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2004), Manu Bhagavan, 
Heterotopias: Nationalism and the Possibility of History in South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), Masood Ashraf Raja, Constructing Pakistan: Foundational Texts and 
the Rise of Muslim National Identity, 1857- 1947 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2013),  
24 See Robert Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (New Brunswick: Routledge, 1993), Derek 
Sayer, Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber (New York: Routledge, 
1991), and David Frisby, Fragments of Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, 
Kracauer and Benjamin (New York: Routledge, 2013), Stuart Hall et al., eds., Modernity: An 
Introduction to Modern Societies (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996). 
25 Theodor W. Adorno, History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965 (Malden: Polity, 2006) and 




carried out by philosophers, historians, sociologists, and cultural critics over the last three 
decades.26 Here again, critiques of Eurocentric conceptions of modernity advanced by 
Postcolonial theorists and other critics problematize a singular modernity and suggest that 
alternative and multiple modernities capture and theorize the experiences of modernity outside 
the West.27 Though modernity and modernization have occupied different discursive fields 
within Western academia, in the postcolonial context these distinctions have been less clear, 
where discussions of modernization and development are inseparable from discussions of 
modernity.28 Thus, I engage theories of modernization and development, emphasizing post-
development theories that have challenged the hegemony of development discourses in the Third 
World and have opened up new possibilities for appreciating the social forms and practices of 
the so-called “underdeveloped.”29 
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27 S. N Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
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Gurminder Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination, 
2007 edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Ali Hassan Zaidi, Islam, Modernity, and 
the Human Sciences (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).  
28 Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air (1983). 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), Benjamin Zachariah, Ideas of Developing India: 
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The field of intellectual history of South Asia has come a long way over the last three 
decades, in part due to the spaces opened by postcolonial critiques. Works of intellectual history 
have ranged from hermeneutic engagements with texts of prominent intellectuals and thinkers to 
studies of the context, social history, and discourse that constitute and express general 
intellectual tendencies and modes of thought. Many intellectual histories have analyzed and 
theorized modernity and identity in the non-West, while some have catalogued and theorized 
political thought. Within this growing body of literature this dissertation engages directly with 
the studies of Muslim identity in South Asia, Pakistani nationalism, and Bengali culture.30  These 
studies contextualize the dissertation’s focus on the history of the double birth and the formation 
of modern Bangladeshi identity.  However for the most part, East Bengal and its people figure 
marginally in the narratives of Bengali culture or the Muslim nation.  The few studies that 
address intellectual histories of East Bengal or Bengali Muslims focus on the 19th and early 20th 
century.31  Given the relative lack of focus on East Bengal and on the post-colonial, second half 
of the 20th century, a formative period for the Bangladeshi thought world, Bangladeshi subjects 
are conspicuously absent in the discussions of South Asian intellectual history.  
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Chatterjee, Texts of Power: Emerging Disciplines in Colonial Bengal (Minneapolis: University 
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31 See Soumitra Sinha, The Quest for Modernity and the Bengali Muslims: 1921 - 47 (Calcutta: 
Minerva Associates, 1995), Ashoke Kumar Chakraborty, Bengali Muslim Literati and the 
Development of Muslim Community in Bengal (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 
2002), Shahadat H. Khan, The Freedom of Intellect Movement in Bengali Muslim Thought, 
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There have been a few interesting and insightful studies of the thought-world and 
subjectivities of post 1947 East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh, but they do not take up the 
kind of analysis I propose.  For example, Sartori and Dasgupta analyze thoughts of individual 
authors/thinkers focusing limited texts and aspects of their thought.32  Raju, though has a larger 
canvas and asks broader questions about modernity and identity, limits his analysis to cinematic 
texts only.33 Murshid, Samaddar, and Uddin analyze a broad range of texts and discourses with a 
focus on identity and politics.34  However, the scope of their analyses span colonial and post-
colonial periods and much of their primary investigations remain focused on the late 19th and 
early 20th century. Though Hasan’s study of intellectual practices in East Bengal during the 
period from 1947 to 1970 is comprehensive and even encyclopedic, it does not extend to post-
independent Bangladesh or specifically treat political thought as an object of analysis.35  These 
studies remain limited for various reasons, most notably for their lack of systematic focus on 
political thought and the second half of the 20th century.  
And finally, a study of intellectual history and analysis of political thought must also be 
informed by analyses of history and politics. As such, I have undertaken a close reading of a 
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Subhoranjan Dasgupta, “Dystopia, Utopia, and Akhtaruzzaman Elias’s Novel Khowabnama,” in 
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substantial literature on political and social history of Bangladesh and South Asia. Emphasis has 
been placed on the literature that addresses the social history of Bengali Muslims, the formation 
Bangladeshi identity, the Partition of British India in 1947, and the War of Independence in 
1971. Furthermore, the dissertation has been informed by the literature that analyzes the 
characters of states, societies, political cultures, and political movements in both Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi contexts. These literatures, particularly those coming out of Bangladeshi academia, 
contextualize the analysis and constitute the object of analysis, as expressions of Bangladeshi 




The “Postcolonial” Tension Between Modernity and Identity  
“Modernity is easy to inhabit but difficult to define,” reads the opening sentence of 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s collection of essays on modernity.36  Whether modernity is a condition, an 
epoch, a project, or even an ideology has produced hundreds of treatises over the last two 
centuries. Though an attempt to define modernity can be endless, we need at least a provisional 
definition. One way to define modernity would be to do so temporally, where the modern 
signifies “that which is new.”37 In the temporal rendering, “the modern” becomes a diffuse, open, 
and general concept that allows for the possibility that every epoch and society can produce and 
experience that which is new, i.e., its “own modernities.”38  Yet, modernity also has an identity 
tied to a time and a place.  Over the last two centuries theorists have identified social, political, 
and economic structures, and the co-responding subjectivities that are the essence of modernity.39 
Despite the diverging conceptions of modernity, there is a consensus that “modernity” refers to 
the “modes of life” or the social forms and organizations that emerged in Europe or the West 
from about 16th or 17th century on.40  Even those who define modernity in temporal terms, and 
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not in terms specific attributes of societies and individuals, identify it with Europe or the West. 
As an example Marshal Berman, evoking Baudelaire and Marx, has argued most eloquently for 
the possibility, or even the imperative, of producing constant change rather than being stuck or 
comfortable in fixed and frozen traditions.41 However, It is precisely the presence of the 
possibility and imperative to change that distinguishes Modern Europe from its historical and 
civilizational others.42  
 Identification of a European experience with modernity rests on the argument that the 
experience represented something genuinely new, something that can be qualitatively 
distinguished from the old.  These arguments for the novelty and the historical specificity of 
modernity rest not only on empirical evidence, which certainly is plentiful, but also on discursive 
constructions.43 Efforts to comprehend the profound social transformations that Europe had 
begun to experience from about the 16th century produced, by the 18th and 19th centuries, new 
directions in philosophical reflections grounded in new conceptions of history, the economy, 
politics, and society. These concepts and the new academic disciplines they spawned, most 
notably sociology, facilitated ways of distinguishing between and theorizing about “the old” and 
“what was new.” The academic disciplines themselves were part of that what was new. Thus, 
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Provincializing Europe (2009) 
41 Baudelaire defined modernity as “that which is ephemeral, fugitive, contingent,” and Marx 
understood the modern experience to be one in which “all that is solid melts into air.” See 
Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air (1983). 
42 For example, though Berman (1983) argues that possibilities and imperatives of change have 
become global by the end of the 20th century, he recognizes the origin of the process to lie in the 
European experiences of the previous centuries. In doing so Berman reproduces the dichotomy 
between dynamism and ossification that European philosophers of the last two centuries – from 
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modern social and philosophical theories were simultaneously produced by and constitutive of 
modernity.44  
The argument by modern social theories that modernity constitutes a qualitative and a 
definite break from the past is predicated upon a “historicist” understanding of time and history. 
The central idea in historicist thinking is that social and cultural phenomena are historically 
determined; that is to say, social forms and individual experiences and subjectivities are products 
of history.  And, history itself is conceived as causally linked changes that have direction and 
perhaps even purpose.45  The concepts of development and progress are used variously or 
sometimes in conjunction to conceptualize the direction of history. While the idea of 
development points towards an immanent process of coming into being or the actualization of a 
potential, the idea of progress suggests a “movement of linear time towards an open and 
infinitely perfectible future.”46 Despite the important differences between the concepts of 
development and progress, they both function in the discourse of modernity to distinguish and 
identify modernity as a historically significant epoch – either as the fulfillment of human 
potential or as the “end of [the] history” of human perfectibility.47  The idea of perfectibility or 
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maturation contained within conceptions of development and progress suggests the addition of 
values, which is measured in terms of moral perfection, material well-being, or most importantly 
rationality.  History, according to dominant historicist thinking, is the result of the progressive 
movement of reason.48  Applied to the modes of knowledge production, the argument about the 
progressive movement of reason simultaneously identifies the emergence of the modern 
sciences, including social sciences, as a marker of modernity and authorizes modern modes of 
knowledge production as the only valid mode.49 More importantly, however, the idea of the 
forward march of reason implies not only that our knowledge has become more grounded in 
reason but also that social relations themselves have become more rational.50  
Predicated upon a conception of a universal human history, modernist discourses have 
conceived modernity not only to be the culmination of the particular history of social progress in 
Europe but also as a universal category and the future of all non-modern societies.51  By 
postulating the “modes of life” emerging in Europe to be historically necessary experiences for 
all of humanity, modernist discourses betray their inherent Eurocentrism. In trying to define 
Eurocentrism Samir Amin has argued that social theories produced by modern Europe 
“conceived the history of Europe or the West to be exceptional, not in the sense that the modern 
world was constituted there, which in itself is an undeniable fact, but because it could not have 
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of the Enlightenment and has been shared by many European thinkers after. For a critical 
account of the Enlightenment movement see Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: 
Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988). 
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(1999). 
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Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2009). 




been born elsewhere.”52 This paradoxical proclamation – claiming modernity to be 
simultaneously universal and Western – has profoundly shaped the experiences of modernity for 
the places that are designated to be outside of the modern West. Modern social theories 
incorporate the non-West in their universal developmental schemas by designating it pre-
modern. Here, cultural and spatial differences get codified in terms of chronology; the non-West 
is not simply a different place, but it also inhabits a different time. To borrow Chakrabarty’s 
celebrated and provocative formulation, the non-West is placed in the “waiting room” of 
history.53  Modernization has been a narrative of self-development for the West. For the non-
West, however, the process has not been a matter of simply producing social transformations or 
experiencing something new but a matter of adopting already defined social forms, i.e., “the 
superior prototype of social organization, a model that could be reproduced in other societies that 
have not had the good fortune of having initiated this superior form on the condition that these 
societies free themselves of the obstacles posed by their particular cultural traits, responsible for 
their backwardness.”54  
The non-West encounters modernity first through European colonialism.  Modern social, 
economic, and political structures get constructed in the process of colonizing and ruling non-
modern societies by modern or modernizing European powers.  Modernity and colonialism were 
not merely coincidental. Rather, Eurocentric constructions of modernity authorized colonialist 
discourse and justified colonial enterprise.  In other words, the project of modernization provided 
one of the strongest ideological justifications for the establishment and maintenance of colonial 
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rule.55 Modernizing projects of the colonial powers, however, had to be incomplete. If 
colonialism were to produce complete modernization, it would have undercut the justifications 
for its own exercise of power by abolishing the distinction between the West and the non-West.56 
The non-Western subjects, on the other hand, experienced modernity in their colonial encounter 
as an alien thing and as an imperative, something they had to adopt in order to operate within the 
modern structures imposed by the colonizing powers and to challenge the ideological 
justifications for colonization.57  Overcoming the limitations of colonial modernization provided 
the impetus for most anticolonial movements, which, with some notable exceptions, did not so 
much object to the goal of modernization as to its failure under colonial domination. 
Consequently, in the postcolonial era modernization, reformulated through the discourse of 
development, has been constructed as the raison d’état for postcolonial states.58 
However, anti-colonial and postcolonial nationalisms have also often been constructed in 
opposition to colonial modernity and perhaps modernity as such.59 While modernization is 
pursued as a strategic choice to survive under colonial modernity, to legitimize claims of self-
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determination or to overcome “backwardness,” modernity itself is often seen to be external to the 
“essential” self of the emerging nations.60 Paradoxically, however, to become a nation is to 
inexorably become modern. The nation is a modern political concept that signifies a sovereign 
and legitimacy producing political community with the right to its own state. Thus, the nation is 
imagined not only by evoking an identity but also by elaborating political ideals as the 
foundation of the sovereign national state. These political ideals, which are often formulated 
through modernist discourses, construct the identities of the nations, despite the nations claiming 
essential identities for themselves. 61 Thus, the challenge for anti-colonial and post-colonial 
political thought is to articulate national identities and political ideals that are inexorably modern 
yet sufficiently differentiated from the modernity of the colonizers.62  
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The Negotiation of Modernity and Identity in Bangladesh 
The question of the negotiation of modernity and identity drives this dissertation. This is 
an old question to ask, however, and Bangladeshis, including myself, are late in asking it. The 
question regarding the tension between modernity and identity acquires new urgency and 
significance for Bengali-Muslim intellectuals and political actors in the mid-20th century for 
myriad reasons, not least because of the imminent emergence of new nations and states at the 
end of British colonial rule in India. However, by then much ink had already been spilled in 
India and in Bengal particularly in thinking and theorizing about modernity and identity. Great 
Bengali thinkers of the 19th and early 20th centuries such as Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, 
Bhudeb Mukhopadhyay, Bipin Chandra Pal, and Rabindranath Tagore have all dealt with this 
question with intellectual acumen. What could have the belatedly arrived Bengali-Muslim 
intellectuals offer beyond some regurgitation of the thoughts of the great thinkers of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries?  
The negotiation between modernity and identity has not reached a conclusion. As the 
Shahbag moment suggests, negotiation still informs politics and political discourses in 
Bangladesh even today, as it probably does elsewhere in the postcolonial world. Moreover, the 
mid- and late 20th century negotiations in Bangladesh might contain and reveal something that 
could not have been contained within the 19th or early 20th century negotiations, given the 
changing political and discursive contexts at the local and the global levels over the last two 
centuries. A distinction of course arises out of the qualitative differences between the colonial 
and the post-colonial political and discursive dynamics. As David Scott has argued, a defining 




national sovereignties, and consequently the loss of the hope or vision for an acceptable future.63 
Anticolonial thought took “national self-determination” seriously and imagined that 
decolonization would produce national sovereignties that would pursue alternatives to European 
modernity and usher in a new humanity.64 Yet, postcolonial political realities have revealed the 
tenuous nature of the sovereignties of postcolonial nations and their inability to pursue 
alternatives to the social, political, and economic forms of European modernity. The negotiation 
between modernity and identity in Bangladesh mostly unfolds within a global context 
characterized by increasing disillusionment about national sovereignty and the increasing 
hegemony of modernist discourses.  What did it mean for Bengali-Muslims to imagine a nation, 
when the idea of national sovereignty lacked the promise it once had? What possibilities did 
Bengali-Muslims have to think about alternatives to modernity when modernization was seen as 
an historical inevitability?  
Bangladeshi nationalism is perhaps a new kind of nationalism in the Indian subcontinent. 
Indian national identity was by and large founded upon a notion of a civilizational essence that 
promised to transcend the divisions of language, religion, ethnicity, and caste. However, in most 
renderings, Indian nationalism has taken on an upper caste Hindu character, excluding or 
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64 While many nationalist leaders, for example Nehru, wanted to imitate the modernity of the 
colonizers, others did not. Gandhi, for example, argued that decolonization must produce an 
alternative to European modernity. Among the numerous studies of Gandhi’s thought the most 
relevant in this context is probably still Ashis Nandy’s The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery 
of Self Under Colonialism, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Even Fanon, 
who was politically different from Gandhi, shared Gandhi’s vision that decolonization would 
produce different conceptions of humanity (in Fanon’s word a “new man”) from the one 
advanced by European modernity. See Neelam Srivastava, “Towards a Critique of Colonial 
Violence: Fanon, Gandhi and the Restoration of Agency,” Journal of Postcolonial Writing 46, 




marginalizing other social groups.65 In reaction to the latent Hindu character of Indian 
nationalism, Pakistani nationalism mobilized the language of minority protection and conceived 
Pakistan abstractly as a Muslim Zion or the “homeland of Indian Muslims” without any concrete 
reference to ethnicity, language, territory, or even population.66 Bangladeshi nationalism, by 
contrast, has emphasized an ethno-linguistic identity and its claims over a territory. As such 
Bangladeshi nationalism is perhaps closer in form to classical European nationalism, based on 
the arguments of “blood and soil,” than to its sub-continental cousins.  Even more significantly, 
the Bangladeshi nation went through a double birth – first as Pakistan, then as Bangladesh – 
which distinguishes the history of Bangladeshi nationalism not only from other sub-continental 
nationalisms but also from most other postcolonial nationalisms.  
East Bengal became a part of Pakistan with Bengali-Muslim intellectuals and political 
actors strongly supporting the idea of Pakistan and the claim of Muslim nationhood.67  Within a 
generation, however, they were constructing a new national identity based on ethno-linguistic, 
i.e., Bengali, claims to a nation.68 Though Bengali identity forms the core of Bangladeshi 
nationalism, it has also been shaped by a desire to articulate a distinction based on religious and 
regional differences from the dominant Bengali identity of West Bengal.69 Moreover, the 
rejection of Pakistan and its Muslim nationalism has not eliminated “Muslim” as an important 
marker of identity.  The Muslim claim to the nation did not disappear but continues to exacerbate 
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67 See for example Bose, Recasting the Region (2014).  
68 A. F. Salahuddin Ahmed, Bengali Nationalism and the Emergence of Bangladesh: An 
Introductory Outline (Dhaka: University Press, 1994). Shireen Hasan Osmany, Bangladeshi 
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69 See Bose, Recasting the Region (2014) and Andrew Sartori, “Abul Mansur Ahmad and 




the problems of articulating the new nation and the political priorities of the new state.70  So, if 
for Indian nationalists the project was to create a modern nation that was not Western, for 
Bangladeshi nationalists the project has been to create a modern nation that is not Western, not 
Indian, not Pakistani, and not just Bengali or Muslim.  Negotiations over national identity have 
become much more complex and multifaceted. Moreover, since this double birth of the nation 
occurred within twenty-four years, the tasks of elaborating two national identities and political 
logics were carried out by individuals of the same or successive generations and, at times, by the 
same individuals. Consequently, there has been a remarkable profusion of new ideas alongside 
tremendous confusions and contradictions.  
Another interesting feature of Bangladeshi nationalism is the cohabitation of feelings of 
inferiority with an irrepressible sense of optimism.  East Bengal and its people have often been 
described as “backward” compared to the English educated Bengalis of Calcutta and the 
classically trained aristocratic Muslims of North India. The common view had been that Bengali-
Muslims were basically illiterate peasants possessing little, if any, culture and that they were 
both “poor Muslims” and “poor Bengalis.”71 Backwardness thus constitutes an inherent feature 
of Bangladeshi identity not only as a representation of the postcolonial condition but also in 
terms of specific comparisons to more locally dominant social groups.72  Nationalist discourses 
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in Bangladesh reflect this position of backwardness and the consequent marginality. The 
protagonists of Bangladeshi nationalism, in contrast to Indian or Pakistan nationalism, have not 
been members of the aristocracy serving the British bureaucracy or the sons of rich merchants 
and zamindars or even the elite of the newly emerging professional classes. Rather, the 
protagonists of this nationalism have been the sons of peasants competing to become a clerk or a 
reporter or a schoolteacher.73 Their nationalism has no glorious past from which to draw 
inspiration or legitimacy. Instead, they have a history of exploitation, marginalization, and 
oppression. Their nationalism has been oriented not towards an imagined past but towards a 
hopeful future in which the establishment of national sovereignty promises the end of inferiority, 
backwardness, and injustice. Consequently, some nationalist thinkers in Bangladesh viewed 
independence not as a nation claiming sovereignty but as the production of possibilities for the 
people to become a nation.74  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
shouldn’t surprise us that in the late colonial period the biggest political ally of Bengali Muslims 
were the nama-shudras (lower castes) and not so much the ashraf Muslims. I will elaborate on 
this in chapter 2.  
73 The urban middle class has been the principle protagonist of nationalist politics and modern 
politics in general in Bangladesh, as elsewhere around the globe. However, the Bengali-Muslim 
urban middle class emerged only recently out of the ranks of the rural peasantry, containing 
within it not only the interests but also the sensibilities of that social group. The significance of 
the peasant origins of the Bengali-Muslim middle class generally and of Bengali-Muslim 
political and intellectual actors particularly has been emphasized by most scholars of 
Bangladeshi politics and history. See Kamruddin Ahmad, A Socio Political History of Bengal 
and the Birth of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Inside Library, 1975), Iftekhar Iqbal, The Bengal Delta: 
Ecology, State and Social Change, 1840-1943 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), and 
Golam Kibria Bhuiyan, Banglay Muslim Modhdhobitto Srenir Bikash [Emergence and 
Development of Muslim Middle Class in Bengal, 1885-1921)] (Dhaka: Khan Brothers and Co., 
2013). 
74 This was eloquently and powerfully argued by Ahmad Sofa, one of the most important 
political and cultural commentators in post-independence Bangladesh. Ahmad Sofa, Ahmad Sofa 





The tension between Bengali and Muslim identities flagged by the Shahbag moment has 
a history that is almost two centuries old, dating back to the emergence of modern Bengali 
cultural identity in the 19th century among the Hindu bhadralok of Calcutta, a class produced as a 
result of British colonial rule.75 The discourses of Bengali cultural identity displayed a decidedly 
upper-caste Hindu orientation and were saturated by orientalist prejudices against Islam. They 
constructed Bengali-Muslims as both backward and outsiders.76 Bengali-Muslim discourses of 
self-identity since their emergence in the late 19th century have been fundamentally conditioned 
by and carried out in response to these constructions of inferiority and outsider status. The 
response by Bengali-Muslims has varied. For the purposes of our discussion here, however, I 
will highlight tendencies in broad strokes.  One current of thought, which has enjoyed varying 
degrees of hegemony over the decades, has in some ways been a motivating ideology behind the 
Shahbag movement. It internalizes orientalist views and conceives Muslimness as the reason for 
the backwardness of the Bengali-Muslims but understands “Bengalines” as a secular and thus a 
progressive category. The implicit and often explicit conclusion of this line of thinking has been 
that Bengali-Muslims must overcome their Muslimness or at least subordinate their religious 
identity to Bengali national identity to become both genuinely Bengali and modern.  On the 
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Formations of the Secular (2003) is another notable and path breaking critique along these lines. 
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Indian nationalists and, thus, has informed modern Indian historiography, which constructs an 
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opposite end of spectrum is an emphasis on Muslim identity at the expense of Bengaliness the 
latter equated with Hinduness. In embracing Muslim identity these discourses either reject 
modernity altogether or advance some notion of what Faisal Devji has called “apologetic 
modernity.” It argues that Muslims have no need to embrace European modernity because they 
already have their own modernity.77  This line of thought dominated the late 19th century reaction 
against Bengali culturalism, was then embraced by the ideologues of the Pakistani state, and, as 
demonstrated by the rhetoric of the Hefazot movement, continues to enjoy support even today.  
In between the two extremes are the discourses that emphasize the composite category of 
Bengali-Muslim.  They argue the impossibility of separating Bengaliness and Muslimness in the 
social history of Bengal, particularly in its eastern parts. These discourses neither reject nor 
discard the composite identity for being responsible for the backwardness of the Bengali-
Muslims. Rather, these discourses counter the inferiority constructed through colonial discourses 
by endowing each of the categories with positive ethical and political values and by endorsing 
projects of both modernizing and re-vitalizing these categories. The discourses of Bengali-
Muslim identity challenge and decenter not only the bhadralok constructions of Bengali identity 
but also the orientalist essentialization of Muslimness. I focus on these Bengali-Muslim efforts to 
reconcile and inhabit Bengali and Muslim identities because an understanding of these efforts 
will help us understand the complex dynamics of identity formation in post-colonial Bangladesh.  
 
																																								 																				




Reading Bangladeshi Political Thought: Practical and Methodological Challenges  
This dissertation seeks to examine the experiences of becoming modern and a nation in 
Bangladesh as reflected in Bangladeshi political thought.  The two main methodological 
challenges I have faced in carrying out this project had to do on the one hand with questions of 
how to read political thought generally and on the other hand with the difficulties of defining 
“Bangladeshi political thought.” As thoughts cannot be accessed directly but can only be inferred 
from texts and acts, conventional analyses of political thought often take the form of intellectual 
histories based on textual exegesis of intellectual figures. The emphasis in these approaches is on 
a hermeneutic or interpretive analysis that, on the one hand, seeks to investigate the logical 
integrity, coherence, and clarity of the texts and, on the other hand, seeks to locate the text and 
the author in local and global traditions of thinking.78  Such intimate engagements with thinkers 
and their texts enable one to make claims about particular thinkers. But how does one make 
claims about a general category like “Bangladeshi political thought”?  In the process of 
producing an intellectual history of Victorian England, Lytton Strachey argued that producing an 
exhaustive and comprehensive study of all the intellectuals and texts of any given place or era to 
make general claims may be as impossible as rowing across a great ocean and measuring it.79 
Instead, Strachey suggested a better approach was to “drop a bucket” here and there and collect a 
“characteristic specimen” with the aim of studying it with “careful curiosity.” Following 
Strachey’s suggestion, one may, for example, engage with thinkers like Gandhi, Ambedkar, 
Rabindranath, or Jayaprakash Narayan as examples of characteristic specimens or as exceptions 
or simply as interesting and eccentric characters of Indian political thought.  However, there is 
no recognized body of Bangladeshi political thought, as there is, for example, French, German, 
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British, American, or even Indian political thought. Since there is no constituted category of 
“Bangladeshi Political Thought,” it is difficult to talk about this Ahmad or that Hashim as a 
characteristic specimen.  Moreover, I did not begin the dissertation project with certain thinkers 
or texts in mind.  Instead, I proceeded from the assumption that I would find such thinkers and 
texts in the archive or the “shelf” of Bangladeshi political thought. The problem, however, is that 
such a “shelf” of Bangladeshi political thought does not yet exist.  Thus, the first task of the 
dissertation then became the conceptualization of Bangladeshi political thought and the 
construction of that “shelf” from where I may select my interlocutors. I have felt compelled to 
engage with a great ocean of materials to ascertain the general character of Bangladeshi political 
thought before embarking upon close examinations of “characteristic specimens.” 
Ascertaining the general character of Bangladeshi political thought has also been 
suggested by many recent arguments within political theory that have made a case for analyzing 
political thought with reference to specific political lives and social, historical, and discursive 
contexts. 80  Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge School, for example, have advocated reading 
thinkers in their discursive contexts, i.e., reading them as making arguments and interventions in 
the specific debates and discussions prevalent in a place and a time.81 On the other hand, Marxist 
and neo-Marxist approaches note that thinkers and intellectuals respond not only to ideas and 
debates but also to the socio-economic and political structures and necessities of their time.82 
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Skinner and His Critics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
82 Ellen Meiksins Wood’s Liberty and Property: A Social History of Western Political Thought 
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Alongside discursive and historical contexts, Christopher Bayly has championed Anthony 
Giddens’ formulation of an upward hermeneutic that personal experiences and specific economic 
and political conflicts must also be considered as factors informing and shaping ideas and 
arguments.83 Bayly has suggested that micro experiences of everyday life – affected by factors 
like levels of technology, communication networks, availability of certain commodities for 
consumption, and the experience of social inclusion or marginalization – affect how thinkers 
receive, make meaning of, and participate in intellectual and political arguments and debates. I 
engage with broader political history and social histories of intellectuals as a step for not only 
contextualizing thought but also for accessing it in the first place.  
Constructing the “shelf” of Bangladeshi political thought and ascertaining its general 
character has involved first and foremost extensive reading of the intellectual, social, and 
political histories of Bangladesh and going through the works and biographies of dozens of 
intellectuals and political actors. The insights from these readings have been articulated in 
chapter 2, where I provide an outline of Bangladesh’s social, political and intellectual histories. 
However, perhaps the more important but less easily quantifiable or describable insights came 
from an immersion in the political and intellectual cultures of Bangladesh during my six months 
of field research.84 My personal connection and my proficiency in Bengali was a motivating 
factor behind studying Bangladeshi political thought. However, I had become a stranger to 
Bangladeshi politics and culture in the decades that I had spent outside of Bangladesh. My 
prolonged stay in Bangladesh during the field research gave me the opportunity to reacquaint 
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myself with the country’s culture and political sensibilities. Ostensibly, the objective of my field 
research in Bangladesh was to find and gather textual materials by going through the dusty 
catalogues and shelves of the libraries and archives, by visiting bookstores and publishing 
houses, browsing personal libraries of some of my friends and contacts, and by regularly 
attending a month long book-fair. During my stay in Bangladesh I had the opportunity to read 
the local newspapers regularly, socialize or participate in addas85 with intellectuals and political 
activists, and attend lectures, seminars, plays, concerts, and other cultural programs. These 
general experiences, along with two specific events have been instructive.  
Shortly after my arrival in Bangladesh, the country was gripped by one of its regularly 
occurring violent political crises arising out of partisan struggles over control of government. 
Massive rallies, violent clashes with the police, strikes, and even terrorist attacks on civilians 
were regular occurrences for about three months before the crisis abated and order was restored. 
Living in Dhaka in those months provided me with visceral connections with the insecurities, 
fears, frustrations, and anxieties that people in Bangladesh experience with unfortunate 
regularity. That episode, however, also provided me with a glimpse of the resilience, courage, 
and optimism of the Bangladeshi people, which have enabled them not only to survive but also 
to strive forward. During my stay I also gained an understanding of Bangladesh’s imperfect 
experiment with electoral democracy through my close association with one of the campaigns in 
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Dhaka's mayoral election. Each experience allowed me to immerse myself in and gain a deeper 
understanding of Bangladesh’s political and intellectual culture.  
My immersive experiences provided me not only with a cultural context but also a 
“discursive context” in the sense suggested by Quentin Skinner. Ascertaining the discursive 
contexts for Bangladeshi political thought is challenging given that intellectual practices in 
Bangladesh are seldom contained within formal institutionalized spaces of academic research, 
journals, seminars, conferences, etc.  Rather, informal settings like addas and readings circles act 
as sites of intellectual practice and vehicles for carrying forward intellectual traditions. Personal 
connections and interactions, particularly between teachers/mentors [guru] and disciples, 
produce powerful moments of knowledge production and transmission.86 Consequently, 
intellectual traditions are often oriented around charismatic personalities, and the continuation of 
these traditions takes the form of hagiographic accounts rather than critical engagements. 
However, contestations and competitions among gurus, their disciples, and breakaway factions 
produce possibilities for critical evaluations of persons, ideas, and arguments. My participation 
in various addas during my stay in Bangladesh provided me with valuable insights about the 
social and discursive contexts of Bangladeshi intellectual practices and the “every-day 
experiences” of my protagonists. In short, the immersive experience brought me into contact 
with persons, discourses, and practices that substantially informed and redefined my project. My 
immersive experiences and my substantial engagement with the intellectual and political 
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histories of Bangladesh enabled me to define the general character of Bangladeshi political 
thought, define the boundaries of my project, and select interlocutors for the project.  
Discussing Indian political thought, Anthony Parel has proposed a distinction between 
political thought in India and of India.87 While the former connotes political thinking within the 
geographical and political boundaries of India and is carried out by Indian thinkers, the latter 
makes a stronger claim for the specific character of an Indian way of thinking or an Indian 
canon.  I make claims about the possibilities of political thought of Bangladesh, starting with the 
more empirically definable category of political thought in Bangladesh.   
The seemingly uncomplicated category of political thought in Bangladesh, however, is 
not obvious and requires reflections on and decisions regarding its temporal and spatial 
boundaries. Though Bangladesh as an independent state with territorial boundaries emerged only 
in 1971, we can identify a “Bangladeshi” intellectual tradition that precedes the emergence of the 
state. Arguably, we may start from the second half of the 19th century, when the Bengali cultural 
identity emerges and Muslims in Bengal begin to think of themselves as Bengali-Muslims. 
Alternatively, we may start from 1905, when, in the context of the first partition of Bengal, we 
can discern a distinct and organized political interest of the people of East Bengal. Or, we may 
also start from the 1920s, when literary and cultural movements inaugurated a distinct Bengali-
Muslim modernity. Finally, we may start from the early 1940s, when, in the context of the 
imminent dissolution of the British Empire, Bengali-Muslim identity was politically mobilized in 
support of Pakistan. It is this last period that I start my inquiries for two reasons. First, a 
relatively rich and nuanced body of 19th and the early 20th century Bengali intellectual history 
exists. The dissertation benefits from this existing scholarship without reproducing the primary 
																																								 																				




research. Instead, I focus on a period that has received relatively little academic attention, i.e., 
the second half of the 20th century. Second and more important, the partition of British India and 
emergence of independent Pakistan produces the territorial unit and political discourses that 
eventually produce the possibilities for an independent Bangladesh. Since the creation of 
Pakistan involved partition of Bengal and loss of Calcutta, the hitherto undisputed cultural and 
intellectual capital of Bengal, East Bengalis had to inaugurate new intellectual and cultural 
tradition that we now call Bangladeshi.  
While the starting point of this study is based on historical consideration, the end point is 
more arbitrary. Though my question about the tension between modernity and identity arise from 
observations of the political and social dynamics of contemporary Bangladesh, I have not 
extended my analysis to the present. Rather, I have decided to end my analysis in the mid-1970s 
for primarily practical reasons. Originally, I envisioned a more comprehensive study covering 
more than 70 years and ending in the mid-2010s. However, as I began to research and write I 
realized that the project was enormous. I concluded that a study of political thought in 
contemporary Bangladesh would require different analytical and methodological approaches and, 
perhaps, another dissertation altogether. Reluctantly, I have limited my inquiries to the mid-
1970s.  Though my focus on the 1940s to the 1970s is certainly insufficient for a comprehensive 
account of Bangladeshi political thought, I can capture political thinking across two key 
generations that have shaped Bangladesh’s political and intellectual discourses. The first 
generation includes those who were intellectually and politically active before the creation of 
Pakistan and continued to be so in post-colonial Pakistan or even in independent Bangladesh. 
The second generation includes those who became intellectually and politically mature and 




two generations represent the coming into being of a modern Bengali/Bangladeshi nation – from 
mobilizing Bengali-Muslims in support of Pakistan, to encountering all the contradictions of 
post-colonial Pakistan to articulating a Bengali national identity and leading a war of national 
liberation to setting up political institutions in post-independence Bangladesh to elaborating and 
also challenging the ruling ideologies of the new state. 
Selection of Interlocutors  
One of the challenges in studying political thought of colonized and post-colonial spaces 
is that political thought is produced not so much as a self-contained object of analysis by 
specialized academics or philosophers but more as practical and normative ideas of political 
activists, leaders, statesmen, creative writers, public intellectuals, and such.88  As Aditya Nigam 
has argued, post-colonial societies are over-burdened with political concerns and, consequently, 
every poet, novelist, playwright, or filmmaker worth the name may also be considered a political 
thinker.89  We are faced with a double-edged problem – the scarcity of texts that are ostensibly 
theoretical and the potentially limitless archive of texts inscribed with political thought.  One 
way to disaggregate this massive archive is to think of different “registers” through which 
political thoughts are articulated and elaborated.90 There can be many registers: academic 
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writing, political speeches, works of literature, media discourses, etc. Though boundaries of 
these registers may not always be well defined, disaggregating the archive into registers narrows 
my focus.  My task should not be and is not to produce a comprehensive or encyclopedic account 
of Bangladeshi political thought.  Limiting the focus of the study on a limited number of 
registers and interlocutors requires making choices based not only on extensive readings of the 
social, political, and intellectual histories of Bangladesh but also immersion in contemporary 
political and intellectual discourses. After countless dead ends and discarded notes I made three 
key decisions that made progress on the dissertation possible. At the end, my choices turned out 
to be obvious and straightforward. However, the journey to those choices was anything but. If I 
had been able to make these choices earlier in the dissertation process, it would have been a 
much shorter and less onerous process. However, what I have learned in the process of selecting 
my interlocutors has provided me with a deep understanding of Bangladesh’s political and 
intellectual landscape, something that I believe has made my dissertation richer.  
In narrowing my focus and selecting my interlocutors the first choice I have made is to 
limit the investigation of Bangladeshi political thought to the urban middle-class intelligentsia 
that emerged in Bengal in the 19th and 20th centuries. It may suffice here to say that the choice 
makes obvious sense given that conventional approaches to political thought have predominantly 
focused on urban intelligentsia. A focus on urban intelligentsia is, however, fraught with danger 
because such an approach not only ignores subaltern political discourses but also fails to 
recognize alternative intellectual discourses carried out by the “traditional intellectuals,” who are 
trained not in the modern or westernized educational institutions but in the traditional or religious 
system of education. As many Bangladeshi scholars have argued, the traditional intellectuals or 




population of Bangladesh and, thus, have played decisive roles in Bangladeshi politics on many 
occasions, including producing popular support for the Pakistan project.91 Though I recognize 
that not engaging with the traditional intellectuals risks producing a lopsided account of 
Bangladeshi political thought, I have decided to do so partly because of the conceptual and 
methodological challenges associated with carrying out such an engagement. But more 
importantly perhaps, I focus on the urban intelligentsia and the hegemonic political discourses 
because even these discourses have not been studied adequately. A lopsided account of 
Bangladeshi political thought is probably better than no account at all. And I hope that future 
projects on Bangladeshi political thought will complicate and correct this lopsided account.  
Second, I have sought to narrow my focus by considering only two of the many different 
possible registers of political thought.  The first register focuses on public intellectuals who were 
directly or indirectly involved in politics and, more importantly, have produced texts containing 
their thinking about politics. Here the investigations focus on published and unpublished works 
of select interlocutors, their lived experiences, as well as on their biographies. The second 
register focuses on political actors who have shaped the political questions and concerns and 
have influenced the thought world in Bangladesh not so much through their textual outputs but 
through their leadership and political activities. In engaging with the political thought of these 
figures, the dissertation not only examines their published texts, public and legislative speeches, 
personal diaries, autobiographies and memoirs but also analyzes the party manifestos, political 
programs, and national constitutions that these figures have been instrumental in producing.  
																																								 																				
91 See, for example, Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, Pakistan As a Peasant Utopia: The Communalization 
of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920-1947, First edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). Ali 
Riaz, God Willing : The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 




Last, I have decided on four individual figures representing the two registers discussed 
above to be the primary interlocutors of the dissertation. Though it is hard to avoid an element of 
arbitrariness in choosing registers and selecting primary interlocutors, the process has not been 
random or whimsical. Of course, the generative questions regarding modernity and identity 
helped me narrow my focus by selecting thinkers who have something meaningful to say about 
the topics. Moreover, I identified and selected figures, who not only represent moments, shifts, 
and moods in Bangladeshi history but also continue to be relevant in contemporary Bangladeshi 
political and intellectual discourses. During my stay in Bangladesh, I received invaluable 
feedback and guidance through formal and informal conversations I had with Bangladeshi 
intellectuals and academics, which have been helpful for identifying “significant” and 
“influential” political and intellectual discourses, personalities, and texts. I have decided to 
engage with the lives and works of Abul Mansur Ahmad, Abul Hashim, Abdul Hamid Khan 
Bhashani, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. I have organized my discussion of these four figures by 
dividing them into two pairs, each serving to illuminate one of the births of the double-birth of 




Preview of the Chapters  
Chapter 2, “Contextualizing Bangladeshi Political Thought: An Outline of Social, 
Political, and Intellectual Histories of Bangladesh,” serves as a prelude to the main discussion 
and provides a general overview of the social, political, and discursive terrain within which my 
interlocutors operate. The chapter opens with a historical analysis of the colonial encounter with 
modernity in the Indian subcontinent. The discussions highlight how the social, political, 
economic, and epistemological transformations produced by British colonial rule and 
governmentality in turn produce new political subjectivities and possibilities for new kinds of 
political thinking. The chapter then pursues a historical and sociological analysis of the 
formation of “Bengali-Muslim” identity and the emergence of the Bengali-Muslim urban 
middle-class intelligentsia as new political subjects. The chapter then briefly discusses the 
political history of Bangladesh highlighting a few select events and episodes, particularly those 
relating to the emergence of the states of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Against the backdrops of 
social and political history, the chapter then pursues a discussion of the Bengali-Muslim mind or 
thought-world by analyzing general atmosphere, trends, sensibilities, and ideological orientations 
of intellectual practices in Bangladesh.  
Chapter 3, “The First Birth of the Nation: Bengali-Muslim Identity and the Ideas of an 
Islamic State in Producing the ‘Pakistan Moment’,” analyzes the political and intellectual 
responses of Bengali-Muslims to Pakistan both before and after the creation of the country in 
1947.  It anchors the discussions around two prominent Bengali-Muslim political figures of the 
mid-20th century, Abul Mansur Ahmad and Abul Hashim. Though Ahmad and Hashim were not 
first-tier leaders of the era – that distinction belonging to figures like A.K. Fazlul Huq and 




writers than the others.  Though Ahmad and Hashim both played crucial roles in the creation of 
Pakistan through their intellectual support and political leadership, their understandings of 
Pakistan and their logics for supporting it were substantially different, as were their responses to 
and critiques of the state of Pakistan. Ahmad’s politics was consistently oriented by his 
commitment to Bengali-Muslim identity. His initial support for Pakistan, as well as his 
subsequent critique of the policies and practices of the Pakistani state, were motivated by his 
concerns for the autonomy, wellbeing, and modernization of the hitherto marginalized and 
exploited nation. Hashim’s politics were motivated not by identity but by his commitment to 
Islam as a political ideology. Though Hashim supported the idea of Pakistan, he was highly 
critical of leaders like Jinnah, who stressed Muslim identity while seeking to establish a 
Westernized secular state. For Hashim, the creation of Pakistan represented not merely the 
possibility that a particular nation would become free of colonial domination but more 
importantly that it would be able to articulate and establish a new political-economic system 
based on a different philosophical understanding of the world.  By engaging with the lives and 
works of these two political thinkers this chapter seeks to capture the hopes, anxieties, and 
contradictions produced by the first of the double-births of the nation. 
Chapter 4, “The Second Birth of the Nation: Aspirations for Democracy, Equality, 
Freedom, and Social Uplift in Producing the Bangladesh Moment,” discusses the second moment 
of the double-birth of the nation, when Bangladesh emerged as an independent state after the 
breakdown of the awkward political entity called Pakistan. The chapter’s central figures are 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (popularly known as Mujib) and Abdul Hamid Khan (popularly known 
as Maolana Bhashani), who came to the foreground of Bengali-Muslim politics in the 1950s and 




writers, they continue to cast their immense shadows on Bengali-Muslim politics and thought 
worlds long after their deaths in the 1970s.  Mujib, of course, came to be known as the jatir pita, 
the father of the nation, by virtue of the leadership he and his political party, the Awami League, 
provided in the struggle for Bangladesh’s independence. After the independence, Mujib, with the 
help of party intellectuals, articulated a new ideology, known as Mujib-bad [Mujib-ism], which 
reflected the ideological radicalization produced in the struggle for independence and served as 
the foundation for the constitution and the early economic and social policies of the newly 
independent state. This hastily constructed amalgamation, which combined the principles of 
Bengali nationalism, democracy, secularism, and socialism in pursuit of economic development, 
was idealistic and progressive. Though actual commitment to this ideology remains debatable, it 
has become, by virtue of Mujib’s and subsequent Awami League government proclaimed 
adherence, something like the ruling ideology of Bangladesh.  Bhashani, on the other hand, has 
come to embody the symbol of popular opposition to state injustices. In his long career as a 
peasant leader, Bhashani not only fought against the British, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi states 
but also was highly critical of the urban middle-class politics represented by Mujib and the 
Awami League. Bhashani, who was deeply influenced by Maoism and ideas of Islamic 
socialism, produced a synthesis of the languages of political Islam and Marxism that attracted 
and inspired legions of followers not only among the rural masses but also among radicalized 
urban intellectuals. For much of the 1950s and 1960s he was the most influential and powerful 
political figure in East Pakistan and even achieved international recognition.  Though he became 
sidelined during the crucial moments of Bangladesh’s struggle for independence and was forced 
to continue his role as a critique of the regime rather than being one of architects of the new 




with the thoughts and politics of Mujib and Bhashani this chapter examines the ideas and 
aspirations that produced and were produced by the independence of Bangladesh. 
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by highlighting some of its key arguments and their 
implications for contemporary political discourses in Bangladesh.  The conclusion reflects upon 
the ways the dissertation has been successful in accomplishing its objectives, as well as on some 
of the limitations it failed to address or overcome.  Finally, the conclusion reflects upon the 






Contextualizing Bangladeshi Political Thought: An Outline of social, political, and 
intellectual Histories of Bangladesh 
 
Political theory is more comfortable with and interested in intimate, nuanced, and 
sophisticated engagements with thinkers, texts, and concepts than with broad categories like 
“Bangladeshi political thought.” As a student of political theory, I also share the desire for close 
readings and deep engagements with thinkers and texts. And, I do not want to produce an 
encyclopedic and, thus, superficial catalog of Bangladeshi history and personalities in lieu of a 
critical account of Bangladeshi political thought. Yet, I find it necessary to start with a landscape 
shot, if I may be permitted to use a cinematic analogy, before moving towards close-ups of 
individual thinkers and their ideas. Thus, in this chapter I discuss the broad outlines of the social, 
political, and intellectual histories of Bangladesh, which will provide the necessary historical and 
discursive context for the more detailed and focused discussions that take place in the following 
chapters. Admittedly, discussions of this chapter remain limited to painting the contours of 
Bangladeshi history with broad strokes and rely heavily on other scholarly accounts. Much of the 
discussions in this chapter may be familiar to Bangladesh or even South Asia specialists. I have 
nevertheless decided to move forward with these discussions partly because I believe that they 
will provide the basic background information for those readers who may not be familiar with 
Bangladesh. More importantly however, in these discussions I will present my own reading and 
understanding of Bangladesh’s political and intellectual history. These historical sketches will 
produce an understanding of how the categories of “political” and “thinking” have been 
constituted and reconstituted over the recent centuries and decades in Bangladesh. And, I hope 




analyzing Bangladeshi political thought, i.e., how Bangladeshi subjects have thought about, 
understood, and responded to politics in its recent history. Thus, in this chapter I produce these 
historical sketches with trepidation but also with the optimism that my retelling of familiar 
stories may still be insightful and interesting.  
In keeping with the boundary of the dissertation project, the chapter focuses primarily on 
the period between 1940s and 1970s. However, I begin with a brief analysis of the ways British 
colonial rule produced a profound break in the history of Bengal and India generally, producing 
the possibilities for new kinds of politics, thought, and identities. By starting with the colonial 
period, I do not, however, wish to argue that the history of the colonized societies begins with 
colonialism or that the history of the pre-colonial period ceases to inform or be relevant for the 
developments of the post-colonial future. In fact, I agree fully with the arguments advanced by 
scholars such as Sheldon Pollock and others regarding the importance of studying pre-colonial 
history not only of the socio-economic and political conditions but also of ideas and thought 
world for understanding postcolonial places like South Asia.1 The colonial experience should not 
be viewed as the beginning but as one of many episodes in histories, intellectual and otherwise, 
of postcolonial countries. Despite recognizing the importance of pre-colonial intellectual and 
political histories, I begin my analysis from the experience of colonial encounter partly because 
of the need to contain the discussion within a manageable perimeter and partly because the 
colonial encounter is a more proximate vector shaping postcolonial politics and intellectual 
landscapes. After analyzing the impact of the colonial encounter in Bangladeshi thought and 
																																								 																				
1 Sheldon Pollock, “Is There an Indian Intellectual History? Introduction to ‘Theory and Method 
in Indian Intellectual History,’” Journal of Indian Philosophy 36, no. 5–6 (October 1, 2008): 
533–42. Also See Sudipta Kaviraj, “The Sudden Death of Sanskrit Knowledge,” Journal of 
Indian Philosophy 33, no. 1 (2005) and “An Outline of a Revisionist Theory of Modernity,” 





politics, I move on to a reading of the social history of the emergence of the “Bengali-Muslim” 
middle-class intelligentsia and the emergence of the identity category of “Bengali-Muslim.” 
Though this history focuses primarily on the late 19th and early 20th century social 
transformations engendered by the colonial encounter, it stretches back to the 13th century, to the 
moment of arrival of Islam in Bengal. In the third section the chapter presents a reading of the 
political history of Pakistan and Bangladesh, covering a period from the 1920s to the 
contemporary moment. The fourth and last section of the chapter presents an intellectual history 
of the “Bengali-Muslim” intelligentsia, focusing particularly in the second part of the 20th 
century, in an effort to identify the general characteristics of Bengali-Muslim manos or thought 
world. My hope is that the broad-stroke historical narratives presented in this chapter will define 
and present the political and intellectual landscape in which my interlocutors are situated and 




Colonial Encounters in Shaping Politics, Society and Thought in India and Bengal  
 Despite the British East India Company’s claim to be mere traders and not conquerors or 
governors and despite the intention of Warren Hastings, the first governor general of India, to 
rule India according to its own laws and customs to suit the “exigencies of the country,”2 British 
rule in India would produce profound changes in nearly all aspects of Indian life. I want to draw 
attention to a few transformations that are particularly relevant to our discussion. The first of 
these concerns the construction of a new kind of political authority in the form of the modern 
state, distinguished not only through its claim of sovereignty3 but also through its practice of 
governmentality.4 The modern state was not simply imported to India from Britain; neither was 
its emergence in India an isolated event. The emergence of the modern state in India was a part 
of a global shift in political arrangements, produced in part by experiences and political ideals of 
																																								 																				
2 Hastings had declared 1792 that the objective of company rule should be to “adapt our 
regulations to the manners and understandings of the people, and the exigencies of the country, 
adhering as closely as we are able to their ancient uses and institutions.” Barbara D. Metcalf and 
Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), pp. 57.  
3 Though philosophical discussions on sovereignty have been vigorous and numerous since the 
time of Bodin and Hobbes, sovereignty has also become a standard concept in modern political 
discourse. It is defined not simply by the empirical phenomenon of the absolutist states 
characterized by centralization of bureaucracy and the monopoly of means of violence but also 
by the political logic that claims the state as the only legitimate political authority, i.e., having 
the authority to make and enforce law. Daniel Philpott, “Sovereignty,” in Oxford Handbook of 
the History of Political Philosophy, ed. George Klosko (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011) 
4 As advanced by Michel Foucault, governmentality describes that mode of modern 
power/regime that functions not only through law, the sword, or power to say no but also through 
producing, facilitating, and structuring possibilities of life and fields of action. Foucault’s 
formulations have radically altered contemporary scholarly discourses about how power 
functions and have provided the theoretical framework for many contemporary studies of 
colonial and post-colonial politics. See for example David Scott, “Colonial Governmentality,” 
Social Text, no. 43 (1995): 191–220, Nicholas B. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the 
Making of Modern India (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002), Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of 
the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World (New York: Columbia 




European and American revolutions in which the state became the primary and most dominant 
actor.5 Also, in this global shift towards the state-form and the discourse of governmentality, 
movements of political ideas and practices did not flow only from colonial powers to the 
colonized spaces. Rather, political ideas, practices, and institutions in the metropolitan centers 
were also informed by their colonial experiences. Despite these caveats, it will be reasonable to 
argue that the modern state in the Indian subcontinent arises directly out of the colonial 
encounter and produces political and social structures that are qualitatively different from their 
pre-colonial predecessors.  
As Sudipta Kaviraj has argued, political authorities of pre-colonial India did not claim 
sovereignty over all domains of life but rather accepted authority of various other discourses and 
practices. In contrast, the colonial state, particularly after being formally incorporated in the 
British Empire in 1858, not only claimed supremacy over all other authorities but also 
increasingly claimed the right to intervene in every aspect of social life.6 The colonial power 
restructured the colonial economy by introducing new regimes of property relations and revenue 
collection, by centralizing and standardizing finance and state budget, by rearranging agricultural 
and industrial production, and by creating new infrastructures and communication networks.7  
																																								 																				
5Jean-François Bayart, for example, argues in Global Subjects: A Political Critique of 
Globalization (Malden: Polity, 2007) that globalization of the “state” constitutes a major, if not 
the most significant, element of modern world/global history. Also C. A. Bayly in Recovering 
Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) presents a perceptive analysis of the influence of European and 
American revolutions on political ideas and practices in colonial India.  
6 Sudipta Kaviraj in The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010) uses a metaphor of circle of circles, in which the state is one of many 
circles that exercise authority and determine membership in a community.  
7 See Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press, 2004) for a compelling and provocative account of the production 
of the colonial economy through the practices of the colonial state, which in turn made possible 




The colonial state also quickly abandoned its principle of non-interference in favor of policies of 
social reform aimed at liberating Indian people from the shackles of “despotism,” “priestcraft,” 
and “superstition.”8 To this end colonial rulers sought to use the sovereign power of the state, 
i.e., the law, to proscribe and prescribe social practices, customs, and behaviors.9 Censuses, 
surveys, catalogues, anthropological studies, and other practices of what Nickolas Dirks has 
called, the “ethnographic state” produced profound transformations in the conceptions of 
identities and communities.10 In the colonial state Indian subjects thus encountered a new kind of 
political authority that was not only alien but also transformed social imaginaries or the “ways 
people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on 
between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative 
notions and images that underlie these expectations.”11  
Colonialism colonized not only space or political structures but also the minds of the 
colonized, producing “an epistemic rupture on the vastest possible scale”12 and establishing the 
dominance of Eurocentric knowledge and epistemology. Stephen Marglin, for example, has 
characterized this “epistemic rapture” as one in which oral and other non-textual knowledge is 
																																								 																				
8 The colonial power was not monolithic by any means, and there existed considerable debates 
among British thinkers and policymakers regarding the aim of colonial rule. However, as 
perceptively argued by Uday Singh Mehta in Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-
Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) and by others, 
liberals ranging from Adam Smith to Jeremy Bentham to James and John Stuart Mill saw 
advancement of liberal values as the justification of colonial rule.  
9 Prohibition of the practices of Sati under Lord Bentinck in 1829 is one of the earliest and most 
celebrated examples of such injunctions. However, the colonial state carried out many more 
major and minor interventions in the society in the next hundred plus years of its rule. Metcalf 
and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India (2012).  
10 Dirks, Castes of Mind (2002). See also Kaviraj, The Imaginary Institution of India (2010) for a 
discussion about how the pre-colonial “fuzzy communities” were transformed into “enumerated 
communities” through practices of colonial governmentalities.  
11 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 23.  




devalued in favor of gridded, rational, and textual knowledge. The epistemology accompanying 
the colonial power relied upon literacy and formal institutions of education for the purpose of 
production and transfer of knowledge, whereas the pre-colonial production and transfer of 
knowledge had more of the qualities of “techne,” a kind of knowledge that may be impossible to 
articulate as abstract reproducible knowledge but is transferred through direct learning, imitation, 
observation, etc.13 Institutions of knowledge production set up by colonial power were motivated 
by the practical necessities of gathering more knowledge of the society and the people it was 
ruling and of producing a class of functionaries for colonial administration. These practices of 
knowledge production, however, also provided legitimation for colonial power and established 
the supremacy of Western knowledge over indigenous knowledge.14 Observing the simultaneity 
of the formation of the Western scientific disciplines and modern imperialism Gyan Prakash 
argues that “the authority and application of science as universal reason” buttressed new 
structures of rule and knowledge produced by colonial power.15 
The superiority of Western knowledge and discourses was, of course, unquestioned in the 
minds of the British colonial rulers. The challenge, however, was to produce the recognition of 
Western knowledge’s authority among the colonized population, which the colonial power 
concluded could only be achieved by enlightening and transforming Indian subjects through a 
																																								 																				
13 Marglin, “Towards the Decolonization of the Mind” (1990). 
14 Stephen Marglin for example argues, “the imperialistic pretension to universality made on 
behalf of Western episteme and the total inability of its adherents to regard competing systems 
with anything but contempt, the inability indeed even to contemplate the existence of competing 
systems. Other systems of knowledge, particularly when they are embedded in myth and ritual, 
become superstition, the very antithesis of knowledge. The encounter is often fatal for 
indigenous systems because the supreme confidence of Westerners or Westernized elites in their 
knowledge is coupled to the superior means of political and economic force at their disposal.” 
(ibid, p.25) 
15 Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton: 




program of Western education.16 The early efforts in learning Indian languages, literature, 
history, and law by Western scholars displayed a sort of orientalist reverence for the once great 
Indian civilization. Such sentiments were soon discarded in favor of a growing assertion of the 
supremacy of European knowledge. By 1835 Thomas Macaulay, the Whig politician who served 
in the Council of India from 1834 to 1838, would conclude in his controversial “Minute on 
Indian Education” that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native 
literature of India and Arabia.” The inhabitants of India would be better served, Macaulay 
argued, not by efforts to “revive native literature” or knowledge but by the “introduction and 
promotion of the knowledge of the sciences” and education in British and European literature, 
law, and morals. Macaulay urged the colonial government to adopt an education program that 
would follow a Western curriculum and have English as the language of instruction. However, 
since educating an entire body of population was beyond the means of the colonial government, 
Macaulay contended, the goal of English education would be:  
To form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a 
class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, 
and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the 
country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western 
nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the 
great mass of the population.17 
 
The above passage is remarkable in how well it reflects the attitudes of the colonizer and in how 
well it anticipates the role played by Western-educated Indian elites in establishing the authority 
of modern science and the ideologies of reform and progress that underwrote both modernity and 
colonial rule in India.  
																																								 																				
16 Ibid, pp. 8. 






By the early 19th century a growing number of Indians, of whom Raja Rammohan Roy 
was the most prominent, had been expressing enthusiasm and appreciation for Western 
knowledge and education. The Hindu College, India’s first English-language institution of higher 
learning, was set up in Calcutta in 1817. By the 1830s, already several thousand students 
attended Calcutta’s English-language schools.18 The 1835 English Education Act, embodying 
much of Macaulay’s arguments, and then the 1854 Education Dispatch, a set of specific policy 
reforms proposed by Sir Charles Wood, greatly accelerated the growth of literacy and Western 
style secular education by allocating funds for the establishment of and grant-in-aid for schools 
throughout India. Despite its popularity and rapid growth, English-education in India remained 
for the most part an elite phenomenon, restricted to the upper class and upper-caste male 
population.19 English-educated Indians formed an elite stratum in colonial India not only because 
they came from already privileged sections of the society but also because English education 
itself produced higher social, economic, and political status. On a practical level, education 
generally, and English education particularly, became marketable commodities and produced 
economic and social opportunities by providing access to new careers and business ventures. 
More importantly, however, English education provided access to the discourses of the colonial 
masters and, thus, to colonial power itself. English education, by providing access to power and 
																																								 																				
18 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India (2012) 
19 For example, in 1911, in Bengal, the most literate/educated part of India at that time, the 
literacy rate among upper-caste Hindu men was 64%, while for women of the same caste group 
it was only 11%, and for Muslim men it was 8%; among Muslim women as well as among 
indigenous tribes the literacy rate was almost zero. Latika Chaudhary, “Taxation and Educational 
Development: Evidence from British India,” Explorations in Economic History, Asian Economic 
Growth and Development, 47, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 279–93. By 1921, in Bengal, only 3.4% of 
the population had an English education. Partha Chatterjee, Texts of Power: Emerging 




wealth, became a major constitutive element in the formation of new elite and middle classes in 
colonial India, which in the context of Bengal came to be known as the bhadralok.20 
Expansions in literacy and English education played instrumental roles in social and 
political transformations in India not only by producing new class dynamics but also by 
generating possibilities for the emergence of a print culture, new forms of sociality, and 
ultimately new political and intellectual discourses. Printing presses had arrived in India in the 
early 16th century via Portuguese missionaries and had a visible presence in various parts of India 
throughout the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. However, it was only in the late 18th and early 19th 
century that there emerged a print culture in India.21 By the 1780s and 1790s, British journalists 
were setting up English-language newspapers and journals in colonial cities such as Calcutta, 
Madras, and Bombay. Vernacular newspapers and journals began to emerge in the early decades 
of the 19th century due to efforts by both European and Indian pioneers. The early 19th century 
also witnessed the growth of books and pamphlets published in local languages. Many of these 
texts were produced by institutions like the Fort William College, which patronized translations 
of English and other European language texts into Bengali and other local languages and 
supported production of original scholarships in local languages.22 The efflorescence of print 
																																								 																				
20 Bhadralok literally means gentlemen or respectable folks, a much used yet loosely defined 
composite category, which in colonial Bengal primarily signified urban dwelling English-
educated professionals of upper-caste Hindu background but also included rent-collecting land-
lords and businessmen.  By the beginning of the 20th century it began to lose some of its caste 
and religious identities, producing possibilities for Muslim bhadralok, for example.  See Parama 
Roy, “Bhadralok/Bhadramahila,” Keywords In South Asian Studies | SOAS University of 
London, accessed March 19, 2018, https://www.soas.ac.uk/south-asia-institute/keywords/. 
21 To use it in the sense advanced by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on 
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 2006). 
22 Along with newspapers, new and specifically modern literary forms like essays, public 
addresses, and novels became defining features of the print culture, which in turn fundamentally 
shaped the vernacular languages and literature from the 19th century on. For histories and critical 




culture went hand in hand with the growth of voluntary associations of various orientations and 
goals throughout India and particularly in cities like Calcutta. Circulations of and discussions 
about printed texts were important propellers of the emergence of new forms of sociality – 
informal gatherings or addas, formal voluntary organizations, and public meetings – that served 
as sites of discussions, debates, and commentaries about various socio-political issues of the day. 
The circulation of texts and many of the new associations also served as vehicles for establishing 
the authority of the modern, i.e., Western sciences and rationalist discourses and were 
instrumental in producing movements for religious and social reforms.23 Though these socio-
cultural and epistemological transformations occurred throughout colonial India, they were most 
profound in Bengal and over the course of the 19th century culminated in a phenomenon that has 
come to be known as the Bengal Renaissance.24 The nature and significance of the so-called 
renaissance have been assessed and reassessed over the years. Whatever else its impact might 
have been, at the least it announced the emergence of the modern intelligentsia among the 
bhadralok class and signaled a discursive shift in the Bengali and Indian thought world.  
Much has been written about the role played by the English-educated elite, such as the 
bhadralok intelligentsia, in colonization and decolonization of India. They have been described 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
Print : Popular Publishing and the Politics of Language and Culture in a Colonial Society, 
1778-1905 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) and Francesca Orsini, Print and 
Pleasure: Popular Literature and Entertaining Fictions in Colonial North India (New Delhi: 
Permanent Black, 2009).  
23 Prakash, Another Reason (1999), p. 52 to 57 makes this argument persuasively by discussing 
examples such as the Society for the Acquisition of General Knowledge (1838), the Bethune 
Society, the BurraBazar Family Literary Club (1857), and the Mahomedan Literary Club (1863). 
24 For a critical evaluation of the renaissance and its relationship to Bengali Muslims, see David 
Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization, 
1773-1835 (Oakland: University of California Press, 1969) David Kopf and Safiuddin Joarder, 
eds., Reflections on the Bengal Renaissance (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1977) and 
more recently Nur Mohammad, Bongio Muslim Shomaj: Ouponibesik Shikhkha Babostha O 
Shamprodayikota [Bengali Muslim Society: Colonial Education System and Communalism] 




as clients or agents of colonial power and its fiercest critics and most formidable opponents; they 
have been criticized as self-serving traitors and hailed as nationalist heroes and producers of 
national consciousness; they have been diagnosed as examples of ‘colonized mind’ and revered 
as champions of liberty and enlightenment.25 All these contradictory yet arguably accurate 
descriptions point toward the liminal position occupied by this new class between the borders of 
colonial power and colonized population. As Indian subjects sought to comprehend and contend 
with an alien power that was transforming their ways of being, their conceptions of “the 
political” and their relationships to political authority were also being radically transformed. 
Given that the colonial state was no longer just another authority among many other authorities 
but claimed supreme authority over all, it became less and less possible to challenge colonial 
power by invoking some other authority. Colonized subjects had to negotiate the power of the 
colonial state by using its own logic and speaking in the language produced by it. The bhadralok 
class, and particularly the intelligentsia, emerged as most poised to traverse the new discourse of 
power that was fast displacing pre-colonial political ideas and practices.  
Discourses of modernity, nation, progress, and liberalism entered and increasingly 
dominated the Indian and Bengali thought world as the bhadralok intelligentsia “consciously set 
out to emulate the historical experiences” of European modernity and began to think, speak, and 
write within its discursive limits.26 The print culture and civil society organizations produced in 
India a “public sphere” that was populated mostly by members from the upper classes.27 This 
																																								 																				
25 C. A. Bayly’s Recovering Liberties (2011) and Partha Chatterjee’s Nationalist Thought and the 
Colonial World: The Derivative Discourse? (London: Zed Books, 1986) are two of the best 
examples of the literature that analyzes the history and character of this class. 
26 Partha Chatterjee, The Present History of West Bengal: Essays in Political Criticism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 15.  
27 Civil society was also a “civilized society” in so far as entry into it required a certain level of 




public sphere was in part defined by the possibilities and imperatives of making political 
arguments as appeals to an abstract public. Political arguments sought to either express or shift 
“public opinion” in efforts to secure and establish the “public good.” This form of political 
argument was qualitatively different from its pre-colonial modes, which, as exemplified in the 
Akhlaq treaties of the Mughal period, primarily took the form of petitions to rulers and appealed 
to their generosity and magnificence.28 The public sphere transformed the idea of politics from 
something that pertains only to decisions and policies of kings, i.e., rajniti,29 to something that 
involves ever-larger sets of actors and actions. In this transformed field of politics, the 
intelligentsia emerged as one of the most influential protagonists by virtue of their proficiency in 
the colonial discourses of power and politics.  
However, the colonial power did not manage, especially in its early career, to exercise 
total control over the colonized territories or populations. Vast majorities of Indians remained on 
the margins of and lacked access to discourses of colonial power, particularly given their 
illiteracy. There existed various other alternative discourses of power and authority that operated 
in that marginal space. For instance, many of India’s 19th and 20th century movements and 
uprisings of marginalized peoples invoked religious or millenarian discourses, which could be 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
non-elite print cultures and subaltern public spheres that operated outside and sometimes against 
the bhadralok social space. See for example Ghosh, Power in Print (2006) and Leela Fernandes, 
“Beyond Public Spaces and Private Spheres: Gender, Family, and Working-Class Politics in 
India,” Feminist Studies 23, no. 3 (1997): 525–47. 
28 For analyses of pre-colonial political discourse and argumentation, see Chris Bayly, 
Recovering Liberties and Muzaffar Alam, The Languages of Political Islam: India 1200-1800 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).  
29 “Politics” is translated as rajniti in Bengali and other Indian languages. However, South Asian 
scholars such as Partha Chatterjee (Texts of Power, 1995) have pointed out that the two concepts 
are not synonymous and that the concept rajniti may contain and convey a meaning of politics 




viewed as autonomous discourses of the subaltern.30 Yet, these possibilities do not negate the 
argument that colonial rule altered the political terrain in India by instituting new and modern 
discourses of power, in which the bhadralok intelligentsia served to translate and enforce 
colonial power over the masses but also produced possibilities for negotiating and resisting that 
power. Initially, the English-educated intelligentsia, “trapped in the discourse of [the colonizer’s] 
Enlightenment rationalism,”31 had no connection to or motivation for communicating with the 
subaltern, whose subalternity was constituted by his inability to access or speak in the modern 
discourses of power. By the late 19th century, however, a nationalist consciousness began to 
emerge among the intelligentsia as it increasingly recognized colonial modernity as a “travesty” 
of the original European modernity. Likewise, it recognized the impossibility and undesirability 
of reenacting the modernity of the colonizer.32 This recognition, in turn, stimulated the colonized 
intelligentsia to discover and return to an autochthonous Indian identity, for which it looked not 
only to the “inner domain” of spirituality or to the supposed glories of classical Indian science 
and philosophy but also to the cultures and traditions of agrarian masses.33 Efforts to locate the 
“true India” among the rural subaltern found expressions in the writings of Indian thinkers 
																																								 																				
30 Following Gramsci and Foucault, the Subaltern Studies Group argued that wherever there is 
power there is resistance, domination is seldom complete, and exercise power is seldom total. 
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subaltern. See Vinayak Chaturvedi, Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial (New York: 
Verso, 2012) and Rosalind O’Hanlon, “Recovering the Subject Subaltern Studies and Histories 
of Resistance in Colonial South Asia,” Modern Asian Studies, 1988 for assessments of the debate 
about the autonomy of subaltern.  
31 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (1986). 
32 Kaviraj, Imagined Institution of India (2010), pp.105  
33 For the discussion of the “inner domain” see Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: 
Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For critical 
discussion of the nationalist celebration of scientific achievements of classical India see Prakash, 




already in the late 19th century and by early 20th century they constituted a coherent political 
project in the Swadeshi movement.34  
Though the intelligentsia’s efforts during the Swadeshi movement to “return” to the 
village and connect to peasant farmers were unsuccessful, they nevertheless signaled the 
necessity for a nationalist discourse to overcome the bifurcation between elite and subaltern 
discourses.35 It was Mahatma (M.K.) Gandhi who finally produced a truly nationalist politics not 
so much by erasing the distinctions between the two but by bridging their bifurcated discourses 
through his ability to speak in the dual registers of the subaltern and the English-educated 
elites.36 Gandhi, though certainly the most prominent, was not the only one who was speaking in 
these dual registers. Many Muslim League leaders, particularly East Bengal leaders such as 
Fazlul Huq, Maolana Bhashani, and Abul Hashim made successful cases for Pakistani 
nationalism precisely because they could speak to urban middle class aspirations and to the 
desires for a “peasant utopia.”37 These leaders connected to and commanded the rural subaltern 
not only because of their skills and charisma but also because of the larger structural shifts that 
undermined the autonomy of the agrarian economy and society.38 Thus, by the mid-20th century 
																																								 																				
34 Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908 (New Delhi: People’s Publishing 
House, 1973) and Andrew Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of 
Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
35 Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History (2008). 
36 Kaviraj, Imagined Institution of India (2010), pp. 110 – 117.  
37 Neilesh Bose, “Anti-Colonialism, Regionalism, and Cultural Autonomy: Bengali Muslim 
Politics, c.1840s--1952.” (Tufts University, 2009). Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, Pakistan As a Peasant 
Utopia: The Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920-1947(Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1992). 
38 Over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries qualitative changes in agricultural 
technology, the property regime, market structures, transportation networks, and even geography 
reduced the autonomy of the rural economy of India and subjected it to prerogatives of the world 
market and colonial governmentality. See Goswami, Producing India for critical evaluation of 




nationalist discourses successfully incorporated and subsumed subaltern discourses that hitherto 
operated on the margins of civil society. The displacement of a peasant worldview by a modern 
nationalist political consciousness meant that the authority to elaborate political ideals and lead 
political movements increasingly shifted away from religious and other traditional leaders to the 
urban intelligentsia.  
 The profound transformations in socio-political structures and educational systems 
produced by British colonial rule in India facilitated the emergence of the intelligentsia as the 
primary protagonist of colonial politics. In the early 19th century the intelligentsia was an elite 
phenomenon, confined mostly to upper-caste Hindus in large colonial cities like Calcutta. By the 
end of the century, however, the intelligentsia was acquiring a middle-class character as English 
education spread to mofussil [small/provincial] towns and rural areas and was embraced by an 
increasing number of the upper peasantry. The emergence of a Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries certainly fits within this broader pattern of historical 
development. However, to appreciate the distinct character of the Bengali Muslim intelligentsia 
and their particular intellectual and political concerns we need to understand the specific social 
and political histories that had structured the conditions of the emergence of the Bengali-Muslim 
intelligentsia and gave it its identity.  
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The Bengali-Muslims and Their Middle-class Intelligentsia: A Social History  
 
Islam arrived in Bengal in the 13th century via Muslim proselytizers, traders, and military 
conquerors of mostly Perso-Turkic cultural background. By the 18th century the meeting of 
Islamic and indigenous cultures in the eastern part of Bengal made possible the emergence of an 
ethnic group that we now identify as the “Bengali-Muslims.”39 However, the use of the category 
“Bengali-Muslim” to designate a particular social group before the 1920s would be somewhat 
anachronistic given that such an identity was not proclaimed by any group, nor any group was 
identified as such by outsiders. As many scholars of South Asian history have commented, pre-
colonial communal identities were “fuzzy” in different ways. 40 First, the markers and boundaries 
communities were seldom precisely or concretely defined, leaving the questions of who 
belonged inside and outside the group open. Second, there was no necessity for or possibility of 
knowing exactly how large or small the community was. And lastly, a person could claim 
membership in different communities simultaneously based on religion, caste, language, 
occupation, and place of birth or residence. These “fuzzy communities” increasingly gave way to 
“enumerated communities” with precisely defined markers, borders, and exclusive membership 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries for a number of reasons, most significant being the 
interventions of colonial governmentality.41 In particular the censuses, first conducted in India in 
1872 and carried out decennially from 1881, produced increasingly definite communal identities 
based on religious and caste affiliations. These censuses of the late 19th century revealed, 
contrary to the commonly held assumptions of the period, that the majority of the population of 
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40 See for example Kaviraj, The Imaginary Institution of India (2010) and Chatterjee, The Nation 
and Its Fragments (1993). 




Bengal proper were Muslims and in the eastern regions of the province Muslims were more 
numerous.42 The censuses produced definitions and measurements of a social group that in the 
19th century was known as Bengal Muslims or Muslims of Bengal.  
The Bengal Muslims were not, however, a monolithic entity. They were divided among 
numerous sects based not only on the well-known divisions between Shia and Sunni but also on 
innumerable other differences arising out of adherence and allegiances to various imams, pirs 
(Sufi saints), and diverging theological and juridical traditions. These sectarian differences were 
often so pronounced that forms of social integration, for example intermarriage, among the sects 
were as restricted among them as they were between Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Moreover, 
the social and ritual lives of Bengal Muslims were highly syncretic, often blurring the 
distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim and making the category of Muslim highly elastic 
and porous.43 The more significant divisions among Bengal Muslims, however, arose not from 
sectarian differences but from differences in social statuses arising from the composite factors of 
class, caste, place of ancestral origin, and claims of spiritual purity. Ashraf, meaning high born or 
noble, referred to the members of Muslim upper classes in urban centers and to the rural landed 
elites that had emerged during the five centuries of Muslim rule in Bengal prior to the 
ascendency of the British. While ashraf Muslims generally claimed foreign, that is to say Arab 
and Perso-Turkic, ancestry, converts from upper-caste Hindus may have also been included in 
																																								 																				
42 Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity (New York: Oxford 
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which were included or excluded at different periods in the administrative unit of colonial 
Bengal.  
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this category.44 The category of ajlaf or the atraf, connoting lowborn, referred to certain 
occupational groups and the peasantry without land-holdings, the vast majority of Muslims in 
Bengal. A third category named arzul mirrored the caste concept of untouchable and referred to 
groups such as butchers and scavengers. The boundaries of these social divisions among Bengal 
Muslims were, however, not well defined. Lack of any scriptural or juridical basis in Islam for 
these status differences also allowed for relatively easier upward social mobility for the Bengal 
Muslims. In fact, late 19th century theories about the low caste origins of Bengal Muslims and 
the census’s need to fix and claim one’s social status as a matter of government record drove 
many Muslims in Bengal to claim ashraf status simply by making a show of wealth and adopting 
Arabic, Persian, or Turkic names.45 The porousness of the category of ashraf and many 
“fraudulent” claims to that status, however, do not negate the concrete and substantial social 
difference between ashraf Muslims and the great mass of Bengal Muslims.  
While the Muslim population constituted a majority in Bengal, the sectarian and social 
differences among Muslim groups meant that there was no “Muslim community” in any self-
conscious way. In fact, ashraf Muslims shared a greater sense of community with Muslim elites 
across India and beyond than with their co-religionists among the rural peasants. The upper strata 
of ashraf Muslims belonged to a pan-Islamic cosmopolitan elite through shared Perso-Turkic 
culture, Urdu and Farsi language and literature, and family ties. These elites demonstrated 
cultivated disinterest, if not disdain, for Bangla, the language of the vast majority of Bengal’s 
Muslim peasants. Even in the 20th century many Bengali Muslim political leaders, most notably 
																																								 																				
44 Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims (1981). 
45 Ahmed in The Bengal Muslims (1981) makes a persuasive argument for this, where he also 
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Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, did not even speak adequate Bangla.46 Muslim peasants, on the 
other hand, were thoroughly integrated in the social lives of rural Bengal and enjoyed 
community or even class solidarities with peasants of different sectarian denominations.47 The 
peasants of Bengal not only shared Bangla as their mother tongue but also rituals, social 
customs, festivals, fairs, art forms, music, and everyday cultural practices. It would be, however, 
too simplistic to argue that Muslim peasants had adopted Bengali language and culture or that 
the Bengali peasants had converted to Islam. Rather, a complex mix of “foreign” and indigenous 
cultural, linguistic, and religious elements produced a cultural form that was simultaneously 
Bengali and Muslim. 48  
																																								 																				
46 Suhrawardy was one of most influential politicians of Bengal, serving as the last prime 
minister of Bengal under British Rule. He continued to play an active role in independent 
Pakistan both as a member of the opposition and as part of the government until the late 1950s. 
For a discussion of the linguistic and social background of Suhrawardy and other leading 
politicians of East Bengal, see Murshid, The Sacred and the Secular (1996). 
47For example, the Faraizi movement of the 19th century can be viewed primarily as a class 
movement of Bengal peasants [krishok] of various sectarian orientations. Though the 
overwhelming majority of the participants were Muslims and the movement was mobilized using 
Islamic symbolisms and ideas, non-Muslim peasants also took part in the movement. (Iqbal, The 
Bengal Delta, 2010) Similarly, the Tevaga movements during the 1940s, a high period of 
Pakistan movement and communal tensions, demonstrated a high degree of class solidarity 
across sectarian and class boundaries. (Hashmi, Pakistan as A Peasant Utopia, 1992).  
48 Expansion of Muslim rule in India contributed to the flourishing of vernacular languages in 
various parts of India, as it did in Bengal, for reasons that are too complex to fully elaborate here. 
However, we can point to two main reasons. First, Muslim rule challenged the dominance of 
older knowledge and education systems based on the Sanskrit language and a Brahminic 
monopoly. Second, Muslim rulers actively patronized vernacular languages for myriad reasons, 
not least because of their desire to gain legitimacy among the local indigenous population. 
(Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 2012) The formative role played by 
Muslim rule in the development of Bangla was first suggested by Bengali-Muslim linguist 
Muhammad Sahidullah in the 1930s. Historians Momtazur Rahman Tarafdar and Abdul Karim 
in the 1950s and literary historian Ahmad Sharif in the 1960s produced further arguments in this 
regard. Many of these arguments informed Richard Eaton’s seminal work, The Rise of Islam and 
the Bengal Frontier (1996), which argues a close association between the expansion of Islam and 




Between the cosmopolitan elite ashraf and the Bengali speaking peasant there existed a 
middle class composed mostly of clerics and religious scholars, office holders in civil and 
judicial bureaucracy, and sections of the peasantry with small land holdings or tax collection 
rights. The Muslim middle class was relatively small and weak even in the pre-British Muslim-
ruled Bengal as many middle-class positions in trade, banking and even government 
administration were occupied by non-Muslim groups, particularly by upper-caste Hindus.49 The 
British takeover made the position of the Muslim middle class in Bengal even more precarious 
during the early decades of the 19th century.50 Fundamental changes in land tenure and 
administrative and judicial structures instituted by the British eroded the economic and political 
bases of the traditional middle class and precipitated the rise of a new middle class, which, as 
discussed above, was dominated by upper-caste Hindus. The Bengal Muslims were unable and, 
to a degree, unwilling to find a place within this new middle class, which required different 
qualifications and social capital, i.e., secular English education.  
Culturally, the Muslim middle class of Bengal occupied an ambivalent position. Though 
the necessities of their practical lives and occupations demanded extensive interaction with and 
immersion among Bengali-speaking peasants, their social aspirations, particularly for the status 
of ashraf, often led them to disavow Bengali identity in favor of a claim of foreign ancestry. 
Though they were often Bangla speaking, they were invested in learning Urdu and Farsi, which 
boosted not only their claims of ashraf status but also their economic opportunities, at least until 
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of seven of the highest administrative positions in Nawab Ali Vardi’s cabinet were held by 
Hindus, while eighteen out of nineteen zamindars (landlords) were also Hindu. Nur Muhammad, 
Bongio Muslim Shomaj (2015). 
50 The deterioration of Muslim conditions under the British is a common argument advanced by 
Bangladeshi historians and commentators, who often cite W. W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans 




the mid-19th century. The desire to distinguish one’s social status through language was so strong 
that many Muslims of Bengal expressed preferences for Dobhasi, a creolized language with 
origins in Bangla and other foreign languages, over Bangla, when their proficiency in Urdu, 
Farsi, or Arabic was less than perfect.51 The disdain for Bangla among the Muslim middle class 
was an old phenomenon and one that was often criticized by many writers of medieval Bengal, 
most famously and scathingly by the 17th century poet Abdul Hakim.52 The disdain towards 
Bangla intensified over the course of the 19th century, perhaps as a reaction to the profound 
changes in Bangla language and literature produced by British rule. Despite being the spoken 
language of the vast majority and being patronized by the rulers, Bangla was not the medium of 
official or business communications during Muslim rule and consequently remained relatively 
unstandardized and heteronomous. The British preferred to use Bangla, instead of Farsi, as one 
of the official languages in addition to English, and they initiated a process of modernization and 
standardization in which the Hindu bhadralok of Calcutta emerged as the standard bearers of 
Bangla.  The language became increasingly aligned with Sanskrit and Brahminical culture. 53 As 
																																								 																				
51 For a social history of Bengal Muslims see Murshid, The Sacred and the Secular (1996), 
Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims (1981), and also Golam Kibria Bhuiyan, Banglay Muslim 
Modhdhobitto Srenir Bikash [Emergence and Development of Muslim Middle Class in Bengal, 
1885-1921] (Dhaka: Khan Brothers and Co., 2013). 
52 Abdul Hakim (1620-1690) in his poem “Bongobani” [The tale/speech of Bongo] argues that 
Bangla and not Arabic or Farsi should be the language of the Muslims of Bengal because God 
understands all languages. About those Muslims who having been born in Bengal nevertheless 
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are born.” Wakil Ahmad, Modhyajuge Bangla Kabyer Roop O Bhasha [Form and Language of 
Medieval Bengali Poetry] (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1994). 
53 See Sudipta Kaviraj’s The Imaginary Institution of India (2010) and particularly his essay 
“Writing, Speaking, Being” for a critical analysis of the emergence of linguistic identities in 
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a result, the negative attitudes of the Muslim middle class towards the language intensified 
during the 19th century. Shorn of intellectual, social, and political statuses, the Muslim middle 
class of Bengal sought refuge in the cultural identity of the upper ashraf and became politically 
and intellectually ineffectual for the greater part of the 19th century.  
 In the second half of the 19th century, especially after the spectacular failure of the 1857 
Sepoy Rebellion, Muslims in India generally reconciled with British rule and gradually became 
more amenable to English education. During this period Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) and 
the “Aligarh School” famously led the charge for expansion of education and reform of Indian 
Muslims. In Bengal such efforts were led by the likes of Nawab Abdul Latif (1823-1893) and 
Syed Ameer Ali (1849-1928) of the so-called “Calcutta School.” Though these men differed 
greatly in their opinions and politics, their efforts at educational reforms shared the goal of 
overcoming the “prejudice and exclusiveness of the Mohammedan community” by imbuing it 
with a desire for “Western learning and Progress” and by giving its members “an opportunity for 
the cultivation of social and intellectual intercourse with the best representatives of English and 
Hindu society.”54 By “Mohammedan community” they meant not any local community but a 
pan-Indian community of Muslims elites, who were finding themselves at politically and 
economically disadvantageous positions because of their lack of English education. Despite 
professing to strive for the “well-being” and “recognition of just and reasonable claims” of 
“Indian Mohammedans,” these reformers were generally uninterested in the fortunes or the 
“moral revival” of the mass of the Muslim population and restricted their education promotion 
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54 From sections of Abdul Latif’s autobiography; quoted by Bhuiyan, Banglay Muslim 




programs among the upper classes.55 These early reformers also stressed the need for the 
continuation of traditional Madrasa education by arguing that though English education was 
necessary for practical purposes, religious indoctrination and training in Arabic and Farsi 
language and literature were essential for preserving the identity and moral character of the 
community. While these reformers are primarily celebrated as the modernizers of Indian 
Muslims, they should also be recognized as key figures in producing and mobilizing Muslim 
communal identity in India. And, while their reform initiatives produced considerable expansion 
of English and Madrasa education among the Muslim elites and middle classes of India and 
Bengal, they did little to promote either mass education or vernacular language and literature.  
The emergence of the modern intelligentsia among Bengal Muslims at the turn of the 19th 
century had less to do with elite reform movements and more to do with the formation of a new 
middle class among Muslim peasants. The Bengal Permanent Settlement of 1793 instituted by 
the British created a class of landowners with full proprietary rights over large estates. However, 
in practice a complex system of revenue collection with multiple layers of intermediaries situated 
between the zamindar (the landowner) and the ryot (the man with the plough or the tiller of the 
land) developed. These intermediaries, generally referred to as the jotedars, directed agricultural 
activities in the villages and wielded considerable social and economic power.56 In addition, East 
Bengal’s deltaic geography and shifting rivers meant that the rural landscape was being 
constantly restructured through erosion of riverbanks and the generation of new landmasses, or 
chars, elsewhere. Formal proprietary rights in these chars were almost impossible to establish as 
they often lay outside of the state’s control or reach. These vast swaths of land, occupied and 
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settled by fierce individuals and kinship groups, supported a class of independent cultivators 
outside of the Permanent Settlement regime.57 In East Bengal the jotedars and independent 
cultivators were mostly Muslims and over the course of the 19th century constituted a rural 
Muslim middle class. By the turn of the 19th century this class had become relatively prosperous 
due to increases in the commodity value of their crops, particularly jute, and began to invest 
surplus income in higher education for their children and in various business ventures.58 Thus, by 
the early decades of the 20th century, a new urban Muslim middle class – which, unlike the 
traditional Muslim middle class, was deeply rooted in the agrarian economy and the peasant 
culture of eastern Bengal – emerged in mofussil towns, as well as in Calcutta.59  
The new urban middle class that emerged from the peasantry undertook a journey in the 
early decades of the 20th century from being Muslims of Bengal to becoming “Bengali-
Muslims.” This transformation in identity is critically important to understand because the new 
identity of Bengali-Muslims would eventually serve as the foundation for Bangladeshi 
nationalist identity and politics. Initially, however, the new urban middle class prioritized its 
Muslim identity and aligned itself with ashraf Muslims based on their shared religious identity. 
Such an alignment was produced partly because the emerging Muslim middle class of Bengal 
found itself competing with the already established Hindu urban middle class or the bhadralok 
for jobs and business opportunities. Economic competition exacerbated inter-communal 
differences, while fostering intra-communal solidarities. Moreover, by the end of the 19th century 
Calcutta’s bhadralok intelligentsia was articulating an idea of a “Bengali Culture” that was 
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simultaneously modern yet deeply Hinduized, that is to say Brahminical and Sanskritized.60 This 
Hinduized conception of Bengali cultural identity, in which Muslims of Bengal were constructed 
as foreigners, caused the new Muslim middle class to retract further into its Muslim communal 
identity.61 However, the new Muslim middle class could not be as hostile to Bangla as its 19th 
century predecessor, partly because Bangla was most obviously its mother tongue and partly 
because literacy in Bangla was now helpful in securing employment and conducting business. By 
the late 19th century and early 20th centuries, Muslims in Bengal were becoming literate not only 
in Arabic, Farsi, or English but also in Bangla! The increase in Bangla literacy facilitated a 
Bangla print culture among Bengal Muslims, which by the 1920s made way for the emergence of 
a distinct “Bengali-Muslim” literature and cultural identity.  
During the late 19th century, in the context of an emerging print culture and print 
capitalism in colonial India, Muslim writers and publishers embraced Bangla as the preferred 
language, which propelled publication of several influential journals and newspapers along with 
the outpouring of punthi literature.62 Printed in Calcutta’s Bat-tala presses and in small presses in 
mofussil towns, these publications constituted a separate and subaltern print culture, which was 
oriented towards Muslim peasants as its primary audience. These publications focused on 
facilitating wider and more effective dissemination of the message of Islam. Some of the writers 
and publications, most notably those associated with the Shudhakar Movement of 1889/90, were 
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Muslim poets in 18th and 19th centuries. Though the literature covered various themes from love 
stories to epics on war, the most common theme was the stories and legends about prophets and 




quite successful in their endeavors and were even politically influential. Their influence 
remained, however, confined mostly among the peasantry and failed to make any significant 
impression among the urban middle class.63 At the beginning, Muslim Bengali print culture 
embraced Bangla mostly as a medium of communication to spread Islamic reform and revivalist 
ideologies and campaigns among Bengali speaking Muslims, without necessarily embracing or 
promoting a Bengali cultural identity. However, even this limited acceptance of Bangla required 
reconstruction of Muslim identity to be based on adherences to and practices of theological, 
juridical, and ethical discourses and not on Perso-Turkic or Arabic cultural identities. Though 
this decoupling of Muslim identity from linguistic or cultural elements allowed for the 
possibilities for being Muslim and Bengali simultaneously, Bengali Muslim print culture 
continued to work within and reproduce the category of “Muslims of Bengal” well into the 20th 
century.  
One of the few Muslim writers who managed to challenge the subaltern and somewhat 
ghettoized status of Muslim Bengali literature in the 19th century was Mir Mosharraf Hossain 
(1847-1912), famous for his epic novel Bishad Shindu (1885-1891). Though Hossain’s works 
addressed themes common to other contemporary Muslim of Bengal writers and were greatly 
influenced by punthi literature, he broke into the mainstream literary scene of the bhadralok by 
adopting the modern genres of the novel and the play and by associating himself with 
mainstream publications.64 Following Hossain, a number of Muslim writers began to write in 
																																								 																				
63 See Anisuzzaman and Ahmad Sharif, eds., Bangla Shahityer Itihash [History of Bengali 
Literature] (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1987) and Ranabir Samaddar, Paradoxes of the 
Nationalist Time: Political Essays on Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press Ltd., 2002). 
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Bangla and ventured into modern literary genres aimed at urban middle-class audiences during 
the first two decades of the 20th century. During this period several journals and magazines were 
also established, most notably by Mohammad Akram Khan (1868-1968), in efforts to provide 
outlets for the burgeoning literary activities.65 Furthermore, the Bangiya Musalman Shahitya 
Shomiti was founded in 1911 in an effort to promote Bangla literacy and literature among the 
Muslims of Bengal. Despite these efforts, Muslim Bangla literature remained limited and weak 
until the end of the WWI as a majority of the Muslim middle and upper classes continued to 
view Bangla literature as being less prestigious and less worthy of engagement compared to Farsi 
or Urdu literature.  
In the years following World War I and throughout the 1920s, however, perhaps the most 
significant, shift occurred in the political and intellectual history of Muslim Bengal. Muslim 
writers and intellectuals of this period enthusiastically embraced not only Bangla language but 
also Bengali literary and cultural identity. This shift in attitude can be discerned from the 
activities and gestures of new periodicals like the Saogat, a literary magazine launched in 1918, 
and literary and cultural organizations like the Muslim Shahitya Somaj, founded in 1926. These 
periodicals and organizations provided intellectual and literary spaces for a new generation of 
progressive and modernist Muslim writers and intellectuals and reflected the attitudes and 
aspirations of an upwardly mobile and newly urbanized Muslim middle class.66 The literary and 
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65 Considered a pioneer of Bengali-Muslim journalism, Mohammad Akram Khan founded the 
Monthly Mohammadi in 1903, which became a weekly in 1908. He then went on to establish the 
monthly Al-Eslam (1915), the daily Shebok (1921), and the Daily Azad (1936). See ATM Atiqur 
Rahman, Banglar Rajnitite Maolana Akram Khan [Maolana Akram Khan in the Politics of 
Bengal], (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1994). 
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intellectual spaces, though intended to promote Muslim writers and oriented towards Muslim 
readers, were also self-consciously secular or non-communal and were committed to promote 
tolerance and cultural exchanges among Hindus and Muslims.67 The vast majority of the literary 
activities of the period were concerned with elevating the literature of Muslim Bengal from its 
ghettoized status through processes of refinement, which translated into adopting the tropes and 
conventions of the bhadralok literature. However, some writers, most notably Kazi Nazrul Islam, 
succeeded in infiltrating the standard Sanskritized and Hinduized Bengali language and literature 
into linguistic and cultural elements of the Bengal Muslims. In doing so they also succeeded in 
secularizing Islamic imageries and expressions. Overall, the1920s produced a literary and 
cultural space that was identifiably Muslim yet secular and increasingly part of mainstream 
Bengali culture.  
Several global and local factors may have facilitated this shift towards secularism and 
embracing Bengali identity among Muslim writers in Bengal. First, due to increased support by 
the colonial government, the urban middle class and the intelligentsia among the Bengal 
Muslims grew significantly during this period. Following the overturning of the first partition of 
Bengal in 1911, the British adopted a policy of courting Muslim support by increasing 
educational and employment opportunities in Muslim dominated Eastern Bengal. Particularly 
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important in this context was the founding of the University of Dhaka in 1921, which played a 
significant role not only in promoting secular higher education among Bengal Muslims but also 
in transforming Dhaka, which up until then had been little more than a provincial and dispirited 
mofussil town, into an vibrant intellectual and political center.68 Second, World War I and the 
Russian Revolution precipitated radical ideological changes throughout the world by spreading 
nationalism and communism. Bengali-Muslims, particularly those who participated in the war, 
were also deeply affected by these world-changing events and became interested in nationalist 
and egalitarian ideologies.69 Furthermore, the alliances constructed between Hindus and Muslims 
in the context of Gandhi’s Non-cooperation movement and the Khilafat movement also 
facilitated a departure from the communitarian politics of the previous decades. And finally and 
more proximately, the growing prestige of Bengali literature generally and the awarding of the 
Nobel Prize to Rabindranath Tagore particularly played significant roles in attracting a growing 
number of Muslim writers to the folds of Bengali literature.70  
A confluence of factors produced a critical juncture in the intellectual and political 
history of Muslim Bengal in the 1920s, when the Bengali-Muslim middle-class intelligentsia 
could finally break free of the cultural holds of the ashraf Muslims and the consequent 
veneration of Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu literature and culture and to proclaim Bengali to be their 
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autochthonous cultural identity. The 1920s marked an inauguration of the Bengali-Muslim 
identity. Due to the expansion and reconfiguration of the middle class and the expansion of 
literacy and institutions of higher education, sociologically speaking, the modern intelligentsia 
emerges among Bengal Muslims only in the 20th century. More importantly, only during this 
period did the Muslim intelligentsia begin to grapple with the question of cultural identity, which 
had become available globally as a conceptual category only in the preceding decades.71 In 
efforts to conceptualize their cultural identity the Muslim intelligentsia of Bengal began to 
construct the category of Bengali-Muslim, which on the one hand recognized the primacy of 
Bengali linguistic and cultural identity but on the other sought to produce distinctions from the 
Bengali identity of the Calcutta bhadralok by emphasizing both religious and regional 
differences. The Bengali-Muslim identity inaugurated in the 1920s by young Muslim 
intellectuals continued to develop in the subsequent decades in complex and interesting ways as 
it interacted with the identities and politics of Bengali, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi nationalism. 
This complex unfolding of the Bengali-Muslim identity constitutes a major theme of discussions 
presented in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. There I will revisit the lives and careers 
of some of the important actors who produced this formative moment in Bangladesh’s history.  
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An Outline of a Political History of Pakistan and Bangladesh  
The interwar period (1919-1939) was tumultuous globally and for colonial India. Among 
the myriad historic developments, perhaps the most significant was the beginning of colonial 
India’s mass politics. Politics in colonial India had hitherto consisted of either lobbying and 
petitioning by the elites hoping to secure economic benefits and political concessions from the 
colonial government or of acts of violence carried out by small groups with the intention of 
terrorizing the colonizing power.72 Anti-colonial and nationalist politics in India went through a 
qualitative shift after WWI with the emergence of mass movements of resistance and rebellions, 
exemplified by Gandhi’s Non-cooperation movement.73 These mass movements were 
accompanied by gradual expansion of representative government and the franchise, instituted by 
the colonial government either as political concessions or as strategic maneuverings. The 
introduction of electoral politics and the institution of separate electorates for Hindus and 
Muslims transformed the nature of politics in colonial India by making numbers the most 
important political factor and by solidifying political identities along markers of religion and 
caste. The political dynamics of the interwar period determined the postcolonial future of British 
India, which as we know would eventually be partitioned into the states of Pakistan and India. 
The political history of Bengali-Muslims is located within and shaped by these macro processes. 
We need to, however, also pay attention to the particularities of Bengal politics during this 
period and treat them not just as regional or local manifestations of all-India politics. Focusing 
on the particularities of Bengal politics is especially warranted if we are to appreciate the 
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historical contingencies that led to the second partition of Bengal and East Bengal’s inclusion in 
Pakistan.  
Though “Muslim separatism” is often offered as one of the main causes of the partition of 
India and Bengal, this narrative needs to be contested. In the all-India context, apprehensions 
about the status of “minority” motivated much of the Muslim support for Pakistan. In Muslim 
majority provinces of Bengal and Punjab, however, the political dynamics were much different.74 
With the introduction of electoral politics in the 1930s, Bengali-Muslims, who constituted the 
majority of Bengal, became a powerful political bloc despite their relative economic and 
educational “backwardness” compared to Bengali-Hindus. This new political advantage along 
with the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia’s embrace of Bengali identity from the 1920s meant that 
Bengali-Muslims were conflicted and ambivalent about a partition of Bengal and separation from 
Bengali-Hindus. Bengali-Muslim’s support for Pakistan, though proved to be decisive in the end, 
was neither inevitable nor unequivocal; nor was there a consensus about the idea of Pakistan.75  
Bengali-Muslim politics in the 1930s and early 1940s, as exemplified by A.K. Fazlul 
Huq’s Praja Party, was motivated more by peasant class concerns than by communal interests. 
Though the Praja Party, because the vast majority of Bengal peasants were Muslims, was a de-
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facto Muslim majority organization, it was explicitly secular or non-communal and drew support 
and membership from many non-Muslim groups, particularly from lower-caste Hindus. In the 
election for the first Bengal Legislative Assembly in 1937 the reconstituted Krishak-Praja Party 
(KPP) won 35 seats and the Bengal Muslim League won 40, while independent candidates won 
42 other “Muslim seats”. As the numbers suggest the political parties were relatively equal in 
strength and no party exerted hegemonic control. The postelection intrigues, however, produced 
a coalition between the KPP and the Muslim League not so much as a result of communal 
solidarity but as a result of pragmatic political calculations. The coalition was invited to form a 
government and the Congress became the opposition party despite winning more seats (54) than 
other party. Fazlul Huq became the head of the government and the first prime minister of 
Bengal despite his party winning fewer seats than either the Congress or the Muslim League. 
This points not only to Huq’s own stature as a leader but also to the importance and vibrancy of 
peasant politics in Bengal.76  
 The second and last election of the Bengal Legislative Assembly was held in 1946. This 
time the Muslim league won 110 seats out of 117 Muslim reserved seats and the KPP won only 
four, of which two belonged to Huq himself as he contested successfully from two 
constituencies. The League received 95% of the total Muslim urban vote and 84.6% of the 
Muslim rural vote. The demise of the KPP and Huq and the ascendency of the Muslim League to 
become the sole representative of Muslims of Bengal ultimately paved the way for the creation 
of Pakistan and the partition of Bengal.77 If the KPP and its brand of politics had not collapsed so 
spectacularly, the history of Bengal and perhaps the entire Indian subcontinent would have 
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unfolded much differently. Thus, the question of what caused the fall of KPP and the rise of the 
Muslim League in Bengal remains a central question in the Bangladeshi and South Asian 
historiography. Bangladeshi historian Taz Hashmi has argued that the collapse of the KPP and 
rise of the Muslim League in the 1940s resulted from the increasing “communalization of class 
struggle” and construction of Pakistan as a “peasant utopia.”78 Communalization of class politics 
was certainly a factor in enlisting peasant support for the Pakistan movement and might have 
motivated a section of the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia, particularly those with strong peasant 
roots and left-leaning politics. Multiple other factors also contributed to the fall of the KPP and 
the rise of the Bengal Muslim League. The weak organizational base of the KPP, factional 
competition and maneuvering among Bengali-Muslim leaders, the failure of Fazlul Huq’s 
leadership, and interference by the colonial government explained the changing fortunes of the 
two political organizations.79  
 The dominance of the Muslim League in Bengal politics did not, however, automatically 
translate into support for Pakistan, not at least for the kind of Pakistan that Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah, the Quaid-E-Azam, and others were envisioning elsewhere in British India. The rise of 
the Bengal Muslim League and its overwhelming victory in the 1946 election owed a great deal 
to the leadership, political acumen, and organizational skills of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and 
Abul Hashim, both of whom were deeply skeptical of Jinnah and the central leadership of the All 
India Muslim League and their idea of Pakistan. Suhrawardy, Hashim, and other Bengali-
Muslim political leaders, however, supported the demand for Pakistan because they understood 
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Pakistan to represent possibilities for creating multiple states, possibly federated, out of the 
dissolution of British India. One of the sovereign post-colonial states would have been a unified 
Bengal, possibly including Assam and other parts of Eastern India, which would represent 
Bengali cultural/national identity while allowing for substantial political power for the Bengali-
Muslim majority. United Bengal remained a realistic possibility even as late as May of 1947, a 
mere three months before its eventual failure and consequent partition of Bengal. 80  
Arguably, the most significant factor behind the failure of the United Bengal movement 
had to do with the insufficient development of an idea of a Bengali nation, which could have 
provided the ideological foundation of the new state. Lacking any ideological foundation for 
unity, Hindus and Muslims of Bengal had become increasingly hostile to each other based on 
their real and perceived differences of interests. The underdevelopment of Bengali nationalism 
and the lack of unity among Bengali Muslims and Hindus contributed to the subordination of 
local Bengal politics to the demands of the political contests between the Muslim League and the 
Indian National Congress (INC) for control of the post-colonial future. The imperial ambitions of 
the central leadership of these organizations and their failure to successfully negotiate or share 
power with each other produced the political crises of the 1940s, which increasingly produced an 
inevitable partition of British India.81 Given the choices that Bengal would either become a 
unified independent state or become divided into two parts with one side joining India and the 
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other Pakistan, the majority of Congress leaders chose the latter option. In their efforts to 
establish a United Bengal, Bengali-Muslim leaders were joined by some progressive Bengali-
Hindu politicians like Sarat Bose, brother of Subhash Bose. A majority of Bengali-Hindu leaders 
from the Congress party, however, strongly opposed the idea of an independent unified Bengal, 
fearing that Bengali-Hindus would be dominated by the Muslim majority in the new state. 
Consequently, Bengali-Hindu leaders pushed for a partition of Bengal that they so vehemently 
fought a few decades ago.82 The ashraf elements of the Muslim leadership, particularly those 
associated with Dhaka’s Nawab family, prioritized a unified Muslim state of Pakistan at the 
expense of a unified Bengal. And, in the end, leaders like Suhrawardy and Hashim capitulated 
not only to the ashraf leaders of Bengal but ultimately to the personality and will of the Quaid 
and to the idea of responsibility towards the “Muslim Community.” In the absence of any 
coherent Bengali nationalist ideology, communal identities prevailed on both sides.  
The creation of the new states of India and Pakistan produced profoundly contradictory 
effects. On the one hand the partition caused massive violence, loss of lives, and displacements, 
deeply traumatic events for millions across South Asia.83 On the other hand it also produced a 
sense of optimism and euphoria that touched even the peasants living in the far-flung corners. In 
Eastern Bengal, the sense of jubilation was particularly high among the rural masses, who 
viewed the establishment of Pakistan not only as the birth of an independent state but also as a 
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promise of freedom from economic exploitation by their Hindu landlords.84 The Bengali-Muslim 
middle class was also generally enthusiastic about Pakistan for its creation represented increased 
opportunities for professional advancement and other economic gains. Yet, in Bengal, perhaps 
more than in other places of South Asia, the partition tore apart the whole social fabric as friends, 
families, and neighbors suddenly found themselves on different sides of the new political border. 
For the Bengali-Muslim middle class the loss of Calcutta, the center of its intellectual and 
political activities, was particularly destabilizing. Many Bengali-Muslim intellectuals and 
politicians simply stayed back in Calcutta instead of migrating to the state they played major 
parts in making, while some others made the move reluctantly and belatedly.85 Such a partition 
was so unfathomable that even years after its occurrence, many continued to insist that it would 
not be sustainable or permanent.86 Historian Ayesha Jalal has argued that perhaps no one, not 
even ardent supporters, really wanted the Pakistan that actually emerged in that confusing and 
bloody summer of 1947.87 Yet, after the creation of the new state, there was no alternative left 
but to work through the many contradictions and crises that plagued the new state from the 
moment of its inception.  
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The partition of British India into two states involved demarcating territories and 
distributing people, institutions, infrastructure, and other resources. After the dust of partition 
had settled, it became apparent that while Pakistan gained a strong military, it acquired a 
relatively weak civil bureaucracy and severely malnourished industrial economy.88 Building up 
the state and its economy thus became the immediate and paramount task facing leaders of the 
new country. This task was made exceedingly difficult by the challenge of accommodating five 
to seven million Muslim refugees coming in from various places in India and the severe shortage 
of administrative personnel and human capital caused by the departure of up to ten million 
Hindus from Pakistan. The war with India over control of Kashmir in 1947-48, the subsequent 
political and military conflicts and the effects of Cold War politics only compounded the 
challenge of governance in the new state. But perhaps, the most difficult and important challenge 
was adopting a constitution that would produce national cohesion and a governing structure for a 
country that did not even have territorial contiguity; its western and eastern wings were separated 
by more than a thousand miles of Indian territory and profound ethno-linguistic differences. All 
these challenges became much harder to tackle because of the loss of authoritative leadership, 
first by the death of Jinnah in 1948 and then by the assassination of his deputy and Pakistan’s 
first prime minister Liquat Ali Khan in 1951. Their deaths produced a crisis of leadership and the 
intensification and public displays of factional and regional conflicts among the political stratum 
of Pakistan. 89  
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For the most part Pakistani political events can be analyzed as the unfolding of tensions 
between the two most prominent factions within the ruling strata. On the one hand there were the 
politicians, fragmented into the ranks of landlords, urban professionals, and capitalists and on the 
other hand were the state functionaries, divided between the civil-bureaucracy and the military.90 
The complex negotiations of interests among these factions were compounded by the distance 
and differences between the western and the eastern wing of the country. West Pakistani leaders, 
in particular Punjabi politicians, were fearful that in a parliamentary system, politicians from 
East Bengal, which contained 54 percent of Pakistan’s population, would dominate national 
politics. The apprehension about representative government was also shared by the ashraf 
segments of the East Bengal leadership, who feared that in a democratic system they might lose 
ground to their middle-class counterparts. These apprehensions about democracy and fear of 
regional dominance made consensus for a constitution difficult to achieve. A constitution was 
finally adopted in 1956, after nine years of negotiations and foot-dragging. However, the failure 
of leadership and the crisis of governance during Pakistan’s early years produced an opening for 
the emergence in 1958 of Ayub Khan as the military strongman bringing order and stability to 
the country.91  
A major source of political tension in Pakistan was the profound ambivalence regarding 
the concept of the nation. The nation that Jinnah and other makers of Pakistan had advanced was 
constructed upon an abstract notion of being Muslim in India, instead of more concrete ties of 
blood and soil. In fact, the founders of Pakistan viewed existing ethno-linguistic identities as 
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sources of division within, instead of the foundations of, the nation.92 The challenge for the 
founders of Pakistan was to produce national unity among ethnically and linguistically diverse 
groups.93 Many proponents of Pakistan, most notably Abul A’la Mawdudi of Jamaat-e-Islam, 
argued that national unity could only be achieved by constructing Pakistan as an ideological 
state, with Islam the foundational state ideology.94 The more secular-minded leaders of the 
Muslim League, however, resisted making Pakistan an Islamic state. Yet they failed to propose 
an alternative ideological foundation. In this ideological void, the founders of Pakistan sought to 
produce national cohesion by imposing artificial linguistic uniformity, making Urdu the only 
official language. The founders reasoned that since Urdu was not the mother tongue of any of the 
major ethno-linguistic groups, making it the official language would require Pakistanis overcome 
their particular ethno-linguistic identities and become national subjects. 95 This move, however, 
failed to produce its desired effects and instead inflamed the politics of regionalism not only in 
East Bengal but also in regions of West Pakistan. 
In East Bengal, political forces had joined together under the banner of the Muslim 
League for the common goal of Pakistan, giving the party near absolute hold over the region’s 
politics by 1946. However, once the new state came into place such political alliances were 
unnecessary and untenable, opening rifts within and ultimately causing the demise of the party. 
The party’s leadership positions had been captured by the ashraf politicians during the 
tumultuous period of the Partition, with Khawja Nazimuddin of Dhaka’s Nawab family in the 
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lead. As the Muslim league became the ruling party after independence, these leaders became the 
new rulers of East Bengal and part of the ruling circle of Pakistan.96 Despite formally 
representing East Bengal, however, these leaders socially and culturally belonged more to the 
pan-India Muslim elite. The political loyalties and interests of the ashraf leaders aligned more 
perfectly with the central power of Pakistan rather than with the regional interests of East 
Bengal. Muslim League leaders’ hostile response to the movement demanding to make Bangla a 
Pakistani state language was one of the early and clear indicators of the new rulers’ antipathy 
towards a population they supposedly represented. In the process of consolidating their power, 
the ashraf elites marginalized the Muslim League leaders with progressive political agendas and 
with more regional appeal and popularity among the middle class in East Bengal.97  
Having been pushed to the sidelines, some veteran leaders and most younger political 
activists in East Bengal became disillusioned with the Muslim League within a short period. By 
1949 many broke with the Muslim League and formed a new party, the Awami Muslim League, 
which was renamed the Awami League (AL) in 1953, under the leadership of Maolana Bhashani, 
Shamsul Huq, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman among others. Suhrawardy and Hashim, who had 
both stayed back in West Bengal after the partition, moved to Dhaka in 1950. While Suhrawardy 
joined and took up the leadership of the newly formed Awami Muslim League, Hashim floated a 
new political organization by the name of Khilafat-e-Rabbani Party. In 1953 some of the more 
leftwing and communist-leaning members of the Muslim League broke with the party and 
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formed yet another new political party, the Ganatantri Dal, under the leadership of legendary 
peasant organizer Haji Muhammad Danesh. Meanwhile, A.K. Fazlul Huq, who had been 
relegated to playing a second-tier role after the collapse of the KPP in 1946, sought to re-enter 
the political limelight in 1953 by reviving his old party under a new name, the Krishak Sramik 
Party (KSP). By the time the first election for the provincial legislative council of East Bengal in 
the post-independence era was held in 1954, most Bengali-Muslim leaders had virtually 
abandoned the Muslim League, causing the party to suffer a total defeat in the election. While 
the Muslim League managed to win only 10 of 309 seats, the coalition of parties assembled 
under the banner of the United Front won 233 seats.98  
The proliferation of new political parties in East Bengal in the early 1950s indicated the 
widespread disillusionment with the Muslim League and highlighted the differences in political 
programs and personalities contained within the old Muslim League. These disparate political 
factions, however, soon realized that their forces had to be aligned if they were to overcome the 
hegemonic hold of the Muslim League. Thus came the United Front, which included the Awami 
League, the Krishak Sramik Party, and the Ganatantri Dal, as well as the Nizam-e-Islam. The 
United Front was, however, another example of an uneasy and unsustainable coalition. It was 
united by the minimum program of defeating the Muslim League but did not manage to work 
through policy and ideological differences to produce real unity. Even its famous 21-Point 
Program was not fully agreed upon by all factions. And there had been many secret negotiations 
and agreements among the various leaders of the United Front, which fundamentally undermined 
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many of the objectives of its publicized platform.99 Despite its massive electoral victory the 
United Front government barely survived two months because of the political differences and the 
conflicting personal ambitions of its leaders and factions. Though many United Front leaders 
would later occupy ministerial posts in the provincial and central governments and build upon 
their electoral mandate, the United Front government and parliamentary democracy in general 
came to an end with the dissolution of Chief Minister Huq’s cabinet and the imposition of 
governor’s rule on May 29, 1954.100  
Though the United Front proved to be a failure in government, its massive electoral 
victory – particularly of the Awami League, the largest partner in the coalition with 143 seats – 
reflected the rising regional consciousness and arguably a nascent Bengali nationalism among 
the electorate. The first of the Front’s 21-Point Program was a demand to recognize Bangla as 
one of the state languages of Pakistan, a demand that had galvanized the populace of East 
Bengal, particularly its student body, from the early days of Pakistan’s inception.  After the 
violent response of the government in February of 1952, this demand took on a central place in 
East Bengal’s politics and served as a unifying force behind the United Front.101 Though the 
1956 Constitution of Pakistan and other government edicts recognized Bangla as a state language 
and fulfilled few other demands of the 21-point Program, the aspirations for East Bengal regional 
autonomy and for economic and political parity between the eastern and the western wings of 
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Pakistan were reflected in support for the United Front. Those aspirations would remain 
unrealized until the very end.102  
Ayub Khan’s coup d’état in 1958 suspended the constitution only after two years of its 
existence, and his military-bureaucratic regime governed Pakistan with an unequivocal 
authoritarian grip, promising political order, national unity, and economic development. While 
GDP growth and other macroeconomic indicators point to a period of relative economic 
prosperity, his regime nullified much of the previous decade’s gains in democratic politics, as 
modest as they may had been. Under Ayub’s rule, political power and economic wealth in 
Pakistan became ever more concentrated, with his cronies and the military establishment 
becoming the chief beneficiaries. Job opportunities and other benefits of an expanding economy 
were distributed, by and large, as patronages for securing support for the regime. In order to put 
democratic veneer on his authoritarian rule, Ayub introduced the system of “Basic Democracy,” 
which did away with universal suffrage and established a mechanism for indirect elections for 
national offices.103 The electorate in this Basic democracy scheme was composed of a limited 
number of local level political figures, who were suspected of being manipulated through 
patronage and favors and consequently provided the strongest support base for the regime. The 
regime also courted support from members of the middle-class intelligentsia by bestowing upon 
them awards and titles and by installing them in prestigious positions in newly created academic 
and cultural institutions.104 And finally, despite Ayub modeling himself as a Kemalist 
modernizer, his regime sought to produce legitimacy for itself and for the Pakistani state by 
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politicizing Islam.105 This is not to suggest that Pakistan became an Islamic state in the sense that 
it adopted sharia as the law of the land or came to be ruled by the ulema. Rather Islam was used 
to serve the interest of a state that never disavowed its inherent secularism, i.e., its claim to 
sovereignty. The Ayub regime sought to produce an Islamic cultural identity as the national 
culture of Pakistan, one that sought to subordinate, if not erase, regional cultural identities. In 
practice this meant justifying authoritarian state practices of social engineering and control in the 
name of Pakistani national unity, which in turn was legitimized as the bulwark protecting not 
only Muslims of South Asia but also Islam itself. Perhaps, Ayub was just less ambivalent and 
more efficient in his “opportunistic Islamization” than his predecessors at the helm of 
Pakistan.106 
One of the significant effects of Ayub’s cronyism was that it compounded the political 
tension between East and West Pakistan through policies that systematically discriminated 
against East Pakistan and disproportionately favored West Pakistani, particularly Punjabi, 
economy and population. As a consequence, notwithstanding the support he enjoyed from his 
client classes and some popular support produced by his personality cult, Ayub faced opposition 
in East Pakistan, where his regime was viewed not only as authoritarian rule but also as an 
instrument of West Pakistani domination.107 By the second half of the 1960s the opposition to 
Ayub’s regime began to find expressions in concrete political movements and campaigns in East 
Pakistan. Discourses of Bengali literature and culture (shahitya and sonskriti), which articulated 
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and emphasized the cultural distinctiveness of East Pakistan, became increasingly politicized 
during this period and frequently clashed with Ayub’s project of producing hegemonic national 
culture.108 By 1966 the Awami League, now led by young and charismatic Sheik Mujibur 
Rahman, launched the historic Six-Point campaign demanding complete political, economic, and 
cultural autonomy of East Pakistan, leaving only matters of military defense and international 
relations in the hands of the federal government of Pakistan. Also by the late 1960s, perhaps in 
keeping with the spirit of the time, a significant part of the student population of East Pakistan, 
as well as in West Pakistan, embraced left-wing revolutionary politics. Ayub Regime’s heavy-
handed response to the political movements against him, in particular the persecution of Mujib 
and other AL leaders on conspiracy charges, not only served to galvanize popular opposition to 
his regime but also established Mujib, now dubbed Bangabondhu or the Friend of Bengal, as the 
most authoritative leader of East Pakistan.109 In 1969 a people’s uprising, involving not only 
urban middle class but also peasants, industrial workers, and state functionaries, both in the 
Eastern and the Western wings of Pakistan forced the “benevolent dictator” to abdicate power. 
His successor, Yahia Khan, was mandated with restoring parliamentary democracy.110  
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In the run up to the first election for the national assembly of independent Pakistan, 23 
years after the birth of the country, there was much excitement and optimism. However, there 
were also anxieties and apprehensions among West Pakistani political leaders about sharing 
national power with or worse yet being dominated by politicians from more populous East 
Pakistan. They were particularly worried that while multiple political parties vied for power in 
West Pakistan, the Awami League had established a near monopolistic hold in political 
representation of East Pakistan.111 In any case, the elections were held in December 1970. The 
Awami League enjoyed a landslide victory, securing 288 out of 300 seats in East Pakistan’s 
Provincial Assembly and 167 out of 169 seats in the National Assembly allotted for East 
Pakistan. The Pakistan People’s Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as the winner in West 
Pakistan securing 83 seats of the national assembly and winning an overwhelming majority in 
provincial assemblies of Punjab and Sindh. The National Awami Party led by Wali Khan 
performed well in the former North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, winning a majority 
in the provincial assemblies of both states. The once hegemonic Muslim League was now 
divided in many factions, and most religious outfits, except Jamiat Ulema Islam, suffered heavy 
electoral defeats.112 The election results laid bare the regional schisms in Pakistani politics with 
each party dominating their own region but unable to make any inroads beyond. The Awami 
League, despite securing an absolute majority in the National assembly, failed to win a single 
seat in West Pakistan. Failure of any one party to claim a national mandate and the failure of the 
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parties to reach a consensus about sharing power and forming the next national government 
triggered a political crisis that would escalate over the next three months, culminating in the 
nine-month-long liberation war of Bangladesh.  
The liberation war was fought between the Pakistani Army and the Mukti Bahini 
[Liberation Force], a guerilla force composed of Bengali personnel from the Pakistani Army, the 
Police, and the Border Guard, as well as a large number of civilian volunteers, particularly young 
university students. The Mukti Bahini was under the formal command of the temporary 
government of Bangladesh, formed on April 17, 1971 by the Awami League leaders, who had 
managed to survive the initial offensive by the Pakistani Army on March 26th and escape to 
India. The Mukti Bahini were trained, armed, and supported by the Indian Army, which 
eventually joined the war directly on December 6th, to force the defeat of the Pakistani Army on 
December 16th, 1971. The war was one of the more devastating conflicts of the 20th century. 
Despite the difficulties in ascertaining actual numbers and despite the hyperbolic arguments and 
counter arguments by those with vested interests, it is reasonable to argue that genocidal violence 
and extreme atrocities were committed by the Pakistani Army.113 The discussion of why such a 
bloody war took place and who should bear the responsibility for the atrocities and devastation 
has produced a cottage industry of historical analysis, with many commentators – including 
academics from both inside and outside of Bangladesh – still trapped in wartime partisan 
narratives. A critical evaluation of this literature and a meaningful analysis of the complex 
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history of the war are beyond the scope of the current discussion. However, I want to offer a 
caution against the kind of teleological reading of the war advanced by Bangladeshi nationalists 
and others who construct the war as the inevitable outcome of the conflict between Bengali 
nationalism and Pakistani neo-colonial domination.114 The war was a much more historically 
contingent event determined as much by geopolitical calculations of global and regional powers 
in the context of the Cold War as by actions and initiatives of local actors.115  
After independence Mujib, who was in a Pakistani prison for the entirety of the Liberal 
War, was hailed as Father of the Nation and became the first president of Bangladesh. The 
Awami League became the official ruling party. Representatives elected in the 1970 election 
assumed the mandate to serve as the constituent assembly and produced a relatively progressive 
constitution for Bangladesh within a year.116 Though the constitution articulated most democratic 
and egalitarian ideals as the founding principles of the new state, the re-construction of state 
apparatuses and mechanisms of governance remained far from complete. Recovering from the 
tremendous loss of lives and the devastation caused by the war posed the greatest of challenges. 
Poverty and unemployment were deep and widespread and exacerbated by natural disasters and 
rampant corruption. Bangladesh’s difficulties culminated in a devastating famine in 1974. The 
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question of how to address the “collaborators” who had opposed the Liberation War or actively 
supported the Pakistani Army proved to be a complex and contentious issue, particularly because 
many of them were to be absorbed into the military and the civil bureaucracy of the new state. 
Moreover, many former members of the guerilla force, now greeted as freedom fighters, had not 
laid down their arms at the conclusion of the war and sought to use their arms as well as their 
status as freedom fighters to secure political and personal gains. The radical left factions, many 
of whom participated in the war outside of the command of the Awami League-controlled Mukti 
Bahini, posed a particularly difficult challenge as they sought to push the struggle for national 
liberation to the next stage and produce radical revolutionary transformations of society.117  
In the face of these challenges, Mujib and the Awami League struggled to assert effective 
control over the country, relying mostly on the charismatic authority of Mujib and politics of 
patronage. Mujib became increasingly authoritarian in his bid to maintain control of the country. 
The Jatiya Rakshi Bahini, formed in February 1972 as a paramilitary force personally loyal to 
Mujib, was draconian in its efforts to produce political order, violently responding not only to 
armed insurgencies but also to political opposition to the regime. Mujib and the ruling Awami 
League’s lack of tolerance for political opposition became apparent during the first general 
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election of Bangladesh in 1973, when the ruling party abused state power and employed dubious 
means to capture 292 seats in the 300-seat parliament. This massive electoral victory, however, 
did not prove to be helpful in either producing legitimacy for the regime or in coping with the 
socio-economic crises facing the country. As discontent and opposition to his regime increased, 
Mujib responded first by declaring a state of emergency, then by discarding parliamentary 
democracy in favor of presidential rule, and finally by instituting a single party regime and 
banning all other political parties. 118 These moves did not succeed in placating the opposition, 
which now denied opportunities for legitimate expression turned more to violent insurgencies 
and conspiracies.119 
On August 15, 1975 the Mujib regime was overthrown by a coup d’état organized by 
factions of the military and disgruntled members of the Awami League, including members of 
Mujib’s own cabinet.120 Mujib, along with most members of his family and personal staff, were 
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brutally murdered that day. Some of his key allies and deputies were imprisoned and later 
assassinated in jail. The coup produced a period of extreme political instability and violence, in 
which several coups and counter coups followed each other as different factions vied to control 
the country. At the end a sepoy-jonota biplob [uprising of soldiers and the people] on November 
7, 1975 helped Major-General Ziaur Rahman to emerge as the de-facto ruler, who then formally 
assumed power first as the chief martial law administrator on November 30, 1976 and then as the 
president on April 21, 1977.121 In a bid to secure his rule Zia relied heavily upon the civil-
military bureaucratic elite, who were installed in key positions at the national and local level. In 
doing so Zia essentially reproduced an authoritarian administrative state similar to the one that 
Ayub Khan had presided over.122 And like Ayub, Zia also sought to produce democratic 
legitimacy for his rule by holding referendums and elections, whose openness and credibility 
remain questionable.123 He also launched a political party of his own, The Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) in 1979, which came to be composed of diverse and conflicting factions 
– disaffected members of the Awami League, members of left wing political parties that were 
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sidelined during the Awami League’s ascendency in the 1960s, and members of conservative 
Islamist parties that were outlawed after independence for their opposition to the Liberation War 
and collaboration with the Pakistani Army. Though Zia’s regime produced mixed results in terms 
of bringing political order and economic development, he personally remained popular because 
of his perceived honesty and hard work. Yet, his personal appeal was not, as it was not for 
Mujib, enough to contain the contradictions and conflicts among different political factions. 
Even the military, his strongest base, lacked any genuine cohesiveness; there were 19 abortive 
coups between 1977 and 1981.124 The last of these abortive coups, on May 30, 1981, claimed the 
life of President Zia.  
After Zia’s sudden death, vice-president Abdus Sattar became president and continued 
with support from Zia loyalists among the civil-military bureaucracy. Old and frail, he failed to 
assert leadership over the country and was removed from office within a year through a blood-
less coup by the then army chief of staff Hussain Muhammad Ershad. The new military dictator 
followed the pattern of military rule that by then had become well established and predictable – 
mixing up oppressive measures with democratic overtures, setting up a political party to produce 
an organizational base and to dress the government in civilian clothes, and politicizing religion to 
mask the lack of an ideological foundation. However, Ershad was more successful than his 
predecessor Zia in consolidating power, particularly within the army, which in turn provided 
some measure of political order and a platform for economic development. The relative stability 
and prosperity of the Ershad regime was, however, severely undercut by rampant corruption and 
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clientelism, which produced widespread dissatisfaction and resentment. Political mobilization 
against the regime started as soon as Ershad lifted martial law and allowed political activities. 
The Awami League, now headed by Sheik Hasina, one of two surviving daughters of Mujib, and 
the BNP, headed by Khaleda Zia, the widow of General Zia, emerged as the most formidable 
challengers to Ershad’s newly constituted Jatiya party. Though the Ershad regime claimed 
landslide victories in presidential and parliamentary elections by blatantly rigging the system, it 
faced increasing popular resistances and agitations. The situation became particularly volatile in 
1987, but he managed to survive by employing strong-arm tactics. However, he failed to survive 
the next wave of popular agitation in 1990 because by then he had lost support of not only the 
civil-military bureaucracy but also crucially of Western powers like the United States, which 
found little use for military strongmen in third world countries at the end of the Cold War.125 
General Ershad stepped down on December 6, 1990 handing over power to an interim 
“caretaker” government headed by the Chief Justice Sahabuddin Ahmed. It was a momentous 
occasion in Bangladeshi political history because it marked the beginning of the new democratic 
era and a transfer of power without a coup where the deposed leader was allowed to live. By 
most accounts the caretaker government functioned admirably by fulfilling its mandate to hold a 
free and fair election, in which the BNP emerged as the surprise winner. Since then Bangladesh 
has been more or less ruled by democratically elected governments and there have been several 
transfers of power based on elections that were generally free, fair, and with a high degree of 
participation. There is a sense among ordinary people that voting and other forms of political 
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participation matter. Despite widely shared views about the corruption and hypocrisy of the 
political leaders, people continue to express active support for the mainstream political parties. 
 Democracy in Bangladesh, however, remains highly precarious. The ruling parties have 
invariably used their political power to enrich their members and in the process made corruption 
a systemic feature of the political economy of Bangladesh. And since party affiliation matters for 
everything from university admissions to job placement to government contracts, all major 
institutions in Bangladesh, including the military and the judiciary, have become increasingly 
divided along party lines.126 And since being in government is not simply about political power 
but very blatantly about economic opportunities and livelihoods, ruling parties have been 
reluctant about transferring power and opposition parties have often resorted to the most extreme 
means to force the hand of the ruling party. The situation was so bad in 2007 that the military 
forced the then ruling party BNP to relinquish power by declaring a state of emergency. The 
military refrained from assuming power itself, however, choosing instead to install a consensus 
civilian government. The military backed emergency government ruled for two years to “restore 
order” before handing over power to democratically elected representatives. The current ruling 
party, the Awami League, is showing no sign of departing from the established pattern. Through 
a combination of legal and extra-legal maneuvering the AL government has virtually neutralized 
the opposition parties and continues to rule the country based on the mandate of the last two 
general elections, which have been criticized by local and international observers for being 
rigged and pre-determined.127 In the face of criticisms of its undemocratic practices, corruption, 
abuse of power, and human rights violations, the AL government has responded by restricting 
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freedom of press and speech. The country seems to be heading towards a single-party 
authoritarian rule. Yet, the regime has not faced mass movements or other major challenges to its 
rule perhaps because, despite all, the economy is growing at a mind-boggling pace of 7.2% per 
year.  




The Bengali-Muslim Thought-World: Trends, Tensions, and Negotiations  
 The question of how to characterize the general intellectual tendencies of Bengali 
Muslims has animated scholars and commentators from East and West Bengal for more than half 
a century. Arguably, the 1947 partition of Bengal inspired and motivated many of the studies that 
have inquired about the mon [mind], manos [mentality/psyche], chinta-chorcha [thought-
practices], and buddhi-britti [intellectual practices] of Bengali Muslims. For many scholars and 
commentators from Western Bengal, understanding the Bengali-Muslim mind was motivated by 
a desire to understand Bengali-Muslims as the existential other of Bengali-Hindus and to make 
sense of the communal politics of the 20th century that had led to the partition of Bengal.128 
Intellectuals and scholars from East Bengal were also motivated by the partition but not so much 
as an event that needed explanation but as an event that produced the possibilities for inquiring 
about a cultural identity that is distinct from the larger Bengali identity and cultural construct. 
Questions about the Bengali-Muslim mind [mon] or psyche [manos] reflect a desire to locate a 
cultural identity in history, or as Bangladeshi literary historian Anisuzzaman has put it, a journey 
“in search of one’s own self [swaruper shondhane].”129 Of course, the centrality of nationalist 
																																								 																				
128See for example, Amalendu De, Roots of Separatism in Nineteenth Century Bengal (Calcutta: 
Ratna Prakashan, 1974); Prathama Raimandal, Bangladesher Buddhhijibi O Pragati-Pratikriayr 
Dandiya [Intellectuals of Bangladesh and Dialectics of Progress and Reaction] (Calcutta: 
Pustak Bipani, 1996); Ashoke Kumar Chakraborty, Bengali Muslim Literati and the 
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129 Anisuzzaman’s 1964 book, Muslim Manos O Bnagla Shahitya (Dhaka: Lekhok Shangha 
Prokashoni, 1964) based on his 1961 Ph.D. dissertation and his 1976 book Swaruper Shondhane 
[In Search for Self Identity] (Dhaka: Jatiya Shahitya Prokash, 1976) are two of the earliest and 
most prominent of the publications that inquire about the thought world of the Bengali-Muslims. 
Other notable examples include Saokat Osman, Muslim Manosher Rupantor [The 
Transformation of Muslim Psyche], 1800-1950 (Dhaka: Jatiya Shahitya Prokash, 1986) and 
Ahmad Sofa’s provocative and controversial essays Buddhibrttir Notun Binyash [New 
Disposition of Intellectual Professions] (1972) and Bangali Musalmaner Mon [The Mind/Psyche 




politics in post-independent Bangladesh means that many of these “journeys,” taken both inside 
and outside of academia in Bangladesh, were motivated by and designed to fit into nationalist 
narratives. In the recent decades, however, there have been academically rigorous and 
specialized intellectual histories of the Bengali Muslims carried out in the universities of India 
and Bangladesh, which have been relatively free of the influence of the political projects of the 
respective countries.130 Beyond these intellectual histories produced by Bangladeshi and West-
Bengali commentators, there exist relatively few studies of the Bengali-Muslim thought world. 
Though many Western academics have written intellectual histories of colonial Bengal and of 
Bengali-Hindus, only a few have been interested in Bengali-Muslims.131 This gap has been only 
partially filled, however, by a handful of intellectual histories produced in recent decades by 
Bengali academics based in Western academia.132  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
ed. Nurul Anwar (Dhaka: Khan Brothers and Co., 2008). This list also includes numerous social 
and political histories that were penned in Bangladesh over the last half a century.  
130 Morshed Shafiul Hasan’s Purba Banglay Chintachorcha: Danda O Protikria [Intellectual 
Practices in East Bengal: Dialectics and Reactions], 1947-1970 (Dhaka: Anupam Prakashoni, 
2007), Abul Kashem Fazlul Huq’s Bangladesher Rajnitite Budhdhijibir Bhumika [Role of 
Intellectuals in Bangladesh Politics] (Dhaka: Kotha Prokash, 2007), and Ranabir Samaddar’s 
Paradoxes of the Nationalist Time (2002) are notable examples of this group. 
131 Andrew Sartori’s “Abul Mansur Ahmad and Cultural Politics of Bengali Pakistanism,” in 
From The Colonial To the Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition, ed. Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, Rochona Majumdar, and Andrew Sartori (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2007) and Liberalism in Empire: An Alternative History (Oakland, California: University of 
California Press, 2014) are among the rare examples of Western academia’s engagement with the 
Bengali-Muslim thought world. 
132 Mahmud Shah Qureshi’s Etude Sur L'évolution Intellectuelle Chez Les Musalmans Du 
Bengale [A Study of the Intellectual Evolution of the Muslims of Bengal], 1857-1947 (Paris: 
Mouton, 1971) is groundbreaking in this regard. However, its circulation and influence remain 
limited mostly because of limited reach of French among Bengali/Bangladeshi academics. 
Tazeen Murshid’s 1996 book The Sacred and the Secular: Bengal Muslim Discourses, 1871-
1977, on the other hand, is a standard reference point to which Neilesh Bose’s works, most 
notably his book, Recasting the Region: Language, Culture, and Islam in Colonial Bengal 
(Oxford University Press, 2014), constitute important and updated additions. Shahadat H. Khan’s 




 Reading through Bengali-Muslim intellectual history and discussions of the Bengali-
Muslim psyche narrative patterns become discernable. The most common narrative constructs 
Bengali-Muslim intellectual history in terms of a tension, if not a conflict, between modern, 
secular, liberal, and progressive elements on the one hand and traditional, religious, and 
reactionary elements on the other hand. This reading of history is of course structured by meta-
narratives of modernity and modernization and is subscribed to by commentators with different 
identities and ideological orientations. For example, many commentators from West Bengal 
identify the socio-economic backwardness and the consequent conservatism of the “Bengali 
Muslim mentality” as the root cause of “Muslim separatism” and, thus, of the communal politics 
of the early 20th century and subsequent partition of Bengal.133 These commentators note that the 
encounter with modernity via colonialism in 19th century Bengal challenged the moral and 
intellectual foundations of society and produced the need for reform. While Bengali-Hindus by 
and large opted for progressive reforms, Bengali-Muslim reform movements sought to re-
establish and reaffirm the authority of religious orthodoxy, as evidenced by the Islamic revivalist 
movements of the 19th and early 20th centuries. This reaction stemmed on the one hand from the 
resurgence of fundamentalist tendencies within and cultural stagnation of the Islamic world 
generally and on the other hand from the resentment of the Indian Muslim elites and middle 
classes towards British rule.134 In these readings the reaction against colonial modernity, 
religiosity, conservatism, and the communalism of the Bengali-Muslims become synonymous 
with each other and indicate some inherent Bengali-Muslim backwardness, which stands in 
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contrast to the supposed secularism and progressiveness of Bengali nationalism. These readings 
concede that despite their backwardness, Bengali-Muslims, inspired and influenced by the 
modernizing and progressive Bengali-Hindus, eventually produce a renaissance or wakening in 
the 1920s and 1930s. The Buddhir Mukti [Emancipation of Intellect] movement is often 
mentioned as the most prominent example of this belated awakening to modernity.135 However, 
the awakening was short-lived; by the mid-1940s fundamentalist and orthodox elements re-
asserted their dominance, producing the political and ideological victory of the Muslim League 
and Pakistani nationalism. In the post-colonial era the dominance of conservative forces 
continued unabated under state patronage, despite occasional resistance offered by sections of 
the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia.136  
 Conflict between progressive and reactionary forces in shaping the Bengali-Muslim 
thought-world is also the master narrative of many intellectual histories produced by Bangladeshi 
scholars and commentators, particularly those who are ideologically and politically aligned with 
“Bengali nationalism.” However, most Bangladeshi commentators reject the argument of the 
inherent conservatism of the Bengali-Muslim society or the intelligentsia, pointing towards the 
syncretic and heterodox characters of Bengali Islam and the existence of a rational and secular 
intellectual tradition that stretches back to the 19th century and further.137 The Buddhir Mukti or 
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136 Raimandal, Bangladesher Buddhijibi O Pragati-Pratikriyar Dandiya [Intellectuals of 
Bangladesh and Dialectics of Progress and Reaction] (1996). 
137 This argument has been advanced by noted Bangladeshi historian A.F. Salahuddin Ahmed for 
whom someone like the 19th century scholar Delawar Hosaen Ahmed Meerza (1840-1913) 
exemplifies an openness to modernity and rationalism among Bengali-Muslims. See for example 
his, Bengali Nationalism and the Emergence of Bangladesh : An Introductory Outline (1994). 
For similar arguments see also Muntassir Mamoon, Bangladesh, Bengali Manos, Rastra-Gothan, 




the shamyabadi [egalitarian] movements of 1920s and 30s are seen not as momentary departures 
from a conservative tradition but as the best examples of an essentially liberal and secular 
tradition.138 In this reading of Bengali-Muslim intellectual history, the ascendency of the Muslim 
League and the success of the Pakistan movement represents a moment of victory for the 
conservative forces, which was produced on the one hand by political dominance of the ashraf 
Muslims in Bengal politics and on the other hand by the capitulation of the middle class 
intelligentsia in the face of the Muslim nationalist fervor.139 For many Bangladeshi 
commentators this capitulation to Pakistani nationalism by the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia and 
their inability to defend against the communal, reactionary politics and ideology of the elite 
classes point to their political weakness and their weak commitments to modernity.140 Other 
commentators, however, have argued that the appropriation of discourses of modernity by Indian 
nationalism that was thoroughly Hindu in character and the disdain displayed by the modernizing 
Bengali-Hindu middle class towards its Muslim counterpart in the early 20th century produced an 
understandable, if not justifiable, sense of indignation and resentment among Bengali-Muslims 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
University Press Ltd., 2009) and Mustafa Nurul Islam, ed., Bangladesh, Bangali: Atmaporichyer 
Shondhane [Bangladesh, Bengali: In Search of Self Identity] (Dhaka: Sagar Publishers, 1990).  
The syncretic character of Bengali Islam and the cross-religious solidarity among Hindus and 
Muslims have also been recognized and celebrated by Hindu scholars such as Kshti Mohan Sen, 
Bharate Hindu Musalmaner Jukta Sadhana [The United Pursuits of Hindus and Muslims in 
India], (1949) and Asim Roy, The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition of in Bengal (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983) 
138See Khan The Freedom of Intellect Movement (2007) and Kamal Hossain, “Bangladesh, an 
Intelligentsia in Search of Its Role,” in The Role of the Intelligentsia in Contemporary Asian 
Societies, ed. S. N. Ray and Craciela de la Lama (México: El Colegio de México, 1981).  
139 Mustafa Nurul Islam argues, for example, that emotions stirred up by the struggle for Pakistan 
simply overpowered the modernist sensibilities of the Bengali-Muslim modernizers, which in 
turn weakened their commitments to rationalism and secularism. Amader Banglittor Chetonar 
Udbodhona O Bikash [The Inspirations and Evolution Our Idea of Bengaliness] (Dhaka: Sagar 
Publishers, 1994). 
140 Saidur Rahman, Purba Bangla Sanskritik Andolon [Cultural Movements in East Bengal] 




and caused them to turn inwards and accentuate their differences, which eventually translated 
into support for Pakistan.141  
Despite differences in the assessments of the intellectual history of the Bengali-Muslims 
leading up to the Pakistan Moment, there is broad agreement that during the Pakistan period, 
between 1947 and 1971, conservative and Islamic orthodox forces were generally dominant over 
the progressive, modern, and secular forces. The former were mobilized and utilized by the 
rulers of the new state for the purpose of producing the ideological foundations for Pakistani 
nationalism and their own rule. The rulers used a carrot and stick approach to either buy off East-
Pakistani intellectuals with lucrative jobs and awards or stifle dissent through aggressive use of 
censorship and imprisonment. Despite these efforts, progressive forces persisted and arguably 
even became stronger as evidenced in the cultural movements of the 1960s.142 Some 
commentators have argued that in their struggles against the reactionary ideologies of the regime, 
progressive Bengali intellectuals from East Pakistan not only became disillusioned with 
Pakistani nationalism but also began to articulate a Bengali nationalism. Thus, by the late 1960s, 
the conflict between conservative and progressive elements among Bengali-Muslim intellectuals 
becomes a conflict between Islamism and Pakistani nationalism on one hand and secularism and 
Bengali nationalism on the other hand. In these readings Bangladesh’s liberation war appears 
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both as a nationalist struggle and a struggle between forces of progress and reaction/regress.143 
The argument is then extended to post-independent Bangladesh to read its political and 
intellectual history in terms of an unfinished project of realizing mukti-juddher chetona – the 
ideal or spirit of the liberation war, which is understood to be modern, secular, and progressive. 
The project remains unfinished because of the violent end to Mujib’s regime and the subsequent 
military rule, which allowed or even relied upon the return and resurgence of the political and 
ideological opponents of the liberation war, i.e., the Islamists and conservatives.144 The transition 
to democracy in 1990 has not restored the spirit of the liberation war as the ruling ideology of the 
country but has merely produced the possibility for doing so, which the Awami League, 
presently the party in government, proclaims to be its mission. 
This widely subscribed to and circulated reading of Bangladesh’s intellectual landscape 
in terms of a binary opposition between progressive Bengali nationalism and a regressive 
Islamist agenda needs to be problematized. Tazeen Murshid’s path-breaking intellectual history, 
The Sacred and the Secular: Bengal Muslim Intellectual Discourses, 1871-1977, produces 
possibilities for a more nuanced understanding. Murshid argues against the orientalist perception 
of an insurmountable opposition between secularism and Islam, proposing instead the possibility 
of recognizing a tension between accommodation and confrontation of secular and spiritual 
concerns within the great tradition of Islam.145 In the case of Bengali-Muslims this tension 
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becomes further complicated by the persistence of folk beliefs and local customs, by the class 
differences among Bengali-Muslims, by the dynamics of the relationship between Bengali-
Hindus and Bengali-Muslims, and ultimately by colonial modernity. Though Murshid recognizes 
a tension between revivalist and reformist tendencies among Bengali-Muslims, she cautions 
against the conflation of communalism with religiosity or religiosity with anti-secularism. 
Finally, she argues that the secular-sacred tension was not unique to Bengali-Muslim discourses 
but was also present in discourses of the Bengali-Hindus and of colonial India generally, thus 
rejecting the claim of inherent “backwardness” or conservatism of the Bengali-Muslim 
discourses.  
The oppositional binary between modernity and tradition or between progress and 
reaction has also been challenged by Morshed Safiul Hasan’s encyclopedic study of intellectual 
practices in East-Bengal during the Pakistan period.146 One of the central and most provocative 
claims of Hasan is that an explicit Bengali nationalism is not discernable among the intellectuals 
of the Pakistan period. Perhaps they were simply not thinking in terms of Bengali nationalism, or 
they chose not to express their nationalist ideas fearing retribution from the authoritarian regime 
of Pakistan. Regardless, Bengali nationalism as a theme or concern is notable in its absence 
among the published works of the intellectuals of East Bengal. Hasan finds instead a vibrant 
debate about how to conceptualize the East-Bengali or Bengali-Muslim identity. On the one side 
of the debate were the shatontro-badis [autonomists], who sought to articulate a distinct and 
autonomous cultural identity for the Bengali-Muslims, distinguished from the cultural identity of 
the Bengali-Hindus in terms of both religious and regional differences. Though a Bengali-
Muslim emphasis on the cultural autonomy produced initial support for the Pakistan movement, 
																																								 																				




it did not translate into continuous support for the Pakistani state or for its effort to erase the 
cultural distinctions of various regions of Pakistan. 147 As an illustration we may point to the 
example of the Tamuddin Majlish, an organization that was set up Bengali-Muslim intellectuals 
in post independent Pakistan for the expressed purpose of elaborating a new cultural expression 
of the new nation. It was also one of the first and most significant actors in the movement to 
recognize Bangla as one of the state languages of Pakistan.148 And, as Hasan demonstrates, a 
Bengali-Muslim politics of cultural autonomy was not inherently reactionary or even communal 
and was subscribed to and appropriated by intellectuals and political actors of various ideological 
hews. The shatontro-badis, however, were more common among older generations, whose 
political and intellectual outlooks were shaped by their experiences of and struggles against 
discrimination by the Hindu middle class. On the other side of the debate Hasan identifies the 
shomonnoy-badis [synthesits], who locate Bengali-Muslim identity within a larger and 
composite Bengali identity and claim inheritance of a Bengali literary tradition going back 
fourteen hundred years. Though one may find shomonnoy-badis among the older generations of 
Bengali-Muslim intellectuals going back to the 1920s and 1930s, most shomonnoy-badis tended 
to be from younger generations, whose political and intellectual outlooks were shaped by efforts 
to assert Bengali cultural identity against the authoritarian imposition of a Pakistani identity and 
by concerns about protecting and producing an inclusive space for the Bengali-Hindus, who had 
become a vulnerable minority in Pakistan. Shomonnoy-badis were expressly anti-communal, 
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emphasizing the commonality and unity of Hindus and Muslims of Bengal and were generally 
more secular and liberal. However, the anti-communal stance of the shomonnoy-badis 
intellectuals did not necessarily translate into a denial of their Muslim identity or religiosity or 
even of their support for Pakistan.149  
Though Hasan does not extend his analysis beyond 1971, I believe that his categories 
may prove helpful in thinking about the intellectual landscape of independent Bangladesh. In 
many ways this older debate between the shomonnoy-badis and the shatontro-badis gets 
expressed through the battle between the “Bengali” and the “Bangladeshi” conceptions of the 
national identity. While, the “Bengali nationalism” emerged in the context of the liberation war 
and has been championed by the Awami League and its intellectual allies, “Bangladeshi 
nationalism,” emerged in the 1970s among certain sections of the political-military establishment 
and provided the ideological foundation for Ziaur Rahman’s regime and for his Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP). While the “Bengali” conception captures the ethno-linguistic identity 
inclusive of all religious groups in Bangladesh, it fails to appreciate the political and intellectual 
journey of Bengali-Muslims becoming a “people.”150 Though the Bangladeshi conception 
gestures towards that journey by highlighting the geographical, linguistic, and religious 
distinctiveness of Bangladesh, it does not explicitly make Bengali-Muslim the foundation of 
Bangladeshi identity. The standard explanation from the advocates of Bangladeshi nationalism 
for this equivocation is that Bangladeshi is an inclusive identity that accommodates all, including 
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those who are neither Bengali nor Muslim.151 However, the sincerity of this claim of 
inclusiveness has been challenged by the policies and practices of the BNP, the official standard 
bearer of “Bangladeshi” nationalism, both in and outside of government. The BNP not only 
accommodated radical Islamist groups and conservative forces but also was complicit in fueling 
discrimination against and persecution of Hindus and other minority groups. Thus, many critics 
have argued that “Bangladeshi” nationalism is a rebranded form of the conservative Islamist 
ideology of Pakistan period Muslim nationalism.152 The debate is highly partisan and remains 
inconclusive. At some level it may be possible to dismiss the “Bengali” vs. “Bangladeshi” debate 
as the mere ideological posturing of the Awami League and the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party, 
vying for power and legitimacy. The debate, however, has dominated the political and 
intellectual discourse in Bangladesh over the last four decades, and it points towards the 
existence of a deep ambivalence regarding the construction of national identity in Bangladesh. 153 
Also, the debate produces a messy Intellectual landscape in which various ideas of the nation get 
tangled up with claims of progress, freedom, equality, and other political ideals in complicated 
ways.  
The narrative of conflict or tension between progressive and reactionary forces has been 
problematized differently by leftist commentators, who have challenged equating progress with 
secular nationalist discourses. Their critiques have generally involved reassessment of the 
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political character of the urban middle-class intelligentsia generally and of “modernizers” 
particularly.154 Leftist critics have argued that the Bengali-Muslim middle-class intelligentsia by 
and large, with notable exceptions, was primarily focused on serving its own economic and 
political interests instead of larger concerns of social transformation. In doing so it aligned itself 
with the ruling classes – first with the feudal aristocracy and then increasingly with the nascent 
bourgeoisie – and against the peasantry and the working classes. Consequently, it failed to 
advance any substantial critique of either capitalism or imperialism. Its modernizing and 
reformist gestures were at best weak or bad imitations of European modernity or at worst, born 
out of an inferiority complex, expressions of disdain for peasant culture. The modernizing efforts 
in either case did not aim at transforming society but sought only to produce changes in the 
attitudes and outlooks of members of its own class. Even the celebrated Buddhir Mukti 
movement fell into this trap by constructing religious orthodoxy and intolerance as the principal 
object of its critique.155 In contrast, the leftist critics have argued that the political language of 
Islam and Muslim identity have often enabled and organized the rural peasantry in class struggle 
against both feudal exploitation and colonialism. Thus, arguably, Islamic movements have often 
been closer to the “true spirit” of modernity and progress, i.e., producing social transformation 
and social justice. The leftist critique also argues that the nationalist culture and national identity 
elaborated by the middle-class intelligentsia, both in the cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh, to be 
elitist and disconnected from the cultural lives of the masses. According to leftist critiques the 
real tension in the Bengali-Muslim intellectual landscape is located not in the conflict between 
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modernity and tradition or between the past and the future but in the conflict between liberal-
nationalist and egalitarian-communist conceptions of modernity and the future.156  
The oppositional binaries discussed in preceding pages offer ideas about the intellectual 
landscape of the Bangladesh/East Bengal of the last century. However, these binaries often carry 
the ideas of conflicts and contradictions, while the idea of negotiation and navigation may be 
more accurately descriptive of ways intellectuals formulate and express their worldviews and 
political positions. The Bangladeshi thought world is characterized on the one hand by the 
politics of becoming, i.e., the articulation of a self-identity or swaruper shondhan, and on the 
other hand the often contradictory but at times complementary pulls of three ideological 
traditions – Islam, liberalism, and socialism – that offer different visions of social justice. 
The centrality of Islam in Bengali-Muslim identity should be evident from the 
discussions above. The language of political Islam, to borrow an expression from Muzaffar 
Alam,157 is much older than the 20th century incarnation of political Islam that is so often 
associated with terrorism and other atrocities. In the context of pre-modern or Muslim-ruled 
Bengal the language of political Islam refers to the discourses produced by Muslim rulers and 
their ideological champions to establish political authority and legitimacy, which required 
elaborating conceptions of justice and welfare and mechanisms for petition and even 
representation, albeit in limited ways.158 This language of political Islam was informed not by 
any monolithic Islam but by a cosmopolitan tradition already accommodating and negotiating 
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multiple ethnic, linguistic, regional, and civilizational diversities of the Islamic world, which in 
turn had to adjust to the socio-political realities of Bengal.159 The language of political Islam 
survived India’s encounter with British colonialism partly because of the policies adopted by 
Warren Hasting, the first governor general of India, who sought to rule India through “Hindu” 
and “Muslim Laws.” More importantly, the language of political Islam survived because it was 
mobilized in the discourses of anti-colonial struggles. In the postcolonial context the language of 
political Islam continued to influence and inform both ruling and oppositional political 
ideologies in Pakistan and Bangladesh.160  
Indian subjects and, thus, Bengali-Muslims encountered liberalism through the 
experience of colonialism, where the colonizing power was becoming increasingly liberal and 
used liberal discourses to justify and make possible the exercise of colonial power.161 
Consequently, colonialism produced the kind of political terrain in which liberal discourses 
provided the most effective, if not the only, way for the colonized people to engage with colonial 
power.162 Despite the construction of “colonial difference” or the maintenance of racial and 
civilizational superiority by the liberal colonizers, liberal conceptions of freedom and rights 
																																								 																				
159 “Concentrating on the period up to the 19th century, for example, Frances Robinson points to 
the cosmopolitanism of a Sunni world in part constituted by itinerant scholars, individuals, and 
families whose mobility not only forged channels of interconnection but produced in communal 
institutions a shared body of knowledge across the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires.” 
Roxanne Leslie Euben, Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and Western Travelers in Search of 
Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008). Also see Alam, The Languages of Political 
Islam (2004) on the diversity of traditions informing the language of political Islam in India.  
160 Rafiuddin Ahmed, ed., Islam in Bangladesh : Society, Culture, and Politics (Dhaka: 
Bangladesh Itihas Samiti, 1983) and Murshid, The Sacred and the Secular. 
161 Uday Mehta in Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal 
Thought (199)  
162 As Chris Bayly in Recovering Liberties (2011) points out, some of the earliest examples of the 
emergence of liberal discourse in India are to be found not in the intellectual exchanges of liberal 
ideas but in the everyday engagements of Indian subjects with colonial power, particularly in the 




created possibilities for the colonized subject to negotiate and, perhaps even resist, colonial 
power. As Chris Bayly puts it, “Despite classic British liberalism’s amnesia about others’ 
territory, race, and community, emphasized by Uday Singh Mehta, Indians were able to 
excavate, appropriate, and cannibalize the thought of European and American liberals in their 
search for modicum of freedom.”163 As discussed above, a significant portion of Bengali-Muslim 
middle-class intellectuals and political actors of the colonial and postcolonial period more or less 
self-consciously located themselves within the liberal, humanist, and secular tradition. The 
dominant “Bengali” nationalism and arguably even the “Bangladeshi” nationalism were founded 
upon liberal discourses, albeit also containing many illiberal ideas and elements.164  
The influence or importance of socialism is harder to trace because unlike Islamic or 
liberal political ideas, socialism never managed to establish itself as a ruling ideology. In 
contrast, socialists have been persecuted by both colonial and post-colonial states. Socialism, or 
more generally egalitarian ideas, however, has profoundly inspired and animated intellectual and 
political actors in the Indian subcontinent and East-Bengal. Bengali-Muslims have been 
particularly influenced by egalitarian ideas given that one of the most significant periods in their 
intellectual history coincided with the Russian Revolution. The Shamyabadi movement of the 
1920s – initiated by Mujaffar Ahmad, who was also one of the founders of the Communist Party 
of India, and Kazi Nazrul Islam, a revolutionary poet who was later honored as the National Poet 
of Bangladesh – placed socialist ideas in the center of Bengali-Muslim intellectual discourses 
and influenced generations of intellectuals and political actors in Bengal.165 The other famous 
Bengali Communist of that era, M.N. Roy also attracted a following among young Bengali-
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Muslims. Facing violent repression by British colonial and postcolonial Pakistani state, socialists 
and communists worked clandestinely or under cover of various front organizations such as the 
Pragati Lekhok Shongho and the Student Union.166 Thus, despite being officially suppressed, 
communist and socialist ideologies of various stripes influenced intellectual and political 
discourses during the Pakistan period and left-leaning intellectuals and politicians managed to 
play leading roles in various social and political movements of the era.167 Arguably, the inclusion 
of socialism in the 1972 constitution of Bangladesh as a core principle of the new state reflects 
the hold of socialist ideas among the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia. And though the governments 
of Bangladesh soon abandoned socialism both in practice and in principle, socialism, broadly 
conceived, continued to dominate political and intellectual discourses in independent Bangladesh 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.168  
The three ideological orientations discussed above, however, cannot always be neatly 
separated, nor can we easily put a thinker in only one of these categories. There are degrees of 
overlaps among these ideological orientations, which at times create interesting syntheses and at 
other times perplexing contradictions. For example, one of the interesting features of 
Bangladeshi political thought is that there have been various efforts at combining Islam and 
socialism and thereby reimagining both. Islam has been argued to be an essentially egalitarian 
political philosophy and perhaps the inspiration behind communism. Moreover, categories of 
class struggles have been often elaborated through popular and Islamic political concepts like 
insaf [justice], haque [right], jalem [despot/oppressor], and majlum [oppressed/exploited].169 
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There have also been attempts to synthesize communist and nationalist projects by elaborating 
national liberation movements in terms of class struggle, and vice versa. Communists and 
liberals have also tended to converge on the questions of secularism, democracy and progress. 
On the question of economic development, communists and liberals differ greatly in theory; 
however, a curious synthesis occurred in practice as both liberals and communists have been 
engaged with NGO activities and development programs. Islam and liberalism, however, have 
found hard it to accommodate each other, particularly given the construction of Bengali 
nationalism as secular and in opposition to the Muslim claim to the nation. Nevertheless, the 
persistence of Muslim identity often requires uneasy compromises, which find expressions in the 





In an effort to provide a historical context for Bangladeshi political thought in this 
chapter I have discussed some of the ways in which the colonial encounter has restructured the 
political and intellectual landscape of the Indian subcontinent generally and of Bengal 
particularly. I then presented an analysis of the social history of Muslims in Bengal, emphasizing 
the transformations of the middle class and the emergence of a modern intelligentsia. By the 
1920s, these developments produced the possibilities and necessities for the articulation of the 
new identity category of “Bengali-Muslim.” In the third section I provided an outline of the 
political history of Bengali-Muslims over the course of the 20th century as they navigate from 
colonial to postcolonial political landscape and emerge as a nation. In this section I discussed the 
major political events of Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the last and final section of the chapter I 
presented a discussion of the Bengal-Muslim thought world based on extensive review of 
existing literature on Bengali-Muslim intellectual histories. I presented these broad stroke 
historical outlines not only for the benefit of the readers who might not be familiar with 
Bangladesh but also as an account of my own understanding of Bangladeshi political and 
intellectual histories, which invariably shapes how I approach the analysis of the political lives 






The First Birth of the Nation Bengali-Muslim Identity and Ideas of the Islamic State in 
Producing the “Pakistan Moment” 
 
In producing an account of Bangladeshi political thought, the idea of Pakistan and the 
“Pakistani Period” of Bangladesh’s political-intellectual history constitutes particularly difficult 
challenges. In post-independence Bangladesh there was a certain degree of amnesia, if not 
willful denial, that Bengali-Muslims ever wanted Pakistan, let alone the idea that Pakistan had 
embodied radical political ideas and possibilities in their minds.1 However expedient such 
amnesia may prove to have been for post-independence Bangladeshi politicians, an account of 
Bangladeshi political thought would be much poorer without a reflection upon the ways in which 
the idea of Pakistan had inspired and animated a generation of Bengali-Muslim political actors 
and intellectuals. The contradictions and shortcomings of the arguments made in the context of 
the first birth of the nation (Pakistan) are evident with the hindsight of the second birth of the 
nation (Bangladesh). However, to discard or ignore these arguments as unimportant or, worse 
yet, as obsolete would limit our understanding of Bangladeshi political thought. In contrast, I 
argue in this chapter that the ideas and arguments articulated in the process of decolonization and 
the birth of Pakistan reflected the political aspirations and anxieties of the period and laid the 
foundations for modern Bangladeshi political thought by expressing concerns and articulating 
themes that would prove to be perennial. 
																																								 																				
1 Neilesh Bose, for example, argues that Bengali-Muslim “Pakistanism” has been buried to the 
point of erasure within post-independence Bangladeshi intellectual and political history 
neglected by Pakistani and Indian histories. See for example, his “Purba Pakistan Zindabad: 
Bengali Visions of Pakistan, 1940–1947,” Modern Asian Studies 48, no. 01 (2014): 1–36. Also 
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In this chapter I examine Bengali-Muslim political thought of Pakistan period by 
engaging with two key figures from this period – Abul Mansur Ahmad and Abul Hashim. I have 
chosen to focus on these two figures because of the instrumental roles they played in bringing 
about Pakistan and because of the fundamental differences in their conceptions of Pakistan and 
reasons for supporting it. Differences between the political ideas of Ahmad and Hashim provide 
illustrations of the diversity within Bengali-Muslim political thought in the mid-20th century. 
Yet, they were united in their support for Pakistan, a project that few Bengali-Muslim 
intellectuals or political actors of the period had resisted or opposed. Both Ahmad and Hashim 
would live to see the end of Pakistan and the Birth of Bangladesh in 1971, and thus had 
opportunities, if only as old men, to reassess and reevaluate their earlier support for Pakistan in 
light of new political realities. Both had argued that the Pakistan that emerged in 1947 and the 
politics that followed were not something that they had wished for. Yet, their criticisms of and 
struggles against the actual Pakistan did not amount to disavowals of the idea of Pakistan. While 
some commentators have evaluated Ahmad and Hashim’s support for Pakistan as anomalies 
from their otherwise progressive politics, others have read them as victories of the reactionary 
forces imbedded deep within the Muslim psyche.2 However, I argue that support for Pakistan in 
the mid-20th century was neither a mistake nor a victory of reactionary forces. Moreover, 
privileging Muslim identity or Islamic ideology also did not necessarily make one anti-modern 
or backward. Perhaps, for political actors negotiating the end of colonial rule, Muslim identity 
and Islamic ideology generally and the demand for Pakistan particularly represented genuine 
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possibilities for progressive politics. In this chapter I would like to critically evaluate this 
proposition by engaging extensively with the lives, politics and ideas of Ahmad and Hashim.  
Abul Mansur Ahmad (1898-1979) was a prominent lawyer, journalist, author, and 
politician from East Bengal, whose political and intellectual career spanned from the 1920s to 
well into the 1970s.3 His long career coincided with the emergence of the Bengali-Muslim urban 
middle class that decisively shaped the politics of Bengal for much of the 20th century.4 
Notwithstanding Ahmad’s personal achievements, which were certainly extraordinary, his 
trajectory of life from a rural peasant family to urban professional middle class is quintessentially 
the story of the Bengali-Muslim middle class overcoming its economic, social, educational, and 
political marginalities. Though Ahmad stopped short of drawing an explicit theoretical 
connection between his personal biography and the biography of his class, for example in the 
manner of Kamruddin Ahmad,5 his memoirs and his political writings display the profound 
influence of his biography and class position on his political ideas and outlooks.6 During this 
long career Ahmad’s writings about politics and identity captured perhaps better than any other 
writer the development and self-realization of Bengali-Muslims as a people. Ahmad’s writings 
not only depicted the social realities and life-experiences of the Bengali-Muslims of his time but 
also contained sharp criticisms of many of their customs, prejudices, superstitions, and 
																																								 																				
3 For a comprehensive biography see Nurul Amin, Abul Mansur Ahmad, 1898-1979 (Dhaka: 
Bangla Academy, 2001). 
4 For the social and economic history of this class and its impact on Bengal politics see my 
discussions in Chapter 2, Section 2. For an analysis of the class dynamics of colonial Bengal see 
Iftekhar Iqbal, The Bengal Delta: Ecology, State and Social Change, 1840-1943 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
5 Kamruddin Ahmad was a left-leaning political activist in the 1940s and 1950s and a diplomat 
and scholar in later life. His Banglar Modhyabitter Atmabikhash [Self Realization of Middle 
Class of Bengal](Dhaka: Inside Library, 1975) is a perceptive self-reflection of the emergence of 
the social class to which he belonged.  
6 Mizanur Rahman, Abul Mansur Ahmader Chintadhara [Thoughts and Ideas of Abul Mansur 




idiosyncrasies. By the mid-1940s Ahmad had developed a formal theory of Bengali-Muslim 
identity, which he named Pak-Bangla, based on the intersections of religious affiliation, 
geographic location, linguistic and literary heritage, and class position.7 He also came to regard 
the realization of Bengali-Muslim cultural autonomy to be the most important task of anti-
colonial and post-colonial politics, a position that would critically inform his political thinking 
throughout the remainder of his career. He was also self-consciously modernist and aspired to 
universalist values such as secularism, social-justice, individual autonomy, equality, and 
democracy.8 Ahmad’s awareness of the tensions between the essentialist claims of identity and 
the universalist demands of modernity is reflected in many of his theoretical and his fictional 
writings and makes him an ideal candidate for studying the post-colonial negotiation between 
identity and modernity.  
Abul Hashim (1905 -1974) was a lawyer, politician, and a scholar from West Bengal, 
whose long political and intellectual career was marked by number of vicissitudes and 
contradictions that made him both an enigmatic and, to quote his biographer Mafidul Haq, a 
“tragic” figure.9 He is remembered, to the extent that he is, as a progressive and democratic 
leader, who fought desperately, though ultimately unsuccessfully, till the very end to resist the 
second partition of Bengal and to produce the independent state of United Bengal as a third 
																																								 																				
7See Andrew Sartori, “Abul Mansur Ahmad and Cultural Politics of Bengali Pakistanism,” in 
From the Colonial to the Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition, ed. Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, Rochona Majumdar, and Andrew Sartori (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2007). Also see, Bose, Recasting the Region (2014). 
8This assessment of Ahmad’s political positions was shared by most commentators on Ahmad’s 
life and work including Amin, Abul Mansur Ahmad (2001), Rahman, Abul Mansur Ahmader 
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dominion outside of India and Pakistan at the end of colonial rule. His efforts in the spring of 
1947 have earned him a reputation for being a forerunner of the Bengali nationalism that would 
accompany the birth of Bangladesh in 1971.10 However, he not only supported Pakistan in the 
crucial years before the independence but also remained committed to it even when it was being 
challenged by a rising tide of Bengali nationalism in the late 1960s. Moreover, throughout the 
Pakistan period Hashim devoted his energies to elaborating the ideological dimensions of an 
Islamic state and a Muslim nation, which led him to a questionable alliance with the military 
dictator Ayub Khan, whom he regarded as the agent most capable of establishing an Islamic state 
in Pakistan.11 The diverse trajectories of Hashim’s politics and ideas signaled to some 
commentators a tragic failure to realize or embrace secular and progressive potentials fully, a 
tragedy that was perhaps induced by his ill health and political defeats.12 Others read them as 
impossible efforts to reconcile fundamental and insoluble contradictions between a secular 
Bengali and a communal Muslim identity.13 Hashim, however, was not as concerned about 
identity as he was with classical questions of political philosophy regarding justice, the good life, 
and the best regime. Though these concerns would be more explicitly pursued in years after 
																																								 																				
10 See Mohammad Towhid Hossain Chowdhury, Abul Hashim O Banglar Rajniti [Abul Hashim 
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The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh: Bengal Muslim League and Muslim Politics 1906-1947 
(Dhaka: The University Press Ltd, 2010) and chapter 2, section 3 of this dissertation.  
11 Sho Kuwajima, Muslims, Nation and the World: Life and Thought of Abul Hashim, Leader of 
the Bengal Muslim League (New Delhi: LG Publishers, 2015). See also chapter 2, section 3 for 
discussions of Ayub Khan’s role in Pakistani politics.  
12 Hashim began to lose his sight in the mid-1940s, becoming completely blind by 1950. This 
certainly hindered his ability to be as politically active as before. The factionalism and 
competition for leadership within the Muslim League also contributed to his marginalization. 
Haq, Abul Hashim (1992) and Kuwajima, Muslims, Nation and the World (2015) both make 
arguments to this effect.  
13 See for example Sailesh Kumar Bandopadhyay, “Abul Hashim: Ek Shapnodrostha Rajnitik [A 
Visionary Politician],” in Abul Hashim: Tar Jiban O Shomoy [His Life and Time], ed. Syed 




Pakistan became independent, from early stages of his political career Hashim was 
fundamentally concerned with articulating an Islamic political philosophy as the possible 
alternative to contemporary liberalism and communism.  His political philosophy contained a 
critique of Western modernity without giving up its democratic and egalitarian ideals, which 
Hashim argued could be best served by the correct interpretation and proper implementation of 
an Islamic political philosophy. In the years after Pakistan’s independence he sought to establish 
his particular reading of Islamic political philosophy as the ideological foundation for the 
postcolonial state.  
Ahmad and Hashim were not only contemporaries but also in conversation with each 
other in their social and political lives. They were, after all, members of the same political party 
and working towards the realization of Pakistan. However, there were fundamental differences in 
their political ideas and in their views about Pakistan. While Ahmad saw in Pakistan the 
possibility of establishing an autonomous Bengali-Muslim cultural identity, Hashim saw in 
Pakistan the possibilities for establishing a postcolonial state based on Islamic principles of 
justice, equity, and rights. For Ahmad identity was the first concern of politics and Muslimness 
was foundational to that identity. He had once quipped that even if he were a communist, he 
would be a Muslim communist, and if he were an atheist, and he would be a Muslim atheist.14 
On the other hand, Hashim was not much invested in Muslim identity and was even less invested 
in the Bengali-Muslim identity that Ahmad was trying to name and represent. For Ahmad 
politics was about advancing the interest of Bengali-Muslims. But for Hashim, who came from 
an aristocratic Muslim family and did not share an identity with either the rural masses of Bengal 
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[Collected Works of Abul Mansur Ahmad], ed. Rafiqul Islam, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Dhaka: Bangla 




or the emerging Bengali-Muslim middle class, politics was about establishing the superiority of 
Islamic political philosophy. Their political difference is best highlighted in one of their now 
famous exchanges reported by Ahmad. 15 Using a medical analogy Ahmad had accused Hashim 
of caring more about the medicine (Islam) than about the welfare of the patients (Bengali-
Muslims). Hashim reportedly defended his position by arguing that a disease can only be cured 
by the application of the proper medicine and thus a doctor’s primary responsibility is to 
prescribe the correct medicine. Though Ahmad found this to be a clever and strong argument, it 
dissatisfied him. The concerns about the correctness of medicine or the ideological battles among 
Islam, communism, humanism, and liberalism seemed an obfuscation of the immediate and most 
pressing political question of the time: the national liberation of Indian Muslims generally and 
Bengali-Muslims particularly. The convergences and the differences of their ideas make Ahmad 
and Hashim an interesting pair to read together in a conversation about Bangladeshi political 
thought during the “Pakistan Moment.”  
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“The Pakistan Moment”: History Making and Political Theory  
 
In the early months of 1940 Abul Mansur Ahmad found himself almost able to alter the 
course of South Asian history. Aged 42 at the time, he was already an established journalist, a 
literary figure, and a rising star in Bengal politics. His political and journalistic work had 
facilitated an association with the famous Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose.16 In the weeks after the 
adoption of the Lahore Resolution by the Muslim League on March 23rd, 1940, Ahmad and Bose 
found themselves discussing the controversial resolution, which by then had been dubbed the 
“Pakistan Resolution” and had been denounced by many as a communalist and separatist idea 
undermining the unity and strength of India’s nationalist movement.17 However, as Ahmad has 
recalled in his memoirs and other writings, he was able to offer Bose a different interpretation of 
the Resolution and convinced Bose not only of the merits and legitimacy of the Resolution but 
also of the necessity of producing a political agreement between the Indian National Congress 
and the Muslim League based on it. Inspired and persuaded by Ahmad, Bose sought to broker a 
deal between the two parties regarding the post-colonial future of British India by meeting with 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the leadership of the Congress, including Mahatma Gandhi, despite 
having had a recent public falling out. As Bose toured the country to put their ideas into effect, 
Ahmad followed the developments with eager anticipation. Ahmad remembers the moment 26 
years later in the following manner:  
																																								 																				
16 Bose, the most influential political leader of Bengal at that time, was one of the few with a 
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The next morning I read in extreme jubilation the news item carried by all the 
newspapers that Subhash Babu on his way to Bombay saw Mahatmajee at Wardha for 
half an hour. Thank Allah, my plan had started working! The victory was near at hand. I 
started floating in the air. Next few days my joys knew no bounds. Subhash Babu met 
Jinnah Sahib not once but thrice in the course of three days, dined with him, posed before 
the camera with him, and what was more he also met Sardar Patel and Mr. Bhulabhai 
Desai, the leader of the Congress party in the Central Assembly in between his interviews 
with Mr. Jinnah. To add importance to these significant events out came in the press the 
biggest news of the time that both Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah have been invited by the 
Viceroy to meet him urgently at Shimla. I went ecstatic. Thank Allah. How swiftly He 
was fulfilling my dream. The newspapermen naturally went wild with exciting 
speculations. They were many and varied. But poor fellows! They did not know what I 
knew; my hopes and expectations went sky-high. I was on the point of bursting out in 
joy. Great events were surely happening!18  
  
As it turned out, Bose and Ahmad were not to be successful in their efforts to produce a 
deal that would bring about a “political solution of the communal problem to prevent a physical 
partition of the sub-continent.”19 Of course, the efforts by Ahmad and Bose did not by any means 
constitute a singular moment of critical juncture in which an alternate future of the Indian sub-
continent could have been determined. During the fateful seven years between the adoption of 
the Lahore Resolution and the partition of British India in August of 1947, the history of the 
subcontinent experienced numerous twists and turns, each opening up and foreclosing different 
possibilities other than the one that ultimately became the reality. Failures of these alternate 
possibilities were certainly not inevitable, not least to the protagonists, who often shared the kind 
of optimism and exuberance evident in Ahmad’s recollection. Ahmad’s effort to produce an 
alternate outcome was neither singular nor successful, but it should not lead us to dismiss his 
reminiscence as an indulgence in a counterfactual exercise. Rather, we will be better served to 
recognize in them Ahmad’s location in history and by extension an entire generation of Bengali-
Muslims intellectual and political actors.  
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For Ahmad and thousands of other political activists in British India, the late colonial 
period represented a moment when even provincial journalists and sons of peasants could see 
themselves as potential makers of history. A meeting here, a right argument there could have 
determined the destiny of millions! Had his plans worked, Ahmad could have justifiably claimed 
his place among the Jinnahs and the Gandhis. Given the historical circumstances, Ahmad’s 
optimism or his desire to affect history should not surprise us. Perhaps more remarkable in the 
passage quoted above, however, is the implicit admission of being unable to make history. 
Though it was his plan, its success did not ultimately depend on him but rather depended on the 
calculations and maneuverings of more important players: Bose, Jinnah, Gandhi, and the 
Viceroy. In the face of such a cold reality, all Ahmad could do was invoke an even higher power, 
Allah, for fulfilling his designs.  
I find Ahmad’s position particularly interesting because arguably it is representative of 
the aspirations and the limitations of contemporary Bengali-Muslim political actors. They were 
acutely aware of the historical significance of the moment in which they lived, and they had deep 
desires to participate in and ideas about how to affect the political processes of the period. Yet, 
they were ultimately unable to decide their own destinies. Nor were they mere spectators, as 
were the journalists in Ahmad’s recollection. A more accurate assessment would be that Bengali-
Muslim political actors of the mid-20th century were the supporting actors of history, closer to 
power with a more intimate relationship with history than mere spectators. Yet they could not 
avoid relying on bigger forces to bring about their desired historical outcomes. The marginal 
position of Bengali-Muslim political actors as history makers reflected the political marginality 
of Bengali-Muslims generally. Expansion of democratic institutions and acquisition of modern 




1920s and 1930s.20 They still had to struggle against colonial power and the established social 
and political hierarchies in which the Hindu bhadralok and ashraf Muslims occupied decisive 
positions. Though the Bengali-Muslim political actors of the mid-20th century challenged the 
established hierarchies, they also often displayed an attitude of deference towards the “natural 
leaders” and acceptance of the reality that they had to live in a history made by others.21  
Nevertheless, for Bengali-Muslim political actors and intellectuals the 1940s produced 
unprecedented possibilities for political action and political thought. As Abul Hashim has 
argued, the 1940s marked a qualitative shift in Bengali-Muslim politics – away from personality 
driven patronage politics towards more ideologically oriented and institutionalized politics. For 
the Bengali-Muslims, who constituted a politically and economically backward group, the 
politics of securing concessions and economic advancement by petitioning the colonial 
government were a practical priority.22 Hashim argues that the best example of old school 
politics was A. K. Fazlul Huq, who was an institution himself and had little use for a party or an 
ideology. Huq’s politics were motivated by concern for members of his backward kin, and he 
performed his politics as a gesture of personal generosity towards them. Huq’s strong personality 
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the Muslim League, were characterized by competition and rivalry with Hindus for 
“opportunities for employment in government, commerce, trade and industry.” A Socio Political 




and his advocacy for and patronage of the less fortunate secured his political base among them. 
Other political leaders, exemplified by Khwaja Nazimuddin, merely sought to preserve and 
advance the entrenched interests of upper class Muslims. Hashim argues that these leaders’ 
adherence to Muslim orthodoxy and conservative views were merely self-serving and not 
ideological. Furthermore, someone like Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, who according to Hashim 
was personally very secular, liberal, and a nice guy, but in politics was “Machiavellian” and 
utterly devoid of ideals.23 However, by the 1940s the end of the British Empire seemed both 
possible and imminent, and this prospect of decolonization produced a new dynamics of politics 
in which the narrow view of politics as merely pursuit of self-interest no longer sufficed. Rather, 
engagement with larger theoretical and normative questions about the state, nation, freedom, and 
equality became not only possible but also necessary. 
In the shift towards the more idealist politics that Hashim perhaps somewhat wistfully 
identified, Bengali-Muslim political actors and intellectuals of the mid-20th century found the 
idea of Pakistan useful and perhaps indispensable for advancing their agendas and for working 
out their political ideas. The demand for Pakistan was the most powerful political demand of 
Indian Muslims in the 1940s.24 However, what was meant by “Pakistan” was not clear to most 
																																								 																				
23 Abul. Hashim, In Retrospection (Dhaka: Subarna Publishers : distributor, Mowla Bros, 1974). 
Hashim was criticizing three of the most prominent personalities of mid-20th century Bengal 
politics. They would go on to become central figures in the pantheon of great leaders of the new 
nation of Pakistan, while Hashim himself would become marginalized. Huq was the first prime 
minister of pre-partition Bengal, Nazimuddin was the second, and Suhrawardy was the third and 
last. They all went on to occupy positions at the top of the government in post-independence 
Pakistan in the 1940s and 1950s. Though in their lives they often were bitter political rivals, after 
their deaths they were buried in the same mausoleum, as if to give architectural permanency to 
history’s ironies. See Willem van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), for details about the life, death, and mausoleum of the three leaders.  
24 Of course, the idea of Pakistan was not universally embraced and there were powerful Muslim 
voices, including among Bengali-Muslims, who were critical of the idea of Pakistan. For 




people. Even its most famous champion, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, refused to define Pakistan in 
any clear and unambiguous terms.25 Perhaps, the abstract and open-ended conception, which 
allowed diverse political projects to claim its name, made the idea of Pakistan so popular within 
a short period of time. The meaning of Pakistan and the rational for supporting it necessarily 
varied widely among Muslim political actors and intellectuals across British India. Bengali 
Muslims embraced the idea of Pakistan because it provided them with ways to navigate their 
marginal position within the hegemonic Indian nationalist discourse. The idea of Pakistan 
enabled Bengali-Muslims to articulate an alternative nationalist discourse, which was not a 
simple reproduction of the “two-nation theory” of the Muslim League or an expression of 
“Muslim separatism.” Rather, this alternate nationalist discourse was an expression on the one 
hand of the nascent Bengali-Muslim identity and on the other hand of the deep history of class 
struggle among Bengali-Muslim peasants.26 
Although the creation of Pakistan produced a sense of optimism and euphoria that 
touched even the peasants living in the far-flung corners, it is far from certain that anyone really 
wanted the Pakistan that actually emerged in the confusing and bloody summer of 1947.27 With 
the benefit of hindsight we know that the many contradictions and crises that plagued Pakistan 
from the moment of its inception would eventually lead to a civil war and the independence of 
Bangladesh in 1971. None of these contradictions and crises negate that Bengali-Muslims played 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
against the Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017).  
25 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
26 See my discussion of these dynamics in Chapter 2, Section 3 of this dissertation.  
27 Ayesha Jalal argues that though Muslims in India overwhelmingly supported the idea of 
Pakistan, perhaps no one, not even ardent supporters, thought that Pakistan matched the ideals. 
Even Jinnah had earlier rejected this Pakistan by deriding it as “moth-eaten,” a reference to its 




an instrumental role in creating Pakistan by embracing it politically and ideologically despite all 
the equivocations and ambivalences. And once Pakistan became a reality, Bengali-Muslims had 
little choice but to work through the contradictions and crises of the new state all the while trying 
to rescue the ideological promises and emancipatory possibilities of Pakistan. For many Bengali-
Muslim political actors and intellectuals of the mid-20th century, Pakistan was not simply the 
name of a political entity but the name of a revolutionary moment and a new, and perhaps 
utopian, postcolonial future.28  
As Bengali-Muslim political actors of the mid-20th century embarked upon theorizing the 
post-colonial future they not only searched for ideals and ideologies to embrace but also began to 
produce political theories of their own. The claim here is not that they inaugurated a new and 
original tradition of political theory but merely that they began to self-reflexively deliberate upon 
normative political questions.29 In their deliberations they could and did draw upon Western and 
indigenous politico-philosophical discourses. Bengali-Muslim political actors and intellectuals of 
the mid-20th century were drawing upon English utilitarian liberalism, German idealism and 
romanticism, American transcendentalism, and increasingly upon Marxism. They also called 
upon what Anthony Parel has identified as the Indian canon of political theory that emerged in 
the first part of the 20th century through the works of figures like Sri Aurobindo, M.K. Gandhi, 
																																								 																				
28 Abu Jafar Samsuddin, one of the younger political activists during the Pakistan movement and 
later a renowned novelist, has argued that the Pakistan movement for the Muslims of Bengal was 
“a revolution similar to the great French revolution. This was the first time in the history of the 
sub-continent that an oppressed agrarian people had established a state of their own by removing 
at a single stroke the tyrannous foreign rulers and the indigenous vested interests such as the 
caste Hindu zamindars, talukdars, moneylenders, professionals, merchants, and industrial 
capitalists.” Sociology of Bengal Politics and Other Essays. (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1973), p. 
26. 
29 Margaret Kohn and Keally McBride in Political Theories of Decolonization: Postcolonialism 
and the Problem of Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) provide a general 
argument regarding the theoretical possibilities opened by the process of decolonization. I think 




Rabindranath Tagore, Bipin Chandra Pal, and Muhammad Iqbal.30 However, Bengali-Muslim 
political thought of the mid-20th century was not simply reproduction or uncritical appropriation 
of either Western theories or the theories developed in other parts of the Indian subcontinent. 
Rather, Bengali-Muslim political actors and intellectuals were drawing upon these theories and 
their own political experiences to produce arguments that would respond to their political 
concerns and would intervene in their local political-intellectual discourse. And, in the process 
they inaugurated a tradition of political thinking that was particular to Bengali-Muslims of the 
time, which became the foundation of Bangladeshi political thought. 	  
																																								 																				
30 Anthony Parel, “From Political Thought in India to Indian Political Thought,” in Western 
Political Thought in Dialogue with Asia, ed. Takashi Shogimen and Cary J. Nederman (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2008), 187–208. See C. A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the 
Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) for a 
comprehensive analysis of Indian political thought of the 19th and 20th century. Also see Andrew 
Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital (University of 
Chicago Press, 2008) and Liberalism in Empire: An Alternative History (Oakland: University of 
California Press, 2014). Javed Majeed, Muhammad Iqbal: Islam, Aesthetics and Postcolonialism, 




Self, Other, and the World: Abul Mansur Ahmad’s Politics of Bengali-Muslim Cultural 
Nationalism  
I 
Abul Mansur Ahmad started his political career as a member of the Indian National 
Congress and generally subscribed to secular nationalist politics.31 In the 1930s he was deeply 
involved in the peasant politics of East Bengal and was highly suspicious of calls for Muslim 
solidarity across class divides. Unsurprisingly, he was critical of the Muslim League for being an 
elitist organization. However, by the mid-1940s he joined the Muslim League and emerged as a 
strong voice in support of Pakistan, a radical shift in his politics, which he maintained was 
necessary and justified. In post-independent Pakistan Ahmad would occupy the role of a 
dissident politician and would ultimately support the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan. 
Yet, Ahmad did not see his support for Pakistan in the 1940s as a mistake. Shortly after 
independence of Bangladesh Ahmad argued, “The emergence of independent Bangladesh is 
neither an act of organic disruption, nor an erratic revolution. Certainly it has not proved any 
blunder on the part of our own forebears.”32 The emergence of Bangladesh represented the 
corrective to a deviation from the intents of the Lahore Resolution and the “end of a betrayal” of 
the true “spirit of the partition” of British India. He argued that “with the emergence of 
independent Bangladesh, ‘Pakistan’ has not been destroyed, but has been more realistic and so 
stronger by being based on the Lahore Resolution which was and still is known and observed as 
																																								 																				
31 Ahmad developed this nationalist, that is to say anti-colonial or anti-British, consciousness and 
politics through his participation as a university student in the Non-Cooperation movement of the 
1920s. (ADRPB, Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 14 to 33) He, like many other young people of his 
generation, was also deeply inspired by the Swadeshi movement and the radical politics of the 
early 1900s. For example, he deeply admired the Anushilon activists he knew in the 1930s 
despite disagreeing with their political strategies. (Atmakotha, pp. 161-162)  




‘Pakistan Resolution’.”33 Ahmad was not merely arguing that Pakistan had not been destroyed in 
the sense that West Pakistan continues to exist as Pakistan, even after the secession by East 
Pakistan. Rather, he was arguing that in the newly independent Bangladesh the idea of 
“Pakistan” had been realized more so than in East Pakistan. Given the ambiguous nature and the 
diverse interpretations of the idea of “Pakistan” discussed above, Ahmad’s claim that 
Bangladesh represents the manifestation of the “true meaning” of Pakistan remains difficult to 
refute or substantiate. A more fruitful line of inquiry would be to examine what Pakistan meant 
for Ahmad and why he thought the emergence of Bangladesh was the restoration of the Lahore 
Resolution.  
 Looking back at the 1940s, Ahmad commented that it was the most significant 
revolutionary epoch in the subcontinent’s history, which revolutionized “not only the social and 
political structures of the country but also [Ahmad’s] own structures of thought, along with [that 
of] millions of activists like [him].”34 Most significantly, the idea of Pakistan challenged the 
hegemonic notion of India as a singular nation and opened up the possibilities for viewing India 
as a collection of many communities and nations instead. Therefore, conceptions of post-colonial 
freedom could not be confined to the limited aim of ending colonial rule but had to also include 
visions for securing recognition, rights, and freedom of various “minority” groups – Muslims, 
untouchables, and Dravidians being the larger and most politically significant among them. The 
vision of a united India, in which group differences were to be subsumed by national citizenship, 
was challenged not only by the Muslim League’s two-nation theory but also by the Communists 
and left-leaning intellectuals, who proposed Soviet inspired visions of federated states based on 
																																								 																				





the principle of national self-determination.35 Ahmad, who had been a subscriber of the Congress 
vision of a united India until the 1940s, was inspired to change his position by the general shift in 
the intellectual and political discourses and more directly by the persuasions of Abul Kalam 
Samsuddin and Mujibur Rahman Khan, the founders of the East Pakistan Renaissance Society.36 
Working through the various arguments, Ahmad came to develop an understanding of Pakistan 
as a program for cultural autonomy, which enabled him to support the Pakistan movement 
despite his commitment to anti-communal politics and his apprehensions about the dominance of 
mullahs and ashraf elites within the Muslim League.37  
In his presidential address to the East Pakistan Renaissance Convention in 1944,38 
Ahmad argued: 
Whatever may be the meaning of “Pakistan” in the judgment of the politicians, for 
literary men its meaning is tamuddini azadi, sanskritik swaraj, cultural autonomy. You 
can get the answer to the question whether a nation can survive without political 
independence [rajnoitik azadi] from the leaders of the state [rastra-neta]. We literary 
																																								 																				
35 In a historic resolution adopted by the Central Committee in September 1942 the Communist 
Party of India (CPI) laid out its policy on the national question, which greatly influenced the 
political discourse of the period and visions for a postcolonial future. Habibullah Bahar, a 
Communist and influential figure among the Bengali-Muslim intelligentsia, for example, wrote 
extensively during the 1940s, defining the idea of Pakistan in terms of the rights of national self-
determination. The resolution declared “Every section of the Indian people which has a 
contiguous territory as its homeland, common historical tradition, common language, culture, 
psychological make-up, and common economic life would be recognized as a distinct nationality 
with the right to exist as an autonomous state within the free Indian Union or federation and will 
have the right to secede from it if it may so desire.” Quoted in Marcus Franda, “Communism and 
Regional Politics in East Pakistan,” Asian Survey 10, no. 7 (July 1970): 588–606. 
36 Mujibur Rahman Khan’s ideas, particularly his 1942 book titled Pakistan, were particularly 
inspirational for Ahmad’s conversion to the cause of Pakistan. Ahmad also mentions 
Ambedkar’s book Pakistan or The Partition of India” as an important influence on his thinking. 
ADRPB, pp.143-144  
37 ADRPB, p.144 
38 In Neilesh Bose’s description, “Nearly all the main players of Bengali Muslim politics 
attended this three-day festival…The festival was therefore the epicenter of Bengali Muslim 
literary, intellectual, and political engagement and a meeting of intergenerational energies all 




men can only say that without cultural autonomy [tamuddini azadi] a literature cannot 
even be born, let alone survive.39 
 
Ahmad’s speech was written and delivered in Bengali but contained Urdu, Sanskrit, and English 
expressions regarding independence, autonomy, and culture. He used these mixed expressions 
not only for establishing equivalency between concepts of tamuddini azadi, sanskritik swaraj, 
and cultural autonomy but also for establishing a distinction between the concepts of 
independence and autonomy. 40 For Ahmad, political independence, or rajnoitik azadi, and 
cultural autonomy, or tamuddini azadi, were related but distinct projects. Ahmad’s prioritization 
of the demand for tamuddini azadi and deferment of the question of rajnoitik azadi was not 
simply a move to evade the question, which he admittedly found difficult to answer in the 
tumultuous period preceding the partition of India.41 Rather, for Ahmad the program of cultural 
autonomy represented the goal of political independence. He borrowed terms such as azadi and 
swaraj from contemporary political discourses to give weight to and make intelligible the 
demand for cultural autonomy and argued that the legitimacy of anti-colonial and postcolonial 
politics depended on their ability to respond to this demand. He asserted in the same speech: 
Political independence of various nations will certainly be the zeitgeist [jugobani] of the 
coming future. However, that political independence would become meaningful 
[sarthokota] in the free and absolute development [bikash] of the intrinsic self of the 
nation. The essential meaning [mormobani] of this development is tamuddini azadi or 
cultural autonomy. Its very name is Pakistan.42  
 
																																								 																				
39 Mul Shovapotir Bhason [Address of the President], East Pakistan Renaissance Convention. 
Islamia College Auditorium, Calcutta. May 5th, 1944. Published as “Pak Banglar Renesa” 
[Renaissance of Pak Bangla] in Abul Mansur Ahmad, Pak Banglar Kalchar [The Culture of Pak 
Bangla] (Dhaka: Ahmed Publishing House, 1966), p. 156.  
40Analyzing the speech, Andrew Sartori argues that juxtaposition of “Urduized Bangla, 
Sanskritized Bangla, and transliterated English terms” was deployed deliberately to “establish 
their interchangeability and equivalence.”  “Abul Mansur Ahmad and Cultural Politics of 
Bengali Pakistanism” (2007), p. 122.  
41ADRPB, p.117 and p.173. 




By the1940s the demand for Pakistan had become “the political demand of Indian 
Muslims,” but it was not at all clear what that demand meant in terms of territory or political 
structure. In this context, Ahmad made sense of the Pakistan demand as an expression of the 
desire for the recognition of cultural autonomy of Indian Muslims generally and Bengali 
Muslims particularly. Though Ahmad became a supporter of the Pakistan demand, he remained 
ambivalent regarding the demand for two separate states for Muslims and Hindus. He was 
willing to support a single federated state or a commonwealth of multiple states or any other 
political settlement at the end of colonial rule as long as it promoted possibilities of cultural 
autonomy for the Bengali-Muslims. He accepted the two-state solution as the best outcome under 
the circumstances of political strife and tension in the late colonial period. However, he retained 
the idea of Pakistan as a program for cultural autonomy to mount a critique of Pakistani state 
efforts to repress cultural diversities in the name of national integration.43 Thus, Ahmad 
constructed a parallel, if not continuity, between the demand for Pakistan and the demand for 
Bangladesh by reading the latter also as a demand for Bengali-Muslim cultural autonomy. 
II 
  
To demand cultural autonomy is to argue for, if not to presuppose, the existence of a 
distinct cultural identity. Thus, for Ahmad a major intellectual and political challenge was to 
name the people whose quest for autonomy and independence justified the projects of Pakistan 
and Bangladesh. The two-nation theory of the Pakistan movement provided Ahmad with the 
conceptual foundations for articulating his politics of cultural autonomy, as well as for 
																																								 																				
43 For example, Evaluating the significance of the language movement of 1952, Ahmad asserted, 
“Five years after the establishment of Pakistan, it has become evident that the majority 
population of Pakistan, the East Bengalis, have been denied self-identity, the desire for which 
was at the heart of the Pakistan movement.” In “Bhasha Andoloner Mormokotha”, in, Pak 




constructing the cultural distinctiveness of what he variously named as Pak-Bangla, Muslim 
Bangla, or Bengali-Muslim. The spirit of partition, Ahmad argued, was to recognize the “two 
great peoples” of India, the Hindus and the Muslims. “Both had separately seen the pinnacle of 
glory on the one hand and jointly suffered a common slavery under foreign rule. Both were now 
pulsating with a new sense of revival and renaissance.”44 Ahmad argued that only a few of the 
great Indian leaders – C.R. Das, Gandhi, Jinnah, and Suhrawardy understood that India was 
home to two distinct peoples and their unity depended not on erasing their social and religious 
identities or on producing a social “fusion” [transliterated English term was used in the original 
Bangla text] but on establishing “political federation,” among them.45 This spirit of partition was 
echoed in Ahmad’s speech in 1944, where he proclaimed:  
There is room for debate whether the Hindus and the Muslims are separate nations [jati] 
in the context of politics. However, in consideration of culture there is no room for debate 
that they are different nations [jati]. … The Hindus and Muslims of India are not one 
people [jati]. Their cultures are not the same either.46  
 
Despite his equivocation about the political implications of the supposed differences between 
Hindus and Muslims, Ahmad was empathetic in his argument about the cultural differences 
among them. Since religion, he argued, functions as the “seed of culture,” the differences in the 
philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic dispositions of the two religions produce two different 
cultural entities.  He argued:  
The religion of Muslims is the religion of justice and equity, struggle and martyrdom. 
Hindu culture, symbolist, beauty worshiping and aestheticist [sic], is person oriented, 
whereas Muslim culture is not person centered. Oriented towards equity, justice and 
common weal, Muslim culture is society centered... The Muslims are fundamentally 
																																								 																				
44 Ahmad, End of a Betrayal (1975), p. 8 
45 See also his discussion on the topic of the Spirit of Partition in ADRPB, pp. 178 – 182. In these 
arguments Ahmad referenced C.R. Das extensively as the most prominent and consistent 
proponent of federalism in India.  




action-oriented rather than devotionalistic [sic]… Muslim social structure is not founded 
on renunciation or otherworldliness.” 47 
 
 Though this argument of cultural distinctions between Hindus and Muslim based on 
fundamental differences in their philosophical orientation toward the world is foundational in 
Ahmad’s thought, it alone was insufficient to articulate a specifically Bengali-Muslim identity. 
His idea of a Muslim culture was profoundly different from Jinnah’s and the Muslim League’s 
conception of an abstract Muslim nation devoid of any territory, language, or history.48 While the 
seed of culture was religion, culture itself was not the seed but the tree, which Ahmad thought 
should be rooted in a specific place and nourished by the soil, water, and climate particular to the 
place.  In his words:  
A tree lives by taking in nutrients [rasa] from the ground. Thus, a tree cannot be planted 
in any country. If the soil is not suitable for collecting nutrients, a seedling will not 
survive. The same is applicable for culture as well. The culture of one country, no matter 
how beautiful it is, cannot be established in another country. Lacking local flavor/life 
[rasa] it will die.49  
 
Culture had to be territorial, bounded, and concrete. This conception of culture allowed Ahmad 
to recover possibilities of many nations within the two-nation theory and to argue for the cultural 
specificity of Bengali-Muslims against the ideas of pan-Indian Muslim cultural identity. The 
spirit of religion or the seed of culture is shared by all Muslims and produces the possibilities for 
trans-regional and transnational brotherhood. Yet Islam or Muslimness does not constitute a 
unified culture. Just as Arabs, Persians, and Turks do not have the same culture despite sharing a 
religion, Muslims of Bengal, Bihar, or Punjab also do not constitute one cultural unit. Since 
																																								 																				
47 “In “Pak-Banglar Renesa” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 171. The same passage was 
quoted by Sartori, “Abul Mansur Ahmad and Cultural Politics of Bengali Pakistanism” (2007), p. 
122. I use Sartori’s translation.  
48See Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion (2013) for a discussion about the abstract, empty, and decidedly 
anti historical, anti-territorial character of the Muslim League conceptualization of Pakistan.  




“culture can not overcome the boundaries of geography,” Ahmad argued, “the inhabitants of East 
Pakistan are an autonomous and distinct people from the other peoples of India and from their 
religious brethren in West Pakistan.”50  
Ahmad recognized that the Muslim culture of Bengal was certainly shaped by the Islamic 
spirit and high culture brought over by Muslim conquerors, traders, and proselytizers during the 
six hundred years of Muslim rule.51 However:   
Not the courtly expression [shahi-rup] but the popular manifestation [gono-rup] of the 
culture of the Muslim period is what is important. That [popular] manifestation 
specifically was our culture. We are the inheritors of precisely that [popular culture].52  
 
The popular manifestation or the gono-rup of the Bengali-Muslim culture that developed among 
and reflected the life experiences of the Muslim masses, Ahmad further argued, had over the 
centuries thoroughly indigenized the “foreign” elements by mixing them with local elements. 
This indigenized and popular manifestation of Muslim culture in Bengal “is reflected in and 
developed through their religious festivals, rituals and ceremonies, names and badges/signs, diets 
and clothing, art and literature, dance and music, and etiquettes and mannerisms.” 53 In the essay 
“Pak Banglar Kalchar” and elsewhere, Ahmad provided numerous ethnographic examples to 
establish the richness and vitality of Muslim popular culture in Bengal and to distinguish it from 
the courtly culture of the Muslim elites. 
Though religion is the seed of culture, “not all of culture is religion.”54 Thus, a culture 
originating from a specific religion can make room for others outside of the religion. To illustrate 
																																								 																				
50 “Pak Banglar Rensa” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 161 
51 Ahmad refers to the Muslim period [amol] starting circa 1201 with the sacking of Nabdwip by 
Bakhtiyar Khilji and ending circa 1757 with the British defeat of Shiraj ud-Daula. “Pak Banglar 
Kalchar”, pp. 26 -27 
52 As Ahmad argued, “Pak Banglar Kalchar” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 30  
53 Ibid.  




this point Ahmad used the example of religious festivals, which he argued lose their religiosity 
overtime and exist mostly as secular festivals participated in by men and women of different 
creeds. He wrote:  
At the end when the religion of the religious festivals gets lost under celebration, the 
human species [manab jati] does not suffer a loss. Whatever they lose in terms of 
religion, they gain many fold more in terms of cultural practice.55  
 
As people from different sects and religions embrace these cultural practices they take on a 
popular and a national character. This logic applies not only to religious festivals but also and 
perhaps more importantly to language. Ahmad argued that the Bengali language or at least the 
literary Bengali language emerged in the 13th and 14th century under the patronage of Muslim 
rulers.56 This language from the beginning was a “Musalmani Bangla,” containing Muslim 
imageries, idioms, and heavy influences of Arabic and Perso-Turkic, albeit in “Bengali 
localized” forms.57 Musalmani Bangla, however, was not confined to Muslims only. Rather, 
inhabitants of Bengal, particularly in the eastern parts, irrespective of their religion, used this 
Bangla in their everyday lives but more importantly in producing literary works. In effect Ahmad 
was arguing not merely that Muslims of Bengal were Bengali, too, but that Muslims produced 
the possibility of Bengali-ness. Thus, he wrote, “We [Muslims] were rulers of this country for six 
hundred years… during this period we gave Bangla its national identity [jati-nam], language, and 
literature.”58 The Bengali culture and national identity produced by the Muslims of Bengal also 
																																								 																				
55 Ibid, p. 31 
56 “Bhasha Andoloner Mormokotha” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), pp. 120- 121 
57 Ibid, p.125. Though Ahmad’s arguments went against the accepted historical wisdom of the 
time, they have been supported by later historical studies of Bengali language. See for Example 
Afia Dil’s Two Traditions of the Bengali Language (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical 
and Cultural Research, 1993). 
58Pak Banglar Kalchar” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 26. Over the course of the 20th 
century and particularly after the creation of Pakistan, new historical accounts argued causal 




had a regional dimension. Since the Muslims constituted a demographic majority Eastern 
Bengal, the ‘Musalmani Bangla’ was more dominant there. Thus, Ahmad envisioned a national 
culture East Bengal that, though shaped fundamentally by Muslim spirit, aesthetic, and 
imaginaries, was not exclusively Muslim.59 Ahmad’s conception of a national culture of East 
Bengal allowed him to defend the idea of Pakistan and his participation in the Pakistan 
movement against charges of communalism:  
In the demand for Pakistan there were both communal and democratic nationalist voices. 
However, under the circumstances [of late colonial period] the soft voice of the 
democratic nationalist demand for East-Bengal’s self-identity [shokiota] was crushed 
under the loud communal voice. As a result the whole demand was mistakenly judged to 
be communalism of the Muslims. This mistake [of judgment] was committed not only by 
the Hindus; many Muslims also did the same. Thus, many Muslim intellectuals also 
judge the demand for the recognition of the self-identity of East-Bengal’s language and 
literature as a communalist demand to partition Bengali language and literature. It will 
take time for them to realize the flaw in their idea.60  
 
Ahmad could claim that his arguments for the cultural autonomy of the Bengali-Muslim 
and of East Bengal did not constitute a demand to partition Bengali culture for two reasons. First, 
Ahmad argued that historically there had not been a common Bengali culture:  
Hindus and Muslims of Bengal, in spite of living in the same territory for centuries and 
speaking the same language could not grow into a common society because of social and 
religious restrictions and barriers like caste system and untouchability, which made social 
mixing amongst the Hindus and Muslims absolutely impossible…. There was thus no 
common Bengali culture in Bengal… So if any Hindu poet and writer arrogantly called 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
Particularly influential were works like Abdul Karim’s, Social History of the Muslims in Bengal, 
down to A. D. 1538 (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1959) and Momtajur Rahman 
Tarafdar’s Husain Shahi Bengal, 1494-1583 A.D.; a Socio-Political Study. (Dhaka: Asiatic 
Society of Pakistan, 1965). Though Ahmad did not cite these accounts specifically, he must have 
been informed by these alternative historical discourses. See chapter 2, section 2 for a discussion 
of the social history of Bengali-Muslims.  
59 See also Bose, Recasting the Region (2014).  
60 “Bhasha Andoloner Mormokotha” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 130. Though I have 
translated the word shokiota as self-identity, the translation does not do convey the meaning 
completely. Shokiota refers to the particular inherent qualities of a person or a thing, something 




anything as “Bengali Culture” and many did so, they meant it to be, and it really was, 
Hindu culture.61  
 
Second and more importantly, it was not only that the modern Bengali culture produced by the 
Hindu bhadralok of Calcutta was fundamentally different from Bengali-Muslim popular culture, 
but it was also that the possibilities for establishing a singular Bengali national culture were 
foreclosed by the inability and refusal of the bhadralok to admit or accommodate cultural 
elements from Muslim Bengal in their construction of modern Bengali culture.  
Ahmad argued that while Bengali culture had a popular and Muslim character from the 
13th century, a distinctly Hindu-Bengali language and cultural identity began to emerge in the 
Western Bengal only around 18th century as a result of the “Hindu renaissance” inspired by 
Bengali Vaishnanbism that had emerged earlier in the 16th century.62 The bhadralok class that 
emerged over the course of the 19th century as a result of British colonial rule had its roots in 
this relatively new Hindu-Bengali culture. The economic and political resources of the bhadralok 
class, along with patronage from colonial rulers, produced the possibilities for a second and more 
significant Bengali-Hindu renaissance by the end of the 19th century. 63 Meanwhile, Musalmani 
Bangla languished under state repression and from the inwardness and counterproductive 
responses by Bengali-Muslim political and intellectual leaders.64 By the late 19th century the 
																																								 																				
61 “Cultural Identity.” in End of A Betrayal (1975). p. 525. (In original English)  
62 Ahmad argues that Chaitanya-bad or the ideology of Bengali Vaishnabism emerged as a 
Hindu reaction to the popularity of Islam in Bengal and was based on the Islamic principle of 
“egalitarian brotherhood” to counter Islam’s popularity. This ideology developed for two 
hundred years under the protection of liberal Muslim rulers before producing a distinct literary 
identity under the patronage of Majaraja Krisna Chandra. “Bhasha Andoloner Mormokotha” in 
Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p 123.  
63 “Bhasha Andoloner Mormokotha” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), pp.126 - 127  
64 Despite occasionally suggesting complicity, Ahmad did not ultimately blame the Bengali-
Hindus for the changing fortunes of Hindus and Muslims of Bengal. The responsibility was 
assigned to colonial rule and to the Bengali-Muslim political leaders and intelligentsia for failing 




language, literature, and culture of the Bengali-Hindus, or more specifically of the Hindu 
bhadralok of Calcutta became much more refined than that of Bengali Muslims and was 
recognized as the standard bearer of Bengali culture. Meanwhile, Musalmani Bangla literature 
and language was relegated to the status of a mere sub-culture and an uncouth dialect.65 Ahmad’s 
arguments against the claim of a singular Bengali cultural and national identity were in effect 
arguments against the hegemony of this bhadralok Bengali culture and the exclusion of Bengali 
Muslims from it.  
Ahmad did not begrudge the advancement of Bengali-Hindu literature and culture and 
even argued, “As a sophisticated example, the literature of West Bengal is certainly worthy of 
our emulation.” However, the core of Ahmad’s politics of cultural autonomy was the argument 
that the culture bhadralok Bengali culture was ‘not our culture.”66 The bhadralok Bengali culture 
of the 19th century was distinguished from the culture of the Bengali Muslims not only because 
it had its roots in the Hindu religion and in Western Bengal but perhaps more importantly 
because of the class differences between the two groups. In contrast to the Hindu bhadralok, 
Ahmad commented, the “Bengali Muslim is not an aristocratic leisure class [sreni] [that is] 
afraid of labor [sromo-kuntho] and [depends on] unearned wealth.”67 The culture developed by 
the urban leisure class of Calcutta necessarily failed to reflect the life experiences, aspirations, 
and energies [jibon khudha] of the productive masses of rural East Bengal. Modern Bengali 
literature, which in Ahmad’s estimation was the most distilled expression of the bhadralok 
culture, could not become the national literature of the Bengali Muslims because it failed to 
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66 Ahmad made this argument on numerous occasions throughout his intellectual career. One of 
his most eloquent expressions is found in his autobiography, where he laments the “loneliness” 
he feels because of failure by Bangladeshi intellectuals to appreciate the self-identity and 
distinction of Bengali-Muslim culture. Atmakotha (1978), Chapters 14 and 15, pp. 300 – 330.  




integrate contributions from Bengali-Muslims and because it failed to contribute much to them. 
The modern Bengali literature could not accommodate the “spirit,” “subject-matters,” or 
“language” of the Bengali-Muslims and thus failed to inspire or give anything to them.68 
Therefore, Ahmad argued, “….in our own country we have to rediscover [transliterated English 
in the original text] our autochthonous national tradition and culture… Like the Bengali Hindu 
renaissance, Bankim-Rabindra and Ramkrishna-Bibekananda of the Bengali Muslim 
Renaissance must be born among us.”69 
Bengali-Muslims, Ahmad noted, had their own vibrant culture, including well-developed 
literary traditions. The idea of popular culture [gono-rup] that Ahmad advanced to produce 
distinction of the Bengali-Muslims from the high culture of the ashraf Muslims also served to 
distinguish them from the high culture of the Bengali bhadralok. Ahmad’s conception of the 
Bengali Muslim identity collapsed the distinctions between regional, religious, and class 
identities as it collapsed together the “Muslim spirit” discussed earlier and the political energies 
emanating from the economic and social lives of Bengal’s peasants. The discourses of justice, 
equality, and rights, which for Ahmad constitute the essential ethical core of Muslim spirit, help 
to give voice to the political aspirations of the Muslim peasants exploited by the colonial state, as 
well as the landlords and moneylenders, who were mostly Hindus. Thus, the demand for cultural 
autonomy of the Bengali-Muslims was then not only a demand for the recognition of a formal 
equality between anthropologically distinct cultural entities but also a demand by an exploited 
and oppressed class for its own liberation. Ahmad’s collapsing of Muslim identity and peasant 
interests in naming the Bengali-Muslim nation is reflective of the sociological and political 
reality of mid-20th century Bengal and his own personal experiences.  
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As we have understood from philosophical discourses about identity over the last two 
centuries, identities are relational and are not products of autogenous processes. Identities are 
constructed through complex and dialectical relationships with the “other,” in which producing 
distinction from and negation of the “other” fulfills a vitally constitutive function.70 Although 
Ahmad was careful to delineate the distinctions between Bengali-Muslims and other Muslims 
based on geography, language, literature, and other elements, he was primarily concerned with 
emphasizing the distinctions between Bengali Muslims and Bengali Hindus. For Ahmad, the 
constitutive other of the Bengali-Muslim was the Bengali-Hindu, or more specifically the upper-
caste Hindu bhadralok. His reasons for emphasizing the differences between Bengali Muslims 
and Hindus were two-fold. First, he argued that Bengali-Muslim intellectuals, particularly those 
with secular and progressive politics, recognized their cultural differences with other Muslims of 
India and elsewhere more easily but failed to sufficiently appreciate their difference from the 
Bengali-Hindus. Second, and on a deeper level, Ahmad’s political and intellectual outlook was 
shaped by the impulse to push back against the marginalization of the Bengali-Muslims, which 
emanated from their double location of being a peasant and a Muslim.  
For Ahmad, like many of his contemporaries, the distinction between Bengali Muslims 
and Hindus was not a matter of choice or a mere theoretical proposition. Rather, the distinction 
was experienced as being marginalized on account of religious identity, which also marked class 
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position and provinciality. Perhaps the experiences of the upper-class ashraf Muslims were 
different but for ordinary Muslim peasants, who constituted the vast majority, 95% in Ahmad’s 
estimation, of the Muslim population in Bengal, Muslimness often entailed experiences of 
exploitation, humiliation, and even violence. Moreover, as Ahmad recounts in his memoirs, the 
experiences of being secondary persisted even as the sons of Muslim peasants made their way 
into the ranks of the urban middle class. Even in the anonymity of the city they could not hide 
the markers of Muslimness ingrained in manners of dress, speech, food, and countless other 
everyday practices, all of which in turn engendered varying degrees of contempt, ridicule, and 
discrimination.71 These experiences made Ahmad a particularly “sensitive Muslim” and 
provoked him to wear his Muslim identity proudly despite his agnosticism and his own criticisms 
of various aspects of Bengali-Muslim society.72 Although Ahmad was a passionate advocate of 
peasant interests, arguably his politics from an early age were more fundamentally motivated by 
concern for the dignity of Muslim peasants.73 Inspired and enabled by the Lahore Resolution and 
																																								 																				
71 See for example, Atmakatha (1978), pp. 108 – 110 and pp. 211-219. Particularly interesting 
and revealing is the account of Bengali-Muslim young men imitating the dress and mannerisms 
of their Hindu counterparts and even adopting Hindu names to be accepted as customers by the 
Hindu prostitutes of Calcutta’s brothels. He found it extremely insulting that even the prostitutes 
would discriminate on account of religion. He was, however, also quick to defend the dignity of 
the women working at the brothels by arguing that they were prostitutes only in the brothels and 
to customers; outside in social life, they are deserving of dignity and respect like all other 
women.  
72 Ahmad devotes five chapters in his autobiography, Atmakatha (1978), to charting the evolution 
of his thoughts about religion and discussing his ambivalence regarding Islam. In the chapter 
“Onislami Musalman [Un-Islamic Muslim]” pp. 211-229, he discusses the psychological and 
political rational for affirming Muslim identity despite becoming increasingly agonistic about 
Islamic faith.  
73 As a young boy he became politicized protesting customs and social practices that demeaned 
Muslim peasantry. For example, he successfully protested the custom requiring Muslim peasants 
[rayot] to sit on the floor in the offices of the landlord [zamindari kachari] while there to pay 
their taxes [khajna] and other official business. (ADRPB, pp.10-11) Other examples include his 




the political discourses surrounding the Pakistan movement, Ahmad became increasingly 
convinced that the dignity of the Muslim peasants of Bengal could only be secured by 
constituting them as nation and not merely as an interest group or a class that can be 
accommodated within an Indian or a Bengali nation.  
The concern for dignity not only inspired Ahmad’s politics of cultural autonomy but also 
provided legitimacy for that politics. Dignity for Ahmad was closely tied up with atma-marjada, 
or self-respect. He argued that one must have a sense of one’s own individuality and pride in 
oneself to demand recognition from others. If it is true for individuals, it is more so for 
collectivities and nations. Culture, according to Ahmad, provides the “individuality” or 
“personality” of a nation.74 Though “among nations and peoples there are more unity than 
divisions, more similarities than differences,” those differences and distinctions matter the most 
because they determine different identities and give cultures their distinct personalities.75 Thus, 
the goal of the politics of cultural autonomy for Ahmad was the recognition and realization of the 
self-identity of the people. Or, as Ahmad puts it, the goal is, amra ‘amra’ hobo or to become 
“we” by discovering our “we-ness.”76 Ahmad articulates the goal and legitimacy for the demand 
of cultural autonomy in the following manner:  
If we have flaws in our social customs and traditions, rituals and ceremonies, 
entertainments and celebrations, we will reform and correct them ourselves to be suitable 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
(ADRPB, pp.6-7) and his longstanding feud with a teacher at his secondary school, who had 
mocked and insulted him because of his Muslimness (Atmakotha, 1978, pp. 105 - 113).  
74 “When we talk about a particular person ... we point towards a collection of qualities that are 
essentially his own and through which he is differentiated from general others… they are 
identifiable through those differences; those differences are his autochthonous identity 
[nijoshshoota]... Similarly every human-collective, or community, society, or nation has its own 
shamebto bakitto or corporate personality [transliterated English in the original after Bengali 
expression for emphasis and equivalency]. “Pak Banglar Kalchar” in Pak Banglar Kalchar 
(1966), p. 3 and 20.  
75 “Pak Banglar Kalchar” in Pak Banglar Kalchar (1966), p. 22; P. 116. 




for modern sensibilities. We will not blindly imitate others’ ways of life. We will make 
everything our own. We will not turn ourselves into others. This is not a matter of 
stubbornness or envy or even anti-reformist stasis. It is a matter of self-identity. It is a call 
for a sense of self-respect and national pride. This is a call to know the self and to recover 
and revitalize the self.77  
 
Evident from the passage above, Ahmad did not advocate cultural autonomy at the 
expense of modernization or progress. To render the project of cultural autonomy compatible 
with modernization Ahmad contrasted the concept of culture with the concept of civilization, 
which for him signified “the total progress of humanity in terms of education, knowledge, 
science, literature, commerce, industry, technology, etc.”78 Thus, civilization represented the 
qualities of a historical period and not of a particular group of people. “Whereas culture must 
have an identity or a national expression, civilization cannot be confined to a nationality.” 
Comparing civilization to light, Ahmad argued that a torch lights the path not only of the 
torchbearer but also for others on the path. Thus, certain civilizational progress may originate 
from a group, but civilization is universal and belongs to all of humanity. Modern Western 
civilization, Ahmad argued, is not an exclusive property of the West. Non-Western peoples are 
also part of that civilization as beneficiaries, creators, and contributors.79  
Despite the admitted difficulties in demarcating culture from civilization in their 
expressions in social practices, conceptually they must be distinguished. Just as all the 
individuals of a society do not possess the same personalities, all the nations of a civilizational 
epoch do not share the same culture. Thus, in the modern era, despite sharing the Western 
civilization and despite the dominance of Western nations as conquerors and colonizers, “people 
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of other countries have resolutely held on to their own cultures.”80 Different cultures are different 
expressions of life or different ways for life to be experienced, Ahmad argued somewhat 
metaphysically. Thus, cultural differences are to be celebrated as diverse expressions of life 
intended by the creator. Accordingly, those who criticize the demand of cultural autonomy in the 
name of universal humanism or anti-sectarianism are in effect advocating a uniformity that goes 
against natural or divine design favoring diversity, which is tantamount to “cultural fascism or 
tamuddini zulumbaji [cultural oppression].”81 Ahmad’s politics of cultural autonomy, however, 
did not rely merely on arguments for diversity for the sake of diversity. Rather, cultural 
diversities and autonomies are to be valued for their potential contribution to human civilization 
and progress. If all human societies were to adopt “Western culture,” Ahmad reasoned, they 
would “lose their personalities and would become a herd of cows under the Western cowherd.” 
And in the process would “lose all their independent thought, motivation for work, and aspiration 
for creativity.” Consequently “they would have nothing to contribute towards world-
civilization.”82 Thus, he argued:  
No nation or human society can move forward on the path of progress by forsaking or 
overcoming its own culture. Those who try, merely imitate, they do not create. They 
cannot contribute anything to the progress of the world. 83  
 
Ahmad’s theory of cultural identity, while demanding recognition and dignity, could 
remain open to modernization and progress because culture, for him, signified not ossified 
traditions dictating human lives but a dynamic field of action that “is the foundation of the 
practice of life [jibon shadhonar bunyiad].” Culture is foundational because it provides 
guidelines or norms regarding self-conduct. Furthermore, culture provides a mooring or an 
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identity from which life’s action can be carried out. Culture for Ahmad is also kristi, which is 
closer to the meaning of culture in the sense of cultivation or refinement. Thus, a culture, though 
based on certain traditions or oitijjo, is also a dynamic process oriented towards refinements of 
individuals and improvements of social lives. This conception of culture allowed Ahmad and his 
colleagues to conceptualize the project of cultural autonomy, to be a project of cultural 
renaissance and a call to action. The demand for cultural autonomy should not be mistaken, 
Ahmad warned, “as a call from behind” but should be taken as “a call to move forward. Not 
revival but renaissance”: 
The world has advanced much distance in the path of progress. We have to catch up to 
that progress and be part of it. Thus our pace has to be very fast. Our culture will also 
have to become modern and scientific. This is not an epoch of feudalism but of 
democracy. Thus our culture will also have to be democratic.84  
  
To catch up with progress Bengali-Muslims must produce a total revolution in their socio-
cultural lives, a renaissance, a project of reawakening and revitalizing – “producing a lightning 
flash of life on its dead bones” – a humiliated nation that has forgotten its proud history and is 
mired in superstition and strife.85 Renaissance is also a project of social revolution, whose “fire” 
would burn away “all the clutter and debris of exploitation and injustice,” along with all the 
superstition and ignorance.86  
As Ahmad envisioned the cultural renaissance to be a revolutionary project of social 
transformation, it could not be reduced to mere “turnovers in political leaderships or even 
transformations in the structures of the state [rastro-rup].”87 The broader meaning of human 
freedom that Ahmad was grasping at could not be realized by mere political means. Real swaraj, 
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freedom, had to be something more than political independence, whether it be from British 
colonial rule or the Pakistani state. As I have discussed, whether the state was Pakistani or 
Bangladeshi was of a secondary concern for Ahmad. Certainly, the character of the state and the 
freedom and democracy it permits matter. Yet the establishment of these states in and of 
themselves did not or could not produce cultural renaissance. Rather, renaissance was to be 
ushered in through “revolution in the thought-world and collective psyche of the nation, without 
which revolutionary action will not be possible.” The responsibility for producing the 
“revolution in thinking,” Ahmad argued, “lies with the poets and men of letters.”88 This 
emphasis on thought over action as the primary site of renaissance and his identification of poets 
and men of letters as its primary protagonists allowed Ahmad not only to construct literature as a 
site and medium of political intervention but also to recover possibilities for universalistic 
enlightenment within his politics of identity.  
Ahmad had been associated with and deeply influenced by the Muslim Shahitya Shomaj 
(MSS) or the Muslim Literary society, which was a self-consciously modernist organization 
dedicated to the “emancipation of intellect” among the backward and unenlightened Muslim 
masses of Bengal.89 As such, Ahmad also shared with MSS the vision of producing social 
transformation among Bengali-Muslims. The bulk of his literary work, particularly his early 
satires, was sharply critical of the puritanism, backwardness, small-mindedness, intolerance, and 
hypocrisy of Bengali-Muslims and was aimed at awakening and reforming them.90 Like many of 
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89 See Rahman, Abul Mansur Ahmader Chintadhara (2008) for a detailed account of Ahmad’s 
association with MSS and its influence on his thinking. For general discussion of MSS and its 
modernist disposition see for example Tapti De, Kazi Abdul Wadud 1894-1970: A Study of a 
Modernizer of Bengali Muslim Society (Calcutta: Raktakarabee, 2009). 
90 Ahmad’s critical force was recognized and applauded by his contemporaries like Kazi Nazrul 




his contemporary university-educated young intellectuals, he was highly critical of the 
conservative, anti-modernist character of the Bengali-Muslim society of his time and came to 
regard the dominance of the mollas [clerics] and pirs [sages] among Bengali-Muslims to be a 
fundamental obstacle in the path of progress. However, there was a difference between Ahmad 
and many of his progressive contemporaries, intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s who saw Islam 
to be inherently conservative and thus the root cause of the backwardness of Bengali-Muslims. 
Accordingly, they argued that modernization and progress of the Bengali-Muslims would require 
overcoming their Muslimness.91 Ahmad, however, could not subscribe to a program of 
overcoming Muslimness since it was foundational to his conception of Bengali-Muslim identity.  
Since culture is a tree that sprouts from the “seed of religion,” the self-identity of a 
culture and politics demanding its autonomy must also acknowledge that religious identity. Thus, 
Ahmad could not forsake Muslimness but needed to conceptualize it in a way that he would 
allow him reconcile his modernist and progressive politics with his Bengali-Muslim identity 
politics. He did so by conceptualizing Muslimness in secular terms, by separating its identity 
from the ideology of Islam and by distinguishing between culture and religiosity. By Muslimness 
he referred to its popular manifestation in the everyday lives of Bengal peasants or the gono-rup, 
which did not conform to fundamentalist interpretations of sharia law.92 The Muslims of Bengal 
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91 Nur Muhammad makes this argument analyzing early 20th century Bengali-Muslim intellectual 
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were distinguishable in their social lives from their Hindu neighbors with a different language, 
manners of dress, eating habits, song and dance, art and architecture, etc. The cultural practices, 
however, had no inherent connection to Islamic theology, law, and injunctions – Quran, sunnah, 
sharia, etc.93 This popular Muslim culture, Ahmad argued was defined not by iman [faith], 
namaz [prayer], or any other of the pillars of Muslim religiosity but by a philosophical and 
ethical disposition or a “Muslim spirit,” that was worldly, action oriented, society centered, and 
based on principles of equity, justice, and right. That “Muslim spirit” was as much a reflection of 
Islam as it was a reflection of the occupation of Bengal Muslims as peasants, as the productive 
class of society.94 In Ahmad’s conception, this popular culture of Bengali-Muslim was as 
dynamic and lively as it was liberal and tolerant. Thus, Ahmad could argue, in stark contrast to 
many of his contemporary progressive intellectuals, that the root cause of conservatism and 
backwardness that characterized Bengali-Muslim culture in the 20th century was located not 
with Muslimness or Islam but with exploitative and oppressive colonial rule and the Permanent 
Settlement regime. The economic exploitation and political repression of almost two centuries 
generally produced an atmosphere of fear, grief, and insecurity among the masses, which was not 
conducive for cultural vitality. Moreover, Ahmad argued, the Bengali-Muslim resistance to 
colonial rule and economic exploitation were expressed through religious movements like the 
Ohabi and Faraizi movements, whose revivalist and “puritanical” ideologies served only to 
further stifle Bengali Muslim culture.95  
This understanding of the causes of Bengali-Muslim backwardness and his secular 
conception of Muslimness enabled Ahmad to propose his program of cultural renaissance as a 
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project of improving the lives of Bengali-Muslims and not a project of reforming or saving 
Islam.96 His support for Pakistan was premised upon the understanding that Pakistan was a 
democratic demand for advancing the cultural autonomy of the Muslims and not a demand for 
establishing an Islamic state. For Ahmad, Pakistani nationalism and the two-nation theory from 
the beginning was a secular nationalism, which he argued, I think accurately, was also the vision 
of Jinnah, the Quaid-E-Azam.97 The cultural autonomy of the Muslims would be ensured, 
Ahmad argued, not by instituting sharia as the law of the state but by constituting the Muslim 
population as the majority and giving them, through constitutional measures, the democratic 
right to make decisions about their social lives. Ahmad wrote: 
Both Pakistan and India are to be secular nation-states… One with Muslim majority, the 
other with Hindu-Majority…. nationalism of Pakistan will be Muslim-oriented that is to 
say moulded in accordance with Muslim concept of political culture and that of India 
Hindu-oriented… This will be so not because they will do it deliberately from a 
communal angle, but because of normal democratic decisions of the majority. Both will, 
no doubt, be modern and science and technology-oriented. [They will strive towards] 
developing progressive liberal democracy based on social justice and equality.98  
 
As such, Ahmad saw the demand for Pakistan as an extension of the democratic demand of 
Muslim-majority provinces for their autonomy. He was, as we have discussed earlier, open to 
possibilities that the demand for autonomy could be accommodated within a unified India or a 
democratic Pakistan. However, the anti-democratic politics and the imperial ambition of the 
Congress and Muslim League leadership meant that the demand for autonomy could not be 
realized under either arrangement. The establishment of Bangladesh represented a new promise 
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to fulfill the demand of Bengali-Muslims to democratically decide the character and future of 
their cultural and social life. The future was certainly oriented towards modernity and progress 









Abul Hashim was alive for only three years after Bangladesh’s independence. He spent 
these last years writing a memoir, In Retrospection, that was published a month after he died on 
October 5, 1974. As the preface of the book makes clear, he intended the memoir to be not 
merely his autobiography but an eyewitness account of the political realities of the Pakistan 
movement for the benefit of future generations and historians.99 Did he, in retrospection and with 
the hindsight of history, think the movement for Pakistan to be a mistake? The answer seems to 
be negative. The bulk of this 164-page memoir is devoted to discussing and defending his role in 
leading the Bengal Provincial Muslim League (BPML) and advancing the cause of Pakistan: 
The Lahore Resolution was the basis of our movement for carving out of [British] India, 
independent and sovereign states as homelands for the Muslims of India. It did not 
contemplate creation of a single Pakistan State but it contemplated two independent 
sovereign states… In the Lahore Resolution I saw my complete independence as a 
Muslim and as a Bengali and for this I supported the [Pakistan] movement… Mr. Jinnah 
preached the two-nation theory and this was the burden of his song. I never believed in 
Mr. Jinnah’s two-nation theory and I never preached this in Bengal. I preached the multi-
nation theory. I maintain that India is a subcontinent and not a country. India consists of 
many countries and many nations.100 
  
Here, Hashim’s assessment of the Pakistan movement is remarkably similar to Abul Mansur 
Ahmad’s. Both saw the emergence of the single state of Pakistan as a betrayal of the spirit and 
intention of the Lahore resolution and the Pakistan movement. Was then the emergence of 
Bangladesh in 1971 a restoration of the intent of the Lahore Resolution and spirit of the Pakistan 
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movement for him, as it was for Ahmad? In his retrospection Hashim remained silent on this 
question. Some commentators have read this silence along with his silence during the crucial 
months of Bangladesh’s independence war as tacit approval of and support for the birth of 
Bangladesh.101 Certainly, Hashim’s argument about India being a subcontinent composed of 
multiple nations and his efforts, unsuccessful as they were, to achieve an independent United 
Bengal make it possible to read him as a Bengali nationalist. Such a reading has been offered 
most famously by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), the leader of Bangladesh’s independence 
movement, who credited Hashim as being his ideological mentor and one of the first ones to 
articulate the conception of a Bengali nation based on linguistic and cultural unity among Hindus 
and Muslims of Bengal and to demand a nation-state for them.102 Many contemporary historians 
have argued that Hashim laid the foundations of Bengali nationalism not only by agitating for an 
independent United Bengal but also by inspiring and training a generation of Bengali-Muslim 
political actors and intellectuals, including Mujib, who would go on to play important roles in 
advancing Bengali nationalist causes.103 However, a closer reading of Hashim may complicate 
his claim to being a forerunner of Bengali nationalism. Hashim was ambivalent about Bengali 
nationhood and much distrustful of nationalist politics in general. And, this distrust of 
nationalism makes Hashim a particularly interesting figure in a moment of history when 
nationalism dominated the horizons of political imagination.  
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In the Lahore Resolution and in the ideal Pakistan, Hashim saw the possibilities for his 
“freedom as a Bengali” and “freedom as a Muslim.” However, while Hashim devoted 
considerable energies, especially after the emergence of Pakistan, for elaborating his conceptions 
of “freedom as a Muslim,” he never developed any rigorous theory about what “freedom as a 
Bengali” or being Bengali may mean. One of the few occasions when he articulated his 
conceptions of and arguments for a Bengali nation came during his agitations for United Bengal 
in the early months of 1947. In a press statement delivered on 28 April Hashim argued, “Hindus 
and Muslims of Bengal, preserving their respective entities had by their joint efforts, in perfect 
harmony with the nature and climatic influence of their soil developed a wonderful common 
culture and tradition which compared favorably with the contribution of any nation of the world 
in the evolution of man.”104 Since as a cultural unit Bengal was already a country and a nation, 
Hashim argued, Bengal must be granted its right to self-determination and complete sovereignty. 
Yet, when he was pressed to define this “common culture” in concrete terms and to differentiate 
it from the common culture of India or the common culture of Indian Muslims he was at a 
loss.105  
Hashim was unable to defend his position with his thin idea of culture because ultimately 
he was not much committed to the idea of cultural nationalism. Unlike Abul Mansur Ahmad, 
Hashim did not see culture encompassing the totality of life experiences. Neither did he produce 
a systematic synthesis between “Bengali” and “Muslim” identities as Ahmad did so 
meticulously. Culture for Hashim was limited, at least in this context, to language and formal 
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cultural expressions like literature and arts.106 And, he subscribed to the Bengali cultural identity 
of the Calcutta bhadralok following family tradition rather than out of any theoretical or political 
reflection.107 He failed to reflect upon the exclusion of Bengali-Muslim life experiences from 
bhadralok Bengali culture and dismissed Bengali-Muslim to be a politically relevant category. 
Perhaps being an ashraf Muslim from West Bengal rather than an upwardly mobile peasant from 
East Bengal partially explains his reluctance to embrace Bengali-Muslim identity. Bur more 
importantly perhaps, he did not embrace Bengali-Muslim identity because it did not make sense 
to him logically. For Hashim, Bengali and Muslim were two independent categories, which were 
not logically or politically connected to each other. While Bengali signified a cultural identity, 
Muslimness referred to an ethico-political ideology.  
 “Muslims are a nation,” Hashim wrote, “not in the Jewish sense but in the sense where a 
nation means a brotherhood based on common ideology.”108 The invocation of the “Jewish 
sense” here was meant to distinguish Pakistan from Israel and to produce an argument against 
many leaders of Pakistan, including Jinnah, who saw Pakistan as the Muslim Zion or the 
homeland of Indian Muslims.109 The Nafsani or identitarian conception of Pakistan sought to 
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prominent politician involved with the Indian National Congress from the 1890s and a member 
of Bengal Provincial Legislative Council, broke ranks with Muslim politicians of Bengal by 
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produce a “state of the Muslims, by the Muslims, and for the Muslims,” where Muslimness was 
constructed in terms of biological and cultural identities and not with any reference to the 
political philosophy of Islam. The “Nafsani Islamists,” Hashim argued, were not only 
communalist and “intolerant of non-Muslims” but also were “in essence imperialist and 
capitalist” and thus were against “the Islamic spirit of love and tolerance” and “the most 
dangerous enemies of Islam.”110 In contrast, Hashim envisioned Pakistan to be not a Muslim 
state but an Islamic state that would pursue Islamic political and economic principles and would 
allow the majority Muslims to realize their particular outlook on life while providing protection 
and cultural autonomy for minority non-Muslims. Muslimness, for Hashim, was defined not in 
terms of identification with the court cultures of “imperial cities” like Damascus, Bagdad, Delhi, 
etc. but in terms of faith and adherence to principles of Islam both in personal conduct and in 
political orientation. This decoupling of Muslimness from particular cultural identities of the 
ashraf Muslims mirrored the late 19th century Islamic revivalist movements in Bengal and like 
the earlier movements argued that since Islam accommodates and encourages diversity of 
languages and cultures within the Muslim ummah or the ideological brotherhood, it is possible to 
be both Bengali and Muslim simultaneously.111 Since Muslimness was a matter of adherence to 
an ideology, Hashim saw no apparent contradiction, as some of his critics saw, in his desires for 
freedom as a Bengali and a Muslim.112 Just as one could claim to be a Bengali and a liberal or a 
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Bengali and a communist without the charges of self-contradiction, one can also claim to be a 
Bengali and a Muslim. 
Living in a nationalist hour as he did, Hashim’s politics were shaped by a critique of 
colonial and imperial domination and by a desire to secure the right of national self-
determination. However, he did not see national liberation as an end in itself. Rather, the ability 
to determine the course of national politics independent of colonial or imperial dictates was 
important to him because it would produce the possibilities for articulating and establishing 
alternate conceptions of ethics and the good life. As Hashim’s provocatively titled press release 
of 1945 “Let Us Go To War” suggests, the struggle for Pakistan for him was not only a struggle 
against the imperial domination and economic exploitation by both “Delhi and London” but also 
a struggle to secure for Muslims of India the freedom to “govern their own society according to 
the laws of the shariat.”113 What Hashim referred to in this public statement as “laws of the 
shariat” were in effect a reference to a political philosophy that he was beginning to develop by 
radically reinterpreting Islamic political and legal traditions. Though the written articulations of 
this political philosophy that he would go on to name Rubbaniyat appeared only after the 
independence of Pakistan, Hashim was already developing and preaching it throughout his years 
as the general secretary of BPML.114 As his memoir and testimonies by his erstwhile supporters 
indicate, Hashim spent his days expanding and strengthening the party and his nights in 
countless hours of study circles and informal conversations discussing the merits of 
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Rubbaniyat.115 In these discussions and later in his writings, which often took the form of 
comparative analysis of political-economic ideologies and systems, Hashim advanced a vision of 
political, economic, and social arrangements that would promote social order and justice and 
enhance the quality of people’s lives. In the years preceding Pakistan’s independence, Hashim 
merged the political philosophical concerns of justice and the good life with the questions of 
national liberation. The establishment of a nation state was a necessary prerequisite for 
establishing an Islamic socio-political order. After Pakistan became an independent state, 
however, the question of national liberation became obsolete and concerns for the establishment 
of an Islamic polity assumed central importance. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s he became 
increasingly critical of “European style nationalism” and the ideas of national sovereignty, 
national interest, and national allegiance. Instead, he sought to establish Islam as a universalizing 
political ideal that can transcend the parochialism of national differences. 
In an essay titled “Greatness of Nations” Hashim wrote, “… The world today is divided 
into nations on the basis of racial, linguistic and geographical affinity. ‘My nation right or 
wrong’ had been the guiding principle of national conduct until the end of World War II. 
Modern achievements of science mark the beginning of a new era of human existence. 
Time and space are no longer inevitable factors standing in the way of universal 
brotherhood of man.” 116  
 
So much was his distrust of nationalism that by the time a Bengali nationalist movement began 
to emerge in East Pakistan he did not see it to be more than the cynical ploy of opportunistic 
politicians.  He wrote in 1967: 
It is as much ridiculous now for the peoples of India to think of a united India as it is for 
the Pakistanis to think of dividing Pakistan on the basis of a Lahore resolution. Referring 
back to the Lahore Resolution is merely a political camouflage for the political 
liquidation of Pakistan. Wisdom suggests that the peoples of Pakistan should reconcile 
themselves to Pakistan as it is, consider its problems and make sincere and earnest efforts 
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to solve the problems in a manner which may consolidate and strengthen Pakistan instead 




Since Hashim was not a nationalist thinker in a nationalist time his ideas and actions were 
often at odds with the drift of the time, and he suffered tragic defeats. Perhaps, in this regard 
Hashim was closest to another and more famous enigmatic and tragic figure from sub-
continental politics, M.K. Gandhi. Hashim himself implied a kind of parallel between their lives 
in his memoir. The last pages of In Retrospection are devoted to a reflection on a conversation he 
had with M.K. Gandhi on 15 August 1947, the day of India’s birth. The reflection conjures a 
particularly melancholy moment – two defeated figures looking at the unfolding of political 
outcomes that they both played significant parts in producing but ultimately did not desire and 
were powerless to prevent.118 When Gandhi saw Hashim that day he said, “Hashim you are 
defeated…. You could not resist the partition of Bengal.” And for Gandhi, Hashim reflected, the 
defeat was that he could not prevent the partition of India. Both Gandhi and Hashim were united 
in their defeats that they could not produce political solutions for Bengal and India based on 
Hindu-Muslim unity.  
However, perhaps the most significant of their tragic parallels was that despite their 
stature as leaders, their political ideals were never fully accepted by their followers. As Hashim 
wrote, “Mr. Gandhi’s lieutenants… never accepted [his] ideals but they utilized him as a leader 
for promoting their ambition. This Mr. Gandhi deeply realized and here was the defeat of his 
life-long struggle.”119 Perhaps, this was also Hashim’s own realization about his own political 
career when he penned these words almost three decades after the events of ‘47. As the general 
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secretary of the Bengal League, Hashim led the “left” faction in a struggle against the dominance 
of religious orthodoxy, feudal aristocracy, and the imperial ambitions of the central leadership of 
both the Congress and Muslim League.120 While some of his disciples were attracted to him 
because of his proto-socialist ideas and others gravitated towards him because of his advocacy of 
the idea of a united Bengal, a majority were not interested in his project of articulating an Islamic 
political philosophy.121 As Hashim moved away from nationalism and became increasingly 
critical of socialism, many of his erstwhile supporters stopped following him.  They found his 
philosophy of Rubbaniyat to be increasingly esoteric and removed from practical political 
concerns of the day.122 While Hashim’s insistence on principled politics profoundly inspired 
many young and progressive Bengali-Muslim political actors searching for ideological 
foundations for their politics, he failed to be relevant to mainstream nationalist politics of either a 
Pakistani or Bangladeshi variety. Thus, beginning in February of 1947, when he lost the bid to 
become the president of BPML and subsequently took a leave of absence from his post as 
general secretary of the party, Hashim became increasingly marginalized within the party and in 
the political arena generally. 123 Decades later, he however found an unlikely ally and admirer in 
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General Ayub Khan, whom he thought to be the only one among the Pakistani statesmen to take 
the idea of an Islamic state seriously. Though with Ayub’s patronage Hashim became the 
founding director of the Islamic Academy and an influential figure in the scholarly circle, his 
scholarly pursuits of the principles of an Islamic polity failed to inspire any political 
movement.124 
 Gandhi once famously argued that he did not object so much to the rule by Englishmen as 
he did to English rule and that true swaraj or self-rule would mean not merely replacing English 
rulers with Indian ones but establishing different political logics and principles from the ones 
instituted by colonial rule.125 Hashim held a similar view, though he was more susceptible than 
Gandhi to give voice to anti-imperialist nationalism and decry the domination of Bengal by 
London, Delhi, or Karachi.126 Surveying his political scene Hashim concluded that modern 
political structures produced by colonial rule rendered the end of politics to be the seizure of 
power, either for individual gain or in the name of a nation or a class. Consequently, most 
politicians lacked any “social programme” or vision that may advance the good of man or 
society.127 Though the Communists and the “left” claimed to have a vision for future society, the 
only concrete program they advanced in the years preceding independence was the “liberation of 
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the tenants of Bengal from the exploitation of land-lords.”128 Of liberal democracy he was even 
more dismissive and argued, echoing Plato:  
All the ills of the human race of the present age is due to that vicious and stupid political 
system which gives political leadership to inefficient and dishonest demagogues and 
accepts as perfect wisdom the decision of fifty-one asses against the judgment of forty-
nine Arab horses by the procedure of counting noses which they call democracy!129 
  
Witnessing the horrors of the Second World War, the communal violence plaguing India, and 
most immediately the abject misery and the tremendous loss of human lives in the infamous 
1943 Bengal Famine,130 Hashim came to the conclusion that politics needed to be radically 
reoriented. Rejecting the Machiavellian and modern understanding of politics as the “vulgar art 
of seizing power and deceiving men,” Hashim argued for a return of the classical understanding 
of politics as the pursuit of good and justice. Following Plato, he further argued that for such an 
idea of politics to be realized politics needed to be grounded in philosophical reflections; only 
the knowledge of the good can get one closer to the good. These convictions were already 
evident in the arguments he presented to Muslim League activists in his famous nightly study 
circles and would inform many of his later writings. However, the most systematic and eloquent 
expressions of these ideas are to be found in his 1950 book The Creed of Islam or the 
Revolutionary Character of Kalima.  
 
III 
The remarkably philosophical and erudite The Creed of Islam, dedicated to “Seekers of 
Truth,” referred to Rousseau’s famous lamentation, “Man is born free but everywhere he is in 
																																								 																				
128 Hashim, In Retrospection (1974), p. 132.  
129 Abul Hashim, The Creed of Islam: Or the Revolutionary Character of Kalima, (Dhaka: Umar 
Brothers, 1950), p. 164. 
130 Kuwajima provides a persuasive analysis of the importance of the famine in molding 




chains” and asked, “Will then humanity never find salvation?” The answer that Hashim provided 
to this question was radically different not only from the one provided by Rousseau but also from 
the ones provided by modernity in general. True, Hashim conceded, there have been historical 
changes and even progress because the “unhappy man in fond hopes and expectations is ever 
engaged in a restless struggle for liberty and freedom.” Yet, he wrote:  
There is no happiness anywhere. Enslaved humanity liberates itself from one bondage 
and embraces another. He shakes off the prison of his ancestors and enters a new prison 
of his own making. 131  
 
Echoing Hobbes, Marx, and Gandhi, Hashim believed the reasons for man’s continued 
enslavement and unhappiness were that men in modern civilization treat each other as mere 
means for making profit and thus are in “a state of constant internecine war,” where states of 
peace are mere pauses for making preparation for “yet greater killing.” But this state of war is not 
the state of nature, as it was for Hobbes. Rather the state of war emerges from the perversion of 
the nature of man and from the artificial man’s war against nature. The root cause of the 
perversion of the nature of man is his ignorance of the Nature of God, perpetuated first by 
corrupt and ignorant theologians and keepers of religion and then by nihilistic rejection not only 
of “all religious and moral principles” and “constituted authority” but also of the idea of “the 
absolute or eternal nature.”132 According to Hashim: 
Man can be liberated from bondage and be really free in an order of life which will be in 
perfect harmony with his nature, will fully recognize the psycho-physical needs of man 
and prescribe definite methods for their orderly satisfaction.133  
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Such an order, however, cannot be produced by secular modern political philosophies because 
they do not correctly recognize the nature of man. Though Hashim conceded that Western 
modernity has played a progressive role in human history and though “organized Nihilism was a 
necessary phase in the evolution of man for clearing the Augean stables of Priests, Pundits, and 
Mullahs, and it has done its job admirably well,” he argued, “time has now come for the 
reappearance of religion in the full-flood of its pristine glory.” Ultimately salvation can be found, 
he argued, by making “Islam once again a living force in the affairs of man” and by establishing 
a vision of politics and society grounded in principles of Islam.134  
In The Creed of Islam, Hashim pursued a number of interrelated arguments against 
Western modernity, the first of which was against philosophical secularism or the banishment of 
God and religion from politics, the public realm, and from philosophical outlooks and moral 
considerations of everyday humans.135 As the Islamic concept of deen and the Vedantic concept 
of dharma connote the ‘nature of things,’ Eastern religions must be properly understood, Hashim 
argued, not merely as dogmatic adherence to the pronouncements by the priestly classes but as 
the paths or the philosophies that enable man to discover and act in accordance with the true 
nature of man and the universe.136 Mirroring Platonic ontology, Hashim argued for recognizing 
the existence of an absolute and transcendental reality, which is nature or fitrat, brought into 
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existence or moved to action by qudrat or the supreme power of God. The cosmic nature and 
natural laws that govern the entire universe, for Hashim, were but the expressions of the 
unchangeable will of God.137 However, materialistic nihilism, which arises out of man’s ego and 
his desire to be free of all constituted authority, limits its inquiries to fitrat without any respect to 
qudrat and thus fails to understand both human nature and the universal. Yet, since “qudrat 
manifests and reveals Himself in Nature as well as in the affairs of man,” argued Hashim, an 
“earnest seeker of truth,” will ultimately be led to qudrat.  
 To discover the true nature of man and universe a seeker of truth must overcome the 
hold of the materialistic epistemology that values only the intellect and recognizes only the 
knowledge accessible through external sense organs. Materialistic epistemology, Hashim argued, 
mirroring the Platonic concept of the “world of appearances,” can only produce a partial and 
perverted conception of the universe and man. “Knowledge of transcendental truth and 
acquisition of objective conscience and ideas,” Hashim argued, “are the products of coordination 
of the mind with intuition.” Though, he concedes, various Western philosophers, including many 
from the modern era, have advanced or accepted some variations of this argument, “the Rishis 
and the Sufis of the East” through their careful study and culture have achieved higher levels of 
development of “intuition or the internal sense organs of direct perception of truth.” 138  
In the modern era, however, the vulgar materialistic nihilism coming out of the West “has 
been given a scientific basis and has been accepted by a considerably powerful and dominant 
section of humanity as the corner-stone of all progressive schemes of human existence.”139 The 
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political and material superiority of the West has served to dismiss other epistemologies and the 
knowledge and precious legacy of the East. Hashim argued: 
For political reasons the white guardians and custodians of modern knowledge made a 
dishonest blackout of the East… Thanks to the vanity of the White races! Every college-
passed man of today will tell you that crafty Machiavelle [sic] is the first original thinker 
in politics and sociology, and chancellor Bacon, the first philosopher after Socrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle. Nowhere in the textbooks of Europe there is mention of intellectual 
giants like ‘Firabi’, ‘Ibn-Arabi’, ‘Gazzali’ and ‘Ibni-Khaldun’. Nearly two thousand years 
rolled between Aristotle and Machiavelle. According Western exponents of knowledge 
there had been a complete deadlock of cultivation and culture of intellect during these 
years. We hear so much of sociology of Spencer and Marx and we hear so much of social 
interpretation of history but whether the West has the honesty and courage to admit or 
not, Ibni-Khaldun is the father of sociology and social interpretation of History.140 
    
Many in the East, “misguided and practically blinded by the immediate comforts and advantages 
of material prosperity” have also accepted the dominance of Western knowledge.141 However, 
the nihilistic materialism, which cannot value anything and ends up making “nothingness” as the 
meaning of life, places man in a state of perpetual war not only against each other but also 
against his own nature. To rescue humanity from the inevitable disaster and misery that nihilism 
produces, Hashim contended, the East must again reappear “on the horizon of knowledge and 
wisdom” by reviving the “ancient genius and spirit” of its religious teachings.  
Eastern religions generally and Islam particularly differ from modern Western 
conceptions of religions, argued Hashim, insofar as they are not confined to “matters of private 
faith and contemplation” but take “a totalitarian view” and “cover all aspects of human 
existence.”142 “Islam is a science,” he declared, “which deals with man – individual as well as 
social and collective organisms” and thus the Quran provides guidance for both duty to God, 
Huq-ul-Allah, and duty to man, Huq-ul-ibad, and makes “the performance of duty to God void 
																																								 																				
140 Ibid, pp. 81 -82.  
141 Ibid, p. 12. 




and invalid when duty to man is ignored or is not duly performed.”143 Since the Quran was 
revealed in a particular time and place, Islamic social laws necessarily addressed the problems of 
its immediate historical context. The Quran, however, also contains visions for “the ideal or the 
ultimate” and “the gap between the immediate and the ultimate programme of Islam is so wide 
and so vast that it can comfortably accommodate ever expanding progress of man till eternity, 
that is, till the cycle of creation and evolution of man is complete.”144 Thus, the fundamental 
social ethics and laws prescribed by Islam, like those prescribed by other major religions must 
serve as the foundation of “any social order in which man may be happy and really progressive.” 
Accordingly, in The Creed of Islam Hashim called for spiritual, intellectual, moral, social, 
political, economic, and cultural revolutions based on the Islamic ideal of “Rubbaniyat” or the 
“natural philosophy of creation, sustenance and evolution of the Universe” to produce the 
“complete man.”145 Such revolution was once carried out by Muhammad and his shahabis 
[followers] to produce the first Islamic state in Medina, which, Hashim argued, should serve as 
the inspiration and model for future revolutionaries.  
According to Hashim the cornerstones of an Islamic political philosophy are the ideas of 
sovereignty of God and the caliphate as the vicegerency of God on earth.146 Man is not sovereign 
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over his nature; rather his nature is sovereign over him. And, since nature is but the expression of 
god’s will, man’s submission to the laws of nature means his submission to the will of God. 
“Acceptance of sovereignty of God and negation of sovereignty of man must be the starting 
point of political philosophy.”147 Practically the negation of the sovereignty of man means that 
man cannot claim the right to do whatever pleases him. A sword of the king or laws of men, 
however, are neither necessary nor the most efficient instrument for compelling men to do what 
they ought. Hashim argued:  
A steady and a uniform moral sense born out of transcendental knowledge of Nature and 
the Laws of Nature which determine the destiny of man and a faith that any behaviour 
inconsistent with such moral sense, however pleasant it may appear at first sight, is 
ultimately and inevitably suicidal to man’s own interest and ruins his destiny, is the only 
natural and absolutely effective compelling force of individual behaviour whether the 
individual is in the solitude of his bed-room or is in the midst of a crowd.148 
 
An individual who attains, through a combination of intellect and intuition, a deep 
transcendental knowledge and faith will need neither laws of men nor fear of the sword to fulfill 
his duties towards god or men. Thus, anarchy or the absence of political power is the “perfect 
state of human existence.” But “perfect anarchy will not be a practical proposition until humanity 
completely shakes off its artificial civilized existence and goes back to the state of Nature,” 
which is “well-nigh impossible.”149 Thus, Islamic political philosophy recommends a “practical 
																																								 																				
147 Hashim, The Creed of Islam (1950), p. 99. Hashim also argued that man’s estimation of 
himself as a sovereign being is borne out of his arrogance, particularly that regarding his reason. 
Since scientific knowledge have allowed man to use and exploit nature to accomplish wonders 
that seemingly defy nature, man has thought that he can conquer and overcome nature. However, 
all of men’s achievements were made possible, Hashim argued, not by defying laws of nature but 
by acquiring more intimate and thorough knowledge of them. “Nature is knowable but is not 
conquerable.” 
148 Ibid, p. 70.  
149 Ibid, p. 120.  Hashim’s argument that the state of war is not the state of nature but one 
produced by corruption of human nature is remarkably similar to Rousseau. However, unlike 
Rousseau, Hashim thinks of the state of nature not as the primitive underdeveloped stage of 




and a maximum attainable anarchy with a minimum state,” which was the guiding principle of 
the first Islamic state of Medina under the auspices of Caliph-al-Rashedeen. 150 The caliph is not 
a sovereign or a king but vicegerent of God on earth. Any man who molds his life according to 
God’s will and advances His will on earth is already a caliph whether he holds the title or not. 
The office of caliphate institutionalizes the concept of vicegerency. “The office of Caliphate is 
not an office of power, privilege and dignity but it is an office of duties, responsibilities and 
trust,” the goal of which is to “nourish and develop their people as vicegerent of God faithfully in 
the manner in which the Creator nourishes and develops His wonderful creation.”151 Thus, the 
caliph is not a ruler but is a leader or, more accurately, an “administrator of the state” that is 
ruled not by the arbitrary will of man but by laws of God set down in the Quran and subsequent 
body of Islamic jurisprudence. Ultimately the caliph is obliged, just like every other human 
being, to fulfill his duties towards God and man and must be both alim [wise and 
knowledgeable] and salih [honest, unselfish and righteous] to discharge the responsibilities of 
the office properly.152  
Rejecting the sovereignty of man and upholding the ideal of the caliphate advanced by 
Islamic political philosophy necessarily challenge fundamental ideas and institutions of modern 
politics such as nationalism, property, individualism, socialism, and democracy. Though Hashim 
had fought as late as 1947 for an independent United Bengal on behalf of a Bengali nation, by 
1950 he regarded national identity as merely an accidental yet unalterable trait of a human being, 
which if “accepted as basis of division or constituent elements of the human race then humanity 
can never be one and the universal brotherhood of man can never be a reality and there cannot be 
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abiding peace and happiness in the world.”153 He did not, however, demand humans overcome or 
denounce their national or cultural identities. Rather, he argued for a rejection of the ideas of 
national sovereignty and interest and the principle of “my nation right or wrong.” Since man is 
not sovereign, neither a nation nor a state can legitimately claim sovereignty. And, no nation has 
the right to promote national interest at the expense of other nations or by violating universal 
principles of justice. Hashim pointed towards the creation of the U.N. as an example of the 
West’s rejection of nationalism and embrace of the ideal of universal brotherhood of man 
advanced by Islamic political philosophy. In place of nationalisms based on identity or what he 
called “biological” nationalisms, Hashim calls for nationalisms based on ideological affinities, 
which are matters of “free choice” and are not “permanent and invincible impediments to 
universal brotherhood.” If all of humanity were to have one common ideology, there would be a 
universal nation despite all the differences of racial, cultural, and other identities. Hashim 
contended that this common ideology is provided by Islam and that Muslims have the 
responsibility to preach and advance an ideology of universal nationalism, “not in the spirit of 
conquest but in the spirit of humble missionaries dedicated to the noble cause of universal peace 
and happiness.”154 
In The Creed of Islam and in a later essay titled “Islam and Economic Problems” Hashim 
combined the idea of a universal nation with a rejection of property rights to produce radical 
																																								 																				
153 Hashim, The Creed of Islam (1950), p. 102. Here Hashim also argues, “ As unbridled 
individualism disturbed the peace of the family, unbridled family ego disturbed peace and order 
of the tribe and tribal patriotism disturbed the harmony of the race, chauvinism or exclusive and 
aggressive nationalism has been disturbing the peace of the world and making human existence 
intolerably miserable during recent years.”  




critiques of capitalism and socialism.155 He argued that while “Capitalism recognizes private 
ownership of individuals” and “Socialism is social ownership of wealth, Islam negates both and 
teaches economic universalism.” The fundamental principle of Islamic political economy is that 
it does not recognize anyone’s ownership except God’s. The earth and its fruit are blessings from 
God for the creation, substance, and evolution of life, and as such they belong to all of mankind 
and the other creatures of God. Every form of ownership other than God’s – whether individual, 
national, or collective humanity – denies someone else’s right to use or consume the bounties of 
God equitably.156 Thus, “man’s rights and freedom of his dealings with his material possessions” 
must be restricted by ethical considerations towards not only “the general welfare of the entire 
human species, but also of all creatures that draw sustenance from the resources of earth.” 
Individuals and nations must devise ways of satisfying their needs without diminishing the 
means or capacities of others to do so.157 Practical forms of “private ownership” or “social 
ownership” may be institutionalized according to particular historical circumstances, Hashim 
																																								 																				
155 Ibid. see Chapter VII, pp. 127 - 145. Hashim read the essay “Islam and Economic Problems” 
at the International Islamic Symposium held at the University of Dhaka in 1958. “Internationally 
reputed scholars from Harvard, Columbia, California,” etc. presented papers there. The essay 
was then published as a booklet in the same year by the Islamic Academy of Sir Syed College, to 
which Hashim had donated the copyright of the essay, which was later included in his anthology 
As I See It (1965). The essay contains refinements of his economic theories presented in The 
Creed of Islam.  
156 Hashim wrote, “Private ownership of individuals over means of production is a means of 
exploitation of surplus-value of individuals. Similarly, ownership of a nation of its national 
wealth and means of production is a means of exploitation of other nations and collective 
ownership of the entire humanity of the resources of the earth would be a menace to all other 
creatures of the earth.” The Creed of Islam (1950), p. 129. 
157 Hashim, “Islam and Economic Problems” in As I See It (1965), p. 46. Though at a first 
reading this argument appears remarkably like the famous Lockean Proviso regarding private 
property, it is indeed significantly different. First, the argument concerns not the right of property 
but only the right of consumption or use. Second, the proviso for leaving the “common” is good 
not only for humans but also for other creatures of God. While Hashim does not go beyond 
anthropocentric ethics, inclusion of non-humans in his ethical considerations and the argument 
for humans to act as stewards of non-human interests during an era of high modernism 




argued, as long as there are mechanisms to prevent hoarding and excessive accumulation and to 
enforce the obligation towards general welfare. Such mechanisms were, Hashim argued, 
prescribed by the Quran and institutionalized under the Caliphate of Medina. For example, the 
system of zakat, which is a tax on wealth and not on income, and the Islamic inheritance laws, 
which allow distant relatives and even unrelated poor to make claims, effectively guard against 
accumulation and hoarding by individuals.158 However, the complexities of the modern industrial 
mode of production require institutionalization of more expansive regulatory regimes regarding 
consumer and environmental protection and worker’s right to uphold the Islamic economic 
principle of promoting the general welfare. Hashim, in his various writings, proposed in detail 
regulations and argued that, if necessary, production and distribution should be nationally or 
even globally coordinated and managed. He also argued that the economic universalism of Islam 
prohibits accumulation and hoarding by nations and, thus, people of relatively poor countries 
have a claim and right over the wealth of prosperous countries. Anticipating 21st century debates 
regarding migration by more than a half a century, Hashim argued, “…all the talks of world 
peace must end in a fiasco until the world’s available space be made open for the use of all the 
peoples of the world.”159  
Recognition of divine sovereignty necessarily restricts man’s legislative powers and 
places limits on democracy. Men should make laws not according to their whims or will but 
according to the laws of nature established by God for the creation, sustenance, and evolution of 
the universe, argued Hashim in a manner similar to John Locke’s arguments about positive 
law.160 And, following Plato’s arguments about qualities of a ruler, he argued that state leaders 
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and makers of laws should be deeply knowledgeable and divinely guided in order to correctly 
interpret and institute the laws of nature. Thus, what is important is that the best men are elevated 
to leadership positions, which can be achieved through any number of procedures, including self-
appointment.161 Modern parliamentary democracy, Hashim argued, is founded upon the principle 
of “omnipotence and omniscience of the judgment and will of the majority.” Adherence to this 
principle, however, is hypocritical and illogical. It is hypocritical because parliamentary 
democracy does not enable the majority to make decisions or laws but merely allows it to select 
the best men for doing so. And, it is illogical because a majority will does not guarantee that the 
best decision or best men will be chosen. Reification of a process such as majority will over the 
quality of the outcome is not only illogical but also is based on a lack of faith in citizens, argued 
Hashim. If citizens of a polity are righteous and vigilant, they will necessarily oppose and fight 
unjust rulers or laws and thus will act as a check against tyranny. The institution of Mujlis-i-
Shura in an Islamic state can ideally act as an open but self-selected body that not only counsels 
and ratifies the decisions of a caliph but also checks and constrains his power. Hashim argued 
that in a rightly guided Islamic state or caliphate not only will there be freedom of opinion and 
dissent, but other basic human rights will be protected.162 “Democracy of Islam,” argued 
																																								 																				
161 Hashim used the examples of various methods for selecting caliphs in support of this 
argument. He particularly used the example of ascension of Ali, the fourth caliph, for 
legitimizing the argument for self-assertion. (The Creed of Islam, pp. 110 – 113) Later this 
argument would provide convenient ideological covers for the military dictatorship of Ayub 
Khan and would help Hashim secure Ayub’s patronage. (Haq 1992, pp. 98-99).  
162 Hashim wrote extensively in The Creed of Islam (pp. 87 – 99) and elsewhere (for example, his 
essays “Islamic Values” and “Muslim Views of Family and The Place of Women in Islamic 
Society” – both reprinted in his anthology As I see It) arguing for Islamic conceptions of social 
and political rights, which in substance were not very different from social and political rights 
advocated by liberal democracies. The1946 Draft Manifesto of the Bengal Provincial Muslim 
League, of which he was the author, and the founding Manifesto of the Awami-Muslim League, 




Hashim, “is just and equitable distribution of rights and privileges of the state but not equal 
participation of all in the affairs of the state.”163   
The idea of an Islamic polity that Hashim envisioned remained quite abstract and 
philosophical in The Creed of Islam. The only concrete example of such a polity he could cite 
existed fourteen hundred years ago. He had hoped, however, that in Pakistan an Islamic polity 
could be reincarnated in a modern context. Though this desire had informed his political ideas 
and actions throughout the Pakistan movement, it was balanced against the more secular and 
immediate concerns of nationalism and to lesser degree the economic struggles of Bengali-
Muslim peasants. After the emergence of Pakistan he became increasingly opposed to nationalist 
and class politics, preferring to focus on producing programmatic politics based on his 
conception of Islamic political philosophy. His politics, however, failed to gain traction with the 
ruling strata of the new state of Pakistan, which were either decidedly secular modernist or paid 
lip services to Islam for advancing chauvinistic Muslim nationalism. Abul A’ala Mawdudi, the 
Deccan cleric and the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, was one of the few among Indian Muslim 
leaders to advance the idea of an Islamic state in any serious way.164 It is striking that Hashim 
and Mawdudi never formed a political alliance and Hashim never engaged with Mawdudi’s ideas 
or writings, despite the affinities of their political positions. Perhaps, Hashim found Mawdudi 
and his brand of politics to be too fundamentalist, intolerant, and philosophically unsophisticated 
to engage with. In any case, both Hashim and Mawdudi remained at the fringes of Pakistan 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
on social and political rights. See Hasan, “Abul Hashim,” in Purba Banglay Chintachorcha 
(2007) and Kuwajima 2015.  
163 Hashim, The Creed of Islam (1950), p. 109. 
164 See Masood Ashraf Raja, Constructing Pakistan: Foundational Texts and the Rise of Muslim 
National Identity, 1857- 1947 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) and Seyyed Vali Reza 





politics and at times were persecuted as secular modernist visions dominated center stage.165 In 
1953, Hashim advanced his political philosophy by launching a new political party, Khilafot-e-
Rabbani, but he failed to challenge the ruling strata and failed to gain much traction among his 
erstwhile followers and allies among the Bengali-Muslim progressives, whose politics were still 
much centered on nationalist and class concerns. His failures to connect increased his political 
marginality and led to his total defeat in the historic 1954 election.166 Hashim finally found in 
Ayub Khan an ally and patron for his ideas and advanced scholarly discourses about an Islamic 
state, though these discourses remained politically marginalized. During this period, Hashim 
opined that Pakistan needed to realize an Islamic state for the sake of its own citizens and for the 
future sake of humanity. In the Cold War ideological battle over the fate of humanity both liberal 
capitalism and socialism had their own states to rely upon. Despite many states claiming to be 
Muslim, Hashim noted, there was no state that was committed to realizing and advancing Islamic 
ideology. Pakistan, thus, occupied a special place in human history having the potential to serve 
as a model of and advocate for an Islamic way of life, which Hashim believed was far superior to 
the materialistic nihilism and egocentrism of both capitalism and socialism.167 Unfortunately for 
Hashim his dream of an Islamic state would remain unfulfilled in Pakistan. And though the 
emergence of Bangladesh represented at least a partial realization of his earlier struggle for an 
independent Bengali state, it was in many ways a pyrrhic victory because the Bangladeshi state 
was founded on explicitly secular principles and foreclosed the possibilities of establishing an 
Islamic state. Thus, Hashim, like Gandhi, remained a tragic figure who failed to realize or be 
hopeful about the ideals he had held dear.  
																																								 																				
165 Hashim was imprisoned for 16 months beginning, February 25, 1952 for his involvement in 
the language movement. See Haq, Abul Hashim (1992). 
166 Ibid, p. 95.  





I argued previously in chapter 2 that by the 1920s Bengali-Muslim became an identifiable 
category as the members of the emerging urban middle class claimed simultaneous belonging to 
Bengali and Muslim identities. The writers and intellectuals of this highly dynamic and 
productive period began to produce a distinctively Bengali-Muslim literary form and cultural 
sensibility by consciously employing both Bengali and Muslim languages, themes, and 
imaginaries in their works.168 This nascent Bengali-Muslim culture was self-consciously 
modernist, secular, egalitarian, and progressive.169 The operative argument of the cultural 
movements of 1920s and 1930s was that Bengali-Muslims were both Bengalis and capable of 
modernity. The project of establishing the Bengaliness of Bengali-Muslims, however, translated 
into a program seeking their inclusion in the bhadralok Bengali culture that saw Muslimness as 
both backward and foreign. Thus, the programs of promotion of Bengali literacy and literature 
among the Muslims of Bengal and “improving” their literary and cultural standards often 
constructed Muslimness as something in need of overcoming.  
Bengali-Muslim efforts in this period to articulate a counter to this patronizing and 
exclusionary discourse of Bengaliness, however, often reverted to 19th century constructions of 
“Muslims in Bengal” at the expense of a composite category of Bengali-Muslim.170 Other 
																																								 																				
168Kazi Nazrul Islam is perhaps the best example of this burgeoning literary scene and the new 
identity category. Among the numerous other examples include those associated with the 
celebrated Muslim Shahitya Shomaj and the freedom intellect movement. Abul Mansur Ahmad 
in fact proclaimed Nazrul to be the first nationalist (jatiyatabadi) poet of the Bengali-Muslims. 
Ahmad’s proclamation was later validated as Nazrul was named the national poet of independent 
Bangladesh. Anisuzzaman and Ahmad Sharif, eds., Bangla Shahityer Itihash [History of Bengali 
Literature] (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1987). 
169 Neilesh Bose, “Muslim Modernism and Trans-Regional Consciousness in Bengal, 1911-1925: 
The Wide World of Samyabadi,” South Asia Research31, no. 3 (2011): 231–48. 
170 This is perhaps most strikingly notable in the ideas of Mujibar Rahman Khan, Ahmad’s 
mentor and collaborator in the East Pakistan Renaissance Society. See Bose, “Purba Pakistan 




challengers to the hegemony of the bhadralok Bengali culture, for example by A.F.M. Abdul 
Hye, asserted the rural culture of Muslim peasants to be the most authentic representation of 
Bengali culture.171 Hye’s equation of Bengaliness with Muslim peasants would find profound 
resonance in the decades to come among Bengali-Muslim intellectuals coming from the peasant 
families of East Bengal.172 However, by identifying the cultivator, rather than the educated 
middle class as the true Bengali, Hye’s formulation problematized the emerging urban Muslim 
middle class’s claim to Bengaliness. Abul Mansur Ahmad, a representative of the new middle 
class, sought to work through this challenge and articulate a cultural identity that, without 
denying its peasant roots, was thoroughly urban and modern and yet distinct from the modern 
bhadralok Bengali culture. Ahmad was not necessarily the biggest name of the intellectual and 
political movement that produced Bengali-Muslim identity but what he did better than other 
luminaries of the period was to name the phenomenon of which he was a part.  
																																								 																				
171 In a pamphlet titled Adarsha Krishok (The Ideal Cultivator), published in 1920 from Ahmad’s 
hometown Mymensingh, Hye commented, “By Bangali, I mean the cultivators… Those who are 
living in Bangla Desh and have done some kind of higher education cease to be Bangali: some of 
them become shaheb, some become mister, some of them become bahadur and so forth. In one 
way or another, they have redeemed themselves of the name of Bangali; and to avoid the air of 
this bad name they have left the village to live in the towns and thereby have totally removed 
their presence from the Bangali class. They are not Bangali anymore. If I want to mean anything 
by Bangali I mean the cultivators. These cultivators have no other means to remove the stigma of 
Bangali from themselves.” (Iqbal, The Bengal Delta. p. 89 quoting A.F.M. Abdul Hye. Adarsha 
Krishok, 2nd ed. Mymensingh 1920, preface). Sartori’s chapter “Muslim Freedom” in 
Liberalism in Empire (2014) engages with Hye as an example of the dominant political outlook 
of the Muslim peasants of Bengal.  
172 The valorization of Muslim peasant or folk culture is evident for example in Abdul Karim 
Shahityabisharod’s effort to catalogue the punthi literature of East Bengal peasants and in the 
rural and peasant motifs in the works of novelist Abu Jafar Samsuddin, poet Jasimuddin, and 
singer Abbas-Uddin, all of whom were cultural luminaries in East Bengal in the 1940s and 
afterwards. For discussion of the centrality of the peasant and the rural in the literature of East 
Bengal see Neilesh Bose, “Remapping Muslim Literary Culture: Folklore, Bulbul, and World-




The program of naming the Bengali-Muslim was not merely an intellectual exercise for 
Ahmad but was a political necessity produced by the desire for a postcolonial future. His ideas 
and politics were shaped by the political and discursive context of the late colonial period and 
particularly by the demand for Pakistan, which, among other things, facilitated the emergence of 
a regionalism in East Bengal.173 The idea of Bengali-Muslim or Pak-Bangla was not his original 
idea. Figures like Abul Kalam Samsuddin, Mujibur Rahman Khan, and Habibullah Bahar – some 
of the notable names who founded the influential East Pakistan Renaissance society – were more 
likely to be considered pioneers of Bengali-Muslim identity than Ahmad. However, Ahmad’s 
intellectual rigor and, more importantly, his commitment to secularism and Bengaliness enabled 
him to produce a synthesis between Bengali and Muslim identity that proved more durable in the 
long run. While his colleagues Samsuddin and Khan would toe the Muslim League’s party line 
during Pakistan period by privileging Muslim solidarity and Islamic ideology over Bengali 
identity, Ahmad would remain committed to Bengali and Muslim components of that identity 
and would advocate for the autonomy of Bengali-Muslims against the homogenizing demands of 
a Pakistani nationalism. Yet during the 1960s and even after the independence of Bangladesh, he 
defended his arguments for the cultural distinctions between Bengali-Hindus and Bengali-
Muslims when the politics of “Bengaliness” were highly popular among secular and progressive 
intellectuals.174 This commitment to preserve the Bengali-Muslim as an autonomous cultural and 
political identity without dissolving it either into to Muslim or Bengali identities, makes Ahmad 
																																								 																				
173 See Bose, “Purba Pakistan Zindabad,” (2014). 
174 See Sartori, “Abul Mansur Ahmad and Cultural Politics of Bengali Pakistanism,” (2007) 
regarding the peculiarity of Ahmad’s position during the high tide of the politics of Bengali 
culturalism in the 1960. Also see Hasan, “Abul Mansur Ahmad” (2007) and Bose, “Pakistan 
Zindabad” (2014) for discussions about Ahmad’s sustained opposition to the idea of unified 




a particularly relevant thinker for contemporary discussions of Bangladeshi identity, which has 
yet to develop the “we-ness” that Ahmad was advocating.  
In articulating the Bengali-Muslim cultural identity Ahmad was borrowing explicitly and 
implicitly upon Indian and Western discourses of culture and national identity. He was informed 
by the discourse of culture that, since the late 19th century, had begun to envision a Bengali 
culture and had argued that culture to be the basis of national identity.175 He did not, however, 
engage with this discourse explicitly, perhaps because his project was to emphasize the 
distinctions between “Bengali-Muslim” and “Bengali” culture. Rather, Ahmad engaged 
explicitly with European and American social and cultural theories and philosophies of history. 
His arguments of cultural autonomy were explicitly constructed against the totalizing humanism 
of the likes of Aldous Huxley and Bertrand Russell, who were immensely influential among 
mid-20th century Indian intellectuals. Ahmad adopted Mathew Arnold’s idea of culture as a 
study of perfection but insisted in line with Ralph Waldo Emerson, who perhaps shaped 
Ahmad’s thinking more than anyone else, that cultural distinction and autonomy were 
indispensable for cultural vitality. Also, particularly influential in Ahmad’s thinking was 
Christopher Dawson, the British philosopher and historian of Catholicism, who argued in the 
1920s and 1930s about the foundational role of religions in culture. By drawing upon all these 
discourses Ahmad produced a systematic and influential theory of Bengali-Muslim cultural 
identity.176  
In contrast to Ahmad, Hashim subscribed to the idea of a common cultural identity of the 
Bengali Hindus and Muslims and celebrated the modern bhadralok Bengali culture of Calcutta 
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as the expression of that common heritage. This embrace of Bengali identity endeared Hashim to 
many Bangladeshi secular nationalist politicians and commentators, who tended to either 
downplay the Islamist aspect of Hashim’s intellectual-political project or dismiss it as an 
unfortunate lapse into reactionary politics.177 Such approaches are understandable given the 
association of religious politics with retrogressive ideas and the ways Islam particularly was 
mobilized to undermine nationalist politics before and after the independence of Bangladesh. 
Such approaches conflate the different varieties of Islamist politics and fail to appreciate the 
radicalism and critical edge of Hashim’s ideas. As Hashim took pains to make clear, his 
argument for “making Islam a living force” was neither an argument for a Muslim nationalism 
nor a dogmatic retreat into orthodoxy and rituals. Interestingly, his Islamism was not inspired by 
or oriented towards the class struggles of the Muslim peasants, as so many Islamist movements 
in Bengal had been, including to a degree the movement for Pakistan.178 Rather, Hashim’s 
Islamism was based on a radical philosophical critique and a rejection of secular modernity or 
what he called “materialistic nihilism” or “nihilistic materialism.” Though his philosophical and 
political criticisms were directed primarily against secular modernity, he was vehemently critical 
of religious orthodoxy and traditionalism. He was also well aware that his efforts carried the risk 
of being misunderstood and discredited. Regarding the reception of The Creed of Islam, for 
																																								 																				
177 Hashim’s biographer Mofidul Haq, for example, quotes Badruddin Umar, Hashim’s elder son, 
stating that after 1947 Hashim’s ideas moved in a direction that made him appear more to the 
right of the right-wing politician Khwaja Nazimuddin, who in Bangladeshi politics is regarded as 
one of the most right-wing figures. (Haq 1992, p. 113)  
178 For critical analyses regarding how Islamic ideas and Muslim identity have informed politics 
generally and peasant politics particularly in Bengal over the last two centuries, see, for example, 
Samaddar 2002, Iqbal 2010, Sartori 2014, as well as Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, Pakistan As a Peasant 
Utopia: The Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920-1947, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1992). Samaddar and Iqbal are insightful regarding the varieties and complexities within 




example, Hashim anticipated, “The modern guardians of religion will call [the author] a ‘Kafir’ 
or a heretic while zealots of Nihilism will curse him as a reactionary revivalist.”179  
In this rejection of modernity Hashim was following a tradition of anticolonial thought, 
which turned to Eastern religions as sources of critique not only of colonial rule but also of 
Western civilization generally. Protagonists of this tradition were generally educated in modern 
Westernized institutions and were deeply immersed in Enlightenment philosophies but 
nevertheless found them to be less than emancipatory. Mahatma Gandhi was of course the most 
famous champion of this tradition, which emerged in the late 19th century and profoundly 
informed the Swadeshi movement of the early 20th century.180 Amir Ali and Muhammad Iqbal 
were notable figures among Muslim thinkers who rejected European modernity in favor of an 
Islamic modernity.181 Since a comparative study of Hashim and these earlier thinkers is out of 
the scope of the present discussion, it will be difficult to make claims about what he borrows 
from and what he adds to the tradition. What makes Hashim particularly interesting for our 
discussion, though, is that the audience of his critiques of modernity was young and progressive 
Bengali-Muslim intellectuals and political actors, who became increasingly critical of Islam. 
Hashim sought to defend Islam against the charges of being a reactionary and anti-progressive 
ideology that had hitherto perpetuated Muslim backwardness. By reconstructing a progressive 
tradition within Islam and by comparing Islamic political philosophy with contemporary liberal 
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180 See chapter 2, section 1 for a general discussion of counter-modernity in late 19th century anti-
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and communist ideas, Hashim endeavored to demonstrate that democratic and socialist ideals 
could be better realized through Islam than through the other two political ideologies.  
Despite their differences, Ahmad and Hashim were united in their efforts to reclaim 
Muslimness without denying Bengaliness or giving up their commitment to progressive politics. 
Thus, it is not surprising that both Hashim and, to a lesser degree, Ahmad were relegated to the 
sideline of nationalist politics in Bangladesh, which in its early formulation was constructed in 
explicit denial of Muslimness either as a source of national identity or as a source of state 
ideology. However, the resurgence of Muslim identity and Islamist ideology in Bangladesh soon 
after independence and the contemporary struggles between Islamist and secular political forces 
point towards the continued relevancy of Islam in the social and political lives of Bangladeshi 
people. Perhaps, commentators and analysts of Bangladeshi politics from inside and outside of 
Bangladesh would be served better, if they were to recognize this centrality of Islam in 
Bangladesh, suspending their negative assumptions about Islam that arise out of centuries of 
Orientalist constructions and the contemporary Islamophobia. In doing so it may be beneficial to 
revisit the ideas of Ahmad and Hashim in order to recover the progressive potentials of Muslim 






The Second Birth of the Nation: Aspirations of democracy, equality, freedom, and social 
uplift in producing the Bangladesh Moment 
 
 
Bangladesh’s emergence as a nation-state has involved a process of “double-birth” – first 
as Pakistan and then as Bangladesh. Consequently, a central tension in Bangladesh’s 
historiography and politics has been establishing acceptable narratives about the relationship of 
these two moments. The dominant nationalist response has been to construct the “Bangladesh 
Moment” as the negation of the “Pakistan Moment” by arguing that Bangladesh emerges as a 
result of the awakening and self-discovery of a secular Bengali nation in explicit rejection of the 
idea of the Muslim nation that had produced Pakistan. In these accounts, Bangladeshi 
nationalism is constructed as a cultural nationalism based on linguistic identity. As Ranabir 
Samaddar has pointed out, “the nation is narrated in terms of literature,” and little else is 
considered to constitute the “nation’s soul.”1 Though not necessarily false or incorrect, these 
narratives produce partial and incomplete accounts that ignore or remain silent about other 
histories or alternative possibilities. In the previous chapter we noted that nationalist histories of 
Bangladesh have often been silent about the enthusiasm with which Bengali-Muslims had 
participated in the creation of Pakistan. They are also equally silent about the range of ideas and 
concerns that animated politics in the years and decades before 1971, preferring instead to read 
																																								 																				
1 Ranabir Samaddar argues this point persuasively in Paradoxes of the Nationalist Time: 
Political Essays on Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press, 2002, p. 21) by analyzing the ways 
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culture and … the maintenance of it.” Abul Mansur Ahmad advocated a project to produce 
“cultural nationalism,” as we have discussed in the previous chapter. The distinction of course is 
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them as the “background to the inevitable emergence of Bangladesh.”2 A closer look at the 
political and intellectual histories of the fifties and sixties, however, reveals that the nation was 
constructed and the Bangladesh Moment was produced by multiple streams of political ideas and 
movements coming together through the unfolding of specific and contingent historical 
processes. 1971 was not merely a result of the self-awakening and discovery of the Bengali 
nation but was also a result of democratic and socialist movements against the Pakistani state’s 
extant socio-economic conditions and political repression. Democratic and egalitarian ideals 
were equally important, if not more, as linguistic and cultural identity in contributing to the 
emergence of the nation. In this chapter I examine this proposition through an interrogation of 
the political ideas that produced the birth of Bangladesh, as well as the ideas produced by its 
birth. The shift in focus from cultural nationalism to other concerns will illustrate the continuities 
and breaks in the political and intellectual histories of Bangladesh and will clarify why so many 
Bangladeshi nationalists could become so without disavowing their ardent support for the 
Pakistan movement. 
One of the arguments of this chapter is that we cannot understand the Bangladeshi 
national movement only or even primarily through the prisms of identity or cultural nationalism. 
If we examine the ideas and actions of Bengali-Muslim political actors of the 1950s, 1960s, and 
early 1970s without the blinders that Bangladeshi nationalist narratives impose, we find 
continuity in political concerns of pre- and post-independent Bangladesh. For Pakistan and 
independent Bangladesh the central political concerns had been drafting a progressive 
constitution, securing democratic and political rights, and producing social transformation and 
																																								 																				
2 Bangladeshi historian Ahmed Kamal has argued that descriptions and analyses of the period’s 
politics and history have become stale, static, and predictable through a frequent recounting of 
the same narrative.  See his State against the Nation : The Decline of the Muslim League in Pre-




uplift. The failures of Pakistani political process to deliver on the promises of national liberation 
produced, by 1971, the program of Bangladesh’s independence, in which Bangladeshi national 
liberation was now expected to deliver what Pakistan had failed to do. Independence of 
Bangladesh meant that Bengali-Muslim political actors were now in charge of a state, perhaps in 
a more meaningful way than they had ever been in modern history. Thus, they could not simply 
play the role of critical opposition but had to become statesmen and state builders and were 
required to think about the state more seriously and systematically than before. The concerns 
with state building, economic development, social transformation, and political rights gave 
intellectual practices and political thought of this period a particularly modernist character, 
which was reinforced by the dominance of high-modernism globally during that time.3 In this 
context the question of national identity, particularly of the Bengali nation, did not take on a 
central political importance until the moment of independence or even after the nation was born. 
The project of imagining or constructing the Bengali nation was not, by any means, complete at 
independence. Rather, nation building became a central political project in post-independence 
Bangladesh because the nation provided the ethical foundation and the political legitimacy for 
the post-colonial projects of state-building and social transformation.4 
In the coming pages of this chapter I will substantiate the claims outlined in the 
paragraphs above by examining the political life and ideas of two figures, who were arguably the 
most instrumental in bringing about Bangladesh’s independence – Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani 
																																								 																				
3 The concept of “high modernism” is borrowed from James Scott, Seeing like a State: How 
Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1999), who argued that a modernist preoccupation with state-building fundamentally 
structured political prerogatives in postcolonial countries. See also David Scott, Conscripts of 
Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), as 
well as my discussions in chapters 2 and 3.  




(popularly known as Maolana Bhashani or just Bhashani) and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
(popularly known as Mujib). Bhashani and Mujib had a complex and shifting relationship with 
each other as they contended for command over East Pakistani politics. Though Mujib was 
bestowed with the honorific Bangabondhu [Friend of Bengal] and eventually Jatir Janak [Father 
of the Nation], Bhashani’s influence as the Majlum Jononeta [leader of the oppressed masses] in 
the Bangladeshi nationalist struggle was arguably no less significant. Both Bhashani and Mujib 
were paradigmatic examples of charismatic leaders, of the kind that function as the “fulcrum of 
the transition from colonial-ruled traditional society to politically independent modern society” 
by leading charismatic or even revolutionary movements of social change.5 They exhibited the 
kind of self-confidence, sense of purpose or calling, and willingness to suffer and sacrifice that 
produce charismatic legitimacy. As a result, they commanded the devotion of millions of 
followers and through their emotional union with followers produced “charismatic 
communities.” In doing so Bhashani and Mujib shaped the political conversations and struggles 
of East Pakistan and Bangladesh from the 1950s to 1970s and produced the collective entities or 
the peoples that would constitute the nation in 1971. It is thus impossible to talk about 
Bangladeshi political thought without considering the ideas and politics of these two leaders. I 
focus on two political rather than intellectual figures because they provide better examples of the 
political thinking of the period than their intellectual counterparts. Intellectuals of this period 
were much invested in the question of cultural and national identity and subsequently 
constructed the history of Bangladesh’s emergence through the prism of cultural nationalism. 
Yet such narratives remain partial and fail to recognize the more radical impulses of the politics 
																																								 																				
5 Robert C. Tucker, “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” Daedalus 97, no. 3 (1968): 731–
56, p.734. Tucker refers to Edward Shils, David Apter, and Dorothy and Ann Ruth Willner, who 





and political thought of the period. By engaging with political figures like Bhashani and Mujib 
we can better understand the aspirations and anxieties surrounding Bangladesh’s second birth.  
However, choosing political leaders like Bhashani and Mujib as interlocutors for the 
purpose of reading political thought presents several methodological and tactical challenges. As 
major political leaders their lives and politics, particularly in the case of Mujib, have been 
subject to innumerable commentaries and analyses, most of which are hagiographical and highly 
partisan. Bhashani and Mujib’s role in and impact on Bangladeshi politics have been and are the 
subjects of tremendous controversy and intense political debates. Any commentary on them risks 
significant political and even legal backlash. To wade through the controversies and understand 
their place in Bangladeshi politics I have immersed myself in the seemingly endless secondary 
literature and partisan debates. In writing, however, I have stayed clear of these controversies as 
much as possible because my aim is not to pronounce judgment on their political actions or to 
correct historical controversies. Rather, I hope to capture their political ideas and thinking about 
questions of identity and modernity.  
But neither Bhashani nor Mujib were prolific writers. Thus, one is compelled to extricate 
their political thought primarily from their speeches, along with their political actions and 
practices and a limited archive of written work. Both Bhashani and Mujib were exceptionally 
eloquent and moving speakers, qualities that contributed significantly towards their charisma. 
Their speeches as well as their political lives have been well documented and preserved. The 
challenge is not the lack of material but is discerning patterns and structures in it, which becomes 
even more difficult given their political positions shifted often to meet the demands of changing 
local and international political realities. Their political thought, though reflecting deep 




eclectic and often displayed uneasy, contradictory, and at times profound co-habitation and 
mixing of various ideas and identities. Thus, it may be justified to question whether it is possible 
to extract systematic thinking or philosophical reflections in actions and speeches of political 
leaders, whose primary function was to persuade. Here I take an Aristotelian, rather than 
Platonic, position that political speeches are not always self-serving instruments of political 
leaders and demagogues but can be expressions of political reasoning and moral arguments that 
recognize the agency of the audience to make rational and informed choices.6 Moreover, I see 
eloquence as civic virtue as Romans did and speech acts as mechanisms for producing political 
agreements, i.e., political communities.7 	  
																																								 																				
6 James Martin, Politics and Rhetoric (New York: Routledge, 2013) and Giuseppe Ballacci, 
Political Theory between Philosophy and Rhetoric: Politics as Transcendence and Contingency 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 
7 See Joy Connolly, The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome 




Between Radical Democracy and Social Justice: Maolana Bhashani’s Arguments for 
Pastoral Governance  
I 
Abdul Hamid Khan – Maolana Bhashani – was born circa 1885 and was at least 90 years 
old when he passed away in 1976. In his long life he experienced and participated in many of the 
events and moments that shaped the history of Bangladesh and modern South Asia.8 Bhashani is 
best known as a political leader because of the roles he played and the positions he held for more 
than four decades in constitutional party politics in colonial India and post-colonial Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. He became the president of the Assam Provincial Muslim League in 1944, formed 
and led the Awami (Muslim) League from 1949 to 1957, and finally founded and led the 
National Awami Party from 1957 until his passing. During his long political career Bhashani 
played significant roles in the independence struggles of Pakistan and Bangladesh, in the latter 
case his importance being second only to that of Mujib. Before Bhashani became a politician of 
national stature, he was a peasant activist for more than two decades and organized fierce and 
often violent peasant struggles against local and regional economic and political elites. 
Organizing farmers and fishermen through independent organizations, he continued his role as a 
peasant activist even after he became a leader of national parties. Besides being a politician and a 
peasant leader Bhashani was also a Sufi pir. In his late teenage years, he was initiated as a murid 
or a disciple in a Sufi tariqua or path by Pir Syed Nasiruddin Bogdadi, and he eventually 
																																								 																				
8 Among the many biographies and commentaries on Bhashani, Saied Abul Maksud’s Maolana 
Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1994) remains the most complete and 
informative, particularly because of its large number of primary documents and first person 
interviews. My presentation is also informed by Nurul Kabir’s polemical yet highly sophisticated 
account, The Red Moulana : An Essay on Bhashani’s Ever-Oppositional Democratic Spirit 
(Dhaka: Samhati Publications, 2012), and Abid Bahar’s dissertation, “The Religious and 




attained the status of a pir himself in his late 30s.9 In his more than half a century long career as a 
pir, Bhashani initiated and served as the spiritual master of thousands of murids from all walks 
of life in Bengal and Assam. Bhashani also worked vigorously to promote education among the 
rural masses and to reform the highly elitist education system that Pakistan and Bangladesh had 
inherited from their colonial past. He helped to establish and patronized many schools and 
colleges throughout his life. In the last decades of his life founding an Islamic university became 
his “dream project,” envisioning an education program for producing radical social 
transformation. Bhashani was also active in the field of journalism and publishing. Besides the 
many bulletins, pamphlets, and newsletters he published to propagate his political ideas and 
programs, he played an important role in establishing the Daily Ittefaq, the largest circulating 
daily in East Pakistan and Bangladesh for decades and a critical role in Bangladesh’s 
independence struggle. Between 1972 and 1976 he published the short-lived but influential 
Weekly Haq-Katha, which provided a platform for critical interrogation of politics in post-
independent Bangladesh.  
How are we to understand the politics and ideas of a man who led such a long and 
colorful life? His biography, political career, and archival texts – mostly speeches and 
interviews, along with a few articles, pamphlets, and political manifestos – offer a bewildering 
diversity of ideas and concerns that shaped his politics. Despite the range, it is possible to 
identify a core concern or a unifying theme that ties together the different aspects – nationalist 
political leader, peasant organizer, Sufi pir, education reformer, and journalist – of his career. 
Shirajul Islam Chowdhury, a prominent Bangladeshi scholar and cultural critic, has suggested 
																																								 																				
9 Often translated in English as “saint” the Persian word pir literally means “elder” and in Sufi 
tradition connotes the figure of a spiritual teacher or master. Pirs are often thought to possess 
great spiritual wisdom, supernatural powers, and the ability to perform miracles. See Barbara 




that Bhashani’s core politics are motivated by a simple but powerful desire to bring a smile to the 
destitute masses of Bangladesh and beyond:  
The kind of smile that doesn’t hide tears, the kind of smile that doesn’t cause pain in 
faces deformed by starvation, the kind of smile that is full of life’s rich and vibrating 
energy [praner prachurjo o jiboner uchchas].10  
 
Bhashani knew extreme poverty and misery not as abstract concepts but as concrete experiences 
from his life. Though he was born in a relatively prosperous peasant household, he was forced to 
fend for himself from an early age having become orphaned before he was ten, losing his father 
at four and mother at age nine. Throughout his teen years a homeless Bhashani drifted through 
the villages and towns of northern Bengal and survived doing odd jobs, mostly as a farmhand or 
a fisherman’s assistant, before he was taken in by Pir Bogdadi as a disciple and a servant. Thus, 
he came to know viscerally how the relentless struggle just to survive occupies and depresses the 
sharbahara, the dispossessed, and saps their humanity, creativity, and life.11 Bhashani’s politics 
																																								 																				
10 After a three-week trip to China as a guest of the state in 1963, Bhashani wrote a booklet titled, 
“Mao Tse Tung er deshe” (“In the land of Mao Tse Tung”). There he noted that above all what 
impressed him most about China was the lively smile on the faces of ordinary people. He 
lamented the lack of such a smile on the faces of his countrymen and contemplated if and how 
such smiles could be brought to the faces of the poor in Bengal. The booklet is much adored in 
Bangladesh because it is written in the popular literary trope of travel narratives and conveys 
powerful emotions and arguments in simple yet elegant poetic language. In his essay “Maolana 
Bhashanir Bhumika” (The Role of Maolana Bhashani) Sherajul Islam Chowdhury provides a 
perceptive analysis of Bhashani’s politics, centering on a reading of this booklet. See his Neta, 
Janata, Rajniti [Leader, Public, Politics] (Dhaka: Dana Prokashoni, 1987).  
11 Among the many words that are available to connote poverty, Bhashani often chose to use 
sharbahara, which translates literally as “one who has lost everything” or “one with nothing to 
lose.” The similarity here with the Marxist concept of the “proletariat” has led some scholars to 
translate Bhashani’s sharbahara as the “proletariat.” See Kabir The Red Maulana (2012). 
However, I think that such an equation is problematic given Bhashani’s critique of communism 
and because the sharbahara that Bhashani was talking about were mostly peasants and landless 
farmers not industrial workers. Perhaps, the phrase “wretched” as used by Fanon or the term 
“subaltern” as used by the Subaltern Studies Group, in Vinayak Chaturvedi, Mapping Subaltern 
Studies and the Postcolonial (New York: Verso Books, 2012), would be better translations of 
sharbahara. However, to stay clear of these conceptual debates, I have chosen to use a less over-




was thus structured by an emotive rather than a theoretical response to the destitution of the 
masses, which produced an identity between him and his followers and made him a powerful 
leader. Perhaps, as with all political philosophies that emanate from powerful emotions about the 
human condition, we may view Bhashani’s political ideas as indignation and protest against the 
poverty and destitution of the masses.12 Yet, insofar as he was interested in ending the misery of 
the masses and bringing smiles to their faces, his politics and ideas reflected an evolving 
understanding of the causes of and solutions to the problems of poverty and destitution. 
 Bhashani’s politics and worldview were instinctively structured by an organic 
consciousness of the oppressed about his own oppression.  More specifically, his politics 
reflected the class-consciousness of the peasant in opposition to feudal structures of 
exploitation.13 The system that keeps peasants perpetually hungry and insecure and denies their 
dignity and humanity despite their hard work from dawn till dusk felt inherently unjust to 
Bhashani. And he refused to accept it as the natural order or even God’s will. He recalled the 
formation of his class-consciousness: 
The so-called aristocracy of society struck my mind in childhood. I could never tolerate 
the idea of class distinction between human beings on the basis of the amount of land 
they own. My mind wanted to demolish the [class-based] social system, and introduce a 
new one on the debris of existing one from the day I came to understand the deliberate 
																																								 																				
12 I think a comparison can be made here, for example, between Bhashani’s lamentation about 
the way the sharbahara is denied his humanity and dignity and Marx’s arguments about the 
alienation experienced by the proletariat. Both Bhashani and Marx produced their political 
theories and programs in efforts to overcome what they felt to be the unbearable. See Istvan 
Meszaros, Marx’s Theory of Alienation (London: Merlin Press, 1970) for an argument about how 
a reaction against alienation shaped Marx’s political thought.  
13 The question of a subaltern consciousness and agency has been debated extensively within 
subaltern studies and postcolonial theories over the last three decades. See Chaturvedi, Mapping 
Subaltern 2012 and particularly Rosalind O’Hanlon’s “Recovering the Subject” Subaltern 
Studies and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia” in that anthology. I agree with the 
line of argument advanced by some subalternists that the subaltern is capable of an insurgent 





and systemic exploitation [of peasants] by the landed aristocracy of zamindars and 
moneylenders. 14 
 
During his long political career Bhashani participated in different political movements and 
struggles, some of which had diverging ideals and gave his politics an eclectic character. Yet, at 
the core his commitment to class struggle and social revolution remained unchanged. He 
participated in different movements with the hope of finding a way to break the system of 
exploitation and usher in a new society based on social justice and human dignity. Though many 
of those movements failed to deliver their promised results, Bhashani did not regret his 
participation in the movements, nor did he become depressed. With lessons from the failures, he 
jumped into new movements with an indomitable spirit because for him there was no room for 
defeat in the marginalized millions’ fight for life and dignity. Bhashani’s core political 
commitment and his indomitable spirit was expressed wonderfully in the answer he provided in 
the year after Bangladesh’s birth to a question about whether with hindsight he regrets his 
participation in the Pakistan movement:  
I am not at all remorseful. The reason is that I am pursuing the same politics [political 
objectives] today as I did 25 years ago in the struggle for Pakistan. The foundation of that 
politics was economics, not the lure of political power. We struggled for Pakistan as a 
symbol of the struggle to end exploitation, and it was a reaction against the exploitation 
and oppression of the Muslim peasants and workers by Hindu landlords, moneylenders 
etc. However, it appears that the oppressor has no religion. Exploitation did not end, after 
the establishment of Pakistan, only the face of the exploiter had changed. The poor 
became even poorer. The rich became richer. Thus, for economic emancipation we have 
again fought for [political] independence. Political ideas and realizations are doubtless 
shaped by contemporary situations. And, if they contain possibilities for truth and justice 
																																								 																				
14 Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, ‘Amar Jindegee’ (My Life), Dainik Paigam, Dhaka, January 13, 
1971. Quoted and translated by Kabir, The Red Maulana (2012), P. 27. Bhashani provided a 
similar account of his motivations and political life in a speech to a special session of the 





and good of humanity at least for the time, that movement, that wakening is nevertheless 
worthwhile.15 
  
Bhashani’s instinctive class-consciousness would not of course remain only instinctive but 
would rather become informed and modified by the different ideas and thinkers he encountered 
and was influenced by in his long political career. Tracing these influences will give us a deeper 
understanding of his politics and thought.  
Bhashani grew up on the legends of various peasant movements that swept through 
Bengal during the 19th century such as the Faraizi movement and the Pabna uprising and was 
cultured in what he would describe as the “revolutionary tradition” of Indian Islam that 
combined religious-social reform with struggles against local systems of exploitation and the 
emerging colonial state.16 He first encountered, however, a coherent articulation of the ideas of 
the revolutionary tradition during his two-year stint at Darul Uloom Deoband, where he was sent 
by Bogdadi, his guardian as well as the spiritual master, in 1907 to receive formal religious 
education. At Deoband, a center of Islamic revivalism in the 19th century that had also become a 
hub of anti-colonial politics by the beginning of the 20th century, Bhashani studied under Shikhul 
Hind [leader of India] Maolana Mahmudul Hasan and Maolana Husain Ahmad Madani. The two 
																																								 																				
15 In the Weekly Haq-Katha, Bhashani wrote a regular column “amar jobab” (my answer) 
answering readers’ questions regarding political, spiritual, and philosophical questions. I think 
this column bears similarities to and was perhaps deliberately styled after M. Gandhi’s 
engagement with readers through question and answer in the weekly Harijan and Young India. 
This response is from the inaugural issue of March 10, 1972. Reprinted in Abu Salek, ed., Haq-
Katha Shomogro [The Collected Volume of the Weekly Haq-Katha] (Dhaka: Ghash Phul Nadi, 
2002), p. 48.  
16 In an essay titled “Ahimsha O Biplob [Nonviolence and Revolution]”, published in the March 
17, 1972 issue of Haq-Katha, Bhashani presented a genealogy of his politics by locating them in 
a “revolutionary tradition” of Indian Islam going back to the late 18th century. In Abu Salek, ed., 
Haq-Katha Shomogro (2002), pp. 59 – 62. See Iftekhar Iqbal, The Bengal Delta: Ecology, State 
and Social Change, 1840-1943 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) for a detailed analysis 
of the peasant movements of the late 19th century Bengal and the roles that radical Islamic 




leaders and the general culture of Deoband provided him with a religious and philosophical 
understanding of jihad as the struggle for personal moral and spiritual purification and as the 
fight against social injustice and imperialism. 17 Throughout his more than six decades of 
political activity he held onto this basic teaching and declared in 1971 in his philosophically 
reflective essay “Amar Shomadhan” [“My Solutions”]: 
Our struggle will be two pronged. One direct and the other indirect. The direct one will 
be of [social] revolution [biplob] and the indirect one will be of purification and reform 
[of the self] [shodhon]. We can only reach our desired destination, if we can pursue both 
sides in the same rhythm.18 
 
Bhashani engaged in this two-pronged struggle of social revolution and the development of an 
ethical self from early on, even if not always in the same rhythm.  
His first explicit political engagement came in his late teens/early twenties through his 
association with the violent revolutionary group Anushilan. It was arguably motivated more by 
his revolutionary impulses and his youthful adventurism than concerns with the purification of 
the self.19 Throughout his twenties and thirties Bhashani restlessly sought to balance the demands 
																																								 																				
17 For a discussion of the impact of Deoband on politics and intellectual practices in colonial 
India, see Barbara Metcalf’s Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1982) and Husain Ahmad Madani: The Jihad for Islam and India’s 
Freedom (London: Oneworld Publications, 2012). See Bahar, The Religious and Philosophical 
Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004) for a discussion how the experience of Deoband 
had radicalized and shaped Bhashani’s intellectual-political outlook. 
18 Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, “Amar Shomadhan (My Solutions),” Dainik Pakistan, January 
5, 1971, p. 331. Reproduced in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 694 -698.  
19 Anushilan was one of the short-lived revolutionary terrorist organizations to emerge from the 
anti-colonial Swadeshi movement precipitated by the 1905 partition of Bengal. Most Anushilan 
members were university educated idealist young men from upper-caste Hindu families, who 
hoped to produce social revolution and compel the British to leave India through terrorist 
agitation. See Asok Kumar Ray, Party of Firebrand Revolutionaries: The Dacca Anushilan 
Samiti, 1906-1918 (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1999). Bhashani was physically strong, 
daring, and one of the few Muslim members of the group and thus rose to relative prominence 
within the group despite coming from a peasant background. He reportedly participated in 




of livelihood with his inclinations for a politically engaged life. He floated among the riverine 
communities along the Brahmaputra/Jamuna corridor where the shifting flows and floods of the 
mighty river created precarious conditions and the constant struggle against nature in the chars, 
or river islands. Often venturing north into the deep interior of Assam, he worked in these 
communities as a teacher or served as an imam performing religious rites. Eventually he attained 
the status of a pir with thousands of disciples spread throughout north Bengal and Assam. 
Bhashani was no ordinary pir, argues Peter Custers, but one of the last in the long tradition of 
Bengal “frontier pirs,” who had for centuries provided spiritual, social, and political leadership in 
remote agricultural communities and protected them from dangers both earthly and magical.20  
Initially Bhashani’s social-political activities were limited to providing relief to victims 
of floods and river erosion that were all too common and regular in the region. He also organized 
resistance against Christian missionaries, whom he viewed to be preying upon the poor in their 
quest for religious conversions.21 However, soon he became embroiled in the more contentious 
struggles of the local peasants against the excessive tax/rent burden imposed by the zamindars 
and against the exploitative and predatory practices of the mohajons, or moneylenders. By the 
1920s Bhashani began to organize the peasantry more systematically beyond episodes of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
terrorist campaigns and left the group in search of alternative political engagements. See Kabir, 
The Red Maulana (2012), p. 30. 
20 See Peter Custers, “Maulana Bhashani and the Transition to Secular Politics in East Bengal,” 
The Indian Economic and Social History Review 47, no. 2 (2010): 231–59. Here Custers builds 
upon a provocative thesis by Richard Eaton (The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-
1760, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) that argues that charismatic pirs, 
encouraged and supported by Mughal rulers, provided the leadership – both moral and political – 
for producing agricultural settlements by clearing out marshes and forested land. The practice 
encouraged migration of large populations into Bengal from elsewhere in the Indian subcontinent 
and beyond and led to both a significant increase in population and the rise of Islam in Bengal. 
See also my discussions on the matter in chapter 2. 




spontaneous resistance through a deliberate mix of politics and religion.22 His rise as a religious 
and political leader depended in large part on his oratory, which was necessary to communicate 
ideas to and inspire the illiterate masses. He honed his oratory skills in the waz-mahfil (religious 
congregation/ concert) and would often mix political messages and calls for actions in ostensibly 
religious sermons. He would also ask his murids [spiritual disciples] to take a vow as a part of 
their boyat [formal oath of initiation] to join the Krishak Shomiti [farmers/peasant association] 
that he had organized and to fight for social justice generally.23 Also, he began to organize 
krishak shommelan [peasant conferences], which in spirit and form looked and felt like the 
religious festivals [uros] and attracted hundreds of thousands of attendees. 24 The line between 
spiritual disciple and political supporter was blurry within the large and dedicated following that 
Bhashani had generated among Bengal’s rural masses, which by the 1930s made him a legendary 
figure and force to contend with.  
Beyond the peasant moments, Bhashani was involved in the nationalist and anti-colonial 
movements of the 1920s. In 1919 he joined the Indian National Congress and became an active 
member of the faction led by C.R. Das, whose sincerity, concern for the downtrodden, and 
commitment to Hindu-Muslim unity greatly influenced and inspired young Bhashani.25 In the 
1920s he actively participated in the Khilafot and the non-cooperation movements, which 
brought him in contact with more radical Muslim leaders and intellectuals of the period and 
																																								 																				
22 Bahar, The Religious and Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004), pp. 
92-94.  
23 Kabir The Red Maulana (2012), p. 32.  
24 Maksud cites a moving firsthand description of one such gathering by Abul Kalam Samsuddin, 
a prominent journalist and public intellectual, who was amazed not only by the sheer number of 
attendees but also by the organization, efficiency, and spirit of the conference. Maolana 
Bhashani (1994), pp. 49 – 50.  
25 Throughout his political life Bhashani mentioned C.R. Das was one of his political idols. See 
his 1971 essay “Amar Shomadhan (My Solutions)” reproduced in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani 




further solidified his anti-imperialist and revolutionary political outlook. Regarding his 
involvement in these movements, he wrote:  
At that time my political realization was not clear or deep. However, as a child from a 
poor family I joined the independence [azadi] movement with the hope that if we can 
become free by expelling the capitalist imperialist British, our agrarian community and 
the working people generally will benefit.26  
 
Such connection between struggles and conditions of local communities that grappled with 
international structures of power would inform his politics throughout and would make him a 
potent political force. In the 1930s, however, Bhashani became increasingly occupied with local 
struggles and somewhat detached from the larger national movements. This was due in part to 
the fact that in 1926 the Bengal government, facing intense pressures form local landlords, 
declared Bhashani persona non grata and forced him to limit his activities in Assam.   Between 
the1920s and 1940s Bhashani became a pivotal figure in the Bengali-Muslim migrant settlers’ 
struggle against the infamous “line system” and the general discrimination and violence they 
suffered in Assam.27 In the 1930s he joined the Muslim League and became active in the 
constitutional party politics of Assam with the aim of pushing Assamese politicians and 
government to adopt policies favorable to Bengali-Muslim migrant settlers. With the 
																																								 																				
26 Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 7-8. 
27 In the 19th century the “frontier” – as conceptualized by Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the 
Bengal Frontier (1996) – of agricultural, population, and Islamic expansion moved north 
towards Assam after it was conquered by the British and integrated into the colonial 
administration. After 1900, the influx of Bengali-Muslim peasants from densely populated 
eastern Bengal grew dramatically causing a nativist reaction that would become more or less a 
permanent feature of Assamese politics. In 1920 the Assamese provincial government introduced 
the so-called “line system” to restrict and control the movements of Bengali migrants, which was 
enforced through increasingly draconian means by both governmental and non-governmental 
forces. See Myron Weiner, “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-Immigrant Movement,” 
Population and Development Review 9, no. 2 (1983): 279–92 for historical background and 
analysis of anti-immigrant violence of the 1980s. See Harsh Mander, “Bengali & Muslim: What 
next for Assam’s Forever Foreigners in Modi’s India?” South China Morning Post, August 5, 
2018, online edition, for a discussion of the most recent waves of violence and persecution 




introduction of electoral politics in the late 1930s, the more numerous Muslims in Assam were in 
position to dominate the state government. However, there were several parties jockeying for 
power, and it was Bhashani’s support for and leadership in the Muslim League that ensured its 
eventual emergence as the ruling party.28 Through his participation in the Muslim League 
Bhashani reconnected with nationalist politics and by the 1940s he, like most other Muslim 
leaders of the period, began to hitch his political programs with the demand of Pakistan. He was 
moved by the ideas of Islamic socialism espoused by some of the leaders of the Pakistan 
movement and saw in Pakistan possibilities for the social and economic emancipation of the 
peasants of Assam and Bengal.29 Though his efforts to include the whole of Assam in Pakistan 
were unsuccessful, the Muslim majority district of Sylhet was partitioned from Assam and 
included in Pakistan, which he viewed as a partial victory. After partition Bhashani chose to live 
in the newly created Pakistan and relocated to the Tangail district in 1948, after more than two 
decades of absence.  
Bhashani had fought against British colonial rule for more than three decades and thus 
was genuinely elated by its demise, and he was optimistic about realizing the promises of 
Pakistan. He wanted to take part in building the new utopia or, as one scholar has recently 
described, “the land of eternal Eid” and became a member of the newly constituted East Bengal 
Provincial Legislative Assembly.30 However, Bhashani was soon to be disappointed and 
discovered that the new state dominated by the upper classes had no interest or desire to deliver 
																																								 																				
28 Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), p. 47.  
29 See Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, Pakistan As a Peasant Utopia: The Communalization of Class 
Politics in East Bengal, 1920-1947 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) and my discussions in 
chapter 2.  
30 See Layli Uddin, “In the Land of Eternal Eid: Maulana Bhashani and the Political Mobilization 
of Peasants and Lower-Class Urban Workers in East Pakistan, c. 1930s-1971.” (Ph.D. 




political freedom or economic justice to the peasants and destitute masses of Bengal. Most 
concretely, it became apparent that the new regime would not carry out any substantial land 
reform beyond abolishing the zamindari system in a manner that would only benefit a handful of 
the rural middle class, or the jotedars.31 Bhashani also discovered the hard way, what Ranabir 
Samaddar has described as the invariable truth of postcolonial nationalism: that the peasant is 
mobilized for the nationalist cause only to be demobilized soon after independence.32 From the 
perspective of the ruling elites there was no room for someone like Bhashani, a rabble-rouser and 
a provincial peasant leader, in the affairs of postcolonial state building. Bhashani’s critique of the 
regime and its policies not only failed to generate any positive response but instead incurred 
political and legal harassment. Bhashani resigned from the Legislative Council within a few 
months, but in a press release announcing and explaining his decision, he assured, “My 
countrymen should not think that I will quit serving the people. On the contrary, I will choose the 
right path for serving the country.”33 For the next three decades Bhashani would devote himself 
to defining and elaborating the “right path” both in theory and practice and in the process he 
would become the legend that he is.  
II 
In the press release announcing his resignation from the Legislative Council Bhashani 
also announced the formation of an organization named “Islam Mission” because: 
																																								 																				
31 The excerpts from Bhashani’s speech during the Legislative Council’s budget session on 19 
March, 1948 indicates both his expectations from and frustration at the government of the new 
state. In the speech he railed against the exuberant amount allocated for salaries for government 
officials, defense, police, et cetera, while allocating little for social services, agricultural 
development, or relief for the poor. He also was highly critical of the large compensations 
provided for in the scheme to abolish the zamindari system. Quoted in Maksud, Maolana 
Bhashani (1994), pp. 64-65.  
32 Samaddar, Paradoxes of the Nationalist Time (2002), p. 97.  
33 Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, “Press Release,” Weekly Sainik, Sylhet, December 10, 1948. 




After much reflection I have come to understand that not communism or any other ism 
but only Islam can save the helpless and oppressed peasants, workers, and other destitute 
of the world… Islamic ideals of equality, fraternity, and peace that had been announced 
fourteen hundred years ago should serve humanity better than communism, not only 
today but until the end of days. Thus, I have come to take up promotion [prochar] of 
Islam as my only life-goal.34  
 
How are we to make sense of his intention here to serve Islam? We may see it, as many of his 
secular followers did, as an occasional lapse into pious sentimentality that did not reflect the 
fundamental character of his thoughts or politics. We can point out that Bhashani abandoned the 
“Islam Mission” project within a year and worked tirelessly for the next quarter century building 
up secular, non-communal and inclusive, working-class organizations, political parties, and 
political movements that provided the political foundation for the emergence of a secular Bengali 
nationalism.35 For example, he was the strongest voice for reconstituting the Awami Muslim 
League as the secular Awami League between 1953 and 1955. He was a leading voice in the 
state language movement of the 1940s and 1950s and even suffered imprisonment for his role, 
which in turn endeared him to the Bengali middle class and catapulted him onto the national 
stage.36 He also strongly protested the proposal to ban Rabindranath Tagore from Pakistani 
media. Furthermore, throughout the 1960s Bhashani expressed great admiration for the 
Communist and godless regimes of China and Cuba. He called for the establishment of socialism 
and accommodated many Communists within the ranks and leadership of his political parties and 
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35 See for example Custers, “Maulana Bhashani and the Transition to Secular Politics in East 
Bengal,” (2010). See also Kabir, The Red Maulana (2012) for supporting arguments.  
36 The state language movement started soon after Pakistan’s independence as a reaction to the 
government’s intention to make Urdu the only state language of Pakistan, snubbing Bangla and 
other regional languages. The movement, initiated by university students, was an expression of 
Bengali middle-class anxiety that not having Bangla as a state or official language would limit 
their economic and political opportunity. Bhashani was one of the first politicians to join the 




advocated for a revolutionary social change.37 Thus, when Bhashani began to voice increasingly 
Islamic ideas in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many of his erstwhile followers were extremely 
surprised and could only make sense of it as an old man’s lapse into religiosity.38 
Bhashani himself provided an alternative reading of his political career, claiming that his 
politics had always been shaped by his religious ideas and since at least the mid-1940s they were 
determined by his formal commitment to a particular Islamic political philosophy. In a booklet 
published in 1974 Bhashani recounted how in 1946 he had been formally initiated into the 
philosophy of Rububiyah by Maolana Azad Subhani and took the oath to “never stray in politics 
from the goal of hukumate Rabbania [God’s rule].”39 Bhashani argued that he adopted 
Rububiyah as his formal political philosophy because he found it to be consistent with the 
teachings of his earlier political and theological mentors and expressive of the politics that he 
had been already practicing since at least the 1920s. He further argued that though he had to 
adopt different tactics and strategies and participate in diverse movements and organizations in 
response to the demands of the time, his politics was always oriented towards the establishment 
																																								 																				
37 The Communist Party was banned throughout the Pakistan period, as it had been during British 
colonial rule. Communists thus had to work through various front organizations like the Student 
Union and mainstream political parties like the AL. When Bhashani formed the National Awami 
Party (NAP) in July of 1957, many Communists joined the party. One of them was Haji 
Mohammad Daneesh, a member of the covert CPI since the 1930s and a leader of the historic 
Tevaga peasant movement of the late 1940s and early 1950s, became the vice-president and later 
general secretary of the Party. See Lawrence Lifschultz and Kai Bird, Bangladesh: The 
Unfinished Revolution (London: Zed Press, 1979).  
38 For example, see the criticisms advanced by Mohammad Toha and Haji Daneesh, who broke 
with NAP and Bhashani in 1970, accusing him of betraying class politics for religious 
sentimentality. In Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 341 – 343 and 364 – 367.  
39 Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, Rububiyater Bhumika (The Role of Rububiyah), (Santosh: 
Hukumate Rabbani Samiti Publications, 1974). Reprinted in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), 
pp. 698 - 702. As I discussed in chapter 3, Shubhani was also a foundational influence on Abul 
Hashim’s political philosophy, which he began to construct formally from the late 1940s under a 
slightly different moniker, Rubbaniyat. It is striking that Hashim and Bhashani, despite their 





of hukumate Rabbania or a political order based on God’s commands. Without questioning 
Bhashani’s sincerity or commitment to Rububiyah, which has been meticulously documented in 
Abid Bahar’s dissertation,40 I suggest an alternative reading.  
Bhashani’s 1948 announcement to serve Islam was also a way to appropriate the 
ideological edifice of Pakistan for the purpose of holding the new ruling elites accountable to the 
interest of the destitute. Secular leaders like Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan espoused the idea of 
“Islamic socialism” and sought to make Pakistan a secular and democratic state based on the 
principles of Islam.41 Similarly, Bhashani defined Islam in terms of broad principles and not in 
terms of narrow interpretation of sharia. His construction of shammo, moitri, o shanti – or 
equality, fraternity, and peace – as the basic principles of Islam allowed him to appeal to Islam in 
his concrete critiques of government policies and decisions.42 While he promised to support and 
help the “government of Pakistan wherever it worked sincerely for advancement of Islam and for 
the good of the people,” he also vowed to mount “forceful agitation [probol andolon]” if it acted 
against the interests of the people.43 Here, Islam and the good of the people became synonymous 
and the source of political legitimacy.  
Though Bhashani believed that government should be an agent for establishing and 
carrying out God’s commands, he was decidedly against a theocratic government or the “rule by 
mullahs,” which substantially differentiated him from his contemporaneous religious political 
																																								 																				
40 The primary thesis of Bahars’s dissertation, The Religious and Philosophical Basis of 
Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004), is that Bhashani’s political action and leadership were 
structured by the philosophy of Rububiyah.  
41See Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1963), pp.142-143. 
42 For example, during his brief tenure in the East Bengal Legislative Council he often invoked 
the Islamic principle of equity to not only advocate for land reform and pro-people budget but 
also to resist centralization of government power and imposition of Urdu as the sole state 
language. Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 63-67.  




leaders like Abul A’la Mawdudi.44 He rejected the idea that Godly government can be 
established by mere implementation of sharia because, as the diversity within Islam 
demonstrates, no particular iteration of Islamic law can claim to be the true interpretation of 
God’s command.45 He was particularly suspicious of the sincerity of the traditional ulema and 
the rightwing religious parties’ claim to represent God’s will because they never renounced 
private property despite professing to acknowledge Allah as the malik or the owner of the 
universe.46 On the other hand, unlike the secular leaders of Pakistan, Bhashani did not see Islam 
merely as a source of ethical principles for guiding politics. Rather, his understanding of Islam 
through the lens of Rububiyah led him to formulate a political philosophy that challenged the 
foundational principles of the modern state and modern politics. Like other proponents of 
Rububiyah, he understood its foundational principle to be the acceptance of God’s sovereignty 
over and ownership of everything.47 He did not spend much time or energy on philosophical 
																																								 																				
44 See Bahar, The Religious and Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004), 
particularly pp. 85- 88, regarding the differences in interpretation of Islam by Bhashani as 
compared to Mawdudi and Maolana Muhammad Illiyas, the founder of Tabligh- a Jaamat. While 
Illiyas sought to produce pious Muslims and Mawdudi sought to establish sharia law, Bhashani 
saw his jihad or struggle as the establishment of a just society. See also Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 
Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford University Press, 1996) for further 
analysis of Mawdudi’s thoughts about political Islam.  
45 Despite adhering to somewhat orthodox religious rituals in private life, Bhashani as a Sufi pir 
was not a religious fundamentalist and was sensitive to and tolerant of the diverse ways people 
interpreted and practiced Islam, not only in terms of the sectarian differences between Shia, 
Sunni, and the innumerable Majhabs (ideological schools) but also regarding the methodological 
difference between shariat and marefat. While shariat understood piety as adherence to the 
juridical interpretations of God’s command, marefat disregarded Islamic law and orthodox 
rituals in favor of much more individualistic and esoteric connection with God. See Metcalf, 
Islam in South Asia in Practice (2009) regarding diversities within Islam and Bahar, The 
Religious and Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004), for Bhashani’s 
location in these theological debates.  
46 Bhashani, “Rububiyater Bhumika”. Reprinted in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), p. 701.  
47 Bhashani’s understanding of Rububiyah very much echoes Abul Hashim’s formulations in The 
Creed of Islam: Or the Revolutionary Character of Kalima. (Dhaka: Umar Brothers, 1950). See 




arguments about God’s sovereignty but simply took it as the starting point for understanding 
society and for elaborating concrete political programs. The argument of God’s sovereignty 
enabled Bhashani to advance both a critique of private property and a critique of the sovereignty 
of the state. In an essay written in 1973, Bhashani outlined his critique of the sovereignty of the 
state, which he claimed had informed his politics throughout his career.48 In the essay, he argued 
that the sovereignty of the state or politics based on human sovereignty could only produce 
shasonbad or a system of rule based on coercion and repression, a system based ultimately on 
the power of the sword and the ability to produce death. Instead, he argued, since God is the Rab 
or the nurturer of the universe, acceptance of God’s sovereignty would oblige the state, 
conceived as an agent of God, to establish palonbad, a system of pastoral government oriented 
towards the life and wellbeing of its subjects.  By advancing this neologism palonbad, which can 
be literally translated as a system or ideology of rearing or tending, Bhashani sought to produce a 
Bengali conception of the Islamic political philosophy. By arguing that palonbad should be the 
obligation and source of legitimacy of the states, Bhashani produced an argument that is 
remarkably similar to Foucault’s idea of governmentality and his critique of Hobbesian 
sovereignty, though there is no indication that Bhashani had ever read Foucault. 49 It is 
remarkable that a peasant leader with little formal education was able to produce a critique of the 
Hobbesian idea of sovereignty that was foundational to the modern state, an idea that secular 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
Political Leadership (2004), for a history of Rububiyah as a Sufi concept and for various 
interpretations of Rububiyah by 20th century Indian Muslim thinkers and political actors. Bahar 
argues that Rububiyah remained a highly philosophical, somewhat esoteric, and mostly non-
political concept for most thinkers other than Bhashani.  
48 Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, “Palonbad Ki ebong Keno [What is and Why Palonbad]?” 1973. 
Reproduced in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 687-891.  
49 For an excellent discussion of Foucault’s critique of sovereignty and his concept of 
governmentality see Mitchell Dean, The Signature of Power: Sovereignty, Governmentality and 




leaders of Pakistan were unwilling to abandon despite their professed commitment to establish 
an Islamic Republic.50 Perhaps, more remarkable is that Bhashani’s critique of state sovereignty 
did not lead him to support a theocratic government, as Mawdudi and his party Jamaat-e-Islami 
did. Instead, Bhashani’s critique of sovereignty served as the foundation for envisioning a 
politics that was democratic, egalitarian and transformative.  
What kind of government did Bhashani prescribe for realizing the principles of 
palonbad? The answer that Bhashani provided to this question may be his most significant 
contribution to Bangladeshi political thought. Bhashani reasoned that though there had been 
many experiments in setting up governments based on Islamic principles that the Prophet 
announced some 1,400 years ago none succeeded fully.51 Thus, the question of what kind of 
government can realize the principles of palonbad cannot be answered by simply pointing to a 
pre-existing model but has to be produced through new analysis and practice. Instead of 
prescribing institutional designs for a utopian government, Bhashani focused on the question of 
the kinds of political action that would bring about the best government. At some level, the form 
of government did not matter much to Bhashani because he understood politics to be 
fundamentally premised upon a division between the ruler and the ruled, which perhaps could 
not be overcome. And he also understood that rulers could not be relied upon to do the right 
thing on their own but had to be educated, persuaded, and compelled to do what is good. Thus, 
																																								 																				
50 See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001) on the inherent contradiction facing Pakistani politicians, 
from Jinnah to Zia, in their effort to construct a secular Islamic state. Despite using Muslim 
identity as a mobilizing factor and despite professing adherence to Islamic principles of social 
justice tolerance, et cetera, Pakistani leaders were unwilling and unable to give up the 
fundamentally secular claim regarding the sovereignty of the state, fearing that it would lead to a 
theocratic state.  
51 One of the many occasions in which he expressed this view was in his essay, “Amar 
Porikolponai Islami Bishsho-biddyaloy (My Visions of The Islamic University).” Reproduced in 




Bhashani saw it as his “calling” or a part of his moral religious obligation towards his fellow 
men, particularly those who are destitute, to stand up against injustice and oppression and to 
guide and force the rulers to the path of good. In his politics of “pious opposition,” as one 
commentator has dubbed it, Bhashani invoked on the one hand the traditional authority of the 
religious leaders to hold political power morally accountable and on the other hand the authority 
and obligation of the “frontier pir” to watch over and protect his flock.52 Bhashani claimed, 
however, that the modern period was “the era of the multitude [jonogon],” in which, unlike in 
previous epochs, no single advocate or righteous individual would be sufficient to hold political 
power accountable or advance the interest of the poor. Nor would the power and intention of a 
righteous and just monarch like Asoka or Akbar be enough to produce good government. In the 
modern era meaningful historical social change cannot be achieved without people’s awakening 
[gonojagoron].53 These arguments and his life-long record of fighting against authoritarian 
regimes suggest that Bhashani viewed democratic politics to be an indispensable means for 
establishing and maintaining the ideals of palonbad.  
Though Bhashani saw democracy as essential for ending the poverty and misery of the 
destitute masses and for producing good government, he did not share much enthusiasm for 
liberal or electoral democracy. Up until 1948 he harbored some hope of affecting change through 
																																								 																				
52 Ranabir Samaddar argues in Paradoxes of the Nationalist Time (2002), p. 62 that Bhashani’s 
politics, at least partially, was a form of “pious opposition” that protested against the impiety of 
the rulers. Impiety, as Bahar makes clear in The Religious and Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s 
Political Leadership (2004), meant a failure to observe duties towards God and a failure to 
observe duties towards fellow humans. Thus, injustice was also a form of impiety. Custers, 
“Maulana Bhashani and the Transition to Secular Politics in East Bengal” (2010), reminds us of 
the bond and special relationship that Bhashani enjoyed as a “frontier pir” with religious 
disciples that doubled as his political constituency.  
53 Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, “Amar Shomadhan (My Solutions),” Dainik Pakistan, January 
5, 1971. Reprinted in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), pp. 694 – 698. He had advanced a 




parliamentary politics, particularly if controlled by politicians of a free country and not by the 
colonial masters. He resigned, however, from the Legislative Council after 10 years of a 
parliamentary career, expressing his dismay at the betrayal of the interest of the destitute masses 
by the self-interested political leaders of independent Pakistan. By end of the Pakistan period his 
negative assessment of electoral democracy hardened, which he expressed in a highly critical and 
controversial pamphlet “Voter Age Bhat Chai [We Need Food Before the Ballot].” After 
presenting a sophisticated analysis of the causes and effects of the expansion of electoral 
democracy Bhashani argued: 
I declare unequivocally, no matter how well anyone does in the elections and no matter 
how grand their victories are, they will not be able to do any good for the multitude 
[jonogon], the working people, the farmers and the laborers…. All they will succeed in 
doing would be to push the people into the black hole of electioneering in the name of 
democracy… The general truth of the history of electioneering is that elections and 
ballots have never solved the problems and concerns of the working people – the farmer, 
the laborer – of any country; nor have ordinary people been allowed to occupy the seat of 
power.54  
 
If not electoral democracy, what then should politics be?  
There is no example in the history of the earth that a demand has been realized or a law 
has been enacted that supports the interest of the multitude [jonogon] without mass 
movement, without strong petitioning, and without dauntless and overwhelming struggle 
by the people… For the multitude the only path for securing its demands is the path of 
struggle, that path of ‘the street [agitation].55 
 
This, of course, was not new for Bhashani. He had argued something similar in the historic 1957 
Kagmari Council Session of the Awami League where he declared: 
Talks between the oppressor and the oppressed never benefit the latter; it is always the 
oppressor who wins at the negotiating table… there should, therefore, be no discussion 
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Sultan, Gonotantrik Kormi Shibir, 1970). Reprinted in Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), 
pp.660 – 669. See p. 667. 
55 Maksud, Maolana Bhashani (1994), p. 668. He makes this argument in both of his essays 




with a tyrant; the people are to realize their legitimate demands through mas 
movements.56  
 
Thus, while criticizing electoral democracy, he advanced a much more expansive vision of 
democracy, one marked by active and vigilant presence of the people, of the ordinary masses in 
the political arena. In this regard Bhashani’s views were probably closer to Rousseau’s view of 
democracy. Bhashani, like Rousseau, did not propose any sort of direct democracy where 
ordinary masses occupy the seats of government. Rather, he envisioned the people, when awake 
and active, to be the force that keeps the government accountable and aligned with the interest of 
the masses.57 
Visions of democracy as the political empowerment of the destitute or the subaltern may 
be impossible to institutionalize, and institutionalization may be the death of such a democracy. 
Since the people cannot constantly remain assembled the best one may hope for is what Sheldon 
Wolin has described as “democratic moments.” And these democratic moments, when the people 
wake up, come together, and assert their collective will are “fugitive” and uncertain.58 Bhashani 
certainly had not read Wolin and there is no indication that he had read Rousseau, either. Yet, 
one can detect echoes of Rousseau and Wolin in his argument that the biggest challenge in 
modern politics is to produce and sustain gonojagoron [people’s awakening] and to channel that 
																																								 																				
56 From a speech given by Bhashani at the historic Kagmari Conference. Quoted by Kabir The 
Red Maulana (2012), p. 25.  
57 Rousseau’s views on democracy of course have been debated endlessly, which we cannot 
engage with here. Rather, I make the comparison above based on my reading of his Social 
Contract, particularly the first chapters of Book III. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Basic Political 
Writings, trans. Donald A Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). See Majid Behrouzi, Democracy 
as the Political Empowerment of the People: The Betrayal of an Ideal, (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2005) for a discussion of the tradition of democratic thinking in which Rousseau is a 
seminal figure and Bhashani certainly could be included. 
58 Sheldon S Wolin, Fugitive Democracy and Other Essays, ed. Nicholas Xenos (Princeton: 




people’s power for social change.59 The people do not always rise up automatically to take up 
their historic responsibility. They have to be, as both Rousseau and Bhashani claimed, prodded 
and poked to do so. Thus, it was not enough for Bhashani to remain a moral critic of political 
power or an advocate for the poor. He had to also become an active agent for rousing the masses.  
 Bhashani did not see himself as a mere political agitator and nor did he see politics 
simply as struggles for advancing earthly interests. Because politics was about producing a 
society based on Islamic ideas of justice, brotherhood, and peace, political action was a service to 
God, a form of worship. In his essay “Rububiyahr Bhumika” he compares his role in politics to 
that of a muazzin, one who calls Muslims to prayer by reciting the adzan or ritual call. In the 
essay Bhashani quotes the morning adzan, “Assalatu Khayrum Minan-Naum (prayer/worship is 
better than sleep),” to call on people to wake up and fight against injustice and corruption. In the 
context of the essay ritual worship becomes synonymous with political action.60 In his efforts to 
awaken the masses and advance their interests Bhashani adopted different means that can be 
classified into three broad categories. He advocated for and facilitated direct action by the 
masses, strategically used institutions of electoral democracy, and promoted a program of moral 
education not only to rouse people but also to make them advocates for particular visions of 
social justice rooted in Islamic values. In the next section we will analyze the modes that 
Bhashani used to put his ideas into action.  
III 
Bhashani’s own political awakening, as I suggested earlier, was organic and spontaneous, 
experienced as a member of the sharbahara against the exploitation and violence of the 
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landlords and moneylenders. He would maintain his identification with the sharbahara 
throughout his life no matter how high he climbed politically. He never acquired a taste or desire 
for material wealth and remained content living in straw huts, sleeping on bamboo mats, and 
wearing peasant garbs of lungi and panjabi till the end of his life.61 His commitment to simple 
living was both ethical and political. He abhorred the idea of living in luxury, while millions 
struggled daily against poverty and starvation. Moreover, as advised by his spiritual and political 
mentor Azad Subhani, Bhashani made a lifelong commitment to respect and remain one of the 
poor masses in all aspects of life to become an effective leader of and advocate for them.62 As a 
champion of the sharbahara, he was concerned first and foremost with protecting and advancing 
the political agency of the subaltern. There have been several studies that analyze Bhashani’s 
role as a peasant leader, and Bhashani himself provides a short yet elegant analysis of peasant 
movements and class struggles in Bangladesh and his role in them in a 1972 essay titled 
“Bangladeshe Sreni Shongramer Itihash [A History of Class Struggle in Bangladesh].” 63 From 
these analysis it becomes clear that he valued the direct and spontaneous action of the masses as 
the most effective and potent form of political action and organized public meetings, rallies, 
marches, and protest actions, including occupations and encirclement. Because of his exposure to 
constitutional nationalist politics, however, Bhashani could see the limits of spontaneity (as 
Fanon would) and sought to give organizational coherence and continuity to peasant actions. 
Bhashani sought to promote self-organization and political actions of the destitute masses by 
founding and leading various associations [shomiti] and by organizing conferences [shommelon].  
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The numerous conferences Bhashani organized in his long political career deserve special 
analysis as a notable part of his “repertoire of contention” and mobilization, which served to 
teach political lessons to both the subaltern and the elite. 64 Held in remote rural areas, these 
conferences reversed the geography of power by requiring urban intellectuals and politicians 
wishing to attend to travel instead of making the peasant travel to the capital, the supposed center 
of power. Organized through voluntary labor and donations from ordinary rural folks and 
attended by hundreds of thousands of people, these conferences served to demonstrate the self-
organizing capacity and power of the people. The speeches, cultural performances, and the 
decorative artifacts such as banners and gates used in these conferences were designed to convey 
political messages that would educate the illiterate masses and subvert the hegemony of the 
ruling classes and institutionalized politics.65 
Though Bhashani was acutely aware that electoral politics had the potential to stifle the 
political agency of the sharbahara by substituting electoral politics for subaltern direct action, he 
countered that electoral democracy could produce political openings and opportunities for 
participation that would encourage subaltern pressure on the political system.66 Thus, he fought 
against colonial and post-colonial authoritarian regimes to establish electoral democracy. 
Moreover, unlike many of his Communist colleagues, he did not see politics exclusively as class 
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struggle. Rather, he recognized the necessity of multi-class political parties and united fronts in 
the struggles against colonial rule and post-colonial authoritarianism. Bhashani founded the AL 
and the NAP, both of which were multi-class political parties, and he was a strong proponent of 
the 1954 United Front, a multi-party electoral coalition, and the National Democratic Front, a 
multi-party platform pushing the Ayub regime for democratic reform. His willingness to work 
with others across class and party lines often infuriated his deputies such as Mujib and Oli 
Ahad.67 However, except for an eleven-year parliamentary career between 1937 and 1948 as a 
member of provincial legislative councils, Bhashani did not seek public office. Rather, he 
assumed the role of the proverbial gadfly with the goal of holding political power, elected or 
otherwise, accountable through relentless critique and street agitation, all the while advocating 
for the expansion of electoral democracy.  
Thus, during the 1954 East Bengal legislative elections, the first to be held after 
Pakistan’s independence, the septuagenarian Bhashani campaigned vigorously but neither 
contested a seat in the elections nor sought a government post after the coalition led by his party 
came to power.68 Rather, he continued his role as a critic of government, even when it was his 
own party, which earned him the ire of many of his party colleagues and led to a division within 
the party. Bhashani and his left-leaning followers sharply criticized the ruling faction led by H.S. 
Suhrawardy and his trusted deputy Mujib for failing to deliver many of the election promises, for 
stifling the question of full autonomy for East Pakistan, and for supporting a political-military 
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alliance between Pakistan and the United States.69 Unable to alter the course of the government 
or reconcile the growing divide between left and right factions of the AL, Bhashani broke with 
the party and formed a new one under the name of National Awami Party (NAP) in July of 1957 
with the promise of a new kind of politics geared towards “the emancipation of the oppressed 
public” and “the realization of the ideals of independence and democracy.”70 He would not, 
however, have the chance to pursue this new kind of politics for long or build up his party 
because within a year Pakistan’s fragile democracy finally would break down, and Ayub Khan 
would seize control of the government declaring martial law. NAP was banned and Bhashani, 
like many other political leaders of the time, was arrested in 1958 and spent the next four years 
in prison, ironically often sharing prison cells with his former colleagues from the AL, including 
Mujib. 
During the second half of the 1960s East Pakistan experienced increasing political unrest 
and agitation against the authoritarian rule of Ayub Khan. The agitations were led by students 
and middle-class politicians and demanded restoration of electoral democracy and political 
freedom, provision of full federal autonomy to East Pakistan, and the end of prosecution of 
political prisoners, particularly of Mujib who was on trial on charges of treason and was facing 
the death penalty. There were also agitations by workers and peasants seeking relief from their 
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dire economic conditions. By 1969 these agitations became more unified, at least partially, 
because of Bhashani’s efforts and leadership and took on the form of a mass insurrection or 
gono-obhyuthyan that often utilized tactics such as encirclement, barricades, arson, vandalism, 
and pitched battles against the police.71 Instead of denouncing or distancing himself from the 
violent elements of the uprising, Bhashani defended the violence as the legitimate right of the 
sharbahara in their fight against oppression, earning Bhashani the designation, “the prophet of 
violence.”72 In his refusal to renounce violence Bhashani embodied the political consciousness of 
the rural masses, who as Fanon said, “have never ceased to pose the problem of their liberation 
in terms of violence.”73 For the subaltern, lacking voice and access in the constitutional political 
arena, “the strength of their muscles” and use of “brute force” remained indispensable tools of 
their political action. In an essay written in 1972 and titled, “Ohimsha o Biplob [Non-violence 
and Revolution],” Bhashani advanced an argument in favor of revolutionary violence that was 
strikingly similar to Fanon’s famous tract:  
Do not get carried away by the concept of ahimsa. If you do, you will lose the 
revolutionary spirit. You can at best pretend to be an amateurish patriot, but cannot do 
anything effective for the emancipation of the toiling masses… Ahimsa subdues the 
people who, with the flag of revolution hoisted high, could defeat the exploiters, make 
humble appeals to the palaces of those who would never free the people from 
exploitation… Ahimsa, after all, is a great tactic of exploitation… a soft means of 
controlling or destroying the people’s revolutionary spirit of taking bold steps towards 
abolition of exploitative systems… That is why I have never tolerated the theory of 
ahimsa – however sweet it may sound or however philosophical it may seem. The 
welfare of ninety-five percent of the people lies, I believe, in rejecting with disgust the 
principles of ahimsa and the retention of revolutionary programs… An interesting 
seminar could be held among educated circles on Gandhian and Tolstoy’s philosophy of 
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ahimsa, but no effective program could be adopted on the basis of ahimsa that would put 
an end to imperialist, colonialist and capitalist exploitations, and would ensure the 
democratic emancipation of the destitute masses.``74  
 
Bhashani was often challenged to answer how his endorsement of violence can be compatible 
with his conception of Islam as a religion of peace and Rububiyah as a philosophy of love and an 
obligation to care for others. He replied that violence could at times be a higher form of love and 
peace than non-violence. Violence may be necessary to protect the oppressed from the oppressor 
and to save the oppressor from his own wrongs and misdeeds.75 One who does not see the good 
must be compelled to see it by force, if necessary, declared Bhashani, echoing Rousseau’s 
famous claim that people must at times be “forced to be free.”76 From his confrontations with 
zamindars to his youthful adventures with the revolutionary terrorist group Anushilan, Bhashani 
had exhibited his willingness to resort to violence. However, Bhashani’s openness to violence 
had its most significant impact in the late 1960s and early 1970s in pushing political discontents 
against authoritarianism and West Pakistani domination towards an armed nationalist struggle.77  
Bhashani provided crucial leadership in the uprising of 1969 that freed Mujib from prison 
and toppled the Ayub regime a month late. However, after his release from prison, Mujib quickly 
pushed all the other elements of opposition politics, including Bhashani to become the “supreme 
																																								 																				
74 Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, “Ahimsha O Biplob (Nonviolence and Revolution),” Weekly 
Haq-Katha, March 17, 1972. In Abu Salek, ed., Haq-Katha Shomogro, p. 59 – 62. The same 
passage was also quoted by Kabir, The Red Maulana (2012), p. 91, who referenced the title of 
the article as “Sharbahara Jonotar Jonno (for the proletariats).” Here I use Kabir’s translation 
with slight modifications.  
75 Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, “Amar Jobab (My Answer),” Weekly Haq-Katha, March 24, 
1972. In Abu Salek, ed., Haq-Katha Shomogro, p. 92. Also see, Bahar, The Religious and 
Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership (2004), pp. 58 – 59, for another reading, 
which is largely in alignment with the reading I provide, of Bhashani’s defense of violence as an 
instrument of justice and thus higher form of non-violence.  
76 Rousseau, Basic Political Writings (1987), p. 150.  
77 Kabir, The Red Maulana (2012), analyzes Bhashani’s actions and speeches between 1969 and 
1970 and finds that he enabled the rise of Mujib and the Awami League as representatives of the 




leader of the nationalist Public” and  “the chief tribune of Muslim Bengal,” argues Ranabir 
Samaddar. In Samaddar’s recounting of the nationalist narratives of Bangladesh, there is a sense 
of historical inevitability about the rise of Mujib, representing the urban middle class, and demise 
of Bhashani, representing not only the subaltern but also a mode of politics that was out of sync 
with sanitized processes of negotiations, meetings, and roundtable conferences.78 Bhashani, the 
relentless fighter, saw no inevitability about the end of his political career and was not ready to 
give up in his fight for a social revolution. In 1970, when the middle class was celebrating the 
upcoming general election, the first one to be held in Pakistan, as the crowning achievement of 
their decades-long struggle for democracy, Bhashani wrote “Voter Age Bhat Chai (We Demand 
Food Before the Ballot),” sharply criticizing electoral politics. He was apprehensive that the 
revolutionary possibilities produced by the mass awakening and uprisings of the previous years 
would be extinguished if electoral victory were to be viewed as the goal. Bhashani himself was 
not interested in running for office and was more comfortable in the gadfly role. Moreover, he 
possessed the political acumen to realize that the Awami League, representing the urban middle 
class, had a better chance in electoral politics than his own party. Thus, he made a calculated 
decision to cede the field of electoral politics to Mujib and the Awami League, while exerting 
pressure through street agitation and mass mobilization to adopt more progressive and radical 
positions.79 In a 1971 interview Bhashani explained his logic: 
I myself thought that revolution or no revolution, the timing was perfect for earning 
[national] independence. If I had participated in the elections, the voters would have been 
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divided into two camps. Differences of opinion would have reached an extreme point. 
Subsequently, there would not have been a War of [National] Independence. Hence, I 
[thought] let Mujibur win. Let territorial independence come, although that would not 
ensure [the people’s] emancipation. We will do the rest.80 
 
Though the time for independence might have been ripe, arguably it was not on the 
agenda of the Awami League until Bhashani pushed them to it. He had raised the slogan 
“Shadhin Purba Pakistan [Independent East Pakistan]” as early as 23 November, 1970 in 
response to the Pakistani government’s utter failure to deal with the Bhola Cyclone, one of the 
deadliest natural disasters of the 20th century.81 Over the next few months Bhashani intensified 
the call for independence in meetings, rallies, and newspaper articles, making clear that this was 
no sentimental outburst of an old man but a well-reasoned and indomitable political demand.82 
His rhetoric and incessant agitation greatly inspired many Bangladeshi nationalists, particularly 
the radical student factions, and pushed Mujib and the Awami League to adopt an openly 
nationalist and pro-independence position in place of the moderate demand of provincial 
autonomy that they had hitherto advocated. Mujib and the AL would eventually adopt the 
demand for independence by March of 1971, which would lead to the emergence of Bangladesh 
by the end of the year, after a bloody nine-month war of liberation.  
IV 
 Though Bhashani formed a strategic alliance with the Awami League during the war to 
bring about national independence, after the war he continued to push for radical social 
transformation by pressuring Mujib and the Awami League. To many nationalist commentators 
and to Mujib himself, Bhashani’s oppositional and critical stance appeared counterproductive 
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and anti-nationalist. But to Bhashani such oppositional politics was only logical because he was 
never really a nationalist politician. It is true that his political philosophy was informed by anti-
imperialist and anti-colonial ideologies advanced by the likes of Jamaluddin Afghani and Syed 
Hussain Ahmad Madani, the latter being his direct teacher and political mentor. Yet he sought 
national independence not as the ultimate political end but only as a necessary step in 
dismantling the existing structures of oppression and exploitation. Moreover, his understanding 
of Islam as an ideology of universal brotherhood that transcended national, racial and other 
parochial differences made nationalist politics ultimately untenable. In the early days of his 
political career his nationalism had been tempered by the idea of trans-national Muslim ummah. 
Towards the end of his political career Bhashani began to embrace a more universal humanist 
position, declaring that “every human being on Earth is part of the same universal history” and 
Islamic conceptions of social justice and brotherhood recognize and promote that unity of 
humanity.83 Despite actively participating in the nationalist struggles for Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, Bhashani was never committed to nationalism as a political end. And he felt not 
only justified but also obliged to adopt a critical stance towards the government of the newly 
established Bangladesh, just as he had done in the case of Pakistan, despite his great personal 
affection towards Mujib. 
Although ambivalent about nationalism, he was a proud Bengali and expressed his 
Bengali identity, sometimes quite deliberately, through his language, clothing, food, and 
etiquette. It was an organic identity that emerged from the lived experiences of the peasants of 
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Bengal and not the refined urban cultural identity that was constructed through literature and 
other high arts. Because Bhashani was from the village and he embodied the folk, he need not 
return to the village or rediscover the folk, as Bengali nationalists since the beginning of the 20th 
century sought to do. He was the “real Bengali” that writers like Abdul Hye celebrated.84 Yet this 
Bengali identity was not politically relevant for Bhashani except to the extent that identity 
coincided with a marginalized and oppressed group. As discussed above, he rose to political 
prominence in the 1920s and 1930s as an advocate for Bengali-Muslim migrant farmers in 
Assam. However, his political stance was motivated not by Bengali-Muslim identity but by his 
outrage against the violence and discrimination that poor farmers suffered. That during this 
period he also fought alongside the indigenous Assesse population against the corrupt and 
exploitative practices of Bengali-Muslim traders points towards his capacity to move past 
identity politics.85 His activism in Assam, and later in Pakistan, to make Bengali an official 
language is thought to be an indicator of his Bengali nationalism. His language activism, 
however, had less to do with nationalism and more with overcoming the denial of subaltern 
political agency produced by using English or Urdu as the language of governmental affairs. 
Bhashani insisted on delivering his speeches in Bengali in the East Bengal Legislative Council, 
just as he had done so in the Assam Provincial Legislative Council, declaring that conducting 
government business in the language of the masses is a minimal prerequisite for making the 
political process accessible to the masses.86 Lastly, when Bhashani spoke of a cultural revolution, 
he did not have in mind a literary movement like Abul Mansur Ahmad had advocated or a 
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national culture that an organization like Tamuddin Majlish had sought to construct.87 Rather, 
Bhashani’s cultural revolution, like the Chinese one that he admired, sought to revitalize, 
educate, and modernize the destitute and oppressed masses. “The goal of cultural revolution is to 
construct a social system that is happy, prosperous, and free of exploitation.”88  
Despite his antipathy towards nationalism, national liberation had been an overriding 
concern for him throughout his political career because the question of social transformation had 
always run up against the reality of colonial rule. Independence for Bangladesh had settled for 
him the question of national liberation much more conclusively than the independence of 
Pakistan, allowing him to focus on establishing a just society rather than being preoccupied with 
ending colonial domination. Consequently, one can trace a significant shift in Bhashani’s 
political thinking after Bangladesh’s independence.  
The project of social transformation had always been a two-pronged struggle – one of 
rebellion and the other of moral purification. If the realities of colonial rule had forced him to 
emphasize rebellion, national independence allowed him to focus more on moral purification. 
Thus, towards the end of his political career, Bhashani placed greater importance on the moral 
education of rulers than on mass movements and acts of resistance, without completely foregoing 
the latter. This shift, however, was not entirely new or inconsistent with his previous thinking. 
As a pir or spiritual teacher Bhashani had always been concerned with reforming moral 
characters and his political activism had always contained a pedagogical element. As I have 
discussed above, he used his speeches, sermons, and the conferences [shommelon] as tools for 
political mobilization and means to educate and enlighten the masses. By the 1960s, he began 
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thinking about a more formal pedagogic project in the form of an Islamic university that would 
provide holistic, practical, political, and moral education based on Islamic principles of equality, 
fraternity, and peace. In the 1970s Bhashani wrote several essays that criticized the failures of 
the existing education system to be socially relevant and proposed curriculums and structures of 
a university that would become the centerpiece of an alternative education system.89 These 
proposals echo the perennial theme of education as a mechanism for training human beings to be 
more just and good that is present in the political philosophy of diverse thinkers such as Plato 
and Rousseau.90 Bhashani envisioned his university not as an institution of mass education but as 
a mechanism for producing self-sacrificial men [tyagi-purush] who would be dedicated to and 
practitioners of truth and good, or shadhok. These men would be the “thinkers, activists, and 
leaders,” who would foster mass awakening and move society “to the future.”91  
In laying out the visions for the university, Bhashani reasoned that education was a 
powerful, if not the primary, mechanism for producing progressive social transformation, and he 
emphasized the critical role played by a vanguard leadership in that process. After the 
independence of Bangladesh, the concerns about moral character of and the roles played by 
political leaders in social transformation became even more central to his thinking. By 1974 he 
argued, “Changes in government or state will not be fruitful, if the ruling strata is not moral. If 
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the rulers possess good moral character, the whole of society moves towards purity and 
welfare.”92 This argument informed his decision to launch a new organization, Hukumate 
Rabbania Shomiti [The Association for the Establishment of the Rule of Rab], with the goal of 
reforming the moral character of the rulers. After all, the new rulers of the country were not 
abstract foreign oppressors but individuals whom Bhashani knew intimately and shared a sense 
of kinship with. Mujib, one of Bhashani’s erstwhile deputies, was like a son to him. He did not 
see Mujib and the new rulers as enemies with whom negotiations were impossible. Rather he 
saw them as legitimate rulers who needed moral and ethical guidance for avoiding corruption 
and for staying on the path of justice.  
The increasing concerns with character purification and the explicit embrace of an 
Islamic ideology towards the end of Bhashani’s career prompted many of his erstwhile followers 
to question his commitment to social revolution and progress. Bhashani addressed these concerns 
directly in a 1972 essay: “I have never conducted my politics by considering what is 
‘progressive’ or ‘revolutionary’… My fundamental concern is regarding what contains and 
produces human welfare [manusher kolyan] and whether I am on the path of justice and truth.” 
In that essay he added that though religion had been “exploited” throughout history to “deceive 
people” and “strengthen instruments of oppression,” the essence of religions [dhormer 
mormokotha] had been to “nourish the soul.” Moreover, true religions had played “undeniable 
roles in establishing universal peace and welfare” by keeping men on “straight and honest” paths 
and by advancing ideas of equality and brotherhood among men. Lastly, Bhashani argued, 
politics and economics based only on “absolute materialism” cannot bring about “ultimate and 
																																								 																				




permanent good for humanity.”93 Bhashani continued this theme in another essay written in the 
last year of his life where he argued, citing Russian nuclear physicist and peace activists Andrei 
Sakharov, who had just won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975, that the ideological and practical 
differences between communism and capitalism were decreasing and that both had contributed 
positively to improve the material conditions of humanity. He pointed out that even the 
“proletarians” in capitalist societies are not quite literally “destitute” and that technological 
achievements could make their conditions even better. Despite these achievements, Bhashani 
argued, human beings remained not only unhappy but also in a state of absolute existential terror 
because both capitalism and communism subscribed to nafsania, or materialist conceptions of 
good based on bodily pleasures and self-interest, which ultimately failed to overcome the 
artificial divisions among humans and thus to recognize dignity and equality of all humans. 
Humanity’s continued unhappiness and insecurity can only be overcome by a reorientation of the 
human psyche toward ruhunia, or concerns about the good of the soul, which is the essential 
focus of Islam and all the other true religions. Bhashani had once stated that “I don’t understand 
communism, Leninism or Maoism, I haven’t even read Marx’s Capital but what I understand 
pretty well is that the majority of our people suffer from hunger.”94 Thus, ending material 
destitution was fundamental to his politics. Yet, he also thought that improvements in material 
conditions alone would be insufficient to produce individual emancipation or world peace. He 
did not see any contradiction between religion and progress, but saw religion to be indispensable 
for the true emancipation of the destitute.  
V 
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Bhashani lived in a time and a place where the boundaries between politics and religion 
were not well demarcated. Like many contemporaries from the Indian subcontinent, Bhashani 
was both a religious and political leader and relied on his status as a spiritual leader to generate 
his political authority and mobilize his constituency. His political projects were shaped 
fundamentally by religious sensibilities generally and Islamic ideas particularly. Ultimately his 
goal was the establishment of a political order or a state based on the fundamental principles of 
Islam. Unlike many other religio-political leaders, however, Bhashani’s politics were neither 
motivated by religious chauvinism nor oriented towards theocracy. Instead, he practiced secular 
and progressive democratic politics even when secular politicians themselves were lost in the 
blind alleys of religious nationalism. His secularism emanated from his understanding of Islam 
as an essentially tolerant religion and as one founded on the principles of fraternity, 
egalitarianism and peace. Such interpretation of Islam combined with the poverty and 
exploitation that he witnessed and experienced as a “son of a poor family” set him on a path of 
political activism against local and global structures of oppression. He came to see the pursuit of 
a political career dedicated towards the advancement of social justice and end of exploitation as 
his calling and a part of his duty to men and God. Thus, in his long political career his calling 
played a role that was a mix between the traditional religious authority serving as the moral 
conscience of the political power and the modern public-advocate prodding the political leaders 
to enact and implement policies for the social good and for the advancement of the interests of 
the downtrodden.  
However, Bhashani was more than an advocate because he understood that an advocate 
or a leader alone couldn’t possibly hold political power accountable. He noted, like Rousseau, 




the popular will and serve the public interest. He took on a role that can more appropriately be 
described as a Socratic gadfly or even a Rousseauian educator, who seeks to awaken and educate 
“the people” to take up their responsibility for watching over and keeping political power 
accountable. Some commentators have compared Bhashani to Gandhi based on their style of 
politics and life, particularly in terms of their strict adherence to a minimalist dress-code and 
frequent use of hunger-strikes as a mode of protest and persuasion. It may be more reasonable, 
however, to compare him to the leaders of Latin American liberation theology movements or 
even the North American civil rights movement. Though both movements were 
contemporaneous, there is nothing to suggest that he had any direct connection with or influence 
from any of these movements. Perhaps, the similarities of their politics and ideas are produced 
by the zeitgeist that was expressing the un-suppressible yearnings of marginalized peoples 
around the world to be free. Perhaps, Bhashani can be best understood as a voice of third world 
peasants thrust willy-nilly into the modern world and the stages of modern politics. In the 
political landscape of colonial and post-colonial Bangladesh dominated by nawabs, knights, 
lawyers, generals, and university-educated intellectuals, Bhashani was a lonely “organic 
intellectual” of the subaltern. If it were not for his presence, the subaltern voice would have been 




Between Liberal Democracy and Social Uplift: Sheikh Mujib’s Struggle to Found a New 
Order  
I 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was only fifty-five years old when, on August 15, 1975, he was 
brutally murdered along with most of his family. A mere three and a half years earlier on January 
10, 1972 he had returned from a Pakistani prison to the newly independent Bangladesh as a hero 
and the country’s undisputed leader.95 He had been dubbed Bangabondhu [Friend of Bengal], in 
February of 1969, by adoring students and masses for the great courage he had displayed and the 
tremendous sacrifices he had endured as an advocate for the political and economic rights of the 
people of East Bengal. After independence of Bangladesh he had been proclaimed as Jatir 
Janak, or Father of the Nation, an honorific that Mujib not only accepted all too readily but also 
allowed to become official.96 Yet, on the day of his assassination the streets of Dhaka were eerily 
empty, devoid of any mourners or protesters. Whatever the grief people felt at the murder of the 
once beloved leader and the Father of the Nation, it was stifled by the terror the brutal killings 
had induced, and it was expressed most privately.97 After the coup, the junior military officer 
assassins, some of whom had participated in the country’s liberation war, took to the airwaves 
proclaiming that they had to kill the nation’s father to save it from corruption, violence, and a 
																																								 																				
95 See S. A. Karim, Sheikh Mujib: Triumph and Tragedy (Dhaka: The University Press, 2005), 
which is one of the best among the numerous biographies and commentaries that have been 
written about Sheikh Mujib’s life, politics, and death. Salil Tripathi provides a moving account 
of Mujib’s death in his highly perceptive analysis of Bangladesh’s political history, The Colonel 
Who Would Not Repent: The Bangladesh War and Its Unquiet Legacy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2016). Finally, Anthony Mascarenhas’ Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986) that assembled many detailed accounts and first-hand 
interviews remains an invaluable source for generations of scholars trying to understand the 
bloody first decade of Bangladesh’s history.  
96 The honorific Jatir Janak was advanced by many of supporters soon after independence and it 
became official through the Fourth Amendment, adopted on January 25th, 1975, which also 
bestowed on him the power of presidency. Karim, Triumph and Tragedy (2005). pp. 348-349.  




megalomaniac bent on replacing democracy with dynastic rule. Their claims were endorsed by 
Khondokar Mustak, the commerce minister in Mujib’s cabinet who became the next president 
and applauded the killers as surjo-shontan [children of the sun].  Successive heads of the state 
also furthered the narrative and protected, rehabilitated, and even rewarded the killers for the 
next 21 years. It was only after Sheikh Hasina, one of Mujib’s two children to survive the 1975 
massacre – she was out of the country, became the prime minister of Bangladesh in 1996 that the 
infamous Indemnity Act protecting the killers was scrapped and the prosecution of the killers 
began. 98 After years of trials, appeals, international manhunts, diplomatic negotiations and 
various political setbacks, five of the perpetrators were executed on January 28, 2010, during 
Sheikh Hasina’s second term at the helm of Bangladesh.99  
Tales of Mujib’s and the Awami League’s corruption, ineptitude, and authoritarianism 
served to justify the assassination and subsequent military rule. They became staples of political 
discourse in Bangladesh beginning in the mid 1970s. Such views were advanced by the 
propaganda machines of the military rulers and by many left-leaning scholars and intellectuals 
who derided the petty bourgeois character of the Awami League and Mujib and held them 
responsible for stifling the possibilities for revolutionary social change in Bangladesh in the 
wake of the Liberation War.100 Even the most sympathetic readers saw Mujib as a tragic failure, 
who despite all of his great personal qualities and the crucial role he had played in inspiring and 
																																								 																				
98 The Indemnity Act was promulgated as an ordinance on September 26, 1975 by then President 
of Bangladesh Khondakar Mostaq Ahmad. Parliament adopted it as a part of the Fifth 
Amendment on July 9, 1979 during the presidency of Major General Ziaur Rahman. See 
Tripathi, The Colonel Who Would Not Repent (2016).  
99 Ibid. 
100 The list of leftwing critics of Mujib would be too large to enumerate here. An illustrative 
example is Badruddin Umar, who was a vocal critic of Mujib and the Awami regime from the 
beginning. See, for example, his Politics and Society in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Subarna, 1987) and 
The Emergence of Bangladesh, Volume 2: The Rise of Bengali Nationalism, 1958-1971 (Karachi: 




leading the movement of national liberation proved to be a failure as a governor and a statesman 
during the critical moment of post-war reconstruction and state building.101 Critical and scholarly 
accounts condemned Mujib’s murder and the military regimes that followed. They also argued 
that Mujib himself must bear some responsibility for the way he squandered the tremendous 
political capital he had as the undisputed leader of a newly independent country. Against these 
critical accounts there have been numerous hagiographical accounts of Mujib, in which it was 
claimed that he was not only the greatest Bengali personality of all time and but also worthy of 
belonging alongside Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., all of 
whom had sacrificed their lives as champions of the oppressed and the downtrodden.102 The 
hagiographies treat Mujib not as a failed statesman or a failed revolutionary but as a visionary 
leader who was brutally murdered and systematically defamed afterwards to stop the 
revolutionary program of social transformation for which he had fought. His murder, declare 
many of these accounts, was not a result of rash actions of some rogue military officers but the 
outcome of a deep and vast conspiracy that involved not only local elements like pro-Pakistani 
political forces, bureaucratic-military elites, and opportunistic and corrupt Awami leaders but 
also international elements like the imperialist United States determined to prevent any third 
world country from either going over to the Soviet camp or pursuing economic independence. 
Abdul Guffar Chowdhury, a prominent political commentator and a long-time associate of 
Mujib, has wondered whether Mujib’s assassination and the subsequent political turmoil could 
have been averted if Mujib had been a little more careful, a little more ruthless, and a little more 
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efficient in statecraft. Chowdhury answered his own question in a resigned tone, “How can I 
make the impossible claim that Sheikh Mujib would have been able to do what Lumumba, 
Nkrumah, Sukarno, or Allende could not do?”103 But Chowdhury ends on a hopeful note, stating 
that the visions of democratic and egalitarian societies held by founders and leaders of third 
world countries are making an inevitable comeback. Perhaps Chowdhury’s optimism was due to 
the return to power of the Awami League, which he viewed as a democratic progressive party, 
under the leadership of Mujib’s daughter Sheikh Hasina.  
Since her first term in office as prime minister of Bangladesh, beginning in 1996, Sheikh 
Hasina has sought to avenge her father’s murder and reinstate him as the Father of the Nation 
with all the glory and honor that such a lofty designee deserved.104 Over the last decade, Sheikh 
Hasina and the Awami League government have sought to construct a sanctified image of Mujib 
not only as the leader of the nationalist movement but also as the harbinger and embodiment of 
the “Spirit of Liberation.” And claiming inheritance – both biological and ideological – of the 
“Spirit of Liberation” has allowed Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League to produce an 
alternative political legitimacy and exercise hegemonic hold on the country’s political system, 
																																								 																				
103 Abdul Guffar Chowdhury, “Pomeroy Auguster Hotyakando Ki Nibaron Kora Jeto? [Could the 
15th August Massacre Been Averted?],” in Sheikh Mujib Ekti Lal Golap [Sheikh Mujib Is a Red 
Rose], ed. Monaem Sarkar (Dhaka: Agamee Prokashoni, 1998). Chowdhury here compares 
Mujib with Patrice Lumumba (1925-1961) of Congo, Kwame Nkrumah (1912-1972) of Ghana, 
Sukarno (1901-1970) of Indonesia, and Salvador Allende (1908-1973) of Chile, all of whom had 
their programs of social transformation brutally crushed by military coups allegedly backed by 
the United States.  
104 Mujib’s name and image now adorn almost all political, cultural, educational, and social 
institutions of importance. Numerous buildings, roads, bridges, and other structures now bear his 
name. The Bangladeshi currency, the Taka, in all denominations bears his name. His birth-
anniversary is a national holiday, and 15th August has been designated as the National Day of 
Mourning. These are some of the ways the Awami League government has over the last decade 
sought to enshrine Mujib as the Father of the Nation and to produce a particular understanding of 




when their democratic legitimacy has been less than optimal.105 In this context, the adulation of 
Sheikh Mujib has become a state policy and strategy for producing a personality cult. Criticisms 
of Mujib have faced increasing legal restrictions.106 Of course, many factions on the right and 
left in Bangladesh are politically and ideologically opposed to Awami League hegemony. 
Moreover, many in Bangladesh have grown up with discourses critical of Mujib, some of them 
deserved and others merely partisan hit jobs. Mujib’s sanctified image remains a fundamentally 
contentious issue in Bangladeshi politics. Any discussion of the political thought of Mujib carries 
a risk of getting caught up in these highly partisan and at times violently contentious debates.  
The challenge in thinking about and discussing political ideas of a figure like Mujib is to 
find a way to wade through all the legends, folklore, and propagandas – both positive and 
negative – to discern the “real Mujib.” Particularly challenging is also the task of distinguishing 
between Mujib’s own thought from the political ideology Mujib-bad or Mujibism. The ideology 
can be traced back to Mujib’s first-ever public address as the leader of independent Bangladesh, 
delivered in front of a jubilant crowd at the historic Race Course grounds on January 10, 1972. 
He had been released from a Pakistani prison, where he came close to being executed on charges 
of treason, just two days before and was still coming to terms with the reality that he was the 
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(https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index), respectively, with slight insignificant movements 
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president of an independent but war-ravaged country. 107 In an emotional and moving speech 
Mujib urged the assembled crowd that they would have to work hard to not only solve the 
immediate crises facing his Shonar Bangla, Golden Bengal, but also to build up a new state 
based on new sets of political ideas. Rejecting the ideas of a Muslim nation and Islamic state that 
had defined Pakistani political ideology, Mujib stated: 
I do not want to insult Islam. I want to, however, declare in clear and unambiguous 
language that our country [desh] will be a democratic, secular, and socialist one. The 
farmers and laborers, the Hindus and Muslims of this country will all live in happiness 
and in peace.108  
 
From the next day Mujib started to work with gusto to construct the institutional infrastructures 
of the new country while tackling immediate and urgent problems such as the establishment of 
law and order, disarmament of the Mukti-Bahini (the guerilla forces that fought for Bangladesh’s 
independence), and resettlement of millions of refugees. Impressively and exceeding all 
expectations, he set in motion processes for producing a constitution in less than three months 
and declared that nationalism, along with democracy, secularism, and socialism would be the 
foundational principles of the constitution.109 By May of 1972 factions of the Awami League-
affiliated Chatra (Student) League began to proclaim that these four principles amounted to 
Mujibism, a unified political ideology that would be a more appropriate alternative in 
Bangladesh than capitalism, communism, or “scientific socialism” that other factions of the 
																																								 																				
107 Rejaul Karim, who was then the acting head of the unofficial Bangladesh Mission and had 
received Mujib at the airport in London after he had been released by Pakistani authorities, 
recounted that Mujib had been left in utter ignorance throughout his imprisonment about the 
developments of the Liberation War and was genuinely surprised to learn on January 8th, 1972 – 
more than three weeks after the Pakistani Army’s total surrender on December 16th, 1971 – that 
Bangladesh had indeed become an independent nation.  Karim Triumph and Tragedy (2005), p. 
260.  
108 See The Voice of Freedom, ed. Zahid Hossain (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 2011), p. 224.  
109 His address to the nation via radio and television was on 26 March, 1971, the first anniversary 




Chhatra League and some left intellectuals were advocating. Soon the idea was picked up by the 
Awami League hierarchy and ideologues, who sought to make Mujibbad the ideology of the 
party and the official ideology of the state.110 Mujib himself, not impervious to hubris, condoned 
the move and allowed the term to be incorporated in the constitution, which was adopted on 
November 4th and came into effect on December 16, 1972.111 When Mujib launched his “Second 
Revolution” in 1975 and moved the country’s politics towards a more authoritarian direction, he 
did so in the name of Mujibism. The brutal coup that ended his rule in 1975 was at least partly a 
reaction against Mujibism. After the coup, for more than two decades, subsequent governments 
disparaged Mujibism and held it as an illustration of all that was wrong with Mujib’s rule. They 
sought to negate the ideology of Mujibism and the foundational principles of the 1972 
constitution through ordinances and constitutional amendments. However, with the return of the 
Awami League to power, Mujibism has been rehabilitated to become once again the ideological 
edifice of the regime and the country. The four principles of Mujibism – nationalism, democracy, 
secularism, and socialism – have been restored as the foundational principles of the constitution 
and been claimed to be the constitutive elements of the “Spirit of Liberation.”112 
																																								 																				
110 See Rounaq Jahan, “Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State,” Asian Survey 13, 
no. 2 (February 1973): 199–210. Jahan argued, citing several contemporary left intellectuals, that 
efforts by the Awami League in 1972 and 1973 to build up the party around the ideology of 
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111 Recently Salil Tripathi, a sympathetic commentator, has decried Mujib’s effort to build up a 
political ideology in his name as an example of personal hubris. The Colonel Who Would Not 
Repent (2016), p. 237.  
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Bangladeshi discourse and has been debated endlessly. The Digital Security Act of 2018 
however, sought to end the ambiguities around the concept by positively defining it and 




 Fierce debates over whether the ideology of Mujibism inspired the Liberation War or 
whether the present Awami League government has a serious commitment to the four principles 
of Mujibism have ensued. Those debates are beyond the scope of the present discussion, but the 
question whether Mujib himself had been inspired by the principles of Mujibism remains 
pertinent. How did Mujib understand these four broad principles? To what extent was he 
committed to each of the principles, and when and how did he become committed to them? Did 
he hold one of the principles to be more important than others? How did he reconcile, if at all, 
the tensions between these principles? To answer these questions and produce an account of 
Mujib’s political thought beyond the legends, propaganda, and ideological obfuscations one must 
engage with his primary texts.  
The difficulty in analyzing Mujib’s political thought through primary sources is that he 
wrote little and by all accounts, including his own, he was more a man of action than abstract 
philosophical thought. He knew his strength was his organizational abilities and gift for 
producing rapport with people from all walks of life. He did not have a good estimation of 
himself as a student and showed reluctance to get involved in theoretical discussion and 
debates.113 In fact he showed disdain for philosophical reflections, noting that too much 
contemplation can induce paralysis and inaction. Mujib wrote in in his memoir: 
There are many men who waste their time and life contemplating and deciding without 
accomplishing anything. Once I decide something after some thought, I act on it. If there 
are any mistakes, I correct them. Only those who take action can make mistakes, those 
who do not act do not make mistakes either.114  
 
																																								 																				
113 See Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Oshomapto Atmojiboni [Unfinished Memoirs] (Dhaka: 
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Such straightforward pragmatism and the manic urge to intervene, that at times approached 
rashness, defined Mujib’s political career. Yet, it would be extremely imprudent to say that his 
actions were devoid of thought or contemplation. In fact, he was forced to read and contemplate 
for long periods of time by his numerous stints in Pakistani government prison cells. Altogether 
Mujib had spent about one-third of his adult life as a political prisoner, much in solitary 
confinement with only books and papers as companions.115 Though he was not a writer, he took 
up the pen during his prison stints to combat boredom and maintain sanity and to give an account 
of his life and politics, perhaps for posterity. His prison notebooks, written under the scrutiny and 
surveillance of hostile governments, are his only writings besides personal letters. The notebooks 
remain invaluable sources for accessing his thoughts.116  
We may, however, better grasp Mujib’s political thinking from his speeches rather than 
his written words. By all accounts, he was a spellbinding speaker, particularly when addressing 
large crowds. Though he delivered numerous speeches in mass public meetings during his long 
political career, only a few were recorded and have survived, but they are enough to give us a 
sense of the man and his thoughts. His official speeches and particularly the speeches in the 
parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh, which were often prepared with great care, are much 
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better preserved and accessible.117 We may also get a sense of his political thinking from the 
various manifestos and party programs that bear his signature. As a professional politician, 
Mujib viewed manifestos and programs as important means for articulating and communicating 
political ideas. In fact, he argued that easily understandable bullet point demands were far 
superior in expressing political ideas than scholarly dissertations.118 Though these documents 
were not perhaps authored solely by Mujib, they reflect his political ideas and aspirations. Thus, 
despite Mujib’s few written texts, sufficient materials can be analyzed to construct an account of 
his political thought.  
II 
Though an account of Mujib’s political thought must ultimately rely on the “texts” 
produced by him, it must also analyze his biography because personal biography is important for 
properly understanding any political thinker and for Mujib his politics and biography are 
undistinguishable. Unlike many political personalities of Bangladesh and certainly unlike the 
personalities discussed in this dissertation so far, politics for Mujib was a fulltime and only 
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5. Appendices in Sarkar, Life and Politics of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (2008). 




occupation. Whether Weber would find Mujib a man and leader worthy of the vocation of 
politics is debatable, but unassailable is that Mujib took politics to be his vocation from the 
beginning of his adult life and that he lived for politics.119 Mujib’s “political career” began at 18 
when he was a 9th grade student. Because of a childhood illness he had to miss school for three 
years and was thus considerably older than his cohort. He was also tall, handsome, athletic, and 
from a prominent local family. All of these enabled him to become a “leader” of fellow students 
and local youths. However, his leadership had not yet developed a political content, which was 
supplied by a visit to his school in 1938 by then Premier of Bengal A. K. Fazlul Huq and his 
Minister of Labor Relations, H. S. Suhrawardy. Mujib, on account of his leadership qualities, 
was entrusted with coordinating a volunteer troupe for the welcoming ceremony and guard of 
honor for the visiting dignitaries. While trying to carry out these duties Mujib first became 
cognizant of deep communal division in Bengal politics as the Hindu students of the school and 
local Hindu community in general exhibited reluctance to honor Muslim politicians, apparently 
being instructed by the Congress party to do so. Mujib’s role in neutralizing the communal 
hostility to ensure that the visiting dignitaries were given proper honor and welcome earned him 
notice of the local leadership, and he was given a chance to mingle with the dignitaries. Though 
both leaders were impressed by the courage, passion, and eloquence of teenage Mujib, 
Suhrawardy took particular interest in him as a potential asset for the Muslim League and 
cultivated a relationship with him via correspondence over the next few years.120 By the time he 
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arrived in Calcutta in 1942 to attend the Islamia College, the 22 years old Mujib was already 
fully committed to the Muslim League and to the demand for Pakistan that was sweeping 
through Muslim India. Over the next five years Mujib worked tirelessly, often neglecting his 
studies and familial obligations, as an organizer for the Muslim League, contributing 
significantly towards the growth of the party and thus towards the success of the Pakistan 
movement. Years later a friend from his student years asked him nostalgically what he 
recollected from their years together in Calcutta. Mujib replied, “I don’t remember what I did 
except politics.” As a young man Mujib might have gone to the movies or played sports, as his 
friend attested that he did, but that he did not remember anything else signals that he lived for 
politics and everything else was secondary.121 
Having played a significant role in creating Pakistan, young Mujib returned to Pakistan 
not with the unbridled joy and optimism that many others felt at that time but with a sense of 
apprehension, disappointment, and responsibility. Though Mujib had fought hard for Pakistan, 
he seemed taken aback by the reality of what independence entailed, i.e., the partition of Bengal. 
On a personal level he was concerned about leaving Calcutta, his adopted home and workplace, 
and leaving behind many of his Muslim League colleagues from West Bengal who faced the 
difficult choice between their actual homes and the ideological/political homeland they had 
fought for. As one of the core organizers of the Muslim League he was also coping with the 
practical complexities and challenges associated with continuing the functions of the party across 
the newly created international borders. On a larger political level, Mujib was deeply concerned 
about the communal riots, the fate of Hindus and Muslims who would remain in Pakistan and 
India, respectively, and the fair and balanced distribution of resources and assets of British India 
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between the new states of India and Pakistan.122 To his dismay, Mujib found that the majority of 
the Muslim League leaders were not concerned about tackling any of these momentous 
challenges thrown up by the Partition. Rather, they saw in the creation of Pakistan the 
opportunity for advancing their own material and political interests, and they engaged in “politics 
of conspiracy” for doing so.123 The first victim of this politics of conspiracy was H.S. 
Suhrawardy, Mujib’s “leader” and political mentor, who was removed from the leadership of 
Bengal Muslim League and effectively barred from becoming a part of the government of the 
new country. The sidelining of Suhrawardy, along with Hashim and Huq, and the assumption of 
power by Khwaja Nazimuddin in the wake of Pakistan’s independence was not merely another 
episode of party politics but a political victory of the Muslim aristocrats of Bengal, who, along 
with their counterparts in West Pakistan, were determined to keep the upstart middle-class 
politicians from coming to or sharing in the power of the new country.124  
Mujib, like many Bengali-Muslim middle-class political actors at the time, felt betrayed. 
And, he also felt a sense of responsibility to correct the betrayal and realize the promises of azadi 
[independence]. Thus, though he had enrolled in the Dhaka University to pursue a law degree, he 
once again took up political activism as his primary occupation, first in efforts to give shape to a 
national student organization and then in the movement to have Bangla recognized as a state 
language of Pakistan. This time his troubles got him both expelled from the university and 
arrested by the government of the country that he had fought so hard to bring about.125 While 
Mujib was in prison, disgruntled members of the Muslim League formed a breakaway party the 
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Awami Muslim League on June 23, 1949 under the leadership of Maolana Bhashani. Mujib was 
elected Joint Secretary of the new party in recognition of his contribution and leadership 
qualities. He was released from prison within a week and threw himself wholeheartedly in the 
organizational work of the new party.126 Thus, ended the student activism phase of Mujib’s life 
and began in earnest his life as a professional politician.  
Mujib would remain a professional politician, a party official, for the rest of his life. He 
never held any other occupation except for between 1959 and 1963, when formal party politics 
was banned in Pakistan by Ayub Khan’s martial law regime. During this period, he held an 
executive post in an insurance company. It was, however, largely a ceremonial post, and he 
continued to be active in whatever political opportunities existed under the martial law regime.127 
In his career as a professional politician Mujib was mostly an opposition politician conducting 
street agitation and popular mobilization against sitting governments, until he became the leader 
of independent Bangladesh. In the Pakistan period he was a parliamentarian from 1955 to 1958 
as a member of the Second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. During this period he had two 
brief stints as a minister in provincial governments, first in 1954 at the age of 34 for 14 days in 
Fazlul Huq’s cabinet and a second for about nine months from September 1956 to May 1957 as 
the minister of Industries, Commerce, and Labor in Ataur Rahman’s cabinet.128 Mujib’s 
promising career as a parliamentarian came to an end with the demise of constitutional politics in 
Pakistan in 1958 as Ayub Khan rose to power through a military coup, abrogated the 
constitution, and imposed martial law. Mujib was back to the streets, or more precisely to the 
jails. In 24 years of the Pakistan period Mujib spent altogether about eleven years in prison, 
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sometimes on various pretexts and trumped up charges, other times without any charge but 
simply because he was deemed contrary to the interest of the ruling coterie of the country. Thus, 
Mujib not only was unable to live off politics in economic terms but also was unable to pursue 
any other career or economic activity.  
Mujib’s political career and repeated imprisonment also meant that he was unable to 
contribute or even be present much in daily family life.129 Mujib was unburdened from taking 
care of familial obligations by two persons – his father and his wife, who both had great 
confidence in him, believed that he was doing something worthwhile, and thus provided 
unconditional moral support. Mujib wrote in his autobiography that during the student years of 
his political career well-wishers had advised his father that he might need to control Mujib’s 
political activities to ensure his economic and physical security. His father replied, “He is only 
serving the country and not doing anything wrong. If that lands him in prison, so be it; that will 
not pain me. His life may yet turn out in the end not to be a waste. I will not deter him.”130 
Mujib’s father, Sheikh Lutfar Rahman, was a petty official in a civil court and owned a 
significant amount of land through inheritance. Though neither extremely wealthy nor part of the 
elite, Mujib’s father was prosperous enough to afford higher education for his children and 
support Mujib financially throughout his life. Mujib was married to his second cousin 
Fazilatunnesa in their childhood through family arrangement, a practice that was common even 
in the mid-20th century. Fazilatunnesa was orphaned at a young age but inherited a considerable 
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amount of land from her grandfather. By all accounts she was a courageous and prudent woman, 
who looked after the family with great efficiency and the support of her father-in-law, leaving 
Mujib to pursue politics unencumbered by the niceties of family life.131 Naturally, Mujib felt a 
great deal of gratitude towards his family, particularly towards his wife, and perhaps even guilt 
for being absent and causing them so much pain. His sense of gratitude and guilt perhaps 
explains why he was so indulgent towards his family when he became the head of the country in 
Bangladesh. Perhaps he wanted to reward his family for sticking with him despite all the years of 
sufferings.132  
If Mujib himself ever felt any doubt about his calling, it was during the early years of 
Ayub Khan’s regime. Being imprisoned and fighting all the trumped-up charges that the Ayub 
regime was charging him with caused him great distress. However, he was more disheartened by 
apparent self-interested actions of the politicians and all the petty infighting and conflicts they 
produced. A frustrated Mujib wrote to his father from prison: 
I will not do politics any more because there is no politics left in the country… There is 
no value of sacrifice and dedication in this country. If I ever manage to get out of prison, 
I will make some sort of career and will live a proper family life with my children and 
you all. I have suffered a lot and have made you all suffer as well.133 
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political career.  
132 Karim, Triumph and Tragedy (2005) argues that Mujib’s indulgent attitude towards his family 
– appointing many of his relatives, particularly ones recommended by his wife, to high political 
offices, overlooking their corruptions, allowing for extravagant wedding ceremonies for his sons 
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Once freed from prison, Mujib tried to keep the promise and live the life of a householder, while 
expressing pessimistic views about politics in Pakistan.134 However, his resolve did not last long, 
and within three years Mujib again gave into the siren call of politics. This time not as a mere 
party organizer but as the leader of the reconstituted Awami League, a leading voice in the 
democratic struggle against the military regime, the fiercest champion of the East Bengal’s 
autonomy movement, and ultimately as the Jatir Janak of Bangladesh. 
Max Weber argued that within the structure of modern party organizations “Naturally 
power actually rests in the hands of those who… handle the work continuously.”135 By all 
accounts, even by those of his political adversaries, Mujib was a first rate party organizer and 
worked tirelessly to take care of daily and mundane tasks associated with organizing a political 
party.136 Naturally, to use Weber’s reasoning, Mujib became a powerful figure within the Awami 
League, a party he had been involved in since its inception. What made Mujib a great leader was 
that he had an impeccable work ethic, great organizational skills and that he lived for politics. 
Politics, Weber noted, is essentially and necessarily striving for power, and “He who lives ‘for’ 
politics makes politics his life, in an internal sense. Either he enjoys the naked possession of the 
power he exerts, or he nourishes his inner balance and self-feeling by the consciousness that his 
life has meaning in the service of a ‘cause’.”137 Though some of the critical accounts of Mujib 
have claimed that he was primarily motivated by possession of power for power’s sake, his 
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biography makes such claims extremely untenable. Only politics motivated by a service to a 
cause can inspire one to display the kind of courage and self-sacrifice that Mujib exhibited 
throughout his life. And perhaps that is the only kind of politics that can inspire such personal 
loyalty and devotion that his followers as well as his family members have shown towards him. 
Mujib himself certainly viewed his life and politics to be of a service to a cause. He claimed in 
his autobiography that throughout his life he had abided by advice that his father had given him 
early in his political career, “If you have sincerity of purpose and honesty of purpose, you will 
not be defeated in life.”138 Mujib remained sincere and true to his purpose, despite the blatantly 
authoritarian measures he took during his so-called “second revolution” and the corruption he 
apparently tolerated and even enabled.  
III 
If we grant the argument that for Mujib politics was a calling and that his politics were in 
service of a cause rather than in service of mere quest for power, we must then identify what that 
cause was. To what purpose did Mujib dedicate his life and politics? To what end did he endure 
his sufferings? An answer to these questions can again be found in his first public speech in 
independent Bangladesh, where he declared, “My Bangladesh is independent today. My life-long 
dream is fulfilled today. My people in Bangladesh have been liberated.”139 Later in the speech he 
revealed that when the ruling junta of Pakistan came close to executing him towards the end of 
the liberation war he had told them, “even as I walk to the gallows I will declare that I am a 
Bengali, Bangla is my country, Bangla is my language.” This speech has been cited as evidence 
that the mainspring of Mujib’s politics has always been Bengali nationalism. However, I want to 
argue that Mujib’s political career has been in service of a broader but also less easily definable 
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concept of liberation than mere national independence. In the same speech Mujib warned the 
people:  
The freedom of ours will remain incomplete, if the people of Bangladesh do not get 
sufficient food, our mothers and sisters do not get clothes to wear, and the young men 
their work. 
 
Towards the end of the speech Mujib urged his fellow countrymen that they would all have to 
work harder to “build this Bengal anew,” where the people will “once again smile, live in a free 
atmosphere, have their regular square meals.” Ushering in such a Bengal, a “Golden Bengal,” 
had been and will always be “my life-long mission… my desire,” declared Mujib. The tension 
between the declaration of mission accomplished and the admission that much remains still to be 
achieved that characterizes Mujib’s first public speech as the leader of the newly independent 
country is emblematic of the tension inherent in the moment of “independence”, which is as 
much a moment of celebration as it is a call to actualize true freedom.  
Twentieth century political actors and thinkers of the Indian sub-continent have 
understood freedom or liberation through concepts like swaraj, azadi, or shadhinota, the last of 
which is a Bengali word best translated as self-rule. In the context of anti-colonial struggles, 
these conceptions of freedom were invariably tied up with ideas of national liberation. Yet to 
designate and treat all the different thinkers as mere nationalist thinkers would miss the 
particularities of each thinker and the particular ways they conceptualized freedom. Thinkers like 
Gandhi and Tagore, to take the most prominent examples, constructed conceptions of swaraj as 
modalities of freedom that were not necessarily tied to nationalism or the nation state.140 Without 
claiming Mujib to belong in the same category of thinkers as Gandhi and Tagore, I want to argue 
that his idea of freedom also had a meaning beyond and separate from national independence. In 
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fact, for someone having the distinction of being a “father” of a nation, Mujib’s thinking was 
remarkably non-nationalist, and “Bengali nationalism” was even less central to his political 
ideas. Mujib’s concerns with liberation had more to do with the removal of structures of 
oppression, both political and economic, than with specific concerns with national independence. 
He often described his politics as dedicated to broad causes like desher kaj [serving the country] 
and manusher kaj [serving the people/humanity], which were vague and unmoored to any 
specific national identity. Mujib talked more often about jonogoner mukti [liberation of the 
people] than jatir mukti [liberation of the nation] and even then he called for the latter only in 
March of 1971 and only after being pushed to do so by more passionate advocates of Bengali 
nationalism.  
So why and how did Mujib become the face of Bengali nationalism and the father of the 
Bengali nation? The answer has to do, at least in part, with the way he, through his democratic 
struggles and his quest for jonogoner mukti, brought about the people that would provide the 
body of the nation. The nation, as political theorist Bernard Yack has argued, is also intimately 
related to another imagined community, “the people.” It is not so much that the idea of the nation 
produces the idea of the people as, Yack argues, the “doctrine of popular sovereignty contributes 
to the rise and spread of nationalism by introducing a new image of political community, an 
image that tends to nationalize political loyalties and politicize national loyalties.” The function 
of the nation is to “give the body-politic a body.” The historical idea of “the nation” fills in the 
blanks of the abstract political idea of “the people” as composed of individuals bound by a social 




struggles for democracy necessarily call for “the people” and thus “the nation.”141 Thus, to 
understand his contribution to Bangladeshi nationalism and appreciate his place in Bangladeshi 
politics we need to view Mujib as more than a nationalist leader and to engage with his other 
political concerns, particularly democracy and social uplift.  
Yet, as nationalism defines the political horizon within which all the other ideas and 
concerns get elaborated in the postcolonial context, we will have to also give an account of 
Mujib’s nationalism. In his adolescent years Mujib understood nationalism in terms of the pan-
Indian struggle against British colonial rule, led by the Indian National Congress and personified 
by figures like Subhash Chandra Bose, whom he, like many other young people at time, 
idealized as a national hero.142 From there Mujib’s conversion to Muslim League politics was 
simultaneously fortuitous and over-determined. As I have discussed above, the chance encounter 
with Suhrawardy in 1938 and a continued relationship with him thereafter led Mujib to join the 
Muslim League politics even before he finished high school. Even without this personal 
encounter he most likely would have ended up in the Muslim League, as virtually all Muslim 
middle-class youth and students did at the time. Muslim nationalism appealed to individuals like 
Mujib because it provided a way for them to make sense of and fight against the secondary status 
of Muslims in social, cultural, and political spheres of colonial India and Bengal. The account of 
his family history that he provided in the beginning pages of his autobiography, for example, 
mirrors the Muslim nationalist narrative of Muslim decline and the ascendency of Hindus under 
British rule. In his autobiography Mujib also recounted, in a manner remarkably similar to the 
way Abul Mansur Ahmad had, how everyday experiences of being discriminated against and 
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humiliated by the Hindu bhadralok had pushed him to embrace a politics of Muslim 
nationalism.143 Though Mujib felt a sense of brotherhood with other Indian Muslims on the 
account of their shared experience of suffering and discrimination, he never developed a positive 
formulation or understanding of Muslim identity or the Muslim nation. We do not witness Mujib 
spending energy on constructing differences between Hindus and Muslims over theological, 
philosophical, or cultural differences, as we have seen Abul Mansur Ahmad doing.  In fact, 
Mujib did not think that Hindus and Muslims were fundamentally different or naturally inclined 
against each other. Rather, he found that communal animosities among the Hindus and Muslims 
of Bengal were fermented by political ideologies and interests of Hindu leadership of the openly 
communal Hindu Mahasabha, as well as the supposedly secular Congress.144 While Indian 
Nationalists showed great courage in standing up to the British, Mujib argued, they did not with 
the exceptions of figures like C.R. Das, Tagore, and Subhash Bose, take care or give thought 
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mirrors the narrative of Muslim decline under British Rule, which had become a central tenet in 
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Mujib explained, “a person coming to age after Pakistan’s birth would never fully understand the 
necessity and the power of the Pakistan movement.” Kamal, Sheik Mujibur Rahman (1970). 
144 Three moments recalled in Mujib’s Unfinished Memoirs (2012) indicate his view about the 
artificial and political character of the Hindu-Muslim animosity in Bengal. First, he argued that 
the negative reception of Muslim dignitaries in the mofussil town of Gopalganj in 1938 was 
explicitly engineered by Congress activists rather than coming out of any natural misgivings. (p. 
11) Second, the increasing discrimination and differentiation that he felt from the late 1930s 
were more pronounced in the cities than in villages, indicating to him that they arose from 
political motivations rather than from the social fabric of village life. (p. 23) Lastly, and more 
profoundly, Mujib recalled in vivid details his experiences of being in the middle of the infamous 
Calcutta Riot of 1946. Recalling this devastating event Mujib not only argued how the riot was 
instigated by Hindu operatives but also described with great care how ordinary Hindus came to 




about Hindu-Muslim unity.145 Hindu leadership treated “patriotism as their birth-right” and 
undermined the nationalist sentiments and political agencies of Muslims.146 Ultimately, Mujib 
held the Hindu leadership generally and the Congress particularly responsible for the rise of 
Muslim nationalism and for the eventual partitions of India and Bengal.  
Mujib’s support for Pakistan was more of a reaction against the political realities of late 
colonial India than any commitment to Muslim nationalism. Mujib, inspired by Abul Hashim’s 
theory of multi-national India and Hindu Muslim unity, was beginning to question the validity of 
the “two-nation theory” even before the creation of Pakistan and he came to empathetically reject 
it after independence. However, while Mujib united with Hashim in rejecting the idea of a 
Muslim nation, he deviated from his mentor in rejecting the idea of constituting Pakistan as an 
Islamic polity.147 During the mid-1950s Mujib, as a member of the Second Constituent Assembly 
of Pakistan, would come to denounce the ideas of Muslim nationalism and Islamic republic 
repeatedly and forcefully. Though he was expressing not his personal opinions but the positions 
adopted by his party, the Awami League, he was one of the more passionate and eloquent critics 
of Muslim nationalism and Islamic state in the Constituent Assembly.148 The language and 
structure of the arguments that he made in constitutional debates can give us a sense of the 
political thinking of the young Mujib. Among the dozens of speeches that he delivered in the 
course of his short parliamentary career, the 21 February 1956 speech delivered in the Karachi 
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session was particularly noteworthy as illustrative of Mujib’s political thought. Mujib argued that 
“the ruling junta” was advancing the ideas of the Muslim nation and Islam “to get power by 
manipulation” and “to give bluff to the people in the name of Islam,” which had been their 
“habit” and “tactic always.” Later on Mujib argued, “history has so many times proved that you 
cannot bluff the people for all the time.”149 This argument of bluffing in name of religion is 
interesting not only because it calls out the hypocrisy of the ruling elite of Pakistan but also 
because it reveals Mujib’s own anxieties, and perhaps that of large segments of Bengali-
Muslims, about being duped in the name of Islam into supporting the cause of Pakistan.  
That religion can be used to manipulate public sentiment and decide political outcomes 
profoundly disturbed Mujib. But he also learned how to use religion to advance his own cause 
and political ideas. Mujib opposed the ideas of an Islamic republic and Muslim nation not by 
appealing to liberal democratic ideals but by appealing to Islamic principles and Muslim 
brotherhood. Consider his argument in the speech mentioned above: 
Read the history of Islam and see how the rulers of Islam have treated the minorities and 
how they have given them rights. Now, if you … declare that your country is an Islamic 
Republic, at once the minorities become second-class citizens. At least I feel so and my 
conscience says that it is against the fundamentals of Islam.150  
  
He further argued: 
 
Sir, when we wanted Pakistan, we had declared that the ten crores [a crore is 10 million] 
of Muslims of India constituted one nation and, Sir, out of those ten crores of Muslims, 
five crores are still left in India at the mercy of those fanatic Hindus. Have you ever 
imagined what would be their fate if you declare ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’? …. 
Fanatic Hindus such as the R.S.S. and [the Hindu Mahasabha] might agitate tomorrow for 
declaring India a ‘Hindu Republic’ for taking vengeance on those unfortunate five crores 
of the Muslims of India who have sacrificed everything for the achievement of Pakistan 
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and for making a separate state for seven crores of the people of Pakistan who are 
enjoying the fruit of their sacrifice today.151  
  
Mujib also took pains to make clear that he or his party was not against Islam. Rather he 
redefined Islam to equate it with justice, democracy, and egalitarian social policies. Consider the 
following part of his speech: 
No, the Awami League is not against an Islamic Constitution if it is based on the 
fundamental principles of Islam, [which are] equality [of rights], fair play and equal 
distribution of wealth according to the need of individual. Do it first. You are not making 
a democratic and Islamic constitution. You are making a reactionary constitution, a 
constitution not for the people but for the ruling junta to govern the country according to 
their own fancy and desire…. [Such measures] have done injustice to the people. Now, 
Sir, how injustice and Islam can go together?... If you really provide in the constitution 
fundamental principles of Islam and accept them in the name of Islam, nobody would 
object to it. Even the Hindus will not object to it. 152  
 
Mujib’s efforts to redefine the fundamentals of Islam were remarkably similar, as we 
have discussed above, to those of Bhashani, who at the time was of course the president of the 
Awami League and thus Mujib’s political leader. There is no indication, however, that Mujib 
subscribed to or was interested in Bhashani’s theological-political project. He was not 
particularly an observant Muslim or interested in Islamic philosophy. On the contrary, there is 
evidence to suggest that Mujib did not regard Bhashani as a serious thinker or even a principled 
politician.153 Thus it is more than likely, that Mujib was echoing Bhashani’s language and 
arguments not because he found Bhashani’s reinterpretation of Islam compelling but because 
they were the most effective means for advancing democratic and liberal causes in a highly 
religious society. Thus, we should not read the above speech as Mujib’s effort to redefine or 
recover Muslim nationalism and Islamic state but as his efforts to reject them in favor of 
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democratic and secular principles using a language that was permissible within the confines of 
the political discourse of the time. Underscoring his secular politics Mujib declared: 
As a Musalman [sic], I believe in my religion and it is my duty to obey it. Allah will 
punish me for my faults… I think there is nowhere mentioned that the government will 
punish me and put me in jail if I do not say my prayers. It is my own character and my 
own personal matter.154 
 
  Bangladeshi nationalist historians have argued that Mujib’s secularism, which is clearly 
apparent in the speech discussed above, was tied to an inherently secular Bengali identity, which 
was the source of Bengali nationalism and the inspiration behind the language movement of the 
1940s and 1950s, the autonomy movement of the 1960s, and finally the liberation movement of 
1971. In the case of Mujib this narrative is at best partially true. Mujib certainly had a strong 
sense of himself as a Bengali, and he was demonstrably secular in his disposition.155 However, 
there is no indication that he conceptualized the Bengali identity in nationalist terms before 1947. 
For example, we do not see any coherent nationalist explanation for his support for the United 
Bengal movement that Suhrawardy and Hashim, along with Sarat Bose of Congress, undertook 
in the early months of 1947. Mujib, who was member of the Suhrawardy-Hashim faction of the 
Muslim League, supported this initiative, not out of any sense of Bengali nationalism but 
because he reasoned that a United Bengal would significantly increase the Muslim share in the 
arithmetic of the partition of India.156 Independent Pakistan produced a different field of political 
calculations in which articulation of a Bengali nationalism became possible and perhaps also 
necessary. Yet, Mujib stopped short of articulating a Bengali nationalist agenda and from the 
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outset framed the struggles to secure political and economic rights and parity for the Bengalis, in 
which he played leading roles, in terms of struggles for democratic rights and provincial 
autonomy within the framework of a federal Pakistan. There have been some suggestions 
recently that given the draconian character of the Pakistani regimes Mujib could not openly 
espouse Bengali nationalist politics, which he had in fact come to adopt in private and had even 
initiated an underground operation to “liberate Bangladesh.”157 On the other hand, many 
historians and scholars argue that despite all his disillusionment with Pakistan and all the 
suffering he had endured at the hands of various Pakistani regimes he remained committed to 
Pakistan until his end, publicly and privately.158 I find the second position more plausible that the 
lack of nationalist rhetoric in Mujib’s politics, which is discernible in his speeches and writings 
during the Pakistan period, was not a consequence of his fear of persecution but an indication of 
his genuine commitment to and concern with a politics that served “the people,” which did not 
necessarily have a national character. 
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 Throughout his political career he invoked in his speeches and in his writings “the 
people” as the subject-object of his politics and presented himself as their voice. In his first ever 
speech delivered to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on September 22, 1955 the 35-year-old 
first time parliamentarian from a modest middle-class background declared empathetically to a 
hall full of grandees, nobles, and political veterans that independence had established the people, 
instead of the Queen of England, as the new sovereign. He warned his colleagues there that in 
independent Pakistan their power depends on their status as “representatives of the people” and 
not on wealth and status granted them by the previous sovereign, and “Without the support of the 
people you have got no power worth the name. You may usurp any power that you want. But 
people will not tolerate it any longer.”159 The main argument of his speech was that “The people 
should decide the future [and character] of Pakistan” and not the aristocratic elites. The speech 
demonstrated not only Mujib’s courage but also his conviction that the source of political power 
generally and his own power particularly was and will be the people. In this speech and in 
subsequent speeches in the Constituent Assembly Mujib argued strongly that the constitution 
should fulfill the demands contained in the 21-Point Program of the United Front because, as 
evidenced by the electoral victory of the United Front, they were the demands of the people. 
Similarly, in his famous Six-Point Formula: Our Right to Live, Mujib argued, “these demands 
are not new points invented afresh by me or any individual but are in reality long-standing 
demands of the people and pledges of their leaders awaiting fulfillment for decades.”160  
Mujib presented himself as the voice of the people not only when he was addressing the 
ruling elites but also when he was addressing the people. Mujib did not address the people from a 
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position of superiority or as someone endowed with higher understanding and knowledge than 
them. He was a leader of the people but he was also their brother and one of their own, who 
merely gave voice to their own understanding of the world and to their political demands. For 
example, Mujib opens his most famous and celebrated speech of 7 March 1971 by saying, “My 
brothers I come to you with a heavy heart. You know everything and understand as well,” before 
going on to explain why they must participate fully in the Non-cooperation movement and resist 
the Pakistani ruling junta with “whatever you have.”161 Mujib was in fact calling the people into 
being by articulating “the people’s demand.” This was not a cynical tactic to pander to the 
people. Rather, he sincerely believed that understanding and articulating the people’s demand 
was the duty of the politician and the source of his power.162  
 “The people” is a famously open and unspecific category. So, who were “the people”? 
Though the nationalist narratives have often claimed that by “people” Mujib meant the Bengali 
nation, little textual evidence suggests that interpretation. The concept of nation or jati did not 
occupy Mujib much. And, when he engaged the idea of a nation, he often reacted negatively, 
commenting either on the deleterious effects of nationalism for humanity or disparaging Bengali 
national traits.163 Instead of using the concept of Bengali jat he commonly used the phrase desher 
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the most celebrated and politically significant of his speeches. It has been referenced and 
analyzed by many scholars of Bangladeshi political and intellectual history. See Tripathi, The 
Colonel Who Would Not Repent (2016) pp. 67 -71 for a particularly eloquent discussion about 
the style, language, context, and impact of the speech.  
162 Rahman, Unfinished Memoirs (2012), p. 109.  
163 Mujib had been suspicious of identity politics since his experience of the Calcutta Riot of 
1946. He would later reflect that nationalist feelings, whether based on religious or ethnic 
identity, make people blind and unsympathetic to other’s suffering. Prison Diaries (2018), p. 
184. In many places in his prison notebooks Mujib laments that the Bengali nation is plagued by 
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manush [the people of the country] or sometimes more specifically “the ordinary, poor, 
exploited, and oppressed people” as the subject-object of his politics.164 Even in his famous 
March 7th speech, which has been hailed as one of the most powerful inspirations behind the 
Liberation War, Mujib did not use the word jati but argued instead that the struggle this time was 
for the freedom, rights, and survival of Banglar manush [the people of Bengal]. Later in the 
speech he declared, “The seventy-five million people – Hindus, Muslim or Bengali, non 
Bengalee [sic] – all are our brothers” and vowed to free “the people of this country.”165 Desher 
manush simply referred to all those who resided in the country. At times, he even used the term 
“Bengalee” to refer not to a national identity but more generally to the people of Bengal.166 
Mujib’s preference for using “people of Bengal” instead of the “Bengali nation” was not a mere 
semantic choice but a reflection of Mujib’s commitment to his cosmopolitan sensibilities and a 
multiculturalist vision of the people.  
Mujib was a great admirer of Rabindranath Tagore, a fact often cited as evidence of his 
Bengali nationalism.167 The fact that Mujib mobilized Tagore’s idea of “Shonar Bangla” or 
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165 Rahman, The Voice of Freedom (2011), 188 – 191. 
166 Mujib, for example, argued in 1970 “Whoever lives in Bengal, even if they are originally 
from Bihar or U.P. are Bengalis… they should not be called refugees after 22 years...” Kamal, 
Sheik Mujibur Rahman (1970), p. 43. Moreover, in 1972 he called on all the non-Bengali 
speaking people, both the so called Biharis and the indigenous people, to become Bengali, which 
was not to ask them to give up their languages or cultures, as it has been alleged by advocates of 
non-Bengali indigenous groups for Bangladesh – see for example Proshanto Tripura, Bohujatir 
Bangladesh: Shwarup Onnesha O Oshikritir Itihas [Multinational Bangladesh: History of the 
quest for identity and denial] (Dhaka: Songbed, 2015) – but to simply ask them to accept the 
reality of Bangladesh as an independent country and express their allegiances to it.  
167 See Fakrul Alam, “Tagore and National Identity Formation in Bangladesh,” in Rabindranath 
Tagore in the 21st Century: Theoretical Renewals, ed. Debashish Banerji (New York: Springer, 
2014), 225–42. It is highly ironic that a profoundly anti-nationalist thinker like Tagore would 
come to occupy a central position in the imagining of the Bengali nation. While adherence to all 




“Golden Bengal” to imagine not only a glorious past but also a prosperous future of the nation 
has been noted adequately.  However, much less has been said about the influence of Tagore’s 
cosmopolitanism on Mujib. Though Mujib does not make any direct reference to Tagore while 
advancing his argument for federalism, which was the basis not only of the autonomy movement 
that he would lead in the 1960s but also of his support for Pakistan in 1940s, he echoed Tagore’s 
cosmopolitan sensibility. In his first ever speech to the Constituent Assembly Mujib criticized 
the proposal to form “one-unit” of West Pakistan, pointing out that such a move would ignore 
and suppress its diverse languages and cultures.168 Tagore had argued, “Now the problem 
worldwide is not that of unity by dissolving differences – but how to meet while preserving 
differences.”169 Echoing this cosmopolitan sensibility, Mujib reasoned: 
If I speak in Bengali they cannot follow; if they speak in Urdu, I cannot follow. But we 
can develop. I will speak in Urdu and they will speak in Bengali and this will lead to 
greater friendship and co-operation and Pakistan will become stronger.170 
 
Mujib was calling for a multicultural Pakistan against the policy favored by the new rulers of 
Pakistan of producing national unity and integration by imposing one state language and 
constructing one national culture.171 Mujib’s concern was not only for the protection of the 
Bengalis but also for the Baloch, Pashto, Sindhi, and other “national groups” [jati-gosthi] of 
Pakistan. In the context of demanding a state language status for Bangla he argued that since 
Pakistan was created to accommodate differences and protect the interest of the minority the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
nationalism, little attention has been paid to how Tagore’s philosophies and ideas have actually 
influenced Bengali-Muslim political thought. 
168 Rahman, Sheikh Mujib in Parliament (1997), p. 4  
169 Rabindranath Tagore quoted by Gangeya Mukherji, Gandhi and Tagore Politics, Truth and 
Conscience (New Delhi: Routledge India, 2015), p. 121.  
170 Rahman, Sheikh Mujib in Parliament (1997), p. 220.  
171 See Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion (2013) for a discussion about the policy of Pakistani national 





constitution of independent Pakistan should be based on a principle of federalism and follow the 
Soviet model to accommodate differences and protect the interest of various “national cultures” 
and languages of Pakistan.172  
IV 
Mujib’s multiculturalist views and his concern with the people, as opposed to the nation, 
had profound effects on how he understood political freedom. Mujib was oriented more towards 
ideas of emancipation or liberation than towards independence, ironic given how closely he is 
associated with Bangladesh independence. Throughout his political career Mujib preferred to use 
the phrase mukti rather than shadhinota when articulating political goals and programs. While 
mukti has a broader meaning variously connoting freedom, emancipation, or liberation, 
shadhinota is often narrowly understood as independence. Mujib’s preference for a conception 
of freedom associated with mukti manifested, for example, in his construction of the famous Six 
Point Formula as a muktir shonod or a manifesto of liberation. More famously, in his 7th March 
speech he declared, “The struggle this time is the struggle for our liberation [muktir shongram].” 
He then added, almost as an afterthought and perhaps as a concession to the radical elements 
among his followers chanting for independence, “The struggle this time is the struggle for 
independence [shadhinotar shongram].” Growing up in a colonized society, Mujib knew that 
emancipation or liberation depended on independence. He also thought that independence was 
achieved with the establishment of Pakistan, and he strove for a higher level of freedom within 
the framework of Pakistan. He also knew from the 23 years of experience of Pakistan that 
independence was no guarantee of emancipation. This perhaps explains why he celebrated the 
																																								 																				




independence of Bangladesh with the warning that the job has not yet been completed and that 
political independence of Bangladesh will be meaningless without true freedom for the people.173  
But what was this true freedom or mukti for Mujib, and how had he hoped to achieve it? 
In his March 7, 1971 speech Mujib stated that after his and the Awami League’s landslide 
victory in the 1970 election he had hoped that they would be allowed to “draw up [a democratic] 
constitution” and “build up the country accordingly” to ensure that “the people of this country 
will gain economic, political, and cultural freedoms.”174 He did not elaborate in the speech what 
these three freedoms meant, perhaps because he simply did not have the time or opportunity 
during that frenetic moment to go into theoretical details or more likely because he took the 
meaning of these freedoms to be already apparent and understood by the people. The struggles 
that he had been engaged in and the political programs that he had articulated over the 23 years 
of Pakistani rule had provided his audience with a clear enough sense of what these freedoms 
meant for them to join him in the struggle to secure these freedoms. I have already discussed 
above Mujib’s struggles for cultural freedom as they related to producing a multicultural 
Pakistan generally and to promoting development of Bengali culture and language particularly. I 
would like to focus on his ideas regarding the other two freedoms – political and economic.  
Mujib’s conception of political freedom was undoubtedly connected to principles of 
federalism and the struggles to secure maximum political autonomy for East Bengal/East 
Pakistan. The demand for federalism and provincial autonomy had been a major theme in the 
politics of the Indian sub-continent since at least the 1920s and was a foundational principle of 
the Muslim League’s historic Lahore Resolution, the Manifesto of the Awami Muslim League, 
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on January 10, 1972. 




and the 21-Point Program of the United Front. It is not surprising that Mujib had adopted 
federalism as one of his main political principles, though his unwavering commitment to it and 
the way he was able to use it to mobilize a massive political movement from 1966 onwards is 
remarkable. Though provincial autonomy was certainly a major element in Mujib’s conception 
of political freedom, his struggles establishing a system of modern democratic governance in 
Pakistan and guaranteeing political and civil rights were arguably more fundamental to his 
conception of political freedom.  
Mujib had already established himself as an advocate for democracy in the early years of 
Pakistan through his participation in various political struggles and through the speeches he 
delivered in the Second Constitutional Assembly in 1955-56. Beyond the general call for 
democracy and recognizing “the people” to be the ultimate source of political authority, Mujib 
often spoke in the Assembly to propose and argue on behalf of specific and concrete democratic 
institutions. For example, he presented strong arguments for the establishment of a “joint 
electorate” system, based on the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, instead of the 
“separate electorate” system that had been instituted by the British. He also delivered speeches 
enumerating fundamental political rights that should be guaranteed by the constitution. He 
advocated for establishing separation of powers and limits on executive powers.175 During the 
early years of Pakistan, Mujib like many of his colleagues subscribed to the liberal-democratic 
principles embodied in the constitutions of Western countries like the United States and in the 
emerging regime of international human rights. Though Mujib and his democratic colleagues 
were successful in incorporating many of these democratic principles in the first constitution of 
Pakistan, these became void and meaningless when the constitution itself was abrogated by Ayub 
																																								 																				




Khan’s martial law regime. Mujib, however, continued the fight to establish liberal democratic 
principles and institutions in Pakistan and articulated the demand for liberal parliamentary 
democracy as the first of his famous Six-Point demands.176  
Mujib’s aspirations for liberal parliamentary democracy were not ultimately realized in 
Pakistan, pushing him towards a program of independence. The constitution of Bangladesh, 
adopted swiftly after its independence, provided for a liberal parliamentary democracy with 
extensive rights guaranteed to its citizens.177 Claiming that a nation without a constitution is like 
a boat without a boatman Mujib proclaimed November 4, 1972, the day the constitution was 
adopted, as “one of the red lettered days of my life as I have been able to present a constitution to 
the nation. If the future generation can build up an exploitation free society based on democracy, 
socialism, secularism, and nationalism – the four pillars of the Constitution, my life-long dream 
will be realized.”178 Yet within less than three years Mujib dramatically reneged on his 
commitment to parliamentary democracy and established a single-party rule under a presidential 
system through his “second revolution.” To make sense of this total and fateful reversal we will 
have to discuss the third of Mujib’s freedoms, the one relating to economic freedom.  
 Mujib was a representative member of the Bengali-Muslim urban middle class that 
emerged from the upper peasantry in the early 20th century. Mujib and his class had two strong 
economic motives for supporting the Pakistan movement. First was the abolition of the 
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demanded that Pakistan’s government shall be of parliamentary form, it must be responsible to 
the legislature, the legislature must be supreme, it must be directly elected, and election must be 
on the basis of universal adult franchise.  
177 For a discussion of the liberal democratic character of and the idealism embodied in the 
constitution see for example, Ridwanul Hoque, “Constitutionalism and the Judiciary in 
Bangladesh,” in Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia, ed. Sunil Khilnani, Vikram 
Raghavan, and Arun Thiruvengadam (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012). 




oppressive and exploitative zamindari system dominated by Hindu zamindars. Second was 
increasing opportunities of education and jobs for the expanding middle class. Political programs 
of the middle class in the early years of Pakistan were much focused on achieving these two 
objectives.179 For example, two thirds of the 21-Point Program of the United Front addressed 
issues of economic development and reform. Mujib’s own thinking at this point, as demonstrated 
by some of his speeches at the Constituent Assembly, was moderate and aligned with the 21-
Point Program. He supported moderate egalitarian policies such as limiting the salaries of high 
government officials and investing in primary and vocational schools but dismissed those 
espousing more radical economic programs like socialism as being out of touch with reality and 
living in a fantasyland.180 As the desired economic developments failed to materialize in Pakistan 
and the benefits of whatever meager development did occur went mostly to West Pakistan, 
Mujib’s economic thinking became more radical. In public he proposed the Six-Point Formula, 
which though it demanded complete economic independence for East Pakistan, did not include 
any socialist measures.181 In private he became more sympathetic and open to socialism. In his 
autobiography, which he wrote in prison stints between 1966 and 1969, Mujib claimed: 
“I am not communist myself. However, I believe in socialism and I do not subscribe to 
capitalist economics. I consider it as an instrument of exploitation. As long as this 
economic system that seeks to create capitalist magnets exists, exploitation cannot be 
eradicated from the Earth. The Capitalists are determined to produce world-war for their 
interest.”182  
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example S. M. Shamsul Alam, The State, Class Formation, and Development in Bangladesh 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1995). Also see my discussion in chapter 2.  
180 Rahman, Unfinished Memoirs (2012), pp. 85, 109 
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Mujib’s conversion to socialism might have been influenced by the number of young 
economists and intellectuals with social-democratic views who became close associates of his in 
the 1960s and helped him formulate the Six-Point Formula and other party programs.183 Perhaps 
he was also pushed to adopt a socialist politics by the increasing radicalism of the university 
students and socialist postures of rival political parties like Bhashani’s NAP.184 Or perhaps he 
came to socialist conclusions from his insights into the conditions of oppression and world 
politics.185 Mujib seemed to suggest that he was at least partly inspired by the way China, which 
he had visited in 1952 to attend the World Peace Conference, had been able to summon a 
collective spirit to achieve economic and social development within a short period of its 
revolution.186 Though Mujib might have originally been a representative of the “aspiring Bengali 
bourgeoisie,” to produce a “broader national constituency” he had to appeal to the “subaltern 
classes” of Bengal, according to Rehman Sobhan, one of the economists who helped Mujib craft 
the Six-Point Formula and the economic arguments of the Awami League.187 Mujib’s unrivaled 
popularity in East Pakistan from 1969 on, the overwhelming victory of the Awami League in the 
1970 election, and the spontaneous and sustained participation of the masses in the struggle for 
independence are testaments of his success in producing a vision of economic freedom that had 
appealed to and inspired the subaltern classes. This vision was most eloquently expressed in his 
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campaign speech broadcasted over national television and radio networks on October 29, 1970, 
where he laid out in great detail but simple language “the radical economic programmes” that 
“must be implemented” within “a federal democratic framework” to “bring about a social 
revolution” to end “[t]he exploitation of man by man and of region by region.”188  
Having articulated his visions for economic, political, and cultural freedoms through his 
speeches, programs, manifestos, and struggles, Mujib did not feel the need to define them again 
in that 18 minute speech on March 7th, 1971, when the people of Bengal were quite literally 
facing the guns of the military junta.189 He simply acknowledged that the people “knew 
everything and understood everything.” Then he asked, “Brothers are you with me?” The 
hundreds of thousands of voices assembled there roared in unison “we are with you.” Yes, the 
people were ready to fight for their freedom with whatever they had, including their lives.  
Was that the moment the nation was born? Perhaps. Mujib, however, seemed not to have 
recognized its birth or that he was its father. He was still trapped in the discourse of 
representative democracy. Yes, “power has to be won by the people… to bring about a social 
revolution,” Mujib had argued in his campaign speech on October 29, 1970. But he had hoped at 
that time that the “elected representative of the people” can “give to this country a Constitution” 
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included public ownership of key areas of the economy including banking and insurance, worker 
access to the ownership and management of private enterprises, extensive land reform, and 
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that would allow for the implementation of revolutionary programs of political and economic 
freedom.190 After becoming the representative, nay the tribune, of the people, Mujib could not 
have given up on that hope of a revolution through constitutional means. Perhaps this hope of a 
democratic solution explains why he continued to negotiate with Yahiya Khan and Zulifikar Ali 
Bhutto about a constitutional solution for the future Pakistan, while Pakistani generals were quite 
visibly gearing up to pounce on the unarmed population of Bengal. The hope for a negotiated 
solution perhaps also explains why Mujib decided not to avoid arrest on March 25, 1971 and 
take the chance to lead the war of independence that was clearly imminent.191 Though the war of 
independence was fought in his absence and without his leadership, there was no question about 
his assumption of leadership after independence. Perhaps because Mujib lacked the direct 
experience of the war, independence for him became, as we have discussed above, not so much a 
matter of national independence but a democratic victory of the people. He took independence as 
a referendum of the Awami League’s 1970 election manifesto and as the mandate to implement 
the “radical social programs” outlined there. Thus, assuming the power of an independent 
Bangladesh Mujib proceeded to initiate a social revolution through a democratic constitution for 
the purpose of making the Shonar Bangla [Golden Bengal] of his dream a reality.  
Mujib’s ideal of Shonar Bangla was a fundamentally modernizing concept containing 
visions of economic, social, and political developments. He invoked the idea to imagine and 
aspire for a prosperous Bengal that would be free of the abject poverty, famine, and violence that 
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underground. He felt, however, that the response of the Pakistani junta would be especially 
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had characterized 20th century Bengal. The program of economic development for Mujib was 
intimately connected to the overall social-cultural modernization that would overcome the 
illiteracy, backwardness, superstition, small-mindedness, and despair that plagued the Bengali-
Muslim psyche.192 He argued that the independence of Bangladesh had produced the possibility 
not only of constructing the Shonar Bangla or the utopian homeland but also for producing 
shonar manush or golden human beings, who would in fact act as the agents ushering in the 
utopian future. As the leader of the newly independent country, Mujib could not just theorize 
abstractly about these possibilities but had to propose concrete policies and tangible programs to 
realize them.  
Mujib viewed the establishment of a democratic constitution, which he had fought for 
throughout his career, as the necessary first-step for producing political, economic, and cultural 
freedoms for the people. Given that in the immediate aftermath of independence Mujib’s 
charismatic authority was at its height and the Awami League enjoyed near total support among 
the people, constitution making was swift and did not face significant opposition either in the 
Constituent Assembly or on the streets or in the papers. Only a few grumbling voices on the far 
left objected to the new constitution. 193 It was a modern, progressive, secular, democratic, and 
socialist constitution, which not only provided for democracy and constitutional rights but also 
enumerated programs of social uplift and guarantees of economic security as a matter of state 
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responsibility.194 By 1973 Mujib’s government introduced the first Five-Year Economic Plan 
containing bold visions for industrialization, land reform, and village-cooperatives, all intended 
to “increase production” and make Bangladesh “self-sufficient.” However, realizing the ideals 
and aspirations contained within the Constitution and the Five-Year Plan proved infinitely 
difficult because Bangladesh was a poor country and in absolute ruin after a genocidal campaign 
and systematic destruction of resources by the Pakistani military. And Mujib’s visions for 
socialist economic development failed to materialize because of middle-class resistance and foot 
dragging by the bureaucracy, which was a holdover from the Pakistani and colonial periods. 
Rampant corruption by members of the Awami League, which Mujib failed to deal with 
decisively, exacerbated the situation. For the first three years of Mujib’s rule there were no 
significant improvements in the dire economic conditions of the country. The situation worsened 
by 1974 and brought about a famine that caused tens of thousands of deaths. Mujib, along with 
most of the country, grew increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress, and in 1975 he 
announced his “second revolution” as the remedy.  
Mujib’s “second revolution” officially began on January 25, 1975 when the Parliament, 
which was almost entirely composed of members from the Awami League, enacted the 4th 
Amendment discarding the multiparty parliamentary system in favor of a single party 
presidential system. The Amendment recognized Mujib as the “Father of the Nation” and the 
president for a 5-year term, ignoring the more extreme suggestions to make him the president for 
life. The Amendment nevertheless provided for near unrestricted power for the president and 
suspended many of the fundamental rights that the Constitution had originally provided, 
including freedom of press. Using his new powers, Mujib declared the formation of the new 
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official party, the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), within a month and 
required, in effect if not by law, all political and civil society leaders and civilian government 
employees to join. By adopting the corporatist ideology and the single party system that was in 
vogue in much of the developing world during that period Mujib reversed many of his previously 
held political principles and adopted exactly the authoritarian posture that he had fought 
throughout his life.  
Many Bangladeshi commentators, including some of Mujib’s close associates, have 
argued that it was perhaps the biggest blunder of his political life, one that perhaps precipitated 
the brutal end of his regime and life.195 Mujib himself had argued as a member of the 
Constitutional Assembly in 1956, “if constitutional means of politics were not open to the 
people, they would surely find other means.”196 It seemed that his words had come to haunt him. 
But what explains Mujib’s reversal on democracy? Perhaps it was simply hubris and one more 
tragic example of the corrupting effects of power, as some commentators have suggested. But 
Mujib empathetically rejected this claim in a speech delivered to Parliament on 26 March 1975 
where he defended himself against charges of authoritarianism. Often referring to himself in the 
third person, Mujib argued: 
I believe that power lies with the people of Bengal. The day people will say, 
‘Bangabondhu leave’, Bangabondhu will not remain a president or prime minister even 
for a day. Bangabondhu did not do politics for power; Bangabondhu did politics out of 
love for suffering people. Bangabondhu did politics for the establishment of exploitation-
free society… One thing is clear: we want democracy of the exploited and not the 
democracy of the exploiter… Political freedoms become futile, if there is no economic 
freedom… The rotten system of rule of the British and Pakistani [colonial] era cannot 
continue. [Our system of rule] must be created on a new basis.197  
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Was the call for a “democracy for the exploited” a merely populist rhetoric designed to disguise 
and justify his authoritarian ambitions or a sincere political program advanced in response to the 
demands of the time?  
I think Mujib deserves the benefit of the doubt based on his long record as an advocate of 
democracy and the immeasurable sacrifices he had made and sufferings he had endured for the 
people of Bengal throughout his political career. We should not evaluate the last years of Mujib’s 
political career as an autocrat’s efforts to hold on to power but as a democrat’s efforts to deliver 
the social, economic, and political transformation that independence demanded. Though Mujib 
was an avowedly centrist politician weary of revolutionary extremism and a committed 
democrat, the lack of progress in the first years after independence led him to recognize the 
ineffectiveness of liberal democracy against entrenched social and political hierarchies.198 He 
was extremely suspicious and critical of the economic and political elites of post-colonial 
Pakistan because their status and privileges stemmed from their positions in and relations to 
structures of colonial rule and they had little material interest in opposing colonialism. He was 
particularly suspicious of the bureaucratic class, which stood to lose most because of 
decolonization. As his speeches in the parliament and reflections in his memoir suggest Mujib 
saw the intrusion of the bureaucracy to be a greater threat to democratic aspirations in Pakistan 
than a power grab by the social elites or the ashraf politicians.199 The independence of 
Bangladesh represented a victory of the middle class and reduced the dominance of the ashraf 
elites but did not produce an alternative to the bureaucratic structure inherited from the colonial 
states. By 1974 Mujib came to conclude that fundamental changes to the governance of the 
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country were necessary to overcome the bureaucracy and other vestiges of colonial hierarchy and 
to lift Bangladesh out of misery and poverty and to transform it from “a beggar nation” to a 
modern and prosperous one.200 Mujib’s “second revolution” sought to produce a “democracy of 
the exploited” by restructuring the bureaucracy and, thus, the character of the post-colonial state. 
But revolutions require a show of force against the guardians of the old order. Mujib was 
compelled to deviate from the principles of liberal democracy that he so cherished and adopt an 
authoritarian approach.201 He did not renounce liberal democracy altogether, nor did he reject it 
out of theoretical conviction, as Bhashani and many of the left intellectuals had done. He merely 
felt obliged to deviate from it temporarily as a practical necessity. In June of 1975, mere months 
before his assassination, Mujib expressed his apprehensions about the authoritarian measures he 
felt obliged to take in the following manner: 
What an irony of fate that it is I, who for my entire life have struggled for democracy and 
spent many years in prison for it, should now have to create a one-party [state]… I didn’t 
want this. I have been obliged to do this… This one-party platform is purely temporary. 




In summarizing Mujib’s political life and thought it is useful to remember Machiavelli’s 
warning that: 
Nothing is more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to 
manage, than to put oneself at the head of introducing new orders. For the introducer has 
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all those who benefit from the old order as enemies, and he has lukewarm defenders in all 
those who might benefit from the new orders.203  
 
Mujib is considered a founder of a new order for having inspired the independence of 
Bangladesh.   But what I have argued in the discussion above is that the independence of 
Bangladesh, though it certainly produced a new state, did not produce a new order. Independence 
or even the progressive democratic constitution adopted in 1972 did not fundamentally alter the 
socio-economic or power structures of the country. Political and economic powers remained 
concentrated within the elite, particularly in the hands of bureaucrats who since the British 
colonial period had been trained to serve the state and their own class interest rather than the 
interest of the people. In contrast to the moment of independence, the rhetoric and the programs 
of the “second revolution” expressed intentions to produce a total social revolution, overturning 
not only the power of the bureaucracy but also the class structure of the country.  
Mujib’s “second revolution” sought to nullify or even demolish the power of the elite in 
the name of the people. Though his “second revolution” was a departure from parliamentary 
liberal democracy, he argued it to be more democratic in essence. I think Mujib’s claim can be 
justified if we conceptualize democracy not as democratic procedures and political rights but as 
Machiavelli did in terms exercising power to serve the interests of the people [il popolo] against 
the elites or the grandees. In what has been called a Machiavellian democracy, democratic means 
matter less than democratic outcomes, i.e., economic freedom and improvement of living 
conditions for the masses.204 The landslide victory of the Awami League in the 1973 general 
election, despite partially arising from election rigging, and his undiminished ability to rouse the 
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masses, had convinced Mujib that the people were with him, and that he was their voice. Like 
populist leaders elsewhere, Mujib suspended the niceties of constitutional rule and presented 
himself as the tribune of the people, ready to batter down hierarchies of society. Yet in the end 
his revolution was top down, without spontaneous participation of the people, who turned out to 
be less than “lukewarm defenders” of it.  
Unlike other revolutionaries, Mujib did not have at his disposal a well-organized and 
ideologically motivated vanguard party to carry out the revolution. On the other hand, the 
enemies of the revolution, some from within the ranks of his own party, were much more fierce 
and determined to destroy the new order and preserve the old status quo. Mujib was also a 
reluctant revolutionary, adopting a program of revolution as the last resort and when his 
charismatic authority was on the wane.205 Perhaps, he would have been more successful, if he 
had adopted the revolutionary program right from the beginning of independent Bangladesh, as 
many of his radical followers had wanted him to. But he had been swayed by the ideals of 
freedom promised by liberal democracy. His was a choice between democracy and social 
revolution. At first, he wanted to achieve social revolution through democracy, and then he chose 
revolution at the expense of democracy. But in the end, neither democracy nor revolution 
materialized, and the greatest hero of Bengal’s modern history suffered the most tragic ending to 
his life and dreams.  
	  
																																								 																				




Conclusion: Bhashani, Mujib and the Bangladesh Moment  
 
“The nationalist hour” arrives, Ranabir Samaddar declared, when the nation overcomes, 
if only temporarily, diverse ideas and plural interests to become a unified collective body.206 The 
nationalist hour or what I call the “Bangladesh Moment” certainly arrived in 1971 to produce 
independence. The arrival of the Bangladesh moment, however, was neither inevitable nor 
premeditated. Reflections on the political lives and thoughts of Bhashani and Mujib, who were 
both instrumental in producing the “Bangladesh Moment,” enable us to appreciate how political 
actors of different persuasions arrived at the nationalist hour and the different trajectories they 
followed afterwards. The lives and political careers of these two leaders were intimately 
intertwined and the alliances, friendships, and enmities that characterized their relationship from 
1948 to 1975 were at once personal and political. Their relationship was not merely that of two 
contemporaneous politicians vying for political dominance but expressive of the tension between 
the different political ideals, energies, and constituencies they represented.  
Bhashani was a representative of the sharbahara or the destitute peasants and workers of 
Bengal. His politics were motivated at their core by anger and rebellion against the injustices of 
class society, and he gravitated towards socialist ideals. He was deeply suspicious of electoral 
democracy and argued that without a radical democracy that awakens and empowers the poor 
masses, social justice could be achieved. Bhashani also advocated for class struggle and 
endorsed the use of revolutionary violence.  Mujib, on the other hand, was a representative of the 
middle class and was deeply committed to constitutional politics and electoral democracy, 
arguably even after his “second revolution.” In the 1950s and 1960s, Mujib was relentless in his 
struggle to realize democratic ideals and establish fundamental rights in Pakistan. Though 
																																								 																				




economic development and social uplift were his political goals, he saw the establishment of 
democracy as the necessary prerequisite and the most urgent political goal. By the late 1960s 
Mujib began to embrace socialism over capitalism as the preferred mode of organizing the 
economy and a more effective solution to the problem of underdevelopment, but Mujib’s 
socialism was not predicated upon any commitment to class struggle or any disavowal of liberal 
democratic principles.  
Neither Bhashani nor Mujib were primarily nationalist thinkers or politicians. Rather, 
they were motivated by different political ideals and by their desire to serve their respective 
constituencies. The political struggles of Bhashani and Mujib in the 1950s and 1960s appealed to 
and produced different collective bodies or publics, which began to come together after 1969 to 
produce the nationalist public and the nationalist hour. The nationalist public was created in part 
by Mujib’s ability to subsume different publics, such as Bhashani’s sharbahara or the 
dispossessed, under the category of jonogon, the people. The moment of national unity was also 
produced, at least partially, because of Bhashani’s decision to concede the mantle of the political 
leadership of East Pakistan to Mujib and the Awami League during the crucial years of 1970 and 
1971. Bhashani’s concession was not, however, personal but expressive of the submission of the 
peasantry to the petty bourgeoisie. The ascendency of the urban middle class among Bengali-
Muslims, which began in the 1920s and manifested itself politically in the demand for Pakistan 
in the 1940s, was finally complete with the independence of Bangladesh in 1971.  
It would be reasonable to expect that without the need for strategic alliances against 
external common enemies, whether against the Hindu zamindars and the bhadralok in the 
colonial era or against West Pakistani domination in the Pakistani era, class contradictions within 




advocated this line of reasoning: “let independence come, then we will do the rest.” Accordingly, 
he assumed a radical posture and adopted a critical approach to the government of Bangladesh in 
the years following its independence. In doing so he maintained continuity in his politics, 
fighting to secure economic freedom for the sharbahara and holding those in power accountable 
to the people.  But Bhashani’s class politics did not find much wind in its sail against the strong 
current of nationalism. The peasant movements dissipated, perhaps characteristically so, soon 
after independence, depriving Bhashani of a crucial source of his political power. And he was 
unwilling to embrace the vanguardism that the Jatiya Shomajtantrik Dal, Sharbahara Party, and 
other radical left formations were advocating. Extremist actions by small groups of 
revolutionaries could not be substitutes for a mass awakening and participation, argued 
Bhashani.  
 Towards the end of his political career Bhashani emphasized the more moral and 
spiritual dimensions of the awakening, which he sought to produce through education programs 
rather than through political agitations. Perhaps the shift in his politics was a result of weakened 
peasant movements. Or perhaps, his advanced age led him to emphasize his role as a pir or a 
pastoral caretaker of the masses. Or perhaps Bhashani began to adopt a less confrontational role 
after independence of Bangladesh because he wanted the new regime and particularly Mujib to 
succeed in the task of building up the war-devastated and poverty-stricken country. By 1975 
Mujib and Bhashani had overcome some of the acrimony that had characterized their 
relationship and Mujib reportedly maintained close contact with Bhashani during his move for 
the “Second Revolution,” which Bhashani supported publicly as a good first step. When Mujib 
was assassinated a few months later, Bhashani wept and lamented, “All is finished.”207  
																																								 																				




The independence of Bangladesh changed the political calculus dramatically for Mujib. 
He was no longer an oppositional politician or anti-state agitator. He was now the head of a state 
and charged with the task of establishing a new order. His political career hitherto had been 
defined by struggles for democracy and regional autonomy. In independence, both goals had 
been achieved, and Mujib was now faced with the difficult task of using political power to 
produce economic development and social uplift, the task that had hitherto remained distant and 
abstract. In trying to achieve these goals Mujib came to face tremendous criticism, opposition, 
and resistance. The left-wing critics were arguing that his measures were not drastic and 
revolutionary enough. Yet, whatever modest measures he tried to introduce were severely 
resisted and subverted by the urban middle class and the bureaucratic apparatus. To be true to his 
status as the Father of the Nation, Mujib had to overcome the resistance of the class that he had 
represented for most of his life. Mujib became increasingly disillusioned about democratic 
means for producing social transformation and became increasingly convinced of a need for a 
revolution. Yet, he did not have at his disposal a revolutionary class or a revolutionary party. His 
revolution had to be top-down and was never really given a chance before it was brutally 
crushed, in part by his erstwhile comrades and supporters. Perhaps desires for democracy in post-
colonial countries like Bangladesh are bound to bow before the imperatives of economic 
development and social uplift. And perhaps, revolutionary movements for social transformations 
are fated to fail against the resistance of local and global guardians of the status quo. Mujib could 
not realize his dream of Shonar Bangla. And that dream remains unfulfilled till today, despite 








In a recent monograph, political theorist Michael Walzer reflects upon the “paradox of 
national liberation.” The projects of national liberation, Walzer contends, seek not only to 
liberate the nation from foreign rulers but also to emancipate the nation from its own 
backwardness. “Liberationist militants,” as Walzer calls them, subscribe to a “secular, 
modernizing and developmental creed” that hopes to totally repudiate and overcome the old 
ways of the nation that is to be liberated. “But the old ways are cherished by many of the men 
and women whose ways they are. That is the paradox of liberation.”1 The paradox plays out as 
conflicts between the new and the old, the modern and the traditional, and more significantly, as 
the subtitle of his book suggests, between secular and religious outlooks and ideologies. The 
militant secular and anti-religious politics of national liberation produce, after a generation or 
two, religious counter revolutions whose “protagonists claim to embody the ancient traditions, 
the faith of the ancestors, even to represent a pure, authentic version of it; oldness is their mantra. 
And although the claim is false, the sense of oldness must account, at least in part, for the appeal 
of their program. They connect the liberated people to their own past; they provide a sense of 
belonging and stability in a rapidly changing world.”2 Though Walzer is careful to point out that 
this schematic description does not represent any historical “law,” it nevertheless represents a 
general pattern that at least fits with the experiences of the three cases that he observes – Algeria, 
Israel, and India.   
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Many commentators of Bangladeshi politics would argue that the experiences there also 
fit the pattern. In the second chapter of this dissertation I read the narratives of Bangladeshi 
political and intellectual history, as Walzer does for his cases, primarily in terms of a conflict 
between the forces of progress and reaction, between modernizing secular nationalists on one 
hand and religious conservatives, or more specifically Islamic fundamentalists, on the other. A 
crucial difference is that while Walzer is trying to understand the “revival” of religions and the 
apparent short lives of secular victories, commentators on Bangladesh are concerned with the 
failure of secularism to be fully victorious and the stubborn persistence of religion in 
Bangladeshi politics. They would nevertheless agree that the conflict between secular 
nationalists and religious conservatism fundamentally shapes Bangladeshi political and 
intellectual discourses. They would also argue, as some indeed do, that the Shahbag moment, 
which I discussed at the beginning of the dissertation to frame the questions that the dissertation 
pursues, is just but a dramatic example and expression of that ongoing conflict. Yet, the reality is 
much more nuanced, complex, and messy than suggested, for example, by the dichotomy 
between old and new. National liberation or the desire for colonized people to be free produces 
not so much a paradox but a tension that produces the need for negotiation.   
Walzer also recognizes the need for negotiation. He argues that the ideological rigidity 
and absolutism of the liberationist militants must at least partially account for the failure of their 
secularizing and modernizing projects. Had the militants, he argues following philosopher Akeel 
Bilgrami, advanced “negotiated” visions of secularism and modernity instead of a total 
repudiation of the past, the victories of national liberations might have been more durable and 
hegemonic.3  Liberation militants were modernizers and Westernizers because they “learned a 
																																								 																				




great deal from their imperial rulers and used what they learned in the interests of liberation.”4 
Liberation militants accepted modernity’s identification with the West and found their own 
cultural traditions lacking the “resources” necessary for supporting the modern projects of 
secularism, freedom, democracy, and egalitarianism. The discovery of this lack resulted not from 
an objective lack but from their lack of adequate critical engagement with the inherited cultures 
of the people, Walzer argues, agreeing somewhat reluctantly with many postcolonial critics. In 
conclusion Walzer argues, “Particular engagements with particular cultures and histories… 
produce particular versions of secularism and modernity…. [I]f modern, secular liberation is 
‘negotiated’ in each nation, in each religious community, a highly differentiated universe is the 
necessary outcome.  The orchestra might well be cacophonous, requiring negotiation not only 
within each nation but between and among them, too.”5   
Walzer’s vision of multiple modernities and a differentiated universe is what many 
postcolonial critics have argued for and what I have argued in this dissertation. Yet there are 
several differences in the ways Walzer and I frame and pursue our arguments, which produce 
fundamentally different understandings of the dynamics of postcolonial history.  Chief among 
our differences is that while Walzer bemoans the lack of “negotiation” with the past or with 
national cultures in the modernizing projects of national liberation, I locate and analyze that very 
“negotiation.” The figure of “liberation militant” that Walzer evokes, though not fictitious, does 
not capture the diversity and complexity of nationalist political ideas. Many anticolonial and 
nationalist activists sought to engage critically with inherited cultures and traditions to excavate 
resources in support of emancipatory modernist projects. These figures were not exceptional, 
marginal, or defeated – neither in postcolonial countries generally nor in Bangladesh. His 
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framing of postcolonial history in terms of the victory of secular national liberation followed by 
the backlash of religious revivalism is not persuasive.  
My reading of Bangladeshi political and intellectual history suggests that national 
liberations have involved from the beginning, and continue to do so, a negotiation, not so much 
between modernity and tradition but between modernity and identity. And this is the second 
important difference between us. While Walzer emphasizes tradition or the “old ways,” I focus 
on identity. This distinction is significant because the central driving force of colonial and post-
colonial history is not so much the conflict between the old and the new as the desire to be 
modern while forging and asserting one’s identity. When Walzer argues that “old ways are 
cherished by many” because those are their ways, he reifies and essentializes both the “old ways” 
and the identities of the colonized people. However, neither identities nor the “old ways'' are 
fixed, given, or apparent but are imagined and constructed to serve the political exigencies of the 
present. In this dissertation I have analyzed how Bangladeshi political thinkers have 
conceptualized the national identity, while accommodating and appropriating modernity 
differently.   
Contrary to what Walzer seems to suggest, and as many nationalist discourses assert, 
leaders of national liberation did not always take the existence of the nation as given. Many were 
acutely aware that they were not simply liberating an existing nation but were calling it into 
being.  National liberation required mobilization of a national identity, which, however, had to be 
forged and reproduced through and after liberation.  To paraphrase Abul Mansur Ahmad, in the 
project of national liberation we become “we” [amra amra hobo]. Liberation leaders also 
understood that forging a national identity cannot be successfully accomplished by simply 




future to imagine what we might become.  As I have discussed throughout this dissertation, in 
the case of Bangladesh there have been many competing conceptions of national identity and its 
future.  While some conceptions embodied emancipatory and egalitarian ideals associated with 
modernity, others were antithetical to modernist political ideals.  However, it is not clear why the 
anti-modern invocations would be considered more autochthonous than the modernist ones, as 
Walzer suggests.   
He is correct that most advocates of national liberations were motivated by a deep desire 
to improve the conditions of their people by changing the existing socio-economic conditions 
and transforming their consciousness. Such desires, however, did not necessarily equal a 
repudiation of the “old ways” or the identity of the people.  The examples I have discussed 
demonstrate that at least some, and arguably most, significant protagonists of Bangladesh’ 
national liberation constructed the old ways, whether it be political ideals of Islam or a syncretic 
culture of Bengal, in terms of the modern political ideals of secularism, democracy, and 
egalitarianism.  And, the consciousness they wanted to change was not the consciousness passed 
down by people’s old ways but the consciousness corrupted by colonial rule. Thus, for instance, 
they were much more critical of the attitude and politics of the educated middle class and the 
intelligentsia than of the illiterate peasants.  When they criticized religious conservatisms of their 
society, they did not repudiate religion as such but objected to interpretations of religious 
doctrines that circulated among a defeated and colonized people. They all understood, and some 
like Abul Mansur Ahmad argued explicitly, that religious fundamentalism was a modernist 
reaction to colonial rule rather than an expression of people’s ancient religious practices. So, 




identity of the people but critiques of colonial rule and how it produced material deprivation and 
stunted consciousness.       
 Lastly, Walzer argues that “religious counter movements” appear when national 
liberations seek social revolutions against existing hierarchies generally and against subjugation 
of women particularly. He notes, following Hannah Arendt, that the revolutions that seek to 
produce only political change, such as the one in the United States, do not produce the religious 
backlash he is trying to explain. This, however, undercuts his argument about “religious counter 
movements” being expressions of people’s anxieties about modernity and change and their 
desires to find stability and a “sense of belonging in a changing world.”  The “religious counter 
movements” or backlashes against modernizing national liberation projects are produced not 
because modernity is new or foreign but because modernization threatens the interests of 
powerful sections of society.  Religious counter movements represent the interest of some people 
but not “the people” as such.  In fact, the majority of “the people” – women, persons from lower 
castes, the subaltern – may have material interest in resisting and often do resist religious 
movements.  The “old ways” may be cherished by some but not all.  By failing to make this 
distinction Walzer, despite his call for negotiated modernity, is unable to overcome the 
Eurocentrism that has afflicted even the best of the post-enlightenment Western thinkers.  By 
equating the “old ways” to the peoples’ ways, Walzer locates modernity outside of the cultures 
of colonized peoples.  He then counsels the Westernized elites of colonial societies to make the 
modernization process more palatable by somehow connecting it to native cultural discourses, to 
give it a local guise and disassociate it from the stench of Westernization.  I am not sure that 
would help much in the end.  Calls for democracy, equality, redistribution of wealth, or abolition 




indigenous they sound. The counter-revolution against Mujib’s “second revolution”, for 
example, was not a religious countermovement but a reaction of the most secularized elites – 
civil and military bureaucracy – against their vested interests.       
I engage with Walzer’s argument not only to illustrate the persistence of Eurocentrism in 
contemporary academic discourses but also to use him as a counterpoint to clarify arguments I 
advance about “negotiation” between modernity and identity. Though we both talk about 
negotiation, we mean something quite different by it.  By calling for negotiation Walzer is 
calling for domesticating a modernity that is in fact foreign.  In contrast, I seek to analyze how 
colonial and postcolonial subjects negotiate the tension between modernity and identity that is 
produced by the dynamics of colonial rule and peculiarities of modernist discourses.  I detail this 
tension in the earlier chapters of this dissertation through various postcolonial theorists. Here I 
will summarize the key arguments without the lengthy explanations, caveats, and references that 
I provide in my earlier discussions.      
Eurocentric discourses of modernity on the one hand identify it with the West and on the 
other hand view secularism, democracy, egalitarianism, and nationhood as particularly modern 
constructs and markers of modernity. Furthermore, colonial discourses identify modernity with 
the colonizing power and designate the colonized to be non-modern or pre-modern by describing 
them as uncivilized, backward, or underdeveloped. The modernity of the colonizer and the 
backwardness of the colonized then get used as justification for colonization. Colonial rule 
transforms economy, social structures, politics, epistemology, and consciousness in profound 
ways that leave subjects little choice but to operate within and through its structures and 




When colonized subjects seek to free themselves from colonial domination, they find that 
they must articulate their demands for freedom through the modern political language 
engendered in colonial rule by demanding rights, equality, democratic participation, and 
ultimately national self-determination. The demand for national self-determination requires that 
the self of the nation must be determined, that a nation must be named, and that the national 
identity be differentiated from other national identities, especially that of the colonizer. 
Producing national identity, however, involves not simply marking a nation as a mere variant of 
the universal prototype through language, ethnicity, religion, and other indicators. Producing 
national identity involves imagining the nation’s essence, its character, defined ethically, 
morally, and politically.  To put it as Abul Mansur Ahmad did, different nations produce 
different conceptions of life and provide their members with different platforms and foundations 
to live their lives and pursue their goals.  
And, here is the tension and the need for negotiation – how to accommodate modernity in 
that identity of the nation or that conception of life? Since modernity is identified with the 
colonizing power and since modernist colonial discourses impose the identity of backwardness 
upon the colonized, critiquing modernity becomes necessary.  But does it mean giving up or 
rejecting it altogether, discarding associated discourses about rights, freedom, equality, 
democracy, and progress?  If the nationalist thinkers are not to give up on modern projects of 
freedom, how do they produce differentiation from the colonizer who claims an identity with and 
ownership of these projects?   
Responses to these questions by anticolonial and postcolonial thinkers and nationalist 
leaders over the last two centuries have been philosophically and politically diverse.  My aim has 




Bangladeshi thinkers and political actors have also been diverse, making it difficult to 
characterize a “Bangladeshi” response.  However, the thinkers I engage with in this 
demonstration have challenged modernity’s identification with the West or the arguments about 
modernity’s location outside their “own” cultures.  They reasoned, albeit with various degrees of 
explicitness and theoretical sophistication, that desires for freedom, equality, dignity, or even 
democracy are not exclusive properties of modernity or the West.  To strive for these political 
ideals was not contrary to naming and liberating their nation.  In fact, these political ideals were 
often the very objective of their projects of national liberation.       
II 
 In this dissertation I analyze the negotiation of modernity and identity in Bangladeshi 
political thought through its political and intellectual histories and the ideas and lives of four 
select thinkers. One of the biggest challenges I have faced in this project is that the political 
thinkers with whom I engage were each multi-dimensional thinker concerned with various 
political questions and projects. None were primarily or explicitly concerned with the question of 
modernity and identity. My challenge was to find a balance between having them speak to the 
tension between modernity and identity on one hand and faithfully representing their intellectual 
and political multi-dimensionality, complexity, nuance, and eccentricity on the other. If I 
overstressed the former, I would risk a highly selective reading and reduce them to caricatures. If 
I stressed the latter, I would risk losing sight of the motivating question of this dissertation. I 
constantly struggled to find the balance but perhaps erred on the side of describing the political 
lives and thought of the four thinkers.  Here I want to highlight the ways they spoke to the 




 Among the four thinkers I engage with, Abul Mansur Ahmad was the most explicit and 
systematic in thinking about the relationship between identity and modernity.  Ahmad was a 
secular politician who subscribed to the idea of non-communal (nonreligious) pan-Indian 
nationalism but was nevertheless connected to both Bengali-Muslim middle-class and peasant 
politics. He was also a prominent literary figure situated in the Bengali-Muslim modernism of 
the 1920s and 1930s.  By the mid-1940s, however, he lent his support to the Pakistan movement 
in apparent contradiction to his earlier progressive modernist politics.  He justified the shift by 
advancing arguments about the distinctiveness of Bengali-Muslim cultural identity and the 
legitimacy of the politics of cultural autonomy.  He claimed that different cultural identities serve 
to differentiate one nation from another by giving each their unique personalities.  Though 
Ahmad’s primary political concern was to establish the cultural autonomy of Bengali-Muslims in 
relation to Bengali-Hindus and to overcome the secondary status assigned to Bengali-Muslims 
within Bengali culture, he also sought to secure autonomy from the “cultural fascism” of 
Western universalism.  Yet such a project of autonomy did not amount to a rejection of 
modernity or modern civilization, by which he understood “the total progress of humanity in 
terms of education, knowledge, science, literature, commerce, industry, technology, etc.” Using 
the image of light, Ahmad analogized that just as a torch lights the path of the torchbearer, it also 
reveals the path for others. Modern civilization, though originating in the West, cannot remain its 
exclusive property.  Non-Western cultures can adopt the civilizational gifts of the West because 
cultures are not ossified traditions but dynamic fields of actions that allow for and demand 
constant refinement and improvement. By distinguishing between cultural essence and ossified 
tradition, Ahmad called for a renaissance of Bengali-Muslim culture, which would make it 




nationalist intelligentsia. Failure to live up to this challenge would turn non-Western nations into, 
he warned, a “herd of cows under the Western cowherd.” Though Ahmad offered specific 
examples of how such a task could be carried out for the Bengali-Muslim culture, he failed to 
develop a general theory about how non-Western nations could bask in the light of Western 
civilization without burning up. Nevertheless, Ahmad and his colleagues at the East Pakistan 
Renaissance Society initiated a discussion about the negotiation of modernity and identity that 
has informed intellectual and political discourses of successive generations in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh.    
 Abul Hashim, in contrast, was uninterested in negotiating modernity and identity but 
ruthlessly criticized modernity, which I would argue is also a form of negotiation. Hashim was 
especially critical towards the philosophical secularism of modern political philosophy, which 
denied God’s sovereignty and banished Him from not only politics and public life but also from 
philosophical outlooks and moral considerations. This secularism, he claimed, produced a 
“materialistic nihilism” that prevented men from knowing and realizing their true nature.  
Modern political philosophy also advanced an instrumental conception of politics where men 
treat each other as mere means for furthering their self or group interests. Starting from this 
fundamental critique Hashim criticized various ideas and institutions of modern politics, 
including nationalism, democracy, and class struggle.  After questioning modern ideologies of 
liberal democracy and communism, which were vying to shape the world according to their own 
images during the mid-20th century, Hashim advocated for a newly independent Pakistan to be 
founded upon an Islamic political ideology.   
Despite his call for Islamist politics, it would be a mistake to dismiss Hashim as a mere 




pains to clarify that his critique of modernity was not motivated by concerns about preserving his 
identity or tradition. In fact, he argued that anxieties about identity were a particularly modern 
phenomenon and viewed nationalism based on ascriptive cultural or biological identity to be one 
of the greatest ills produced by Western modernity, one which produced the biggest obstacle in 
the path of attaining the “universal brotherhood of man.”  Rather, his critique of modernity and 
modern politics emanated from his observations of the horrors of the mid-20th century, notably 
the Second World War, the Bengal Famine of 1943, and the violence unleashed by nationalist 
conflicts throughout the world. These horrors of course also caused Western criticisms of 
modernity, of which the Frankfurt School is a notable example.  
Hashim argued that his carefully worked out political philosophy was the essence of all 
religions, most notably Islam, and Platonic philosophy.  His philosophy did not seek preservation 
or revival but constructed an ideal that Hashim used not only to criticize modernity and rival 
political ideologies but also to attack the existing social order and religious orthodoxy of 
Pakistan. In his reinterpretation Islam became a revolutionary creed, which he argued was more 
conducive to political ideals of freedom, equality, peace, and even progress than modern 
ideologies of liberal democracy or communism. The validity of these arguments, which I discuss 
at length in chapter 3, remains open to debate. What is important to stress, however, is that 
Hashim saw decolonization and national liberation not merely in terms of independence of a 
nation but as possibilities for establishing alternatives to modern politics. He conceived and 
argued for Pakistani nationalism to be based not on Muslim identity but on the essence of Islam. 
Though he rejected modernity, he conceived of its political aims, for example, concerns about 
the equality and dignity of human beings, as the essence of Islam rather than intrinsic to 




Pakistan or Muslims but also for humanity.  The establishment and spread of the ideology was to 
be Pakistan’s contribution to humanity.  
 Maolana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani shared many of Hashim’s philosophical criticisms 
of modernity, though the inspirations behind Bhashani’s critiques were more diverse, as were 
their political manifestations.  He and Hashim were deeply influenced by the philosophy of 
Rububiyah, a particular interpretation of Islam that had significant following among Muslim 
leaders and thinkers in the early 20th century.  Bhashani was, however, also a Sufi pir with a 
large number of disciples among the Muslim peasants of Bengal and Assam.  And his political 
thought and action were primarily oriented not by philosophical considerations but by his 
impulse to serve the interests and improve the condition of the poor peasants, the sharbahara of 
Bengal, of whom he was an organic representative.  Throughout his political life Bhashani 
fought to overturn the class society, which exploited the toiling masses and deprived them of 
their humanity. His philosophy was always connected to the interests of his constituency and 
concrete political programs.   
He argued, similar to Hashim, that the banishment of God, spirituality, and concern for 
the soul constituted the fundamental flaw of modern politics and that “The Islamic ideals of 
equality, fraternity, and peace that had been announced fourteen hundred years ago that should 
serve humanity better than communism, not only today but until the end of days.” However, 
Islam was superior not merely in an abstract philosophical comparison among political 
ideologies but concretely because it served the “helpless and oppressed peasants, workers, and 
other destitute of the world” better.  While Hashim spent much of his energy criticizing 
modernity and articulating a theory of an ideal Islamic polity, his theories about how to achieve 




of ideal government, palonbad or the doctrine of nurture.  Unlike Hashim, however, Bhashani 
also advanced theories and concrete political programs for realizing the ideal.  He contended that 
to achieve true freedom and the ideals of Islam required the simultaneous pursuit of a two-
pronged struggle, which on one hand should seek to produce social revolution and on the other 
hand should seek to achieve purification and reform of the self. By social revolution Bhashani 
meant overturning the existing socio-economic hierarchy through class struggle and radical 
democratic actions of the dispossessed. The purification and reform of the self were to be 
produced by a program of philosophical and practical education, which Bhashani theorized and 
then tried to institute through his Islamic University.  While Hashim’s philosophical elaborations 
of the ideal Islamic polity appeared esoteric and failed to attract much of a following, Bhashani’s 
concrete political programs animated political movements with hundreds of thousands of 
participants and produced sustained curiosity and excitement about his political philosophy 
among successive generations of the Bangladeshi intelligentsia.       
The question of identity occupies a curious space in both Hashim and Bhashani’s 
thought. Though both of them played leading roles in various movements of the Pakistan era that 
sought to advance Bengali culture and language, neither saw the need to treat the question of 
identity seriously in their political theories. They treated cultural identity as a fact of life without 
much, if any political significance. Perhaps they were anxious that attaching political 
significance to their Bengali cultural identity might lead them down the slippery slope of 
identitarian politics and nationalism, which they both agreed were contrary to the Islamic ideal of 
the universal brotherhood of men.  Thus, Hashim failed to offer any cogent rationale for his 
participation in the state language movements of the 1950s or the pro-Tagore movement of the 




articulated as making politics accessible to the subaltern masses by ensuring that government 
business be conducted in their language.   
By minimizing political significance of cultural identity, Hashim and Bhashani decoupled 
the question of political ideology from identity, which in turn allowed them to advance Islamist 
political ideology without facing the charge of communalism.  Both argued that just as one could 
be a Bengali and a liberal or a communist simultaneously, one could also be a Bengali and an 
Islamist concurrently. And what was politically significant was not Bengali identity but 
adherence to liberal, communist, or Islamist ideologies.  I find this argument to be entirely 
legitimate in the context of defining the political character of the postcolonial state, which 
according to the logic of national liberation should be subject to choices made by postcolonial 
politics.  Yet I cannot help but wonder, as have critics of Hashim and Bhashani, how seriously 
can we take their claim that their adherence to Islamic political ideologies resulted from their 
philosophical reflections and not from their Muslim identity? Perhaps, their projects were 
ultimately about rescuing modernity for Muslims by articulating an Islamic political ideology 
that, despite all the objections to modernity, would be able to appeal to modern subjects.    
In striking contrast to Hashim and Bhashani, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was 
unapologetically modernist. He was a modern professional politician committed to liberal 
political ideals of constitutionalism, democracy, federalism, secularism, egalitarianism, and 
individual rights. And though Mujib agreed with Ahmad about the importance of cultural 
identity and autonomy, he did not hold cultural autonomy to be the essence of national liberation, 
as Ahmad did. Liberation signified not merely independence of the nation but the emancipation 
of the people from economic misery and political oppression. This conception of liberation 




programs in independent Bangladesh. He invoked the idea of Shonar Bangla to imagine and 
offer an inspiration for a prosperous Bengal that would be free of the abject poverty, famine, and 
violence that had characterized 20th century Bengal.  Mujib’s ideal of Sonar Bangla was a 
fundamentally modernizing concept containing visions of economic, social, and political 
developments. Mujib grew up during a period when the Bengali-Muslim middle class was 
coming into being and constructing its self-identity by embracing social-cultural modernization. 
Like many of his generation Mujib was deeply influenced by and subscribed to the modernizing 
project and saw moral and cultural improvement of Bengali Muslims as requisites for the social-
economic development of the country.   
In many ways Mujib resembles the figure of “liberation militant” described by Walzer. 
Certainly, Mujib made no attempt to differentiate his political project from Western modernity.  
Among the thinkers in this dissertation, Mujib was the least concerned with the negotiation 
between modernity and identity.  One explanation for this may be that unlike the political 
projects of Ahmad, Hashim, or Bhashani, Mujib’s was not primarily shaped by anti-colonial 
struggles against a Western colonizer but by struggles against an authoritarian postcolonial state. 
Another explanation is that he saw no tension between modernity and identity and thus no need 
for negotiation. He was liberal in his political ideology, Bengali in this cultural orientation, and 
Muslim in his faith.  Mujib never explicitly discussed the relationship among these three 
categories, but I read this silence, while he continued to simultaneously be Bengali, Muslim, and 
liberal in his political life, as an indication that he saw no contradiction among the categories.  
His liberalism was not intrinsic to his Bengali identity, despite contrary claims by many present-
day Bengali nationalists. Neither was liberalism antithetical to his Bengali identity or his 




decoupling identity from ideology.  Like Hashim and Bhashani, Mujib did not claim the validity 
of his political ideology based on any inherent connection to the cultural identity of the people. 
And like these two thinkers, Mujib did not argue that acceptance of or adherence to any political 
ideology required the people to overcome their identity. If one can be Bengali and Islamist 
simultaneously, one can also be Bengali and liberal and thus modern at the same time.   
III 
 
In analyzing the negotiation between modernity and identity in Bangladesh, I inevitably 
engaged with the history of nationalism and with the nationalist discourses of the country. My 
engagement has been framed by the argument that national identity is both real and imagined. 
National identity is both a sociological category and a discursive construct. Definite and 
identifiable historical processes produce the ties and “sentiments” that bind the nation and 
produce the possibilities for and shape nationalist discourses. In my analysis of nationalism I 
focus on how Bengali and Muslim identities have been constructed and negotiated against each 
other to produce a composite Bengali-Muslim identity, which serves as the foundation of 
contemporary Bangladeshi national identity.  I also analyze how these two identities have been 
mobilized in particular ways in service of the two moments in the double birth of the nation – 
first as Pakistan, then as Bangladesh.  My decision to organize the dissertation around the two 
moments of birth rests on the argument that to understand 1971 one must understand 1947 – the 
moment of decolonization, the original moment of national liberation, and one that makes 
possible and continues to live through 1971. To understand the political dynamics and discourses 
in contemporary Bangladesh one must engage with the Pakistan period of Bangladesh’s history 
and examine how Bengali-Muslims thought of Pakistan and why they participated in the 




However, as the passions around the Shahbag movement demonstrate, these questions 
and issues are not merely academic but are politically potent and highly contentious.  1971 looms 
large in Bangladeshi history, and the memory of the genocidal violence unleashed on the 
Bangladeshi people by the Pakistani Army remains alive as an open wound. The Shahbag 
movement of 2013, you will recall, was first and foremost a movement to ensure accountability 
for 1971’s war crimes and atrocities, committed to defeat the Bangladeshi liberation struggle. 
The memory of trauma and sacrifice are not mere abstract nationalist constructions in 
Bangladesh but all too concrete and deeply personal. Thus, the questions about the relationship 
between 1947 and 1971, between Pakistan and Bangladesh and between Muslim and Bengali 
identities, understandably stirs up trauma and outrage among many in Bangladesh.  Yet these 
questions must be raised and answered if there is to be clarity. Perhaps academic works that seek 
such understanding, as I do, can play positive of roles in healing remaining open wounds.    
One of the ways my dissertation contributes to the process of healing is by challenging 
the oppositional dichotomy between Bengali and Muslim identities and political ideals that is all 
too common in Bangladeshi political and intellectual discourses. Though I have argued that 
Walzer overemphasizes the impact and political power of the “liberation militant,” the figure is 
by no means fictitious or inconsequential. One may find plenty of examples of this figure in the 
political conversations carried out in academic circles, traditional media, and especially in the 
emerging social media of contemporary Bangladesh. Bangladeshi incarnations of the liberation 
militant claim to represent the mukti-juddher chetona, the spirit of liberation, which they 
construct in terms of secular Bengali nationalism and in opposition to the Muslim nationalism of 
Pakistan.  In these constructions Muslimness appears not only as the bearer of a discredited 




Muslimness in such a way, the militants demonstrate their failures to recognize the religious 
commitments of the people and to appreciate the possibilities of the emancipatory politics 
contained within religious politics generally and Bangladeshi Islamist politics particularly.  This 
failure allows a particular kind of political Islam to claim to be the true representative of the 
people and to rejects Bengali nationalism and progressive and egalitarian political programs on 
account of their supposed anti-Islamic character. The dichotomy between Bengali and Muslim 
identities is not only politically counterproductive but also something that is almost entirely 
absent in the thought and politics of some of the most important figures in Bangladeshi history.   
None of the four thinkers in this dissertation, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman – 
Bangladesh’s Father of the Nation, saw support for Pakistani nationalism as problematic, 
regressive, or antithetical to Bengali ethno-linguistic identity.  Nor did they see their Bengali 
identity or nationalism as antithetical to their Muslimness.  Engaging the thought and politics of 
these thinkers, along with critical analyses of social and political histories of Bangladesh, allow 
one to navigate the tensions between Bengali and Muslim, between secular and religious, 
between modern and traditional, between progressive and reactionary politics with more clarity.  
Such engagements produce political discourses and practices that are much less contentious and 
a lot more accommodating and empathetic towards different points of views, which has been one 
of my objectives here. 
IV 
In this dissertation I have provided an account of Bangladeshi political thought. A 
comprehensive and exhaustive account of any such tradition is nearly impossible. It is much 
more difficult in a context like Bangladesh, which lacks a recognized body of political thought. 




much is given. I have discussed many of these limitations in the introduction and provided an 
argument regarding why engaging with the lives and ideas of the four thinkers that I select, 
leaving aside dozens of others who could have legitimately claimed to be included in a project 
like this, may still be valuable in providing an account of Bangladeshi political thought. 
However, in the process of completing this dissertation I recognize many other limitations of the 
project. Two of those limitations are significant.   
First, though I seek to analyze “Bangladeshi” political thought, I do not actually engage 
with much of it.  By choosing to focus on the two moments of the double birth of the nation and 
by selecting the figures that I found to be especially relevant for understanding these two 
moments, I end up discussing mostly the political thought of the late colonial and Pakistani 
period. Though they are constitutive of and relevant for understanding Bangladeshi politics, they 
represent mostly its prehistory. I have little to say about the diverse questions and concerns that 
have been discussed and debated by Bangladeshi intellectuals and political actors over the last 50 
years. I was aware of this limitation from the beginning and even considered engaging with more 
contemporary political thinkers, for example, those who are reflecting upon the difference 
between the promise and the reality of national liberation or with those who are re-imagining the 
discourses of development and progress. I found, however, it too difficult to contemplate these 
contemporary discourses while continuing to engage with the discourses that I do here. I had to 
make some choices, and I chose, after carrying out substantial research and accumulating some 
notes, to save my engagement with contemporary Bangladeshi political thought for a possible 
future project. I chose to focus instead on this mostly prehistory of Bangladeshi political thought 
because without understanding this prehistory attempts to understand contemporary discourses 




The second and perhaps more glaring limitation of this dissertation is that it is silent 
about gender equality. Part of this silence is because each of my interlocutors themselves was 
silent about the gender question, despite their concerns about liberation, equality, autonomy, and 
democracy.  This kind of silence, however, was not uncommon in traditions of political thought. 
Nineteenth century Indian liberals were for example silent about the question of caste, just as 
18th century American revolutionaries were silent about the question of slavery. I do not point to 
these historical examples as a way of excusing the silence of Bengali-Muslim nationalists on 
gender questions, especially because feminist discourses were already in circulation – not only in 
distant Europe or America or among Indian nationalists but also within the cultural tradition of 
Bengali Muslims, the most famous example of which was Begum Rokeya.6  However, I argue 
that though their silence on the gender question is potentially revealing of their patriarchal 
attitude, it does not necessarily invalidate their other democratic and egalitarian projects.  
Of course, another reason for the dissertation’s silence on the gender question is my own 
failure to engage with it. Perhaps there were other thinkers and actors whom I could have chosen 
who would have allowed me to engage with the questions of women’s rights and equality.  Or I 
could have more explicitly addressed the silence of my interlocutors and of Bengali-Muslim 
nationalist discourses regarding the gender question.  On both accounts I must admit my failure, 
due in part by the practical necessity to focus on some questions while ignoring others.  But my 
failure was also due to my lack of appreciation about how productive an engagement with the 
gender question would have been for a discussion of the negotiation between modernity and 
identity.   Again, this I will have to save for a future project.     
																																								 																				
6 Rokeya Sakhawat Hussain (1880-1932) is by far the most famous Muslim feminist writer of 
colonial India. She penned among others the celebrated 1905 satire and feminist utopian story 
“Sultana’s Dream.” See Kalyani Dutta, Freedom Fables: Satire and Politics in Rokeya Sakhawat 





Despite the many limitations of this dissertation, some of which I am aware of and have 
tried to account for and others that will be evident only to a more perceptive reader, I believe that 
I have succeeded in accomplishing the tasks that I had proposed. The most explicit of the tasks 
was to provide an analysis of the negotiation of modernity and identity in Bangladeshi political 
thought.  In the process, I have offered a reading of the political and intellectual histories of the 
country that I hope will produce a better understanding of the dynamics of nationalist politics.   
Perhaps the analysis provided here will persuade us to reevaluate our conceptions about the 
political significance of Islam in Bangladesh, not only as the source of social conservatism or 
political violence, which it certainly is sometime, but also as inspiration for a politics oriented 
towards social justice, egalitarianism, radical democracy, and universal peace.  Perhaps we 
should view Islamist politics as something that needs to be politically and philosophically 
contended with rather than as something that needs to be suppressed by the secular state.       
By analyzing Bangladeshi political thought, I advance a fundamental argument that 
Bangladeshi political thought exists. Though in some sense it is an unnecessary point to make. 
Why wouldn’t there be Bangladeshi political thought? Yet it is also a radical argument to make 
given the persistent Eurocentrism of Western academia and its inability to treat non-Western 
peoples as thinking subjects capable of producing philosophical reflections and theories.  In 
recent years there has been increasing recognition, perhaps due to the influence of postcolonial 
critiques, of the possibilities of philosophy in India, China, or the Arab world, places that have 
civilizational identities and ancient aura. However, there is less recognition regarding little places 
like Bangladesh or Burkina Faso. And even when that recognition is granted theoretically, it does 




far off places. Eurocentrism is also internalized and reproduced in non-western countries. There 
may be many Bangladeshi scholars who are trying to make sense of Deleuze but not many bother 
to read Hashim. There are some occasional efforts to read the political philosophy of this or that 
Bangladeshi thinker or political leader, but there is no concept of a Bangladeshi tradition of 
political thought. I seek to overcome that glaring absence by trying to build a “shelf” or body of 
Bangladeshi political thought, which I imagine to be situated in the great library of political 
thinkers and philosophers. The four thinkers that I engage with are the first ones on that shelf. I 
hope more will be added to the shelf. The question, however, is who should be on that shelf and 
how should we decide? Is my decision to put these four thinkers on that shelf justified? Do they 
even qualify as philosophers? Are they worthy to be in the same section of a library with Plato or 
Locke or Foucault?  To answer these questions we must first read them and be open to the 
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